THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
SUPREME COURT
In Case No. 2024-0242, In the Matter of Warren Jackson and Jean Jackson, the court on November 21, 2025, issued the following order:
The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted on appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See Sup. Ct. R. 20(3). The respondent, Jean Marie Jackson (wife), appeals a final decree and subsequent orders of the Circuit Court (Curran, J.) in her divorce from the petitioner, Warren Jackson (husband). We affirm. The following facts were found by the trial court or are otherwise supported by the record. The parties married in 1991 and have two adult children. During their marriage, the husband enjoyed career success, while the wife remained at home to raise the children and manage the parties' affairs. The husband filed for divorce in October 2020. During the pendency of the proceedings, the parties lived together in the marital home. Prior to the final hearing in July 2022, the wife filed two motions for contempt against the husband: one asserting that the husband did not produce court-ordered financial documents pursuant to Family Division Rule 1.25-A, and the other asserting, in part, that the husband did not return personal property removed from the marital home. After the final hearing, the court issued a narrative order and final decree in December 2022. In its narrative order, the court deferred ruling on the issue of the husband's alleged failure to return property, required the husband to deliver the property to the home, and ordered a show-cause hearing on the issue. The court otherwise denied the wife's motions for contempt, finding that the wife did not satisfy her burden of proof to establish that the husband knowingly violated court orders. Next, the trial court revised and adopted the wife's proposed form decree. This final decree provided that the husband "shall maintain a life insurance policy in the minimum amount of $1,000,000 designating [the wife] as Death Beneficiary." The final decree also contained a checked box under the heading
"Compliance With Rule 1.25-A," indicating that "[the wife] has and [the husband] has not complied with Rule 1.25-A." The decree also contained a checked box titled "Miscellaneous," which provided that the husband filed
"false and/or inaccurate" financial affidavits, thus causing the wife to receive less temporary alimony than she was entitled to. The paragraph also stated
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that the wife was awarded treble damages and attorney's fees pursuant to RSA 458:15-b, I (2018).
The husband filed a motion to reconsider the final decree, which the court granted in April 2023. The trial court explained that it "did not intend to adopt the provisions incorporated in [the wife's counsel's] drafting" of the language under the headings "Compliance With Rule 1.25-A" and
"Miscellaneous," and that "by scrivener's error or oversight did not excise these terms from the subject pleading." The court also stated that it intended to modify the decree to require only $500,000 in life insurance. The court accordingly issued a modified divorce decree, using the term "nunc pro tunc,"
crossing out the language under the subject headings and changing the husband's life insurance obligation from $1 million to $500,000. In May 2023, the trial court held a show-cause hearing and determined that the husband was not in contempt for failing to return personal property to the marital residence. In March 2024, the trial court issued an order on several post-final hearing motions and denied the wife's motion for reconsideration of the modified divorce decree. Based upon the equities of the case, the trial court converted the final decree to be the controlling temporary orders pending an appeal or the passage of 31 days. See Fam. Div. R. 2.29(b). This appeal followed.
On appeal, the wife argues that the trial court erred by: (1) making substantive changes to its original divorce decree and characterizing the changes as scrivener's errors; (2) refusing to find the husband in contempt for his non-compliance with Family Division Rules 1.25-A and 2.16; (3) awarding the husband 50% of the wife's pension without excluding her premarital portion pursuant to the Hodgins formula; (4) failing to establish an effective date for the parties to divide their financial assets; (5) retroactively imposing the final decree as a new temporary order; (6) taking no action on the wife's request for retroactive alimony; and (7) failing to issue a ruling on the distribution of the parties' personal property.
A trial court has broad discretion in fashioning a final decree of divorce and in managing the proceedings before it. In the Matter of Spenard & Spenard, 167 N.H. 1, 3 (2014). We will not overturn a trial court's rulings absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion. Id. We review the record only to determine whether it contains an objective basis to sustain the trial court's discretionary judgments. Id. If the court's findings can reasonably be made on the evidence presented, they will stand. Id.
We first address the wife's argument that the trial court's changes to the divorce decree should be reversed because the changes were substantive, cannot be characterized as scrivener's errors, and lack support in the record. In modifying the divorce decree, the trial court explained that it "did not intend
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to adopt the provisions incorporated in [the wife's counsel's] drafting" of the subject language, and that "by scrivener's error or oversight did not excise these terms from the subject pleading." The trial court has the inherent power to revise its own orders and correct errors. See In the Matter of Stapleton & Stapleton, 159 N.H. 694, 696-97(2010). Based upon our review of the December 2022 divorce decree and narrative order, we conclude that the trial court did not unsustainably exercise its discretion by modifying the divorce decree. See In the Matter of Salesky & Salesky, 157 N.H. 698, 702 (2008) (stating that interpretation of trial court order is a question of law, which we review de novo).
In the original December 2022 divorce decree, the trial court edited and adopted the wife's proposed decree. The wife submitted this proposed decree on a circuit court form titled, "Final Decree on Petition for Divorce, Legal Separation, or Civil Union Dissolution." Within the form, the wife typed in additional proposed language, including the $1 million life insurance policy and the text under the headings "Compliance With Rule 1.25-A" and
"Miscellaneous." The court edited the proposed decree by hand, inserting language consistent with its narrative order. In its narrative order, the court denied the wife's contempt motion, in which she contended that the husband did not comply with Rule 1.25-A. In doing so, the court noted that "Rule 1.25- A provides additional remedies if it can be shown that financial data was withheld or misrepresented." (Emphasis added). This language reflects that the trial court did not find that the husband violated Rule 1.25-A and did not find that the wife was entitled to additional remedies.
Regarding the life insurance term, the court explained in its order modifying the decree that its intent in ordering life insurance was to ensure the payment of alimony. It stated that "the alimony obligation over the set term (exclusive of bonus monies) totals an amount short of $500,000," and thus the
"life insurance term in the decree is so modified, as the court had intended, but neglected to do in issuance of its final orders." The court's December 2022 narrative order supports this finding, as it awarded the wife alimony in the amount of $3,833.33 per month, plus 23% of the husband's net commissions, for 10 years.
The language of the December 2022 narrative order supports the trial court's statement that it "did not intend to adopt the provisions incorporated in [the wife's counsel's] drafting" of the proposed decree. The trial court's oversight in excising the subject terms can properly be characterized as scrivener's errors. See State v. Stern, 150 N.H. 705, 712, 714 (2004) (determining that the trial court made a scrivener's error in sentencing order where the error "was clerical in nature and was not the product of judicial reasoning or reflection" and that "when the court corrected its error, it was merely conforming the record to reflect its original intent"). Accordingly, the
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trial court did not unsustainably exercise its discretion by modifying the divorce decree.
The wife further argues that the trial court erred when it refused to find the husband in contempt for non-compliance with Family Division Rules 1.25- A and 2.16. Fam. Div. R. 1.25-A (mandating the disclosure of specified documents, unless otherwise agreed by the parties or ordered by the court); Fam. Div. R. 2.16 (requiring each party to file with the court and with the other party a "financial affidavit which contains the information requested on the family division financial affidavit"). The trial court denied the wife's motion for contempt, finding that she did not satisfy her burden of proof to establish a knowing violation of court orders. We conclude that this determination is supported by the record and the court did not unsustainably exercise its discretion. See In the Matter of Clark & Clark, 154 N.H. 420, 425 (2006) ("The contempt power is discretionary and the proper inquiry is not whether we would have found the respondent in contempt, but whether the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion." (quotation omitted)). We next address the wife's argument that the trial court erred when it awarded the husband half of the wife's pension without excluding the portion that she earned prior to the marriage, which she contends is exempt pursuant to the Hodgins formula. See Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711, 715-16 (1985) (superseded on other grounds by RSA 458:16-a, I (2018)). The husband asserts that the trial court had the actual value of the wife's pension and thus the Hodgins formula is not applicable. We agree with the husband that the wife's reliance upon Hodgins is misplaced. The Hodgins formula "does not apply when the value of the pension is ascertainable." In the Matter of Watterworth & Watterworth, 149 N.H. 442, 452 (2003). Further, Hodgins "does not address how to apportion pension benefits when some portion of those benefits was earned prior to marriage." In the Matter of LeGault & LeGault,
177 N.H. 365, 370 (2025), 2025 N.H. 24, ¶14. Accordingly, where the trial court had the actual value of the wife's pension plan and is permitted to distribute property that the parties brought to the marriage, see RSA 458:16-a, I, the Hodgins formula did not apply, and the trial court did not err in its distribution of the wife's pension.
The wife next argues that the trial court erred when, in March 2024, it retroactively imposed its final decree orders as the new temporary orders. While a temporary order typically remains in effect during the pendency of an appeal, a trial court may specifically order that the final order remain in effect pending resolution of the appeal. See Gray v. Kelly, 161 N.H. 160, 167-68 (2010). The wife takes issue with the retroactivity of the court's imposition of the final orders. The family division, however, has "powers of a court of equity." RSA 490-D:3 (2010). Here, the parties operated under the final decree, including "mutually listing the house and entering into a P&S, preparing QDROs, segregating their respective property and altering health
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coverage." Based upon the equities of the case, the trial court converted the final orders to be the temporary orders pending appeal or the passage of 31 days. We accordingly conclude that the trial court did not err. The wife also argues that the trial court erred when it did not act on her request for retroactive alimony for the seven-month period between the divorce filing and the temporary alimony orders. In its narrative on the final decree, the court did note that the wife requested an arrearage and it did not order that the husband pay it. We read the trial court to have denied the wife's request for retroactive alimony. Salesky, 157 N.H. at 702 (stating that the interpretation of the trial court order is de novo). "[T]he date from which alimony is payable is peculiarly within the discretion of the trial court." Walker
v. Walker, 133 N.H. 413, 418 (1990) (quotation omitted). The record supports that during this seven-month period, the husband was paying the bills for the marital home. We conclude that the trial court did not unsustainably exercise its discretion in declining to award the wife retroactive alimony. See In the Matter of Peirano & Larsen, 155 N.H. 738, 746 (2007) (concluding the trial court did not err when it "denied the petitioner's request for retroactive alimony based upon the amounts already paid by the respondent prior to the final order").
Finally, the wife argues that the trial court erred by failing to establish an effective date for dividing remaining financial assets and failing to rule on the distribution of the parties' personal property. The wife has not demonstrated, however, that she raised these arguments in the trial court. See In the Matter of Sweatt & Sweatt, 170 N.H. 414, 423-24 ("It is a long-standing rule that parties may not have judicial review of matters not raised in the forum of trial."
(quotation omitted)). To satisfy the preservation requirement, any issues that could not have been presented to the trial court before its decision must be presented to it in a motion for reconsideration. Id. at 424. Therefore, because the wife did not raise these arguments in the trial court or in a motion for reconsideration, they are not preserved for our review, and we decline to address them. See id. In light of our conclusions, we need not address the husband's motion to dismiss portions of the appeal.
Affirmed.
MACDONALD, C.J., and DONOVAN, COUNTWAY, and GOULD, JJ.,
concurred.
Timothy A. Gudas, Clerk