Ernest Tilley v. Deputy Pierson

2

According to the Complaint, due to his illness and dehydration, Plaintiff wandered outside his home in his underwear and was not fully aware of his surroundings. Id. ¶¶ 17 18. unusual behavior prompted a call to law enforcement. Id. ¶ 19. When officers arrived, they began cursing at Plaintiff and deployed a taser on him approximately four times. Id. ¶ 20. The officers then threw Plaintiff to the ground, choked him while he was handcuffed, and subjected him to a continuous beating lasting approximately twenty-six minutes. Id. ¶¶ 22 23. While being loaded onto a stretcher, officers continued to beat Plaintiff, and, unable to defend himself, he lost consciousness. Id. ¶¶ 24 26. Plaintiff alleges his fiancée captured the entire incident on video. Id. ¶ 32.

As a result of the alleged conduct, Plaintiff avers he suffered a broken shoulder that required surgery and was hospitalized for three days. Id. ¶¶ 27 29. He further alleges that he sustained additional injuries and continues to experience ongoing complications, including the potential need for a full shoulder replacement. Id. ¶¶ 30 31. Plaintiff asserts that he has incurred over $50,000 in medical expenses and lost his employment because of the incident. Id. ¶¶ 33 34. Plaintiff instituted this action on April 18, 2025, against (1)

(2) the FCC, (3) WVSP Trooper Joseph L. Milam in his official capacity, (4)

(5) the WVSP. Id. ¶¶ 7 12. Count One alleges excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment against Deputies Pierson and Fox, the FCC, Trooper Milam, and the WVSP. Id. ¶¶ 35 45. Count Two alleges false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment and state law against Deputies Pierson and Fox, the Fayette County John and Jane Does, Trooper Milam, and the West Virginia John and Jane Does. Id. ¶¶ 46 52. Count Three alleges malicious prosecution Case 2:25-cv-00259 Document 34 Filed 11/17/25 Page 2 of 18 PageID #: 232

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in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and state law against Deputies Pierson and Fox, the Fayette County John and Jane Does, Trooper Milam, and the West Virginia John and Jane Does. Id. ¶¶ 53 57. Count Four Failure to Train and Supervise Officers [and/or] Patrolmen under State Law the FCC and the WVSP. Id. ¶¶ 58 62. Count Five alleges an Unconstitutional Policy of Arresting for Obstructing an Officer the FCC and the WVSP. Id. ¶¶ 63 69. Count Six alleges a Failure to Train and Supervise Officers [and/or] Patrolmen against the FCC and the WVSP. Id. ¶¶ 70 73.²Count Seven alleges assault and battery against Deputy Pierson, Deputy Fox, and Trooper Milam. Id. ¶¶ 74 78. Extreme and Outrageous Conduct; Emotional Distress Id. ¶¶ 79 85.

Plaintiff seeks a range of remedies, including compensatory damages damages against all Defendants on the theory of vicarious and strict liability prejudgment and post-judgment interest as provided by law, , and uch further recovery and relief as this court may deem just and equitable. Id. With respect to the West Virginia State Agency defendants, the Plaintiff[] only seek[s] recovery up to the limits of applicable insurance policies and possibly beyond. Id.

Although Plaintiff provided the FCC

Office with an Official Notice of Claim with Notice to the Attorney General on March 20, 2025, he did not file the instant Complaint until April 18, 2025. [ECF No. 1; ECF No. 14, Ex. A].

4

Defendants now move to dismiss all claims for several reasons. First, Defendants argue -year statute of limitations. [ECF No. 10, at

4 6; ECF No. 12, at 3 6; ECF No. 27, at 3 5]. WVSP further argues that it is not a suable entity separate from the State and that sovereign immunity bars any suit against the State. [ECF No. 10, at 6 7]. Trooper Milam also contends that state officials sued in their official capacities are not nder 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore any claims against him in his

official capacity should be dismissed. Id. at 7 8.

malicious prosecution claim (Count Three) fails as a matter of law. Id. at 8. Finally, the FCC asserts that Counts Four and Six, alleging failure to train or supervise, should be dismissed because they custom of the FCC. [ECF No. 27, at 7 9].

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008). In resolving a motion to dismiss under e

E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 448 (4th Cir.

2011).

true all of the factual allegations Farnsworth

v. Loved Ones in Home Care, LLC, No. 2:18-CV-01334, 2019 WL 956806, at *1 (S.D. W. Va. Case 2:25-cv-00259 Document 34 Filed 11/17/25 Page 4 of 18 PageID #: 234

5

Feb. 27, 2019) (citing E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 637 F.3d at 440). These factual allegations, Robertson v. Sea Pines Real

Est. Cos., 679 F.3d 278, 288 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly

state a claim that is plausible on its face, it nevertheless need only give the defendant fair notice of Hall v. DIRECTV, LLC, 846 F.3d 757, 765

Id.

III. DISCUSSION

At the outset, I conclude 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the WVSP and Trooper Milam in his official capacity fail as a matter of law. [s] subject to suit under § 1983. See Will v. Mich. , 491 U.S. 58, 64 71 (1989) (holding states and state agencies are immune from § 1983 suits in federal court); P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.

. The same immunity applies to state officials sued in their official capacity for monetary damages, as such suits are treated as actions against the State itself. Will, 491 U.S. at 71. Moreover, there is no respondeat superior liability for state agencies based on claims against its officers under § 1983. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690

(1978).

To the extent Plaintiff now Two, [and] Three, I find such an argument unpersuasive. [ECF No. 14, at 6]. The Complaint caption identifies Trooper Milam solely in his official capacity. Nowhere in the body of the Case 2:25-cv-00259 Document 34 Filed 11/17/25 Page 5 of 18 PageID #: 235

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Complaint does Plaintiff specify that Trooper Milam is being sued in his individual capacity. In Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1995), the F that a plaintiff need not plead expressly the capacity in which he is suing a defendant in order to state a cause of action under § 1983. The Biggs rule, however, does not apply here. By the rule s own terms, it applies only Id. at 61. And here, Plaintiff

specifically identifies the capacities of each Defendant. The caption makes clear, for example, that Deputies Pierson and Fox are sued in both their individual and official capacities underscoring that the omission of any individual-

pleading choice and therefore controls.

Accordingly, to the extent Counts One, Two, Three, Five, and Six assert § 1983 claims against the WVSP and Trooper Milam in his official capacity, they are DISMISSED.³ A. Federal Law Claims

The parties disagree as to whether .

Defendants argue federal law claims are barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. [ECF No. 10, at 4 6; ECF No. 12, at 3 6; ECF No. 27, at 3 5]. Plaintiff contends that the limitations period was tolled under West Virginia law. [ECF No. 14, at 4 5; ECF No. 15, at 4 6; ECF No. 28, at 4 6].

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The statute of limitations for claims brought pursuant to § 1983 is governed by the length of time the forum state allows for personal injury claims. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249 50 (1989). Federal law, however, governs when the limitation period begins to accrue. Id.; see also McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. 109, 115 (2019) ( he time at which a § 1983 claim accrues is a question of federal law, conforming in general to common- (internal quotation marks omitted)); Wallace v. Kato 5 he accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law Owens v. Baltimore City State s Att ys Off., 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014); Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 348 (4th Cir. 2011).

With respect to all of § 1983 claims, the applicable limitations period in West Virginia is two W.

Va. Code § 55-2-12(b).⁴See Smith v. Travelpiece, 31 F.4th 878, 883 (4th Cir. 2022); see also Okure, 488 U.S. at 249 50

8

statutes of limitations for personal injury actions, courts considering § 1983 claims should borrow As noted, Plaintiff brings five causes of action pursuant to § 1983. First, Plaintiff asserts three Fourth Amendment-based claims: Excessive Force (Count One), False Arrest (Count Two), and Malicious Prosecution (Count Three). [ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 35 57]. Second, Plaintiff asserts a Monell claim (Count Five) Unconstitutional Policy of Arresting for Obstructing an Officer against the FCC. Id. ¶¶ 63 69. Lastly, Plaintiff asserts a Monell supervisory liability claim (Count Six) against Id. ¶¶ 58 62. I address each claim

below.

1. Count One Excessive Force Although state law determines the applicable statute of limitations for § 1983 claims, federal law governs the date on which that limitations period begins to run. Wallace, 549 U.S. at

388. Federal . . . to common- to determine this date. Id.; see also Travelpiece, 31 F.4th at 883 ( -law principles, without reference to West Virginia s law, determine when the claim accrues and when the statute of limitations

.

Under [general] common-law principles, it is the standard rule that accrual occurs when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action, that is, when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief. Travelpiece, 31 F.4th at 883 (quoting Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388); see also Owens v. , 767 F.3d at 389 ( -

of action accrues, and the limitations period commences, when the plaintiff knows or has reason ). But the standard rule does not always control the start of the

Travelpiece, 31 F.4th at 883 (quoting Owens v. Baltimore

Case 2:25-cv-00259 Document 34 Filed 11/17/25 Page 8 of 18 PageID #: 238

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City State Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d at 389). Where the common law provides a rule for when a particular

§ 1983 claim. Id.

To determine whether there is a distinctive accrual rule for a § 1983 claim, courts look to the common law to identify the tort most analogous to the constitutional violation. Id. at

883 84.

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989); see also Travelpiece, 31 F.4th at 886 87 (finding that the closest common law tort analogy to a search and seizure claim is trespass and that such claim accrues

).

Applying these principles, the Fourth Circuit has held that a § 1983 claim based on an unconstitutional search and seizure of property runs from the time of the search and seizure. Travelpiece, 31 F.4th at 887 (citing Cramer v. Crutchfield, 648 F.2d 943, 945 (4th Cir. 1981)). The same reasoning applies where the seizure is effected against the person rather than property:

the injury and its cause are immediately known. Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306, 311 (2021) (excessive force claims concern ); Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on

the Law of Torts or the Wrongs Which Arise Independent of Contract 62 68 (1880) (treating trespass as the proper vehicle for direct, wrongful applications of force).⁵

10

Accordingly, for purposes of determining the accrual of the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim for excessive force, such a claim accrues at the time the alleged excessive force occurs as the injury and its cause are immediately apparent. See Travelpiece, 31 F.4th at 887 see also

Seabolt v. Saltsgaver,

No. 2:14-cv-28018, 2016 WL 675702, at *4 5 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 4, 2016) (finding that the plaintiff excessive force claim accrued on the date that the alleged excessive force was applied by the defendant).

Here, the alleged excessive force occurred on March 23, 2023. [ECF No. 1, ¶ 13; ECF No. 14, at 4]. On that date, Plaintiff knew or had reason to know of his injuries and their connection to the conduct of the Defendants. Nothing in the Complaint suggests any factual basis for delaying accrual of Plaintiff s excessive force claim beyond March 23, 2023, and Plaintiff offers no argument to the contrary.

Instead, Plaintiff contends -

suit notice statute, W. Va. Code § 55-17-3. [ECF No. 14, at 4 5; ECF No. 15, at 4 6; ECF No. 28, at 4 6]. That statute requires that at least 30 days prior to the institution of an action against a governmental agency, the complaining party or parties shall provide the chief officer of the governmental agency and the Attorney General written notice . . . of the alleged claim and the relief desired. W. Va. Code § 55 17 3(a)(1) If the written notice is provided . . . any applicable statute of limitations is tolled for 30 days . . . . Id. § 55 17 3(a)(2). Relying on these provisions, Plaintiff asserts that the timely mailing of his Notice of Claim to the FCC, the WVSP, and the Attorney General tolled the statute of limitations for thirty days, Case 2:25-cv-00259 Document 34 Filed 11/17/25 Page 10 of 18 PageID #: 240

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rendering his complaint timely filed. [ECF No. 14, at 4 5; ECF No. 15, at 5 6]. Plaintiff further argues that strict compliance with the statute presents a procedural dilemma when both state and non-state defendants are named. [ECF No. 15, at 5 6]. Filing immediately to preserve claims against the FCC and other county defendants would violate the pre-suit notice requirement applicable to the WVSP, while waiting for the thirty-day tolling period to expire could render the claims against the FCC untimely. Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff maintains that his compliance with W. Va. Code § 55-17-3 properly tolled the limitations period and preserved all claims asserted in this action.

argument fails for one straightforward reason: statute

does not apply to actions filed in federal court. Section 55 17 2 expressly under the statute as a circuit court or in

the supreme court of appeals W. Va. Code § 55 17 2 (emphasis added). Because the instant action was filed in federal court, the state law requiring notice is inapplicable. D.W. v. Walker, No. 2:09-cv-00060, 2009 WL 1393818, at *3 (S.D. W. Va. May 15, 2009) (Goodwin, J.); see also Durstein v. Alexander, No. 3:19-cv-0029, 2019 WL 6833858, at *6 (S.D. W. Va. Dec. 13, 2019) (Chambers, J.) West Virginia s notice-of-claim law does not apply to suits filed in federal ); Smith v. Allred, No. 2:15-cv-06026, 2016 WL 3094008, at *7 (S.D. W. Va. June 1, 2016) (Copenhaver, J.) Because the statute limits the pre-suit notice requirement, as well as the related tolling provision, to suits instituted . . . in a circuit court or in the supreme court of appeals, it has no application to suits filed in federal court. W. Va. Code § 55 17 3)).

Case 2:25-cv-00259 Document 34 Filed 11/17/25 Page 11 of 18 PageID #: 241

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Consequently, the limitations period for excessive force claim expired March 23, 2025. Plaintiff did not file this action until April 18, 2025. [ECF No. 1]. Accordingly, Count One is time-barred and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to all Defendants.⁶

2. Count Two False Arrest violation of the Fourth Amendment, where the arrest is followed by criminal proceedings, begins to run at the time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal proce Wallace, 549 U.S. at

397. Put another way, Id. at 390 (

).

Plaintiff alleges he was arrested on March 23, 2023. [ECF No. 1, ¶ 13]. He pleads no facts regarding any criminal proceedings stemming from his arrest. However, in his response to Trooper , Plaintiff attaches state magistrate court records showing that a

criminal complaint⁷charging him with obstructing an officer and battery on officers was filed and

13

signed by the magistrate on March 23, 2023. [ECF No. 14, Ex. B]. The records further reflect that Id. Plaintiff asks the

Court to take judicial notice of those records. Id. at 7.

Ordinarily, matters outside the pleadings are not considered at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. However, a court may, in narrow circumstances, consider documents subject to judicial notice without converting the motion to one for summary judgment. Goldfarb v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 791 F.3d 500, 508 (4th Cir. 2015); Zak , 780 F.3d

597, 606 07 (4th Cir. 2015). Courts may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record, including state court criminal proceedings. Goldfarb, 791 F.3d at 508; see also Brockington v. Boykins, 637 F.3d 503, 505 (4th Cir. 2011) (taking judicial notice of plaintiff- in state court).

The parties do not dispute that the magistrate court orders are matters of public record. Accordingly, I take notice that, following arrest on March 23, 2023, his initial appearance in magistrate court occurred on March 31, 2023, at which time he was advised of the charges against him, the potential consequences of a guilty finding or plea, and his right to counsel. That same day, the magistrate authorized continued detention until bail was posted. Accordingly, the statute of limitations began to run on March 31,

2023 the date the court initiated legal process and authorized continued custody. Plaintiff did not file the Complaint in this matter until April 18, 2025, after the two-year limitations period had expired. Therefore, § 1983 false arrest claim is time-barred and is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to all Defendants.

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3. Count Three Malicious Prosecution A § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution does not accrue until the criminal proceedings have terminated in the plaintiff's favor Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489 (1994); McDonough, 588 U.S. at 116. Here, the Complaint does not allege any facts concerning the disposition of any underlying criminal charges. However, state magistrate court records show that he pled guilty to the obstruction charge in exchange for the dismissal of the related battery charge pursuant to a plea agreement. [ECF No. 14, Ex. B]. The magistrate court entered the corresponding criminal judgment orders on September 13, 2023. Id. Considering that date as I find the claim

is timely.

Nevertheless, to state a federal claim for malicious prosecution

that the defendant (1) caused (2) a seizure of the plaintiff pursuant to legal process unsupported by Evans v. Chalmers,

703 F.3d 636, 647 (2012). Although timely, I find the favorable-termination element cannot be met. A dismissal of related charges as part of a plea agreement does not constitute a favorable termination because the criminal prosecution did not end without a conviction. Thompson v. Clark,

596 U.S. 36, 39 (2022) (holding that a plaintiff alleging a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 need only show that his prosecution ended without a conviction, not an affirmative indication of innocence).

Because Plaintiff has not alleged and the judicially noticeable public record confirms that he cannot allege a favorable termination, his federal malicious prosecution claim must be dismissed. As amendment would be futile, to the extent Count Three asserts a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983, it is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to all Defendants. Case 2:25-cv-00259 Document 34 Filed 11/17/25 Page 14 of 18 PageID #: 244

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4. Counts Five and Six Monell Liability Counts Five and Six assert Monell claims against the FCC based on a failure to train and supervise and an allegedly unconstitutional policy of arresting individuals for obstruction without probable cause. Plaintiff has not cited, nor have I found, any controlling legal authority supporting a separation of the accrual of a Monell claim from its predicate constitutional violation.⁸ Monell claims at this juncture

because, even if timely, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged a Monell claim. Under Monell, a municipality may be liable under § 1983 only

violation. , 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). A municipal policy or custom may be established

(1) through an express policy, such as a written ordinance or regulation; (2) through the decisions of a person with final policymaking authority; (3) through an omission, such as a failure to properly train [or supervise] officers that manifests deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens; or (4) through a practice that is so persistent and widespread as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.

16

Blair v. Appomattox Cnty. Sch. Bd., 147 F.4th 484, 493 (4th Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 61 (2011);

Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). Municipal liability, however, may not be premised on a theory of respondeat superior. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). municipality is liable only for its own illegal acts. Owens v. Baltimore City State s Att ys Off., 767 F.3d 379 at 402; see also Connick, 563 U.S. at 60 61.

Count Six alleges a failure to train and supervise. A failure-to-train claim will trigger of persons with whom [municipal employees] Harris, 489 U.S. at 388.

Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 (2011)

(cleaned up) A municipality culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train. Deliberate indifference for may be shown in two ways. First, deliberate indifference on the part of policymakers. Id. at 62. Second, a municipality may be liable Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 456 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Harris, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10)

for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been

).

A plaintiff must also plead causation. Simply establishing that a particular officer may be unsatisfactorily trained will not alone suffice to fasten liability on the [municipality] Harris, 489 Case 2:25-cv-00259 Document 34 Filed 11/17/25 Page 16 of 18 PageID #: 246

17

U.S. at 390. There must be Id. at 385; see also Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 (a municipal policy must be the

Here, Plaintiff failed to plausibly allege or that the need for further . Plaintiff alleges only, Due to the large number of illegal and improper incidents[,] . . . it is clear that the FCC has not properly trained these two deputies. ¶¶ 60, 70]. The Complaint makes no mention of the type or scope of training the deputies received, identifies no prior incidents, and provides no facts describing any alleged deficiencies in training. There are also no facts from which I could infer a alleged use of force. I find conclusory assertions do not satisfy federal pleading standards.

failure-to-supervise claim fares no better. To state a failure-to-supervise claim under Monell, Plaintiff must plausibly allege (1) that policymakers had actual or constructive knowledge that their subordinates were engaged in conduct posing a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury; (2) that their response evidenced deliberate indifference or tacit ed injury. Wilkins v.

Montgomery, 751 F.3d 214, 226 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. on several occasions. Id. Again, Plaintiff identifies no prior similar incidents, no facts suggesting that FCC supervisors were aware of any pattern of wrongful arrests or excessive force, and no or inaction to his arrest, prosecution, or the alleged

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18

use of force. In the absence of well-pled facts supporting each element, his failure-to-supervise claim does not cross the line from possible to plausible under Twombly and Iqbal. excessive force is likewise unsupported by factual allegations from which such a policy or custom could be inferred. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 415. Plaintiff pleads only a single encounter his own and offers a

without probable cause. [ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 65 69].

ence or the existence of any widespread practice.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Accordingly, Counts Five and Six are DISMISSED.

B. State Law Claims

Having dismissed the federal claims that conferred original jurisdiction in this action, I -law claims pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). Accordingly, the state-law claims are DISMISSED and subject to the tolling provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, motions to dismiss, [ECF Nos. 9, 11, 26], are

GRANTED.

The court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to counsel of record and any unrepresented party. The court further DIRECTS the Clerk to post a ENTER: November 17, 2025

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