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trial counsel's conduct. In its order, the district court mentioned, in passing, Mason- Kimmons's and his trial counsel's assertions that they would have gone to trial had trial counsel been prepared to do so. The district court did not mention Mason-Kimmons's or his trial counsel's explicit testimony that Mason-Kimmons would have gone to trial had the State not provided substantial discovery at the last minute and had his trial counsel been adequately prepared. The district court made no express credibility determinations about Mason-Kimmons's or his trial counsel's testimony.
Mason-Kimmons appealed for a third time. The court of appeals first reviewed the district court's factual findings for clear error. See Mason-Kimmons v. State (Mason- Kimmons III), No. A23-0914, 2024 WL 1251736, at *3 (Minn. App. Mar. 25, 2024). It determined that two conclusions in the order were clearly erroneous. First, the court of appeals rejected the district court's finding that negative evidentiary rulings persuaded Mason-Kimmons to plead guilty because the district court never made those rulings. Id. It also determined that the district court's finding that Mason-Kimmons expressed interest in reaching a plea deal before his trial counsel's declaration of unpreparedness was contrary to the record and, as such, clearly erroneous.9 Id.
The court of appeals also concluded, however, that the individual errors were not determinative. Id. Instead, it affirmed the district court after summarizing all the facts the court of appeals found relevant and, "[v]iewing these facts together," determined that there
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was no reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient advice, Mason-Kimmons would have insisted on going to trial. Id. at *4-5. Mason-Kimmons petitioned for review on whether he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's deficient behavior as part of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and we granted review.10
ANALYSIS
This case comes to us from the district court's decision denying Mason-Kimmons's petition for post-conviction review. Mason Kimmons claims that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because of his trial counsel's ineffective representation in advising
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Mason-Kimmons to plead guilty. Because there is no dispute in this appeal that trial counsel's advice to plead guilty was constitutionally deficient under the first Strickland prong, we narrowly focus on whether Mason-Kimmons suffered prejudice from this constitutionally deficient advice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (stating that even if a defendant's claim succeeds on the first prong, no relief is warranted unless counsel's ineffective representation resulted in prejudice to the defendant); see, e.g., Scruggs v. State,
484 N.W.2d 21, 25 (Minn. 1992) (applying the Strickland test to determine whether to grant a defendant a new trial on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel). While we review a district court's denial of a postconviction petition for an abuse of discretion, we review de novo the Strickland analysis because "the performance and prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry [involve] mixed questions of law and fact." Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 600 (Minn. 2017) (alteration in original) (quotation omitted); see also Petersen v. State, 937 N.W.2d 136, 139 (Minn. 2019) ("We review a district court's denial of a postconviction petition for an abuse of discretion, and we review any embedded issues of law de novo."). Factual findings "made during the course of deciding an ineffective-assistance claim are subject to the clearly erroneous standard." Pearson, 891 N.W.2d at 600.
A.
Our resolution of this case turns in significant part on what Mason-Kimmons must show to prevail on his argument that his trial counsel's constitutionally deficient advice prejudiced him. To assess whether a defendant suffered prejudice in ineffective assistance of counsel cases we conduct a case-by-case analysis considering the totality of the
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evidence. Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357, 367 (2017). To establish prejudice, a defendant who has pled guilty must show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill
v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). A "reasonable probability" is a "probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome"; the amount of proof required is something less than a preponderance of the evidence. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). Thus, to show prejudice, Mason-Kimmons must demonstrate that, based on the totality of the circumstances, there is a probability—not proof by a preponderance of the evidence—sufficient to undermine confidence in the fact that he would have pled guilty in the absence of his trial counsel's constitutionally deficient advice.
We focus our inquiry on a defendant's decision-making in choosing to plead guilty; in this case, "what an individual defendant would have done" in the absence of constitutionally deficient advice regarding the guilty plea. Lee, 582 U.S. at 367-68. In assessing our confidence that a defendant would have pled guilty in the absence of constitutionally deficient advice, we do not rely solely upon a defendant's "post hoc assertions . . . about how he would have pleaded but for his attorney's deficiencies." Id. at
369. Rather, we "look to contemporaneous evidence to substantiate a defendant's expressed preferences" that he would have gone to trial in the absence of the constitutionally deficient advice. Id.
Further, because our focus is on the defendant's decision-making in pleading guilty, our assessment of prejudice "may not turn solely on the likelihood of conviction after trial."
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Id. at 367. In Lee v. United States, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that,
"[a]s a general matter, it makes sense that a defendant who has no realistic defense to a charge supported by sufficient evidence will be unable to carry his burden of showing prejudice from accepting a guilty plea." Id. at 366-67. The Supreme Court, however, refused to elevate this general proposition to a per se rule for two reasons:
First, it forgets that categorical rules are ill suited to an inquiry that we have emphasized demands a "case-by-case examination" of the "totality of the evidence." And, more fundamentally, the Government overlooks that the inquiry we prescribed in Hill v. Lockhart focuses on a defendant's decisionmaking, which may not turn solely on the likelihood of conviction after trial.
Id. at 367 (internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court recognized that even a defendant without "any viable defense" may be willing to proceed to trial. Id. "[C]ommon sense (not to mention our precedent) recognizes that there is more to consider than simply the likelihood of success at trial. The decision whether to plead guilty also involves assessing the respective consequences of a conviction after trial and by plea." Id. We also observe that attorneys are critical to criminal defendants navigating the legal environment. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) ("[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) ("Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law."); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685 ("The right to counsel plays a crucial role in the adversarial system embodied in the Sixth Amendment, since access to counsel's skill and
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knowledge is necessary to accord defendants the ample opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution to which they are entitled." (quotation omitted)); United States v. Cronic,
466 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1984) ("Lawyers in criminal cases are necessities, not luxuries . . . . Without counsel, the right to a trial itself would be of little avail . . . ." (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnotes omitted)). The client-attorney relationship is based on trust. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. The Constitution protects the right to counsel because it assumes counsel guides and assists a defendant through the adversarial criminal process.
B.
We turn then to whether, as a matter of law and considering the totality of the circumstances, a probability exists sufficient to undermine confidence that Mason- Kimmons would have pled guilty in the absence of his trial counsel's constitutionally deficient advice. We conclude that such a probability exists. Before we address the contemporaneous evidence bearing on whether Mason- Kimmons would have pled guilty in the absence of his counsel's deficient advice, however, we address a procedural argument the State raises. The State argues that the district court found that Mason-Kimmons and his trial counsel's post hoc assertions at the postconviction evidentiary hearing were not credible and that this finding should end the analysis. At the postconviction hearing, Mason-Kimmons and his trial counsel testified that Mason-Kimmons knew a conviction and a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole were potential consequences of going to trial. Notwithstanding those potential consequences, both Mason-Kimmons and his counsel repeatedly testified that Mason- Kimmons intended to go to trial up to and until his counsel said he would provide
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ineffective assistance if forced to proceed. They both also testified that Mason-Kimmons's decision to plead guilty was motivated by his counsel's advice to do so because counsel was unprepared for trial. His trial counsel testified that part of the rationale for bringing Mason-Kimmons's case to trial was that he believed Mason-Kimmons was not guilty and that the evidence supported this inference. And Mason-Kimmons testified that his counsel's deficient representation affected his decision by "ma[king] me consider taking a plea agreement" because his other option was to "[g]o to trial and face life in prison with a—with a lawyer who's unprepared."
Although the State explicitly asked the district court to expressly find that Mason- Kimmons's and his attorney's testimony was not credible, the district court made no such finding. The district court did find that the trial prosecutor "credibly testified at the evidentiary hearing that a substantial amount of evidence supported the State's First- Degree Murder case against Mr. Mason-Kimmons." Relying on the district court's finding that the trial prosecutor credibly testified about the evidence supporting the State's case, the State asserts that the district court must have also believed the prosecutor's alternative theories for why Mason-Kimmons pled guilty and impliedly determined that it did not believe the defense's testimony on any topic. We are not persuaded. The district court's credibility determination was very specific: The prosecutor testified credibly regarding the State's evidence. The district court made no credibility findings about Mason-Kimmons's or his trial counsel's testimony regarding Mason- Kimmons's mental state when he decided to plead guilty. We will not infer from the district court's specific, express credibility finding about the prosecutor's testimony
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concerning the strength of the State's evidence that the district court also made a broad, implicit credibility finding that other witness testimony concerning Mason-Kimmons's subjective mental states was not credible.
Having addressed the State's procedural argument, we consider whether Mason- Kimmons's argument relies solely on post hoc assertions about how he would have pled but for his attorney's deficiencies. For the following reasons, we conclude that it does not. During his plea hearing, Mason-Kimmons stated his concern about his lawyer's preparedness, noting that his attorney had not spoken to newly discovered witnesses:
THE DISTRICT COURT: And like I said, it's a big decision and I know there's been some time pressure. I don't want to pressure you into it. And I know it seems like I've been trying to move the case forward. But as I mentioned a couple of times, I recognize this is a big case for you and for [your trial counsel]. And I don't want the pressure of the moment to be the only thing that allows you to make your decision. Do you know what I'm saying?
THE DEFENDANT: I hear what you're saying, but you didn't give us no time to speak to the other witnesses, though. Yeah.
(Emphasis added.) Mason-Kimmons's statement that he was pleading guilty because his trial attorney had not spoken to witnesses constitutes contemporaneous evidence supporting his present claim that he pled guilty because his attorney was not prepared.11
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We therefore conclude that Mason-Kimmons's argument does not rely solely on post hoc assertions.
We continue our totality of the circumstances analysis by looking to other contemporaneous evidence that bears on whether a probability exists sufficient to undermine confidence that Mason-Kimmons would have pled guilty in the absence of his trial counsel's constitutionally deficient advice. This evidence includes the plea negotiation timeline, the strength of the State's case, and the possibility of a viable defense for trial.
We first turn our attention to the plea negotiation timeline. The State first made Mason-Kimmons an offer to plead guilty on August 1, 2018. Under that offer, Mason- Kimmons would have been sentenced to 366 months in prison rather than facing life in prison without the possibility of release. See Lee, 582 U.S. at 367 ("The decision whether to plead guilty also involves assessing the respective consequences of a conviction after trial and by plea."). He did not respond to that offer nor suggest that he was open to negotiating a plea until August 10, the day after his trial counsel stated that he was not prepared for trial and would provide ineffective assistance if forced to proceed. Between August 1 and August 9, Mason-Kimmons learned about significant developments— including W.S.'s recantation and the district court's denial of Mason-Kimmons's continuance motion—and yet these events did not prompt Mason-Kimmons to engage with the State's plea offer. The parties did not reach a plea agreement until August 13, at which time Mason-Kimmons accepted the same 366-month prison sentence offered on August 1. Mason-Kimmons's decision not to consider any guilty plea until after trial counsel told him
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counsel was unprepared and could not effectively represent him undermines our confidence that Mason-Kimmons would have pled guilty in the absence of his counsel's constitutionally deficient behavior and advice.
On the other hand, Mason-Kimmons agreed to plead guilty after the state offered E.R.D. a reduced charge and probationary sentence. Though the record does not clearly show when that additional benefit was placed on the table-whether it was before or after defense counsel's constitutionally deficient advice-we conclude that the additional benefit increases to some degree our confidence that Mason-Kimmons pled guilty for reasons other than his counsel's constitutionally deficient advice.
Thus, in considering the totality of the record to assess whether there exists a sufficient probability to undermine confidence that Mason-Kimmons would have pled guilty in the absence of his trial counsel's constitutionally deficient advice, we consider both Mason-Kimmons's consistent refusal to even discuss a plea deal offering the same reduction in sentence to which he ultimately agreed and the State's agreement to a new term of reduced punishment for E.R.D. See Lee, 582 U.S. at 367. Next, we discuss the strength of the State's case. The court of appeals and district court concluded that there is substantial evidence to support that Mason-Kimmons shot and killed Lacy with intent and premeditation: Mason-Kimmons and Lacy had been feuding for years, the feud had become physical, Mason-Kimmons told E.R.D. that he planned to kill Lacy, the car that dropped the shooter off and took them away from the crime scene
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belonged to E.R.D., and the police found .38-caliber ammunition in Mason-Kimmons's apartment.12
A significant piece of the State's evidence—W.S.'s statement telling the police, despite earlier denials, that Mason-Kimmons shot Lacy—warrants a more specific discussion. The defense claimed that W.S. initially told the defense investigator that Mason-Kimmons was not the shooter. W.S. originally told the police he was not even in Peavey Park when the shooting occurred and did not know who shot Lacy. Just three days later, W.S. changed his story when the police interviewed him in the Hennepin County jail after his arrest for a probation violation. The original defense interview, paired with W.S.'s statements to the police expressing his hope that testifying would help with his outstanding probation violation, raise questions about W.S.'s credibility that Mason-Kimmons could use to impeach W.S. And, as noted, Mason-Kimmons continued to refuse to engage in
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plea negotiations even after learning that W.S. had recanted his initial statements to the police. By failing to acknowledge W.S.'s changing story, the court of appeals overstated the strength of the State's case.
Finally, we discuss the possibility of a viable defense at trial. Mason-Kimmons was not without any realistic defense to the State's charges that he shot and killed Lacy. See id. (noting that "[a] defendant without any viable defense will be highly likely to lose at trial" and therefore "will rarely be able to show prejudice from accepting a guilty plea"). While Mason-Kimmons did not locate the witnesses his team was searching for before the beginning of trial—in part because his trial counsel failed to timely gather and sufficiently review discovery—from the initial police interview the defense was aware of witnesses who described the shooter as a lanky, six-foot to six-foot-two-inch tall, dark-skinned Black man.13The defense also had the surveillance video, which the defense argues corroborates that description. The defense asserts that the descriptions do not match Mason-Kimmons appearance.
Having discussed the totality of the record, we apply the required legal standard to the question of prejudice before us: Is there a probability (something less than a likelihood) sufficient to undermine our confidence in the fact that Mason-Kimmons would have pled guilty in the absence of his trial counsel's constitutionally deficient advice to plead guilty because trial counsel was unprepared?
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This is a close question. During his plea hearing, Mason-Kimmons made a statement indicating that, consistent with his trial counsel's advice, he pled guilty because his trial counsel told him he was unprepared and that, as a result, Mason-Kimmons would not get a fair trial. We also consider that, before his trial counsel's constitutionally deficient conduct, Mason-Kimmons refused to even consider an offer to plead guilty in return for precisely the sentence to which he ultimately agreed—even though he learned, after the initial plea offer, that, among other things, W.S. had changed his story and was now telling the police that Mason-Kimmons was the shooter. Finally, although there is substantial evidence that Mason-Kimmons was involved in shooting Lacy, at the time Mason- Kimmons made his decision to plead guilty it was possible that the district court would exclude some of the State's evidence. Mason-Kimmons also could introduce witness testimony describing the shooter (consistent with the video) in ways that do not match Mason-Kimmons's appearance. On these unique facts, we conclude that Mason-Kimmons was prejudiced by his trial counsel's constitutionally deficient performance. Accordingly, we hold that the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mason-Kimmons's postconviction petition to withdraw his guilty plea based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. We remand to the district court so that Mason-Kimmons may be allowed to withdraw his plea.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded.
GAÏTAS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.