Joseph Haas v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections

2 Opinion of the Court 24-14213 first-degree arson of a dwelling and arson causing great bodily harm violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.

We review de novo the district court's denial of a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Davis v. Comm'r, Ala. Dep't of Corr., 120 F.4th 768, 788 (11th Cir. 2024) (citing Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir. 2010)). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") governs § 2254 petitions and provides that a federal court may not grant a habeas petition with respect to a claim that was decided on the merits unless the state court decision was (1) "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) . . . based on an un- reasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence pre- sented in the State court proceeding." Davis, 120 F.4th at 788 (quot- ing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2)).

Clearly established federal law consists of the holdings of the Supreme Court's decisions at the time the state court issues its de- cision. Davis, 120 F.4th at 788 (citing Gavin v. Comm'r, Ala. Dep't of Corr., 40 F.4th 1247, 1262 (11th Cir. 2022)). To establish an unrea- sonable application of federal law, the petitioner must show that the state court's decision was so clearly wrong that there is no pos- sibility for fair-minded disagreement. Id. at 788-89 (citing Shinn v. Kayer, 592 U.S. 111, 118 (2020)).

Not infrequently, state-court decisions aren't accompanied by a written explanation. As a rule, federal habeas court should

"look through" any unexplained decision to the last related state-

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24-14213 Opinion of the Court 3 court decision that provides a relevant rationale and presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning. Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122, 125 (2018). On occasion, though, there is no reasoned decision to which to look. An unexplained rejection of a habeas petitioner's constitutional claim still qualifies as an adjudi- cation on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98-100 (2011). In that case, the petitioner must show that there was not a reasonable basis for the state court's denial of relief. See id. at 98. We must then analyze what arguments could have supported the state court's decision and determine whether fair-minded jurists could deem those arguments inconsistent with the prior decisions of the Supreme Court. Id. at 102.

Here, we have two state-court decisions to contend with. First, on direct appeal, Haas raised a double-jeopardy claim for the first time, and the state appellate court rejected it, albeit without explanation. Second, on post-conviction review, the state court ad- dressed and rejected Haas's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, in which he faulted his trial lawyer for failing to present a double- jeopardy defense. The parties dispute which decision we should review. If the state is correct in suggesting that we should focus our attention only on the direct-appeal decision that addressed the double-jeopardy claim proper, then it would get the full benefit of the Harrington rule. If Haas is right that his post-conviction ineffec- tive-assistance claim adequately tees up his double-jeopardy claim, then we should engage the reasons the state court gave for reject- ing that (those) claim(s). We'll return to the "which decision" issue shortly.

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4 Opinion of the Court 24-14213 The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person shall be "subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. amend. V. When reviewing a potential dou- ble jeopardy violation arising from a single prosecution, we start with legislative intent: Did the legislature clearly mean to permit multiple punishments for a given violation? Garrett v. United States,

471 U.S. 773, 778 (1985). If it did, that is the end of the matter. If, by contrast, the legislative intent is unclear, we apply the Block- burger "same elements" test, which asks if each offense "requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not." United States

v. Smith, 532 F.3d 1125, 1128 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Cole v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 133 F.3d 803, 805 (11th Cir. 1998)); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). If they do not, the defend- ant's double-jeopardy rights have been violated. Relevant here are two arson statutes and another cross-ref- erenced provision. Under Fla. Stat. § 806.01, a person commits first-degree arson of a dwelling if he "willfully and unlawfully, or while in the commission of any felony, by fire or explosion, dam- ages or causes to be damaged . . . [a]ny dwelling, whether occupied or not, or its contents." Fla. Stat. § 806.01(1)(a). Under Fla. Stat. § 806.031, a person is guilty of arson causing great bodily harm if he "perpetrates any arson that results in great bodily harm, perma- nent disability, or permanent disfigurement to a firefighter or any other person, regardless of intent or lack of intent to cause such harm." Id. § 806.031(2). That provision continues: "Upon convic- tion and adjudication of guilt, a person may be sentenced sepa- rately, pursuant to s. 775.021(4), for any violation of this section

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24-14213 Opinion of the Court 5 and any arson committed during the same episode." Id. § 806.031(3). The referenced § 775.021(4) codifies Blockburger's dou- ble-jeopardy analysis. See Valdes v. State, 3 So. 3d 1067, 1070 (Fla.

2009).

For a state-law conviction, the threshold legislative-intent prong of the double-jeopardy analysis requires us to look to state law—and, where necessary, the opinions of state courts. See Ohio

v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 (1984) ("We accept, as we must, the [state] Court's determination that the [state] Legislature did not in- tend cumulative punishments . . . ."); see also Williams v. Singletary,

78 F.3d 1510, 1515-16 (11th Cir. 1996) (looking to the Florida ap- pellate court opinions to answer the question of legislative intent in the double jeopardy context). At the time of Haas's conviction, there was one relevant Florida appellate opinion dealing with the application of double jeopardy to the state arson statutes. In Abbate

v. State, the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal held that a de- fendant's convictions of second-degree arson of a structure (as op- posed to first-degree arson of a dwelling here) and arson resulting in great bodily harm violated double jeopardy because second-de- gree arson of a structure is a lesser-included offense of arson result- ing in great bodily harm. 82 So. 3d 886, 888-89 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011).

We review as a "pure question of law" any possible violation of double jeopardy. United States v. Thurston, 362 F.3d 1319, 1322 (11th Cir. 2004) (first citing United States v. Strickland, 261 F.3d 1271,

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6 Opinion of the Court 24-14213 1273 (11th Cir. 2001); and then citing United States v. Baggett, 901 F.2d 1546, 1548 (11th Cir. 1990)).

The first question we face: What is the last relevant state- court adjudication on the merits of the double-jeopardy issue? Was it the unreasoned affirmance of the initial state trial court's ruling on direct appeal, or the reasoned denial issued by the state post- conviction court?¹This would be a straightforward issue if the claims Haas presented on direct appeal and in his state post-convic- tion proceedings were identical: We would look to the decision in the state post-conviction court. Here, though, we have the wrinkle already mentioned: Haas argued the "straight" double-jeopardy is- sue, so to speak—i.e., the one he now asks us to review—only on direct appeal. In state post-conviction proceedings, he argued dou- ble jeopardy as an embedded issue within an ineffective-assistance- of-counsel claim.

The parties seem to think the distinction matters, and it may well. Haas insists that we ought to look to the post-conviction's court discussion of double jeopardy within the context of his inef- fective-assistance claim, whereas the state contends that we should apply Harrington to the state court's unreasoned denial of his straight double-jeopardy claim. In support of his position, Haas cites Wilson's language that we must look through to the "last

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24-14213 Opinion of the Court 7 related state court decision that . . . provide[d] a relevant rationale."

584 U.S. at 125. The state parries with language from circuit prec- edents in the exhaustion area that demarcate substantive claims as

"separate and distinct" from ineffective-assistance claims. LeCroy v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 421 F.3d 1237, 1260 n.24 (11th Cir. 2005); see also, e.g., Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299, 1304 n.8 (11th Cir. 1999) ("An ineffective-assistance claim is analytically distinct from the substantive claim underlying it.").

We need not decide this issue here. Even adopting Haas's stance and looking to the state post-conviction court's reasoning— and treating that court's decision as if it had adjudicated the double- jeopardy issue on the merits, rather than as an element of an inef- fective-assistance claim—he has failed to overcome his weighty burden of showing that the state post-conviction court's reasoning was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Haas argues that his consecutive sentences for first-degree arson of a dwelling and arson resulting in great bodily harm violate double jeopardy. He says so for two reasons: (1) the arson-causing- great-bodily-harm statute's cross-reference to the codification of Blockburger negates any clear legislative intent to allow stacked sen- tences; and (2) even if it didn't, the same provision's "any arson"

language swallows first-degree arson of a dwelling. In response to these arguments—as embedded in the inef- fective-assistance claim—the state post-conviction court cited the

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8 Opinion of the Court 24-14213 second-degree-arson-resulting-in-great-bodily-harm statute's pro- vision allowing for separate sentences in finding a clear legislative intent to authorize separate punishments for the two crimes. As the court found a clear legislative intent, it had no need to conduct a Blockburger same-elements analysis.

Haas counters that the state post-conviction court failed to analyze this provision in full; it quoted but left unexamined the cross-reference to the separate-sentence provision in Fla. Stat. § 775.021(4). As relevant here, that provision makes explicit that lesser-included offenses do not benefit from the general rule of con- struction favoring a finding of legislative intent authorizing punish- ments for separate offenses. Fla. Stat. § 775.021(4) ("The intent of the Legislature is to convict and sentence for each criminal offense committed in the course of one criminal episode or transaction . . .

. Exceptions to this rule of construction are: . . . . Offenses which are lesser offenses the statutory elements of which are subsumed by the greater offense."). So he contends that the best read of rele- vant state law would require a reviewing court to conduct the Blockburger same-elements analysis.

Of course, "it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations of state-law questions." Es- telle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). True, in a double-jeop- ardy case the state-law question—whether Florida's arson statutes evince a clear legislative intent to authorize separate punish- ments—is embedded in the federal law. Still AEDPA sharply limits the role of a federal habeas court: "[A]n unreasonable application of

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24-14213 Opinion of the Court 9 federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law,"

and, accordingly, "a state court must be granted . . . deference and latitude." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101 (quoting Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000)) (emphasis in original). And with respect to the threshold legislative-intent prong of a double-jeopardy claim, a federal court is "bound to accept the [State] court's con- struction of that State's statutes." Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368 (1983) (emphasis added) (citing O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524,

531 (1974)).

We cannot conclude that the state court unreasonably ap- plied federal law in concluding that no Blockburger analysis was nec- essary. The statute for arson resulting in great bodily harm could reasonably be interpreted to demonstrate a clear legislative intent in favor of separate sentences. See Fla. Stat. § 806.031(3) ("[A] per- son may be sentenced separately, pursuant to s. 775.021(4), for any vi- olation of this section and for any arson committed during the same criminal episode.") (emphasis added). The only Florida case that pe- titioners can point to that contradicts this reading, and indeed the only relevant case to address this area of the law, dealt with the relationship between second-degree arson (of any structure) and arson resulting great bodily harm. Abbate, 82 So.3d at 886. As first- degree arson of a dwelling is a distinct offense from second-degree arson, it would not be unreasonable to distinguish Abbate on this ground alone.

Here, the district court did not err in denying Haas relief on his double-jeopardy claim. Haas has failed to show that either state

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10 Opinion of the Court 24-14213 court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law. Accord- ingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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