ORDER DENYING PETITION
This original petition for a writ of mandamus challenges a district court order denying petitioner Duane Keith Davis's motion to dismiss a criminal indictment.
Davis is awaiting trial on charges stemming from the 1996 shooting death of Tupac Shakur. Davis first argues that proceeding to trial would be unconstitutional under the rule of corpus delicti because the State does not possess any evidence, aside from Davis's uncorroborated admissions to law enforcement, connecting Davis to Shakur's murder. Additionally, Davis argues that his statements to various law enforcement agencies were provided pursuant to a continuing proffer agreement and thus are generally inadmissible as evidence against Davis. Having reviewed Davis's mandamus petition and supporting documents, we are not persuaded that our extraordinary and discretionary intervention is warranted. See NRS 34.160—.170; Chasing Horse u. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.,
140 Nev., Adv. Op. 63, 555 P.3d 1205, 1211 (2024) ("[T]he right to appeal is
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generally an adequate legal remedy that precludes writ relief." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Pan u. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 222, 228,
88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004) (observing that the party seeking writ relief bears the burden of showing such relief is warranted); Smith u. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 107 Nev. 674, 677, 679, 818 P.2d 849, 851, 853 (1991) (recognizing that writ relief is an extraordinary remedy and that this court has sole discretion in determining whether to entertain a writ petition).
As an initial matter, the record does not include the indictment or grand jury transcript, making it difficult to ascertain the charges at issue and their relation to Davis's arguments. Regardless, a motion to dismiss an indictment is not the appropriate vehicle to challenge the sufficiency of the State's evidence. Rather, Davis should have petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus if he wished to "object to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the indictment." NRS 172.155(2). And should Davis be convicted, Davis would have an adequate remedy available by way of direct appeal to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial. Nor has Davis demonstrated a legal right to dismissal resulting from the purported proffer agreement. While the district court determined that Davis made statements subject to a federal proffer agreement in 1998, Davis has not shown that any protections extended to subsequent law enforcement interviews or that the State of Nevada was ever bound by such an agreement. Accordingly, we
ORDER the petitio DENIED.
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cc: Hon. Carli Lynn Kierny, District Judge Cega Law Group
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk
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