PER CURIAM:
Attorney Ethel Munson appeals from the district court's orders granting Munson's former client, Stephanie Maddox's, motion to extinguish Munson's attorney's lien and denying Munson's motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3). Munson argues that the district court abused its discretion in extinguishing her attorney's lien and in denying her Rule 60(b) motion. After careful review, we affirm.
I . Background
In 2021, after being terminated from her job as an internal auditor with the Athens-Clarke County ("ACC") government, Maddox retained Munson to represent her in an employment suit against ACC; Kelly Girtz, the ACC Mayor; and Blaine Williams, the ACC City Manager. Maddox initially paid Munson several thousand dollars as a retainer and signed a contingency fee contract.
Munson filed a complaint on Maddox's behalf raising a claim for First Amendment retaliation against ACC, Girtz, and Williams, and a state law claim under Georgia's Whistleblower Act against the ACC. Ultimately, the district court dismissed the retaliation claims against the individual defendants at the motion to dismiss stage, but allowed the retaliation and whistleblower claim against ACC to proceed.
Sometime in December 2023, Maddox retained new counsel, Kevin Epps, and Munson withdrew as counsel. In March 2024, Maddox settled her case with ACC for $44,653.63. The same
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25-11097 Opinion of the Court 3 day that Maddox signed the release of claims, Munson sent ACC a claim for an attorney's fees lien in the amount of $34,860. Three days later, Munson sent a second notice revising her lien to $78,630. Because of the pending lien, the settlement funds were deposited into the district court's registry.
Maddox filed a motion to extinguish Munson's lien on the ground that Munson had failed to produce documentation to prove the value of her services, her services provided no value to Maddox because the parties had settled based on a different claim not brought in the underlying complaints Munson had filed, and Munson abandoned Maddox by repeatedly advising her that she should seek new counsel.
Munson then filed a motion to intervene in the case to protect her lien, which the district court granted. Munson filed a response opposing the motion to extinguish. Munson asserted that she never represented that she was unable to produce a fee petition and billing statement for her services, only that she did not routinely create and provide such invoices for contingency-fee based clients. Munson claimed that she contacted an accountant with experience in generating fee petitions and offered to generate one for Maddox (at Maddox's expense), but Maddox never responded to the offer. Munson explained that her revised attorney's fees lien of $78,630, reflected the previously omitted costs of a mandamus petition she filed in this Court related to a
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4 Opinion of the Court 25-11097 discovery order.1Finally, she denied that she abandoned Maddox, although she admitted that she and Maddox disagreed on many aspects of the case and indicated that there had been a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. Munson attached to her response: (1) a declaration from her office manager, Angela McCoy; (2) Munson's own declaration; and (3) an itemized list of services rendered, time spent, and costs for those services. Office Manager McCoy attested that she was responsible for tracking Munson's "daily hourly usage" for cases. McCoy explained that she did not prepare or send billing invoices to contingency fee clients, like Maddox. However, the "data" for contingency fee clients was "kept in different files for all clients collectively—number of hours per task synchronized with Ms. Munson's and [McCoy's] calendars as to date and time." McCoy explained that a third-party accountant prepared fee petitions, and McCoy provided the accountant "the records, the third-party providers' records, and any other open accounts, that were accessed during the pendency of the case, to the accountant." As part of the information sent to the accountant, McCoy
"incorporate[d] hourly information from [her] records, the
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25-11097 Opinion of the Court 5 individual case folders, and from Ms. Munson's daily calendars as well as [her] calendars."
Munson indicated in her declaration that "Ken Dious [was] presently ill [and would] provide a verification of [her] attorney's fees billing upon his recovery."2Finally, Munson included a list of itemized services that indicated that she spent 110.96 hours on Maddox's case and was entitled to $41,606.25 in fees. Following additional responses and a motion by Munson for disbursement of funds from the court registry, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on the motions.
At the evidentiary hearing, Maddox testified that Munson advised her to seek new counsel at least "half a dozen" times in writing and "a dozen and a half" over the phone. She explained that Munson's repeated advice that she seek new counsel was precipitated by Maddox asking questions about the case and expressing concern over how it was proceeding. Maddox testified that the settlement was not related to any of the claims asserted in the underlying complaint. Instead, it was the result of new counsel's discovery that ACC had violated a local ordinance when it terminated Maddox without a vote by the entire County Commission.3Maddox also explained that, after her deposition in
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6 Opinion of the Court 25-11097 the federal case, ACC had threatened her with Rule 11 sanctions because of incorrect information in Munson's filings.4 The district court questioned Maddox about the nature of her requests of Munson during the time Munson represented her. Maddox explained that she had difficulty getting updates about the case from Munson, who simply repeatedly stated, "if there is an update worth sharing, I'll let you know." As the years went by and unable to get substantive updates from Munson, Maddox signed up for her own Pacer account to view her case, and she observed "a lot of activity that [Munson had not] shared with [her]." When she questioned Munson about the unspecified activity, Munson accused Maddox of trying to be a lawyer and not understanding the legal process. Maddox observed that some of the filings had multiple mistakes in them, and she alerted Munson, and Munson blamed Maddox for the mistakes. During this time, Munson repeatedly told Maddox, "perhaps you should start seeking other termination." The letter also stated that, should a resolution not be reached, Maddox would move to amend her complaint to add this wrongful termination claim.
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25-11097 Opinion of the Court 7 counsel." Eventually, Munson ceased communication with Maddox.5
Maddox explained that she asked Munson for billing records, so that she could determine how much she owed Munson. According to Maddox, Munson refused, stating "she did not keep records," "she didn't have time," and "would get to it when she got to it." Supporting e-mails showed that Maddox requested a statement of "billable hours to date" for the case in September 2023, and that Munson indicated that she would speak with her accountant about preparing a fee petition. Maddox again requested a statement of billable hours in November 2023. In relation to the November billing request, Munson responded as follows:
As I previously explained to you, my law firm does not prepare attorney's fees invoices for contingency fee clients until and unless they are prevailing plaintiffs. At that time, should you become a
prevailing plaintiff, my accountant, at my request and at my expense, would compile a detailed attorney's fees bill from my documentation, district court docket sheet and from third-party providers' records for the court. After my accountant explained the
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8 Opinion of the Court 25-11097 amount of work involved in preparing an item-by- item billing as using in a fee petition and the present cost for such ($350), I did not, and would not, order such for a case unless it was needed for the furtherance of the case. If you desire an item-by-item bill, I am sure that my accountant can accommodate your request for her customary charge. Please advise. (emphasis in original).
The district court asked Munson whether she kept a running record of attorney's fees, and Munson explained that "we have records," but we do "not create an invoice for a contingency fee plaintiff . . . the same way that we do for an hourly client" because if the contingency client does not prevail, those records are of "no use." Rather, Munson explained that her firm kept a record based on "task[s]" and "stages of litigation, like complaint, discovery" and
"would total the number of hours that we spent on each segment of the case."
Munson confirmed that she was proceeding under a quantum meruit theory, and submitted a bill prepared by her office manager for fees totaling $41,606.25. Munson could not confirm the date the bill was prepared. Munson explained that billable records were not kept for contingency fee clients. Nevertheless, Munson insisted that she had "accurate hours of [her] time," which were kept "in files." When asked what kind of files she was referring to, Munson stated "[t]hey are different for discovery files, pleading files." The court questioned her about certain entries on the bill and what increments she kept time in, and Munson was
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25-11097 Opinion of the Court 9 generally not able to answer the court's questions or provide clarity for the entries. Munson's office manager was not present to testify at the hearing. The court noted that, in her prior declaration, Munson had indicated that a person named "Ken Dious" would provide verification of her attorney's fees billing, and Munson confirmed he was not present at the hearing. She confirmed that she had no one else present at the hearing to testify in support of her fees. Nor did she bring any documents to support the bill.6 Following the hearing, the district court granted Maddox's motion to extinguish the lien and denied Munson's motion to withdraw funds. The district court concluded that Munson was not entitled to the lien because (1) she had effectively abandoned her client; (2) her services provided no value to Maddox because the settlement was based on a new wrongful termination claim discovered by new counsel, not any of the claims Munson asserted; and (3) Munson failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove the value of her services and the reasonableness of those costs. Notably, the district court expressly found that Munson's explanation and support for her requested fees lack[ed] credibility based on the multiple versions of the bill, the delay it took for Munson to produce the [b]ill, her initial attempts to charge Plaintiff for the creation of the [b]ill, the confusion as to who other
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10 Opinion of the Court 25-11097 than Munson compiled the [b]ill, and the lack of explanation of how the [b]ill was created. Munson filed a notice of appeal.
Thereafter, Munson filed a motion to set aside the judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3), on the basis that Maddox obtained the judgment through fraud because she and her current counsel allegedly committed perjury at the evidentiary hearing. Munson identified four specific statements from the hearing that she contended were false.7 The district court denied the motion, concluding that, even if it accepted Munson's perjury contention, its alternative conclusions that Munson's services provided no value to Maddox, or, alternatively that Munson failed to prove the value of her services and reasonableness of the costs remained the same. Munson then filed an amended notice of appeal to include the denial of her Rule 60(b)(3) motion.
II. Discussion
Munson argues that the district court abused its discretion in not granting her attorney's fees because (1) she did not abandon
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25-11097 Opinion of the Court 11 Maddox and the district court's conclusion otherwise was based on clearly erroneous factual findings and perjured statements made by Maddox and her trial counsel; (2) her legal services provided value to Maddox; and (3) she proved the value of her legal services.8
"We review the denial of a motion for attorneys' fees and costs for abuse of discretion." Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 678 F.3d 1199, 1201 (11th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). An abuse of discretion occurs if the district court "fails to apply the proper legal standard or to follow proper procedures in making the determination, . . . bases [its decision] upon findings of fact that are clearly erroneous," or "commits a clear error of judgment." Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 613 F.3d 1035, 1039 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted). This standard "implies a range of choices . . . and often we will affirm even though we would have decided the other way if it had been our choice." Id. Under Georgia law,9an attorney, including one performing on a contingency fee basis, has an equitable right to recover fees
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12 Opinion of the Court 25-11097 and costs due for her services, which may be satisfied "out of the judgment obtained by [her] professional services." Howe & Assocs., P.C. v. Daniels, 618 S.E.2d 42, 44 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005); Amstead v. McFarland, 650 S.E.2d 737, 740 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) ("It is well settled that an attorney who is discharged prior to earning a contingency fee is entitled to recover fees from the client based on quantum meruit." (quotations omitted)). These attorney's liens are "superior to all liens except tax liens; and no person shall be at liberty to satisfy such an action, judgment, or decree until the lien or claim of the attorney for [her] fees is fully satisfied." O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14(b). The attorney bears the "burden to show her attorney fees and the reasonableness thereof. An attorney cannot recover for professional services without proof of their value."
Webb v. Watkins, 641 S.E.2d 611, 613 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (citation and quotations omitted). Even where the attorney proceeded on a contingency fee basis, the attorney "must also introduce evidence of hours, rates, or some other indication of the value of the professional services actually rendered." Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Tvrdeich, 602 S.E.2d 297, 302 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). "A party's testimony as to the approximate cost of legal fees is insufficient."
Patton v. Turnage, 580 S.E.2d 604, 748 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (quotations omitted). "An award of attorney's fees is unauthorized if [the party seeking fees] failed to prove the actual costs of [the attorney] and the reasonableness of those costs." Southern Co. v. Hamburg, 470 S.E.2d 467, 474 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (quotations omitted).
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25-11097 Opinion of the Court 13 Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Munson's attorney's fees lien because she failed to prove the value and reasonableness of her fees.10The record establishes that Munson initially asserted an attorney's lien for $34,860, and then, a few days later, revised her lien to $78,630. Then at the evidentiary hearing, Munson produced an itemized bill for a third amount of $41,606.25. Although Munson contended McCoy prepared the itemized bill, McCoy did not testify at the hearing, and McCoy's declaration does not shed light on how, or what she did, to prepare the itemized bill. Similarly, there was no evidence as to how the initial retainer Maddox paid Munson factored into the itemized bill. Furthermore, the district court found that Munson's explanations and support for her fees were not credible, and "[c]redibility determinations are entitled to great deference[] and must not be disturbed unless manifestly unreasonable."
Ballard v. C.I.R., 429 F.3d 1026, 1031 (11th Cir. 2005). Based on the three different lien amounts submitted in this case, the lack of information regarding how the itemized bill was prepared in this case, and the district court's conclusion that Munson's explanations and support for her bill were not credible, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny Munson's lien. See Webb,
641 S.E.2d at 613 (explaining that the attorney bears the "burden to show her attorney fees and the reasonableness thereof" and that
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"[a]n attorney cannot recover for professional services without proof of their value"); Southern Co., 470 S.E.2d at 474 ("An award of attorney's fees is unauthorized if [the party seeking fees] failed to prove the actual costs of [the attorney] and the reasonableness of those costs." (quotations omitted)). Consequently, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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