United States v. Brett Siegel

sexually abuse young boys and then to share photos, videos, and audio files of the conduct. Siegel pleaded guilty to one count of knowingly receiving child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A). The statutory minimum sentence was 60 months' imprisonment. But the Sentencing Guidelines recommended 70 to 87 months. Siegel argued for the statutory minimum without challenging the guidelines calculation. He asserted that the guidelines range overstated his culpability and risked an unwarranted sentencing disparity. In advancing the latter argument, Siegel did not compare himself to any similar defendants.

At sentencing the district court adopted the undisputed guidelines range and then proceeded to consider Siegel's arguments in mitigation. The district court expressly acknowledged that Siegel was receiving mental health treatment and had a low risk of recidivism, and further that he had no criminal history, strong family support, worked as a pediatric social worker, and complied with the terms of his pretrial release. Acknowledging Siegel's concerns about certain aspects of the guidelines calculation, the court addressed his culpability, observing that nearly all offenders use computers, that he had a relatively low number of images, and that his conduct entailed no more than receipt and possession. The district court then asked Siegel whether it had "considered [his] factors in mitigation?" Siegel replied, "Yes."

The district court also considered aggravating factors. The court recognized that Siegel's conduct occurred over a long period of time and that he encouraged another person to sexually abuse children. The court acknowledged the victim impact statements and that the victims continue to experience harm.

At the end of the sentencing, after sharing its proposed 76-month sentence, the district court asked whether "either side ha[d] any legal objection to the sentence I propose or request any further elaboration of my reasons under 3553 both as to the term of imprisonment … or any other aspect of sentencing?" Both parties replied, "No."

II

We see no merit to Siegel's contention that the district court procedurally erred by inadequately considering his arguments in mitigation.

We have encouraged courts, "after imposing a sentence … to inquire of defense counsel whether they are satisfied" with the explanation provided. See United States v. Garcia-Segura, 717 F.3d 566, 568-69 (7th Cir. 2013). "If the response is in the affirmative, a later challenge for failure to address a principal mitigation argument … [is] waived."

United States v. Brown, 932 F.3d 1011, 1019 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Garcia-Segura, 717 F.3d at 569). Waiver forecloses appellate review of a challenge to a sentencing court's failure

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to address a defendant's arguments in mitigation. See United States v. Tyler, 139 F.4th 598, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2025).

By twice affirming that the district court sufficiently considered his mitigation arguments, Siegel waived any challenge on this basis. After addressing each of his contentions, the court asked Siegel whether it "had considered [the] factors in mitigation," and Siegel responded that it had. And then in connection with announcing Siegel's sentence, the court asked whether he wanted "further elaboration" of the reasons for it. Siegel again declined. On this record, Siegel waived the challenge he now presses on appeal. See, e.g., id. (concluding that defendant's affirmative answer to whether court addressed his principal arguments in mitigation waived later procedural challenge). Siegel quibbles with the language of the district court's inquiry, contending that the word "consider" is improper because the correct question is whether a defendant is

"satisfied" that his arguments have been addressed. See Brown, 932 F.3d at 1019. But district courts have broad discretion at sentencing, Tyler, 139 F.4th at 602, and we have never required a district court to follow a precise script when it inquires whether it considered arguments advanced in mitigation. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 21 F.4th 490, 494 (7th Cir. 2021) (concluding that a challenge was waived when court asked defendant,

"Are there other issues you feel I haven't addressed or any other recommendations you think I should make?"); Brown, 932 F.3d at 1019 (determining that an argument was waived when the court asked whether parties requested "further amplification" of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors).

The district court's questions were unequivocal: the court drew Siegel's attention to its discussion of his arguments in mitigation and the reasons for his sentence and twice asked whether he wanted further consideration or elaboration. That is sufficient to trigger waiver. Compare United States v. Donelli, 747 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 2014) (observing that an inquiry was satisfactory when the court asked whether defendant "had any disagreement with the sentence or required further elaboration of the court's reasons"), with United States v. Morris, 775 F.3d 882, 866 (7th Cir. 2015) (concluding that a general inquiry whether parties had "anything further in this matter" was not sufficient). Taken together, the district court's inquiries gave Siegel more than one opportunity to raise any arguments the court may have overlooked or to request additional explanation for his sentence. Siegel's failure to use those opportunities constitutes waiver. See Perez, 21 F.4th at 494.

Even if Siegel had not waived this argument, it fails on the merits. A district court only needs to address a defendant's primary arguments in mitigation and may do so implicitly or imperfectly so long as the record "gives us confidence" that the court did so.

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United States v. Sanchez, 989 F.3d 523, 540 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Jones,

798 F.3d 613, 618 (7th Cir. 2015)). The district court satisfied that standard here. Siegel's challenge to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence also falls short. Indeed, for the first time on appeal, he argues that his sentence violates 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) because it is disproportionately long when compared to the sentences of other first-time offenders guilty of similar conduct. Even setting aside considerations of forfeiture, we have said many times over that a sentence within a properly calculated guidelines range "necessarily complies with § 3553(a)(6)." Sanchez, 989 F.3d at 541 (quoting United States v. Bartlett, 567 F.3d 901, 908 (7th Cir. 2009)). Indeed, a sentence within the guidelines range automatically considers unwarranted disparities with others who committed the same crime. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347-50 (2007). In any event, the district court stated that it had considered the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. And Siegel did not present any specific comparators for the district court to consider. A district court cannot abuse its discretion by failing to consider an argument not presented to it. See United States v. Reibel, 688 F.3d 868, 872 (7th Cir. 2012). And the other defendants Siegel now identifies are not readily comparable to him. The specific facts of each case and individual characteristics of each comparator defendant are relevant. See United States v. Newsom, 428 F.3d 685, 689 (7th Cir. 2005). While Siegel points to other first-time offenders who pleaded guilty to the same or similar crimes, he does not identify any defendant who, like himself, encouraged another person to abuse children, record the abuse, and share it.

For these reasons, we AFFIRM.

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