United States v. Matthew Rocco

3

we would have decided the fact differently," United States v. Stevenson, 396 F.3d 538, 542 (4th Cir. 2005).

The Supreme Court has explained that "[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and . . . is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which [law enforcement] intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which [a search or seizure] is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 192-99 (2013) (conducting same balancing analysis to determine legality of law enforcement's seizure of defendant's person). In conducting this balancing analysis, courts must "examin[e] the totality of the circumstances." Knights, 534 U.S. at 118 (internal quotation marks omitted). In Knights, for instance, the Supreme Court was faced with determining the reasonableness of law enforcement's warrantless search of a probationer subject to a general search condition that required the defendant to "submit to a search 'by any probation officer or law enforcement officer.'" Id. at 116. In conducting its balancing analysis to decide the defendant's motion to suppress seized evidence, the Supreme Court explained that a court must "examin[e] the totality of the circumstances, with the probation search condition being a salient circumstance."¹Id. at 118 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

4

As the Supreme Court explained, the defendant's "status as a probationer subject to a search condition informs both sides of that balance" because "[p]robation, like incarceration, is a form of criminal sanction imposed by a court upon an offender after verdict, finding, or plea of guilty." Id. at 119 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,

"[i]nherent in the very nature of probation is that probationers do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). And

"[j]ust as other punishments for criminal convictions curtail an offender's freedoms, a court granting probation may impose reasonable conditions that deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens." Id.

On the other hand, the Supreme Court has unequivocally held that the government's interests in conducting searches on supervisees and parolees, for instance, "are substantial"

because such individuals "are more likely to commit future criminal offenses." Samson,

547 U.S. at 853 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has also acknowledged the government's "interests in reducing recidivism and thereby promoting reintegration and positive citizenship among probationers and parolees," which "warrant privacy intrusions that would not otherwise be tolerated under the Fourth Amendment."

Id. Accordingly, when conducting the totality of the circumstances balancing analysis,

547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006) (analyzing legality of search of probationer under its holding in Knights, and observing that "parolees have fewer expectations of privacy than probationers[] because parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation is to imprisonment"); United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446, 461 (2d Cir. 2002) (applying same principles to search of federal supervised releasee because "[a] convicted person serving a term of supervised release must comply with certain conditions, enforced by federal probation officers, or face further penal sanctions").

5

courts have upheld intrusions on the privacy interests of persons under court supervision under lower standards than the Fourth Amendment normally requires. See, e.g., Knights,

534 U.S. at 121 ("When an officer has reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject to a search condition is engaged in criminal activity, there is enough likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an intrusion on the probationer's significantly diminished privacy interests is reasonable."); Reyes, 283 F.3d at 462 (concluding that, because "home visits 'at any time'" conducted pursuant to a supervised release condition are "far less intrusive than a probation search, probation officers conducting a home visit are not subject to the reasonable suspicion standard" (emphasis omitted)).

Rocco asserts that law enforcement's seizure of his telephone during the execution of a search warrant on his residence was unconstitutional because, working in conjunction with law enforcement, his probation officer instructed him to return to his home, which brought him within the geographical location of law enforcement's search. However, Rocco, who was on supervised release at the time of law enforcement's search, was required to allow the probation officer to conduct at-home visits as a condition of his release. Thus, the probation officer's instruction that Rocco return home was only a minimal impingement on Rocco's privacy.

Regarding the Government's interests, "[i]t was reasonable to conclude that the [imposed] condition[s] would further the two primary goals of [supervised release]— rehabilitation and protecting society from future criminal violations." Knights, 534 U.S. at 119; see United States v. Hamilton, 986 F.3d 413, 418 (4th Cir. 2021) ("Key among [the primary goals of federal supervised release] are protection of the public and rehabilitation

6

of the defendant." (internal citations omitted)). Indeed, the probation officer had a significant interest in ensuring that Rocco was complying with the terms of his release and was not harming the public by engaging in further crimes. Notably, Rocco is a recidivist who had already violated the terms of his supervised release and, given law enforcement's possession of a residential search warrant, there was probable cause to believe that Rocco was violating again.

We therefore conclude that the district court did not err when it denied Rocco's motion to suppress and, thus, affirm the criminal judgment.²We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED