IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING DEFENDANT'S GR 37 OBJECTION A. An Objective Observer Could Conclude That Race Was a Factor When the Prosecuting Attorney Used a Peremptory Challenge To Exclude PJ 39 from Serving on the Jury
An objective observer, watching voir dire, could have concluded the following about PJ 39:
• He was a person of color.
• He considers a person's body language, eye contact, the way they speak, evidence, and facts to determine that person's credibility.
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• He previously served on a jury in a criminal case.
• He would hold it against a defendant if a defendant did not take the stand because he wouldn't have heard all the information.
• He thinks that if a defendant doesn't testify because the attorney advised him not to testify, that the defendant gave the attorney the authority to make that decision.
• He did not pay attention to a question directed to another prospective juror that was sitting next to him.
• When he was asked a direct question, he answered the question.
• When the prosecutor asked a question to the entire panel, he responded by raising his placard.
I am accepting that PJ 39 was not paying attention to the question asked of the prospective juror sitting next to him because he admitted that. For anyone who has ever sat through voir dire, it would be uncommon for someone not to tune out at some point in the process—especially during the second half of the last round. Under GR 37, intent is no longer part of the equation, so we no longer look to determine whether the prosecuting attorney in fact intended to exclude PJ 39 because PJ 39 was a person of color. Instead, after a GR 37 objection, the trial court must determine, looking at all the circumstances, whether an objective observer could conclude that race or ethnicity was a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge. GR 37(d), (g). An objective observer is someone who is aware that implicit, institutional, explicit, and
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unconscious biases have resulted in the exclusion of prospective jurors in our state. GR 37(f).
Here, the trial court erred by not following GR 37's procedure and, instead, apparently relying on its own, unverified, impressions.
First, the trial court never made a ruling as to whether an objective observer, considering all the circumstances, could conclude that race was a factor in the exclusion of PJ 39. Instead, the trial court reviewed subsections (g) and (i), concluding:
I am going to make a ruling, and then I am going to favor you with an observation.
I don't think that this falls under GR 37 for the reasons that I have already stated. I don't see a disproportionate number of questions or ignoring Juror 39. By his own admission, he wasn't paying attention. My observations of him because he's sitting right in the front row is his mind was drifting throughout the questioning.
I didn't focus on relentlessly, but, like I said, he is right in front of my field of vision. I did notice that he was potentially staring off and not completely tracking the proceedings.
I'm going to deny the challenge.
7 TP at 632. It appears from the record that the trial court was engaging in a Batson analysis and concluded that the defendant did not prove that the prosecutor used the peremptory challenge as a result of purposeful discrimination.
Indeed, it appears that both the prosecutor and the trial judge used intent as a factor by relying on the fact that the prosecutor also used a peremptory challenge to
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exclude PJ 31, who also stated that she had not been paying attention at one time.8The trial court should not be attempting to determine the attorney's intent for using the peremptory challenge. That was a major flaw in the Batson analysis. Short of extraordinary circumstances, it is impossible to determine the attorney's intent in excluding a person of color from serving on the jury. In fact, as Justice Marshall noted, the attorney themselves may not know whether implicit bias was a reason they used the peremptory challenge. While they may be telling themselves that the reason they want to exclude that prospective juror from serving is because of a momentary lapse in attention, implicit bias played a role in that decision.
Moreover, there can be multiple reasons why an attorney excluded a prospective juror of color. GR 37 does not require the trial court to conclude that race or ethnicity was the major, "but for," or likely reason that the attorney excluded a prospective juror of color. Instead, the trial court, placing itself in the role of an objective observer, determines whether it is possible that race or ethnicity could have been a factor in the use of that peremptory challenge.
Looking at the facts listed above, it appears the trial court found that an objective observer could conclude that race was not a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge. However, that is not the test. The test is the opposite, and here, an objective observer who is aware of implicit bias could certainly conclude that race not only could have been
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but in fact likely was the reason why this peremptory challenge was used. If anything, one of PJ 39's responses could be viewed as prosecutor oriented. An objective observer could certainly conclude that implicit bias was a reason the prosecutor excluded PJ 39. In other words, while the prosecutor consciously believes (in fact, likely strongly believes) that the reason he excluded PJ 39 was because PJ 39 was not paying attention to a question being posed to another prospective juror, his implicit bias, which by definition is unconscious, was the reason why, even with a prosecutor- oriented response, he chose to exclude this prospective juror of color. However, to make this clear, why the prosecuting attorney excluded PJ 39 from serving on the jury is not part of the GR 37 analysis. It is possible that neither race nor ethnicity was a factor at all in his decision to exclude PJ 39 from serving on the jury. But that is not the test. The test is whether an objective observer, not being able to delve into the psyche of the prosecuting attorney, could view race or ethnicity as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge.
The State argued that race was not a factor because it also excluded PJ 31 for being inattentive.9That is also not part of the analysis because an objective observer would not be able to conclude that the prosecuting attorney excluded PJ 31 only because that potential juror was inattentive. There could have been other reasons; for example, PJ
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31 answered a juror questionnaire before voir dire that contained information that could have provided multiple reasons why the prosecuting attorney decided to exclude PJ 31. Fundamentally, the fact that the prosecuting attorney excluded PJ 31 does not foreclose an objective observer from concluding that one possibility was that race was a factor in the prosecuting attorney excluding PJ 39 in addition to being inattentive. B. The Trial Court's Unilateral Impressions of PJ 39 Should Not Have Been Part of the GR 37 Analysis
In denying the defendant's GR 37 motion, the trial court offered the following impressions: that PJ 39's "mind was drifting throughout the questioning" and "that he was potentially staring off and not completely tracking the proceedings." 7 TP at 632. These unilateral impressions are irrelevant to the GR 37 analysis. First, the trial court stated that it was watching PJ 39 throughout the questioning and that PJ 39's mind was drifting throughout that time, and PJ 39 was potentially staring off and not completely tracking the proceedings. The trial court did not state why it had the impression that PJ 39's mind was drifting throughout the questioning. That type of conclusory remark does not add to the GR 37 analysis. Moreover, that remark appears to be belied by the record where, whenever PJ 39 was asked a direct question, he provided an answer. The trial court's impression could be the effect of implicit bias itself. A corollary to implicit bias is confirmation bias—scrutinizing another to confirm one's biases. In other words, if someone holds the implicit bias that a person of color is less likely to pay attention than a White person, they will scrutinize that person to confirm
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that bias. That was one reason for the notice requirements of GR 37(i)—when a party believes that a prospective juror is inattentive to the point where it is chronic, they must notify both the opposing party and the judge so that others can either confirm or not confirm that observation. Apparently, neither the two prosecuting attorneys nor the defense attorney had seen PJ 39 being inattentive before that last questioning because none of those three attorneys brought it to the court's attention. Under a GR 37 analysis, unless the parties and the court are put on notice that someone believes that a prospective juror is being inattentive, that allegation cannot be included in the GR 37 analysis. To make this clear, the one instance of PJ 39 being inattentive was properly part of the GR 37 analysis. The allegation by the trial court that PJ 39's mind had been drifting off, that he wasn't tracking, and that he was potentially staring off throughout the voir dire should not have been part of the trial court's GR 37 analysis.
C. Notice Under GR 37(i) Must Be Given as Soon as Possible and Cannot Be Given at the End of Questioning the Prospective Jurors
GR 37(i) provides, in part:
If any party intends to offer one of these reasons or a similar reason as the justification for a peremptory challenge, that party must provide reasonable notice to the court and the other parties so the behavior can be verified and addressed in a timely manner.
The majority spends a fair amount of time analyzing whether the requirements of GR 37 were satisfied here and concluded the role of "notice timing on review is minimal"
because a lack of corroboration is "the deciding factor." Majority at 17. I have a
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different view. Timing is important at the trial court proceedings and on appellate review. Notice given late will result in lack of corroboration. Not only must notice be given before voir dire ends, but it must be given as soon as possible.
1. Notice Must Be Given Before Voir Dire Concludes The purpose of requiring a party to give notice is so the opposing party and the judge can either verify or disagree with that claim. Making a claim at the end of voir dire doesn't allow the opposing party and the judge to observe if the alleged behavior is occurring. If such a claim isn't made until the end of voir dire, it is difficult to believe that the prospective juror had been inattentive throughout the process—if they had been, the party would have provided that notice earlier. Therefore, the claim of a prospective juror not being attentive at the end of voir dire cannot be part of the GR 37 analysis. I would explicitly hold that notice under GR 37(i) will not be timely if given after the questioning of the prospective jurors has ended. If notice of a prospective juror's inattention is not given until the peremptory challenges are made, then the purpose of providing notice is defeated. The purpose for the notice is so that others can corroborate the alleged inattention.
2. Notice Must Be Given as Soon as Possible Notice under GR 37(i) must be given as soon as possible—that is not a difficult requirement. At the pretrial conference, the trial court could set out the procedure when a party wants to confirm a prospective juror's conduct under GR 37(i). One method would be to have a sheet ready that both parties can write down the prospective juror's number
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and alleged conduct to be initialed by the opposing party and handed to the court while voir dire is being conducted. Another method would be for an attorney to stand after noticing the conduct and ask the court for a brief sidebar for a GR 37(i) matter. These are only two suggestions, and there are likely other options where notice can be given quickly while still keeping the voir dire process moving along. Here, the notice requirement doesn't come into play because there was only the one instance of PJ 39 being inattentive that could be considered for GR 37 purposes. The record shows that PJ 39 was not paying attention to the question being asked of another prospective juror. The trial court's claim that PJ 39 had prior instances of being inattentive, for reasons given earlier, could not be part of the GR 37 analysis.
V. T HE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR A GR 37 RULING SHOULD BE DE NOVO
In State v. Tesfasilasye, 200 Wn.2d 345, 355, 518 P.3d 193 (2022), we stated that we would review the appeal de novo, but we left for another case what the standard of review should be in a GR 37 appeal.
I believe it should be a de novo standard of review without deference to the trial court's unilateral observations.
Appellate courts stand in the same position as the trial court in performing the GR 37 analysis. The trial court must know that the record must be complete so the appellate court can review it and rerun the GR 37 analysis based on that record. The trial court's own observations, without verification of the parties as to the conduct or behavior of prospective jurors, may not be used in performing the GR 37 analysis. Appellate courts
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should not defer to these observations because those observations may be tainted by implicit bias themselves.
As discussed, in Saintcalle we applied a clear error standard of review to affirm the trial court's conclusion that there was no purposeful discrimination because that case did not present an opportunity to address the deficiencies found in Batson. 178 Wn.2d at
41. Amici persuasively show that appellate review of a trial court's GR 37 rulings with a deferential standard will not prevent discrimination in jury selection, and the extra scrutiny will mitigate harmful implicit bias. Br. of Amici Curiae Ctr. for Civ. Rts. & Critical Just. et al. at 14-15 (quoting Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 H ARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 149, 162 (2010); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84
N OTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1231 (2009)).
There is no need to defer to the trial court's determination of whether an objective observer, viewing the jury empaneling process, could view race as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge. The parties and the trial court have an opportunity to put on the record what they think is relevant to GR 37, including appearance, demeanor, tone, and body language. The trial court should state on the record its analysis as to how it came to its conclusion. This could include the conduct noted in GR 37(i) as long as notice was given and that postnotice conduct was verified by either the judge or the opposing party. As noted above, this is simply one piece of information that the trial
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court should use in its determination. All of that information will be contained in the record, which provides the appellate court the ability to review the decision de novo.
VI. A GR 37 VIOLATION REQUIRES AUTOMATIC REVERSAL
An appellate determination that the trial court erred in overruling a GR 37 objection cannot be a harmless error. Instead, it is an error requiring automatic reversal. The State argues that GR 37's notice provision is a procedural rule subject to the harmless error analysis. As I discussed earlier, I do not believe that there is any notice issue involved in this appeal. Instead, the trial court simply performed the GR 37 analysis incorrectly and never answered the determinative question of whether an objective observer could view race as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge. We enacted GR 37 to protect the constitutional rights not only of defendants but also of prospective jurors. Jefferson, 192 Wn.2d at 242. As noted above, a diverse jury panel is critical to ensuring the legitimacy of jury trials. Even under Batson, the wrongful exclusion of a juror required reversal because that wrongful act violated the constitutional rights of the defendant and prospective juror and undermined the public's confidence in the legal system. See Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 161, 129 S. Ct. 1446, 173 L. Ed. 2d 320 (2009) (discussing cases requiring automatic reversal). To protect these values, automatic reversal of a GR 37 violation is required.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In our country, and in our state, explicit and implicit racial bias has historically impacted the process of empaneling juries. Those impacts continue to this day. Batson had the goal of addressing those impacts. The framework set out in Batson has failed in achieving its goal—this is especially true in failing to address implicit bias. In response, we enacted GR 37. In GR 37(i) we noted claims that were historically used to provide a race-neutral reason for excluding people of color from serving on juries, including the claim of inattention during voir dire. We set out the procedure for the trial court to follow before it could consider the claim of inattention in its analysis as to whether an objective observer could view race or ethnicity as a reason for the use of the peremptory challenge. That procedure must be followed. In addition, under GR 37, a single instance of inattention does not override all other factors for the court to consider in determining whether an objective observer could view race or ethnicity as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge. Finally, trying to determine the attorney's intent in using the peremptory challenge is not part of the GR 37 analysis.
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challenge. I concur in result with the majority affirming the Court of Appeals and remanding for a new trial.
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