SERVING TIME ON AN ABSTRACT OF JUDGMENT
THAT INCLUDES A NOW INVALID SECTION 667.5,
SUBDIVISION (B) ENHANCEMENT IS ENTITLED TO
FULL RESENTENCING, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER
THAT ENHANCEMENT WAS STAYED OR EXECUTED. ..8
A. S TATUTORY AMENDMENTS IMPACTING SENTENCING
ENHANCEMENTS PURSUANT TO SECTION 667.5,
SUBDIVISION (B) .......................................................... 10
B. T HE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS 136 AND
483 ILLUSTRATE SECTION 1172.75 WAS INTENDED TO
APPLY TO SENTENCES IMPOSED AND STAYED ............ 12
CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 16
CERTIFICATION OF WORD COUNT... .................................... .17
APPENDIX 1: COURT OF APPEAL OPINION .......................... 18
APPENDIX 2: ORDER DENYING REHEARING ....................... 19
2
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
People v. Christianson (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 300 ..................................... 7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15 People v. Gonzalez (2008)
43 Cal.4th 1118 ....................................................... 8, 9, 13, 14 People v. Renteria (2023)
96 Cal.App.5th 1276 ................................................... 9, 11, 12 People v. Rhodius (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 38 ......................................................... 7, 9, 12 People v. Saldana (Dec. 19, 2023, C097966)
__Cal.App.5th__ .......................................................... 9, 12-14
STATUTES
Penal Code § 667.5, subd. (b) ................................................................... 6-10, 12 § 1171.1 ..............................................................................................8 § 1172.75 .................................................................................. passim § 1172.75, subd. (a) ..................................................................... 8-13 § 1172.75, subd. (b) .............................................................. 8, 10, 11 § 1172.75, subd. (c) ................................................................ 8, 10-12 § 1172.75, subd. (d) ................................................................... 10-13
3
COURT RULES
California Rules of Court rule 8.366(b)(1) .............................................................................6 rule 8.366(b)(4) .............................................................................6 rule 8.500 ......................................................................................6 rule 8.500(b)(1) .............................................................................6 rule 8.500(e)(1) .............................................................................6 rule 8.504(d) .............................................................................. 17
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) ................ 10, 12, 13, 15 Senate Bill No. 483 (2020-2021 Reg. Sess.) ............ 8, 10, 12, 13, 15 Sen. Rules Com., Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), as amended Sept. 3, 2019 .................................................. 15 Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 136 (2019- 2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended January 15, 2019 ........................... 13 Stats. 1997, ch. 503, § 1 ................................................................. 14 Stats. 2018, ch. 423, § 65 ............................................................... 10 Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1 ................................................................. 10 Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1 ................................................................. 15 Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3 ............................................................. 8, 10 Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12 ....................................................................8
4
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF Supreme Court CALIFORNIA, No. S________
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Court of Appeal
v. No. E080064 ANDREW CHRISTIAN RHODIUS, Riverside County Defendant and Petitioner. Superior Court No. RIF1502535
PETITION FOR REVIEW
After the Published Decision of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, Affirming the Denial of Resentencing Under Penal Code Section 1172.75
TO THE HONORABLE PATRICIA GUERRERO, CHIEF
JUSTICE, AND TO THE HONORABLE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA:
Appellant, Andrew Christian Rhodius, hereby respectfully petitions this Court for review of the published decision of the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two. The opinion as originally filed on November 13, 2023, is attached as Appendix 1. The order of December 7, 2023 denying Appellant's petition for rehearing is
5
attached as Appendix 2. This petition is timely. (Cal Rules of Court, rules 8.366(b)(1) & (4), 8.500(e)(1).)
ISSUE PRESENTED
Pursuant to rule 8.500 of the California Rules of Court, Mr. Rhodius presents the following issue for review:
Does Penal Code section 1172.751apply and require a full resentencing where the abstract of judgment on which an inmate is currently serving time includes a now invalid section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement, regardless of whether that enhancement was imposed but stayed or imposed and executed?
NECESSITY FOR REVIEW
A grant of review is necessary to resolve a conflict between decisions of the Courts of Appeal and to settle an important question of law; Does section 1172.75 apply where the abstract of judgment on which an inmate is currently serving time includes one or more now invalid section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements that were previously imposed but stayed, rather than imposed and executed? (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(b)(1).)
The Court of Appeal concluded that "the principles of statutory construction dictate that the term "imposed" as used in section 1172.75, applies only to sentences that are "imposed
6
and executed"" and to interpret the statute otherwise "would be contrary to the legislative intent and the plain language of the statute." (People v. Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38, 49 (Rhodius).)
Whereas, other Courts of Appeal concluded that "the Legislature intended to use the term "impose" in the broader sense, to include section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements that were both imposed and executed, and imposed and stayed."
(People v. Christianson (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 300, 313, 316 (Christianson).)
This matter involving statutory construction, legislative intent, and the scope of resentencing laws is a case of first impression that has, and will continue to recur and currently lacks the security of uniformity in decision.
STATEMENT OF CASE AND FACTS
Mr. Rhodius adopts the statement of the case and facts as set forth in the procedural background section of the opinion from the Court of Appeal for the purposes of this petition only. (Rhodius, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 41-42.) A petition for rehearing was filed on November 28, 2023. An order denying the petition for rehearing was issued on December 7, 2023.
7
ARGUMENT
REVIEW SHOULD BE GRANTED TO RESOLVE A SPLIT
AMONG COURTS OF APPEAL WHETHER AN INMATE
SERVING TIME ON AN ABSTRACT OF JUDGMENT THAT
INCLUDES A NOW INVALID SECTION 667.5, SUBDIVISION
(B) ENHANCEMENT IS ENTITLED TO FULL
RESENTENCING, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THAT
ENHANCEMENT WAS STAYED OR EXECUTED
Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) added section 1172.75, formerly section 1171.1.2(Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3.) Effective January 1, 2022, section 1172.75 declares that certain one-year sentence enhancements that were imposed prior to January 1, 2020 pursuant to former section 667.5, subdivision (b) are legally invalid, and provides a mechanism for resentencing individuals serving judgments that include one or more of those enhancements. (§ 1172.75, subds. (a)-(c).)
Since the law's 2022 effective date, courts have grappled with its application. When referring to a sentence enhancement, the word "imposed" can mean imposed and executed or imposed and stayed. (People v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1125 (Gonzalez).) Three Courts of Appeal have rendered published opinions holding in the affirmative as to the question presented while one Court of Appeal has limited resentencing under section
8
1172.75 to those enhancements that were "imposed and executed." Each of these courts cited Gonzalez when determining whether section 1172.75 applies to a section 667, subdivision
(b) enhancement that was imposed and then stayed. (Compare People v. Renteria (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1276, 1282 (Renteria); Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 313 [since section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements were imposed and stayed by the original sentencing court, full resentencing was required regardless of whether the court had improperly stayed the enhancements]; and People v. Saldana (Dec. 19, 2023, C097966) Cal.App.5th, *7-*8 (Saldana) with Rhodius, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 43-44 [interpreting " 'imposed'" in section 1172.75, subd. (a) as " 'imposed and executed' "].)3 The Saldana court agreed with Christianson and Renteria and disagreed with Rhodius; the Christianson court disagreed with Rhodius in a footnote; and the Rhodius court did not mention Renteria. This court should grant review to address this question and resolve the conflict between the Courts of Appeal, securing uniformity of decision.
9
A. STATUTORY AMENDMENTS IMPACTING SENTENCING
ENHANCEMENTS PURSUANT TO SECTION 667.5, SUBDIVISION
(B)
Prior to January 2020, section 667.5, subdivision
(b) permitted enhancements for any prior prison term for a felony. (Stats. 2018, ch. 423, § 65.) Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) amended section 667.5, subdivision (b) to limit the prior prison term enhancement to only prison terms served for convictions of certain sexually violent offenses. (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1; Christianson, supra,
97 Cal.App.5th at p. 309.) In 2021, the Legislature expanded the scope of the statute's retroactivity by passing Senate Bill No. 483, enacting section 1172.75. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3.) Under section 1172.75,
"[a]ny sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5," except for enhancements for certain sexually violent offenses "is legally invalid." (§ 1172.75, subd. (a), italics added.) The mechanism for identifying and resentencing individuals currently serving a term in jail or prison that includes a now invalid section 667.5, subdivision (b) sentence enhancement is set out in the statute. (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 310; § 1127.75, subds. (b)-(d).)
The Secretary of the CDCR and the administrators for each county jail "shall identify those persons in their custody currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a)." (§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) They must
10
then "provide the name of each [such] person, along with the person's date of birth and the relevant case number or docket number, to the sentencing court that imposed the enhancement"
in a timely manner as delineated. (§1172.75, subd. (b)(1) & (2).) Once in receipt of this information, the sentencing court
"shall review the judgment and verify that the current judgment includes a sentencing enhancement described in subdivision (a). If the court determines that the current judgment includes an [invalid] enhancement described in subdivision (a), the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant." (§ 1172.75, subd. (c), italics added.) In doing so, the trial court
"shall apply . . . any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing." (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2); Renteria, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 1282.) The resentencing "shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety." (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).) In addition, the resentencing court shall consider "any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing," (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2)) and may consider
"postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant
11
while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant's risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice." (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3); Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 310-311.)
B. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS 136 AND 483
ILLUSTRATE SECTION 1172.75 WAS INTENDED TO APPLY TO
SENTENCES IMPOSED AND STAYED
The dispute between the Court of Appeal that must be resolved here centers around the meaning of the word "imposed"
as used in section 1172.75, subdivision (a). (Renteria, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1282-1283; Rhodius, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 43-45; Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 311; Saldana, supra¸ at *7-*8.) Specifically, whether a sentence enhancement pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b) which was, prior to January 1, 2020, imposed and stayed for a non- sexually violent offense, is "a sentencing enhancement described in subdivision (a)" of section 1172.75. (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) As this Court has explained, "it is important to understand that the word "impose" applies to enhancements that are
"imposed and then executed" as well as those that are "imposed and then stayed. However, as a practical matter, the word
"impose" is often employed as shorthand to refer to the first
12
situation, while the word "stay" often refers to the latter."
(Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1125, italics in original.) In Mr. Rhodius' case, the Fourth Appellate District, Division Two applied Gonzalez, concluding that "[i]n order to harmonize subdivision (d)(1)'s requirement with subdivision (a), the meaning of "impose" must be interpreted to mean "imposed and executed." Any other interpretation would cause disharmony between subdivision (a) and subdivision (d)(1) of section 1172.75." (Rhodius, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 44.) Here, the Court of Appeal found, after review of the
"legislative histories of both Senate Bill 136 and 483 contain a clear presupposition by the Legislature of an imposed and executed sentence." (Rhodius, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 46.)
"Senate Bill 136 intended to ameliorate the disproportionate impact sentencing enhancements have on the "Black and Latino"
communities. The Legislature found that sentencing enhancements subject the members of these communities to longer periods of incarceration. (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended January 15, 2019, p. 2.) This intent presupposes that the sentencing enhancements are, in fact, creating longer periods of incarceration. That is not so if the sentencing enhancement is stayed." (Ibid.)
In juxtaposition, the Saldana court first posited that "[t]his is not a situation [like Gonzalez] where any statutory subdivisions contradict one another such that resolution of any
13
perceived "ambiguity" is required". (Saldana, supra, at *8.) In the alternative the court disagreed with Rhodius, stating: "The presence of a stayed term or enhancement is not without significance; it is part of the sentence and remains available if its execution becomes necessary and proper for any legally sanctioned reason. "When a punishment is stayed, as opposed to stricken, the trial court retains the ability to lift the stay and impose the term under certain circumstance, such as if an alternately imposed term is invalidated…. Thus, a stayed sentence enhancement remains as part of the judgment and continues to carry the potential for an increased sentence in certain circumstances, and removal of the stayed enhancement does provide some relief to the defendant by eliminating that potential."" (Id. at *9, quoting Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 312.)
Yet, another Court of Appeal opined that "[o]n its face, the word "imposed," in this context, is at least somewhat ambiguous." (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 311.) As to legislative intent, Christianson found that at the time of Gonzalez "the Legislature's stated intent was to ensure that "
'substantially longer prison sentences must be imposed on felons who use firearms in the commission of their crimes, in order to protect our citizens and to deter violent crime.' (Stats. 1997, ch. 503, § 1.)" (Id. at p. 313, citing Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1129.) Whereas, "the statutory scheme at issue here involves statutory amendments expressly aimed at reducing sentences
14
by retroactively eliminating a sentencing enhancement described as exacerbating "existing racial and socio-economic disparities in our criminal justice system." (Sen. Rules Com., Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), as amended Sept. 3, 2019, p. 5; see also Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1 ["in order to ensure equal justice and address systemic racial bias in sentencing, it is the intent of the Legislature to retroactively apply . . . Senate Bill 136
. . . to all persons currently serving a term of incarceration in jail or prison for these repealed sentence enhancements"].)"
(Christianson, supra, at p. 314, italics in original.) Ultimately the Christianson court concluded:
"Reading section 1172.75 in the context of the entire statutory scheme, the stated legislative intent, and the legislative history, we are not convinced, as the People suggest, that the Legislature intended the word "imposed" in this context to be limited to enhancements that were imposed and executed. [Citation]."
(Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 312.) The Courts of Appeal's disagreement as to the legislative intent driving Senate Bills 136 and 483, as it applies to the term
"impose" within section 1172.75, has resulted in disharmony between published decisions. This disharmony will lead to disparate outcomes for defendants dependent upon which
15
Appellate District, and in some instances which Division, their sentence originated.4
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, appellant respectfully requests that this petition for review be granted to secure uniformity of decision and equal application of law.
Dated: December 23, 2023 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Matthew A. Lopas
State Bar No. 247886
Attorney for Defendant/ Appellant
ANDREW CHRISTIAN RHODIUS
16
CERTIFICATION OF WORD COUNT
I, Matthew A. Lopas, hereby certify in accordance with California Rules of Court, rule 8.504(d), that this petition contains 3248 words as calculated by the Microsoft Word software in which it was written.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Dated: December 23, 2023 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Matthew A. Lopas
State Bar No. 247886
17
APPENDIX 1
Court of Appeal Opinion
18
Filed 11/13/23
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E080064
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF1502535)
ANDREW CHRISTIAN RHODIUS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge. Affirmed.
Matthew Aaron Lopas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, and Robin Urbanski, Paige Hazard, and Minh U. Le, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
INTRODUCTION
Defendant, Andrew Christian Rhodius, appeals the trial court's denial of a full resentencing hearing under Penal Code section 1172.751. Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying defendant a full resentencing hearing on the basis that defendant's prison priors were imposed and stayed, not imposed and executed. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
An information was filed on July 28, 2016, charging defendant with three felony counts (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a); Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11378 & 11370.1), one misdemeanor count (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)), two prison priors (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b) (section 667.5(b)), one serious felony prior (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a)), and one strike prior (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (c), (e)(1), & 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).) On December 23, 2016, a jury found defendant guilty on all charges except for count 2 (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378.) On February 15, 2017, in exchange for a stipulated sentence of 11 years, defendant pled guilty to count 2 and admitted both prison priors, his serious felony prior, and his strike prior. Defendant was then sentenced on all counts and allegations.3Of relevance, for each prison prior (section 667.5(b)), the trial court imposed one year and then stayed the punishment.
1 All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 This court omits a recitation of the facts underlying the convictions because it is not relevant to the issue on appeal.
3 This court omits a detailed recitation of the trial court's sentence as it is irrelevant to the issue on appeal.
2
On June 16, 2022, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) identified defendant as an inmate who was serving a sentence containing a section 667.5(b) prior. The CDCR notified the trial court, and a hearing to recall and resentence defendant pursuant to section 1172.75, subdivision (a), occurred on August 22, 2022. At the resentencing, the trial court vacated the sentence for defendant's two section 667.5(b) priors and ordered them stricken. Defendant argued for a full resentencing hearing going beyond striking his two priors. Defendant provided documentation detailing positive changes he had made in the time since his conviction. The trial court reserved ruling allowing the parties to provide further briefing on the issue of resentencing.
Defendant filed a brief arguing he is entitled to a full resentencing hearing. Defendant reasoned that to deny a full resentencing hearing because his section 667.5(b) priors were stayed is contrary to the plain language of the statute and the legislative intent. Defendant also cited specifically how his sentence could and should be modified. The People filed an opposition arguing defendant is not entitled to a full resentencing hearing because the plain language of the statute demonstrates relief under section 1172.75 is reserved for persons whose sentence was increased by the imposition of section 667.5(b) priors. The People also argued that even if the language of the statute is ambiguous, the legislative history shows that the intended benefit was only for those defendants whose sentence was increased by the enhancements. Defendant filed a reply to the People's opposition brief, arguing that a stayed prison prior is still an imposed
3
prison prior for the purposes of section 1172.75. Defendant also argued in his reply that the absence of express language in the statute distinguishing stayed priors from executed priors demonstrates the Legislature's intent to treat the two situations the same. A second resentencing hearing occurred on October 25, 2022. Following briefing and argument by both parties, the trial court denied defendant's request for a full resentencing hearing. The trial court filed a written ruling reasoning that defendant is not entitled to resentencing because his section 667.5(b) priors were imposed and stayed instead of imposed and executed.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on October 26, 2022.
DISCUSSION
A. Section 1172.75 Statutory Analysis Senate Bill No. 483 (Senate Bill 483) (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) added section 1171.14to the Penal Code (Stats. 2021, ch. 728). Section 1172.75, subdivision (a), states that "[a]ny sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense . . . is legally invalid." (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) Section 1172.75 instructs the CDCR to identify those persons in their custody currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an enhancement under section 667.5(b) (excluding sexually violent offenses) and provide such information to the sentencing court that imposed the enhancement. (§ 1172.75, 4Subsequently renumbered without substantive change as section 1172.75. (Stats 2022, ch. 58, §12, eff. June 30, 2022.)
4
subd. (b).) Subsequently, the sentencing court "shall review the judgment and verify that the current judgment includes a sentencing enhancement described in subdivision (a)."
(§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) "If the court determines that the current judgment includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a), the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant." (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).)
Section 1172.75 sets out specific instructions for resentencing. (§ 1172.5, subd. (d)(1)-(5).) Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1), provides in part, "Resentencing pursuant to this section shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety. . . ." (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).)
" ' " ' "As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the law's purpose. [Citation.] We begin by examining the statute's words, giving them a plain and common sense meaning." ' " ' [Citation.] ' "[W]e look to 'the entire substance of the statute . . . in order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision . . . . [Citations.]' [Citation.] That is, we construe the words in question ' "in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute . . . ." [Citations.]' [Citation.] We must harmonize 'the various parts of a statutory enactment . . . by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.' " ' [Citation.]" (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961.)
5
In People v. Gonzalez, the California Supreme Court addressed the meaning of the word "impose" as it applied to section 12022.53. (People v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118 (Gonzalez).) The court in Gonzalez analyzed whether the section 12022.5 enhancement must be stricken or if it could be imposed and stayed. (Id. at pp. 1122- 1123.) The issue arose out of the Legislature's use of the term " 'imposed.' " (Id. at p. 1125.) The court concluded that in order for the statute at issue to "make sense" the use of the term " 'impose' " "must be interpreted as shorthand for 'impose and execute.' " (Id. at p. 1127.) The court in Gonzalez stressed the need to "harmonize the statute internally." (Id. at p. 1126.) Specifically, the court compared and analyzed the language in subdivision (f) and subdivision (j) of section 12022.53 in finding "[i]n both instances, the word 'impose' ensures that the statute's punishment and legislative intent will be carried out only if it is interpreted as shorthand for 'impose and then execute.' "
(Id. at p. 1127.) "The principle that a word's meaning may be determined by reference to the rest of the statute allows us to extend this interpretation to the use of 'impose' throughout section 12022.53[, subdivision] (f)." (Ibid.)
Here, it is necessary to look at the statute as a whole to interpret the meaning of term "impose." Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1), is particularly relevant in this analysis. (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1) ["Resentencing pursuant to this section shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety"], italics added.)
6
Section 1172.75 subdivision (d)(1)'s requirement that the resentencing shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed necessitates the conclusion that the repealed enhancement increased the length of the sentence. The only way for the repealed enhancement to have increased the length of a sentence is for the enhancement to have been imposed and executed. If the repealed enhancement was imposed and stayed, the sentence would not have been increased, as was the case here. To interpret
"imposed" as used in section 1172.75, subdivision (a), to include when a sentence was
"imposed and stayed" would require any sentencing court faced with an "imposed and stayed" enhancement to arbitrarily lower a sentence simply because the judgment contained a stayed enhancement.
Defendant argues the analysis and holding of Gonzalez are distinguishable from the statute and facts before this court. Defendant draws a distinction citing the term
"impose" being used twice in section 12022.53, subdivision (f), whereas here, the term
"impose" is only used once. Defendant suggests because the term "impose" only appears once in section 1172.75 subdivision (a), it does not result in internal inconsistency. However, the number of times a term is used within a subdivision is not dispositive as to internal consistency or lack thereof. As discussed in Gonzalez, the court examined the interplay between subdivision (f) and the other subdivisions within section 12022.53 in concluding that "imposed and executed" was the only interpretation that harmonized the statute as a whole. (Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 1127-1128 [analyzing the interaction between § 12022.53, subd. (f), (g), (h), & (i)]). The same is true for
7
section 1172.75. In order to harmonize subdivision (d)(1)'s requirement with subdivision (a), the meaning of "impose" must be interpreted to mean "imposed and executed." Any other interpretation would cause disharmony between subdivision (a) and subdivision (d)(1) of section 1172.75.
In support of his argument of the meaning of "impose," defendant argues that the Gonzalez decision put the Legislature on notice of the potential for ambiguity in using the term "impose" without further clarification. Defendant concludes the Legislature's failure to qualify the term demonstrates the Legislature's intent for both usages ("imposed and stayed" and "imposed and executed") to be operative under section 1172.75. However, an equally plausible conclusion could be drawn from the same facts. It could be argued the Legislature was aware of the holding in Gonzalez finding that "imposed" meant "imposed and executed" and used the term "imposed" in accordance with the holding in Gonzalez. Ultimately, it is the term's use within the context of the statute as a whole that guides the definition, not the exact terminology used or omitted. (Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 1126-1128.)
When reviewing the statute as a whole, the statutory construction that harmonizes the instructions and provisions contained within the statute is one that defines "imposed"
as meaning "imposed and executed." As such, the principles of statutory construction dictate that the term "imposed" as used in section 1172.75, applies only to sentences that are "imposed and executed."
8
B. Legislative History
1. Senate Bill No. 136 Governor Gavin Newsom signed Senate Bill No. 136 (Senate Bill 136) (2019- 2020 Reg. Sess.) on October 8, 2019. Senate Bill 136 is intended to " 'repeal[] a common and costly one-year enhancement that applies for each prior felony prison term or felony county jail term an individual has served.' " (Sen. Bill 136, Assembly Floor Analysis, 3d reading, as amended Sept. 3, 2019.) "The imposition of this enhancement is ineffective in protecting public safety, is wasteful of public resources, and is damaging to the families and communities that disproportionately suffer from these long sentences."
(Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended January 15, 2019, at p. 2.) Senate Bill 136's author argued, "[t]his single enhancement, applied wholesale and scattershot, is a massive driver of prison and jail populations and associated costs to taxpayers and to the families of incarcerated Californians." (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended January 15, 2019, at p. 3.) In discussing the potential benefits of enactment, Senate Bill 136's author offered that "[r]epealing ineffective sentencing enhancements will save hundreds of millions of dollars, reduce prison and jail populations, mitigate racial and gender disparities in incarceration, and end the double punishment for prior convictions." (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended January 15, 2019, at p. 3.)
9
2. Senate Bill 483 Senate Bill 483 is intended to "apply retroactively the repeal of sentence enhancements for prior prison or county jail felony terms and for prior convictions of specified crimes related to controlled substances." (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended March 3, 2021, at p. 1, italics omitted.) Noting that "[e]nhancements add time to a person's sentence . . . ," the Committee on Revision of the Penal Code recommended retroactively applying the elimination of section 667.5(b) enhancements to people currently held in prisons and jails, "ensuring that no one is serving time based on outdated rules." (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended March 3, 2021, at pp. 1-3.) "The retroactive RISE Act is another step forward in sustaining legislative momentum to eliminate unjust sentence enhancements and end wasteful incarceration spending in favor of community reinvestment." (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended March 3, 2021, at p. 6.) C. The Legislative History of Senate Bills 136 and 483 Illustrates Section 1172.75 was Intended to Apply to Sentences Imposed and Executed
If a statute is ambiguous, extrinsic aids, including legislative history may be considered in resolving the ambiguity. (Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1126.)
" ' "Literal construction should not prevail if it is contrary to the legislative intent apparent in the statute . . . ; and if a statute is amenable to two alternative interpretations, the one that leads to the more reasonable result will be followed [citation]."
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[Citations.]' " (Gonzalez, at p. 1126 quoting People v. Shabazz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 55, 67-
68.)
Here, it is relevant to review the legislative history of both Senate Bill 136 and 483 as Senate Bill 483 provided retroactive relief for the repeal executed in Senate Bill 136. (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended March 3, 2021, at p. 2.) The legislative history of Senate Bill 136 illustrates three primary motivations for the enactment of the bill: (1) sentencing enhancements are ineffective and disproportionately subject the "Black and Latino" communities to longer periods of incarceration; (2) ending double punishment for prior convictions;
(3) reallocating "wasteful" spending from imprisonment to community-based services. (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended January 15, 2019, pp. 1-5.)
The legislative history of Senate Bill 483 is also instructive regarding the motivation for its enactment. Senate Bill 483 intended to provide relief for "[p]eople in California jails and prison who were convicted prior to the RISE acts [and] are still burdened by mandatory enhancements." (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended March 3, 2021, at p. 3.) "S[enate Bill] 483 would ensure the retroactive repeal of these sentence enhancements, ensuring that no one is serving time based on rulings that California has already deemed unfair and ineffective." (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended March 3, 2021, at p. 5.) Senate Bill 483 is intended to provide
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relief for "[t]hose who were convicted prior to their enactment [and] continue to be separated from their families and communities." (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended March 3, 2021, at p. 5.) In discussing the financial benefits of retroactive application, the legislature found,
"[s]entencing enhancements . . . put significant financial burdens on taxpayers and families statewide—each additional year in prison costs over $112,600 per person."
(Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended March 3, 2021, at p. 5.)
The legislative histories of both Senate Bill 136 and 483 contain a clear presupposition by the Legislature of an imposed and executed sentence. Senate Bill 136 intended to ameliorate the disproportionate impact sentencing enhancements have on the
"Black and Latino" communities. The Legislature found that sentencing enhancements subject the members of these communities to longer periods of incarceration. (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended January 15, 2019, p. 2.) This intent presupposes that the sentencing enhancements are, in fact, creating longer periods of incarceration. That is not so if the sentencing enhancement is stayed. Senate Bill 136 is also intended to reallocate spending necessary for incarceration to fund community-based services. (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended January 15, 2019, p. 4.) The freeing of funds through the repeal of sentencing enhancements presupposes the affected inmates will spend less time incarcerated. This is not the case in situations
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where a defendant's enhancement added no additional period of incarceration. Senate Bill 136 also sought to end double punishment for prior convictions. The primary punishment for section 667.5(b) enhancements is one additional year of incarceration. A defendant whose sentence was imposed and stayed does not suffer the same "double punishment" anticipated by the Legislature. As such, the Legislature's intent in enacting Senate Bill 136 would not be served in situations where a defendant's sentence was imposed and stayed.
Senate Bill 483's legislative history cites similar motivations and concerns. (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended March 3, 2021, pp. 1-5.) Senate Bill 483 intended to provide relief to inmates who had been convicted and sentenced prior to the enactment of Senate Bill 136 and are "serving time based on rulings that California has already deemed unfair and ineffective." (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended March 3, 2021, p. 5.) Senate Bill 483 expressed concern about those convicted prior to Senate Bill 136's enactment continuing to be separated from their families and communities because Senate Bill 136 had not been applied retroactively. (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended March 3, 2021, p. 5.) These concerns presuppose a defendant is serving time specifically based on the imposition of additional incarceration as a result of a section 667.5(b) prior. An inmate whose sentence was imposed and stayed is not actually serving any time based on a repealed statute, nor are they separated from their families because Senate Bill 136 has
13
not been applied retroactively. Senate Bill 483's reference to each additional year of imprisonment costing $112,600 per person also contemplates the execution of the sentence. This cost to taxpayers would be irrelevant for defendants whose sentence was imposed and stayed. Funding would not be saved and available for reallocation because a defendant's sentence would not be reduced as a result of the retroactive application of Senate Bill 136.
Defendant argues that section 1172.75's purpose is to reduce as many sentences as possible and suggests the proper outcome is to allow every defendant with a prison prior to have a full resentencing hearing. Defendant also argues the implementation of section 1172.75 was designed to fix the racial disparities in charging, bail availability, and plea bargaining. However, notably, in arguing the purpose of section 1172.75, defendant cites Assembly Bill Nos. 2542 and 256, neither of which are directly related to the enactment of section 1172.75.
The purpose of Assembly Bill No. 2542 (Assembly Bill 2542) was "to prohibit the state from seeking or upholding a conviction or sentence that is discriminatory based on race, ethnicity, or national origin as specified." (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2542 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 1, 2020, p. 2, italics omitted.) Assembly Bill 2542 amended sections 1473 and 1473.7 and added section 745. (Stats. 2020, ch. 317.) The purpose of Assembly Bill No. 256 (Assembly Bill 256) was to "make the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (CRJA), which prohibits the state from seeking or obtaining a conviction or sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or
14
national origin, apply retroactively and to make other clarifying changes." (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 256 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 24, 2021, p. 2, italics omitted.) Assembly Bill 256 acted to amend sections 745 and 1473. While Assembly Bill 2542 and Assembly Bill 256 have certain overall policies in common with Senate Bill 483, the purpose and goals of these bills is separate and apart from the specific legislative intent in enacting Senate Bill 483. To attribute the intent of other bills to Senate Bill 483 based on their common policy views is misplaced. The findings, costs, and ramifications of Senate Bill 136 and Senate Bill 483 cited during the legislative sessions presuppose inmates who are serving additional time as a result of the sentencing enhancement under section 667.5(b). The references to financial and familial burdens do not logically follow if a defendant is not actually serving additional time as the result of an imposed and executed sentence associated with a section 667.5(b) prior. As such, to interpret the statute to include enhancements that were imposed and stayed would be contrary to the legislative intent and the plain language of the statute.
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DISPOSITION
We affirm.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
McKINSTER
Acting P. J.
We concur:
MILLER
J.
CODRINGTON
J.
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APPENDIX 2
Order Denying Rehearing
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Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two Brandon L. Henson, Clerk/Executive Officer Electronically FILED on 12/7/2023 by E. Ceballos, Deputy Clerk
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PROOF OF SERVICE
Re: ANDREW CHRISTIAN RHODIUS No. E080064 I, Matthew A. Lopas, certify:
I am an active member of the State Bar of California and am not a party to this cause. My electronic service address is mlopas@lopaslaw.com and my business address is 333 S. Juniper Street, Suite 110, Escondido, CA 92025. On December 23, 2023, I served the persons and/or entities listed below by the method checked. For those marked "Served Electronically," I transmitted a PDF version of PETITION FOR REVIEW by TrueFiling electronic service or by e-mail to the e-mail service address(es) provided below. For those marked "Served by Mail," I deposited in a Mailbox regularly maintained by the United States Postal Service at Escondido, CA, a copy of the above document in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid, addressed as provided below.
Office of the Attorney General Appellate Defender's, Inc. Sdag.docketing@doj.ca.gov eservice-court@adi-sandiego.com Attorney for Respondent X Served Electronically
State of California Served by Mail
X Served Electronically
Served by Mail
Andrew Rhodius, AK7772 Office of the District Attorney Centinela State Prison 3960 Orange Street, 1stFloor
P.O. Box 901 Riverside, CA 92501
Imperial, CA 92251-0901 Served Electronically
Served Electronically X Served by Mail
X Served by Mail
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Hon. John D. Molloy Office of the Public Defender Riverside Co. Superior Court 30755-D Auld Road 4100 Main Street Murrieta, CA 92563 Riverside, CA 92501 Served Electronically Served Electronically X Served by Mail X Served by Mail
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on December 23, 2023, at Escondido, California.
/s/ Matthew A. Lopas
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Supreme Court of California Jorge E. Navarrete, Clerk and Executive Officer of the Court Electronically FILED on 12/26/2023 by Michael Hallisy, Deputy Clerk
STATE OF CALIFORNIA PROOF OF SERVICE
Supreme Court of California STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Supreme Court of California Case Name: People v. Andrew Christian Rhodius
Case Number: TEMP-KX202XRV
Lower Court Case Number:
1. At the time of service I was at least 18 years of age and not a party to this legal action.
2. My email address used to e-serve: mlopas@lopaslaw.com
3. I served by email a copy of the following document(s) indicated below:
Title(s) of papers e-served:
| Filing Type |
Document Title |
| ISI_CASE_INIT_FORM_DT |
Case Initiation Form |
| PETITION FOR REVIEW |
Petition-for-Review |
Service Recipients:
| Person Served |
Email Address |
Type |
Date / Time |
| Attorney General |
sdag.docketing@doj.ca.gov |
e-Serve |
12/23/2023 10:42:03 AM |
| Appellate Defenders, Inc. |
eservice-court@adi-sandiego.com |
e-Serve |
12/23/2023 10:42:03 AM |
Date
/s/Matthew Lopas
Signature
Lopas, Matthew (247886)
Last Name, First Name (PNum)
LOPAS LAW
Law Firm
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