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People v. Wiley

Supreme Court of California Supreme Court of California Jorge E. Navarrete, Clerk and Executive Officer of the Court Jorge E. Navarrete, Clerk and Executive Officer of the Court Electronically RECEIVED on 9/6/2024 11:50:13 AM Electronically FILED on 9/6/2024 by Gabriela Muca, Deputy Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF S283326

CALIFORNIA,

First District Plaintiff and Respondent, Court of Appeal No. A165613

v.

(Humboldt County

ERIC WILEY, Superior Court Nos. CR1902147B &

Defendant and Appellant. CR2101049)

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF ON THE MERITS

After Decision by the Court of Appeal First Appellate District, Division Four Filed on November 29, 2023

JONATHAN SOGLIN

Executive Director J. BRADLEY O'CONNELL (Bar No. 104755) Assistant Director First District Appellate Project 1212 Broadway, Suite 1200 Oakland, CA 94612

Telephone: (415) 495-3119 Email: jboc@fdap.org

Attorneys for Appellant

1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................ 7

QUESTIONS PRESENTED .......................................................... 15

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...................................................... 16

STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................. 20

A. The 2019 Threat Offense. .......................................... 20 B. Carla Pirovano's Victim Impact Statement. ............ 22 C. The 2020 Firearm Possession Resulting in

Revocation of Probation on the Threat

Conviction. .................................................................. 22 D. The 2022 Sentencing Hearing. .................................. 23

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ....................................................... 26

ARGUMENT .................................................................................. 31

I. The Sentencing Court's Determinations on the

"Increasing Seriousness" of Wiley's Convictions and

"Unsatisfactory" Performance on Probation Violated the Sixth Amendment Under Erlinger v. United States Because Those Aggravating Factors Required Additional Factual Determinations Well Beyond the Bare "Fact of a Prior Conviction." ....................................... 31 A. A Brief History of the Determinate Sentence

Law, Cunningham v. California, and the

Legislature's Subsequent Revisions. ........................ 33 B. The Narrowing and Near Repudiation of the

"Fact of a Prior Conviction" Exception - From Almendarez-Torres and Apprendi Through This Year's Decision in Erlinger v. United States. ........... 36

1. The Origin of the Exception - Almendarez- Torres v. United States. ................................... 36

2

2. This Court's Post-Cunningham Construction of the "Fact of a Prior Conviction" Exception as Encompassing

"Related Issues" Concerning "Criminal History" - Black II and Towne. ....................... 39

3. The U.S. Supreme Court's Further Curtailment of the Almendarez-Torres Exception in Erlinger v. United States. .......... 40 C. Because Almendarez-Torres Was an

"Exceptional Departure" from Fundamental Sixth Amendment Jury Trial Principles, the U.S. Supreme Court Will Not Permit Any Expansion of the "Fact of a Prior Conviction" Exception Beyond Its Literal and Narrow Terms. .................... 43 D. Wiley's Sixth Amendment Arguments Are

Properly Cognizable. .................................................. 45 E. Erlinger v. United States Requires Jury

Determination of the "Increasing Seriousness" of

Convictions, "Unsatisfactory" Probation

"Performance," and Any Other Aggravating Factor Requiring Factual Findings or Discretionary Judgments Beyond Identification of the Elements of a Prior Offense. ........................... 47

1. "Unsatisfactory" "Performance" on Probation (Rule 4.421(b)(5)). ........................... 48

2. Convictions of "Increasing Seriousness"

(Rule 4.421(b)(2)). ............................................ 50

II. Under Elementary Statutory Construction Standards, As Well As the "Constitutional Doubt" Principle, this Court Should Construe "Prior Convictions" in Amended Section 1170(b)(3) As Strictly Limited to the Bare Fact of a Conviction and Not Including the

"Unsatisfactory" Probation Performance or "Increasing Seriousness" Inquiries. ........................................................ 55

3

A. The Court Should Adopt a Literal, Narrow Construction of Section 1170(b)(3) in Order to Avoid the "Serious and Doubtful Constitutional Questions" Raised by Removal of the Probation Performance and "Increasing Seriousness"

Determinations from the Jury. ................................. 56 B. A "Prior Conviction" Is a Determination of an Adult Criminal Offense by Verdict or Plea and

Does Not Include Related or Ancillary

Determinations, Such as the Aggravating

Circumstances Here. .................................................. 58

1. The Established Meaning of "Conviction"

in California Statutes and Case Law.............. 58

2. The Legislature's Consistent Use of

"Conviction" in its Literal Legal Sense. .......... 60

3. The "Construction … More Favorable to the Offender." ................................................... 62 C. The Legislature Adopted the Precise Term "Prior Convictions" Despite Its Awareness of the Broad

Range of Criminal History Factors Listed in

Rule 4.421(b). ............................................................. 62 D. Because Section 1170(b)(3) is Reasonably

Susceptible to a Reading That Will Avoid

Serious Constitutional Questions, this Court

Should Construe These Circumstances As

Falling Outside the Narrowly Crafted "Prior

Convictions" Exception. ............................................. 65

III. The Sentencing Court Compounded Its Erroneous Adjudication of the Unsatisfactory Probation Performance and "Increasing Seriousness" Factors by Basing Those Findings, in Part, on Wiley's Consecutively-Sentenced Post-Probation Grant Firearm Offense in Violation of Rule 4.435(b)(1) and the Dual Use Proscription. .................................................. 67 A. The Rule 4.435(b)(1) Violation. ................................. 69

4

B. The Dual Use Violation. ............................................ 69 C. Cognizability and Forfeiture. .................................... 70 D. The Materiality of Rule 4.435 and of the Dual

Use Rules to Prejudice Review of the Denial of

Jury Determination of Aggravating Factors. ........... 72

IV. The Deprivation of Jury Determination of the Aggravating Circumstances Was Prejudicial Under People v. Lynch, Because Both the "Increasing Seriousness" and "Unsatisfactory" Probation Performance Circumstances Were Reasonably Susceptible to Dispute. ........................................................ 74 A. The Two-Part Prejudice Framework Established

by Lynch. .................................................................... 74 B. Additional Factors Relevant to Harmless Error

Review of Failure to Submit Aggravating

Factors to a Jury. ....................................................... 77

1. This Court's Recognition of the Vague and Subjective Character of Many Aggravating Factors and the Differences Between Jury and Judicial Determination of Those Allegations. ....................................................... 77

2. The Erlinger Opinion's Cautionary Comments on Prior Conviction Records and the Still More Questionable Reliability of a CLETS Printout. ....................................... 80 C. The Failure to Submit the "Increasing

Seriousness" and "Unsatisfactory" Probation

Performance Factors to a Jury Was Prejudicial Under Chapman and Neder, Because Each

Allegation Was Reasonably Susceptible to

Dispute Such That One or More Jurors Could

Harbor Reasonable Doubt. ........................................ 83

5

1. The Failure to Submit the "Increasing Seriousness" Factor to a Jury Was Prejudicial Under Chapman and Neder Because the Sentence Range for Wiley's Current Section 422 Conviction Was Equal to or Lesser Than the Ranges for His Prior Felony Convictions Pursuant to Black II. ...... 85

2. The Failure to Submit the

"Unsatisfactory" Probation Performance Factor to a Jury Was Prejudicial Under Neder, Because Wiley's Prior Performance Was Mixed, Having Performed

Satisfactorily in One Case and Unsatisfactorily in Another, Such That One or More Jurors Could Have Had Reasonable Doubts as to the Overall Assessment. ...................................................... 90 D. The Matter Must be Remanded Under Gutierrez

and Lynch Because the Transcript Does Not

"Clearly Indicate" That the Sentencing Court Would Have Chosen the Upper Term If Fewer Aggravating Factors Had Been Found or If It Was Aware of the More Limited Scope of its Discretion, As Clarified in Lynch. ............................. 93

CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 100

CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT ........................................... 101

6

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

FEDERAL CASES

Alleyne v. United States (2013)

570 U.S. 99 ................................................................................ 39

Almendarez-Torres v. United States (1998)

523 U.S. 224 .................................................................. 27, 36, 37

Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000)

530 U.S. 466 ....................................................................... passim Black v. California (2007)

549 U.S. 1190 ............................................................................ 34

Blakely v. Washington (2004)

542 U.S. 96 .......................................................................... 34, 38

Chapman v. California (1967)

386 U.S. 18 ................................................................................ 75

Cunningham v. California (2007)

549 U.S. 270 ............................................................ 26, 34, 38, 53

Erlinger v. United States (2024)

602 U.S. __, 144 S.Ct. 1840 ............................................... passim Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)

381 U.S. 479 .............................................................................. 44

Jones v. United States (1999)

526 U.S. 227 .................................................................. 56, 57, 66

Neder v. United States (1999)

527 U.S. 1 ................................................................ 83, 88, 91, 93

Pereida v. Wilkinson (2021)

592 U.S. 224 .............................................................................. 39

Shepard v. United States (2005)

544 U.S. 13 .................................................................... 57, 80, 81

7

United States v. Booker (2005)

543 U.S. 220 .............................................................................. 38

STATE CASES

Atlantic Richfield Co. v. California Regional Water Quality Control Bd. (2022)

85 Cal.App.5th 338 ................................................................... 72 Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Cal. (1937)

10 Cal.2d 307 ............................................................................. 72 Egar v. Superior Court (2004)

120 Cal.App.4th 1306 ......................................................... 59, 60 Ex parte Brown (1885)

68 Cal. 176 ................................................................................. 59 Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hospital Med. Center (1994)

8 Cal.4th 992 ............................................................................. 44 In re A.V. (2017)

11 Cal.App.5th 697 ................................................................... 50 In re Aufret's Estate (1921)

187 Cal. 34 ................................................................................. 72 In re Friend (2021)

11 Cal.5th 720 ..................................................................... 56, 58 In re Hartmann (1938)

25 Cal.App.2d 55 ....................................................................... 73 In re J.S. (2024)

100 Cal.App.5th 246 ................................................................. 50 In re Joseph B. (1983)

34 Cal.3d 952 ............................................................................. 59 People v. Anderson (2020)

9 Cal.5th 946 ............................................................................. 71

8

People v. Belmontes (1983)

34 Cal.3d 335 ............................................................................. 97 People v. Black (2005)

35 Cal.4th 1238 (Black I) .......................................................... 34 People v. Black (2007)

41 Cal.4th 799 (Black II) ................................................... passim People v. Brooks (2017)

3 Cal.5th 1 ........................................................................... 84, 92 People v. Brown (2023)

14 Cal.5th 453 ........................................................................... 84 People v. Butler (2023)

89 Cal.App.5th 953, review gr., May 31, 2023 (S269633) ................................... 28, 88 People v. Chandler (2014)

60 Cal.4th 508 ........................................................................... 56 People v. Chism (2014)

58 Cal.4th 1266 ............................................................. 39, 40, 87 People v. Colley (1980)

113 Cal.App.3d 870 ................................................................... 69 People v. Crosby (1992)

3 Cal.App.4th 1352 ................................................................... 86 People v. Engram (2010)

50 Cal.4th 1131 ......................................................................... 56 People v. Flores (2022)

75 Cal.App.5th 495 ................................................................... 96 People v. Gallardo (2017)

4 Cal.5th 120 ....................................................................... 16, 81 People v. Goldberg (1983)

148 Cal.App.3d 1160 ................................................................. 71

9

People v. Gutierrez (2014)

58 Cal.4th 1354 .................................................................. passim People v. Hall (2023)

97 Cal.App.5th 1084, review gr., Feb. 28, 2024 (S283530) ......................................... 96 People v. Hendrix (2022)

13 Cal.5th 933 ........................................................................... 84 People v. Johnson (2015)

60 Cal.4th 966 ........................................................................... 61 People v. Lynch (2024)

16 Cal.5th 730 [323 Cal.Rptr.3d 675] ............................... passim People v. Martinez (2000)

22 Cal.4th 106 ........................................................................... 82 People v. McGee (2006)

38 Cal.4th 682 ........................................................................... 16 People v. Mil (2012)

53 Cal.4th 400 ......................................................... 83, 84, 88, 90 People v. Olay (2023)

98 Cal.App.5th 60 ..................................................................... 61 People v. Perez (2020)

9 Cal.5th 1 ................................................................................. 46 People v. Quiles (2009)

177 Cal.App.4th 612 ..................................................... 51, 86, 87 People v. Ratcliffe (1981)

124 Cal.App.3d 808 ................................................................... 70 People v. Reeder (1984)

152 Cal.App.3d 900 ................................................................... 70 People v. Rizo (2000)

22 Cal.4th 681 ........................................................................... 62

10

People v. Salazar (2023)

15 Cal.5th 416 ........................................................................... 95 People v. Salmorin (2016)

1 Cal.App.5th 738 ..................................................................... 62 People v. Sanchez (2016)

63 Cal.4th 665 ........................................................................... 46 People v. Sandoval (2007)

41 Cal.4th 825 .................................................................... passim People v. Scott (2015)

61 Cal.4th 363 ........................................................................... 40 People v. Superior Court (McPeters) (1985)

169 Cal.App.3d 796 ................................................................... 73 People v. Towne (2008)

44 Cal.4th 63 ...................................................................... passim People v. Watson (1956)

46 Cal.2d 818 ............................................................................. 77 People v. Weidert (1985)

39 Cal.3d 836 ....................................................................... 61, 62 People v. Wiley (2023)

97 Cal.App.5th 676, review gr. (Mar. 12, 2024) (S283326) ...................................... 19 People v. Williams (1998)

17 Cal.4th 148 ........................................................................... 71 People v. Wilson (2021)

11 Cal.5th 259 ........................................................................... 71

FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

United States Constitution

Fifth Amendment ...................................................................... 31 Sixth Amendment .............................................................. passim Fourteenth Amendment ........................................................... 31

11

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,

RULES, AND STATUTES

California Rules of Court

Rule 4.420 ...................................................................... 68, 69, 70 Rule 4.421 ........................................................................... passim Rule 4.423 .................................................................................. 90 Rule 4.425 ...................................................................... 68, 69, 70 Rule 4.435 ........................................................................... passim Rule 8.500 .................................................................................. 47 Rule 8.504 .................................................................................. 47

Evidence Code

§ 664 ........................................................................................... 72

Health & Safety Code

§ 11366.5 .................................................................. 24, 85, 86, 89 § 11377 ....................................................................................... 24 § 11379 ................................................................................ passim

Penal Code

§ 18 ............................................................................................. 85 § 190.2 ........................................................................................ 60 § 190.5 ........................................................................................ 94 § 191.5 ........................................................................................ 60 § 207 ........................................................................................... 16 § 245 ..................................................................................... 16, 17 § 273.5 ........................................................................................ 60 § 422 .................................................................................... passim § 666 ........................................................................................... 60 § 666.5 ........................................................................................ 60 § 667 ........................................................................................... 60 § 667.5 ........................................................................................ 60 § 667.6 .................................................................................. 60, 97 § 667.51 ...................................................................................... 60 § 667.61 ...................................................................................... 60 § 667.71 ...................................................................................... 60 § 667.75 ...................................................................................... 60 § 689 ........................................................................................... 59

12

Penal Code continued:

§ 1170 .................................................................................. passim § 1170.1 ...................................................................................... 97 § 1170.3 ...................................................................................... 78 § 1170.12 .............................................................................. 17, 60 § 1192.7 ...................................................................................... 86 § 1203 ......................................................................................... 60 § 1203.06 .................................................................................... 60 § 1203.8 ...................................................................................... 60 § 1203.066 .................................................................................. 60 § 12022.1 .................................................................................... 60 § 12022.7 .................................................................................... 16 § 22210 ....................................................................................... 17 § 22610 ....................................................................................... 17 § 29800 ................................................................................ passim § 30305 ..................................................................... 24, 25, 85, 86

Vehicle Code

§ 23152 ....................................................................................... 24 § 23550 ........................................................................... 24, 85, 86

Welfare & Institutions Code

§ 203 ........................................................................................... 59

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Legislation and Legislative History Materials

Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Session) (as amended May 20, 2023) ........... 64 Assem. Floor Analysis, Sen. Third Reading, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Session) (as amended July 1, 2021) .............................................................................. 64 Assem. Floor Analysis, Sen. Third Reading, Rep. on Sen.

Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Session) (as amended

Sept. 3, 2021) ............................................................................. 64 Sen. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis Addendum -

Suspense File, Sen. Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg.

Session) ...................................................................................... 64

13

Sen. Com. on Appropriations, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Session) .......................................................... 64 Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 567

(2021-2022 Reg. Session) .............................................. 63, 64, 65 Sen. Rules Com., Floor Analysis - Third Reading, Sen.

Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Session) ..................................... 64 Sen. Rules Com., Sen. Floor Analysis, Rep. on Sen. Bill

No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Session) (as amended Sept.

3, 2021) ...................................................................................... 64

Stats. 2007, c. 3 § 3 (S.B. 40), eff. Mar. 30, 2007 .................... 27, 34 Stats. 2021, c. 730, § 1.3 (S.B. 567), eff. Jan. 1, 202 ............. passim

Practice Guides

Shapiro, Geller, et al., Supreme Court Practice (10th ed. 2013), ch 6.37 ....................................................................... 47

Miscellaneous

Bob Dylan, Subterranean Homesick Blues, Bringing It All Back Home (Columbia Records 1965) ............................ 44

14

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF S283326

CALIFORNIA,

First District Plaintiff and Respondent, Court of Appeal No. A165613

v.

(Humboldt

ERIC WILEY, Superior Court No. CR1902147B &

Defendant and Appellant. CR2101049)

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF ON THE MERITS

To the Honorable Patricia Guerrero, Chief Justice, and to the Associate Justices of the California Supreme Court:

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Should this Court reconsider its decisions in People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, and People v. Towne (2008) 44 Cal.4th 63, that Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 which provides that the Sixth Amendment requires "other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt" permit a trial court to find as factors in aggravation that the defendant's convictions are numerous or of increasing severity and that his prior performance on parole or probation was

15

unsatisfactory without having the jury make this determination in light of the fact that this Court in People

v. Gallardo (2017) 4 Cal.5th 120 disapproved People v. McGee (2006) 38 Cal.4th 682, the decision upon which Black and Towne were based?

2. Aside from the Sixth Amendment issue, does Penal Code section 1170 enacted by SB 567 which requires that any fact save the fact of a prior conviction sought to be used to impose an aggravated term permit a trial court to find as factors in aggravation that the defendant's current convictions are numerous or more serious and that his prior performance on probation or parole was unsatisfactory without submitting these determinations to the jury?

(Pet. Review 7)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A felony complaint filed May 13, 2019, charged appellant Eric Wiley with criminal threats (Pen. Code § 422)1and kidnapping (§ 207). The complaint charged co-defendant Megan Carbonneau with assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245(a)(1)), with a great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7). Wiley was not charged with the assault count. (I CT 1-3) On January 13, 2020, Wiley entered into a plea bargain, in which he pled guilty to the section 422 threat count and the prosecution dismissed the kidnapping count. The plea bargain

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. References to "Rules" are to the California Rules of Court.

16

provided that the prosecution would not oppose probation. It did not specify the term for any possible prison sentence. (I CT 21-29; 1/13/20 RT 10-12) Nor did Wiley admit any aggravating factors as part of the bargain, which took place before the enactment of Senate Bill 567's amendments to the Determinate Sentence Law, section 1170 (Stats. 2021, c. 731, § 1.3 (S.B. 567), eff. Jan. 1,

2022).2

At the original sentencing hearing on July 14, 2020, the court placed Wiley on felony probation pursuant to the plea bargain. The court pronounced an upper term sentence of three years for the section 422 threat conviction and suspended execution of that sentence. (I CT 34-35)

On December 28, 2021, the prosecution filed an information charging Wiley with three weapon counts - possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800(a)(1)), possession of a billy club (§ 22210), and possession of a stun gun by a felon (§ 22610) - and with a prior "strike" (§ 1170.12) based on the section 422 conviction. (I CT 99-102) The probation department also moved to revoke Wiley's probation in the section 422 case based on the new charges. (I CT 137-142)

On March 11, 2022, Wiley entered into a new bargain in which he pled guilty to the section 29800 felon-with-firearm count, and the prosecution dismissed the other weapon counts and the "strike." Based on his plea to the firearm charge, the

2 On the same date, co-defendant Megan Carbonneau pled guilty to an amended charge of assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245(a)(4)). (1/13/20 RT 5-10)

17

court also found that Wiley had violated his probation on the section 422 case. The bargain specified that Wiley would receive a prison sentence encompassing both the threat and firearm cases. It provided that the sentence on the threat case would represent the principal term and that Wiley would receive a subordinate consecutive term of 8 months for the firearm possession. However, the bargain did not fix the term to be imposed on the threat case. (I CT 176, 179-186; 3/11/22 RT 22-25) The plea bargain and sentencing occurred after the January 1, 2022, effective date of Senate Bill 567's amendments to the Determinate Sentencing Law. The court and counsel agreed that, because there had never been any admission or finding of aggravating factors and Wiley had not agreed to an upper term as part of his plea, it was necessary to reconsider the suspended upper term on the threat count. While the plea on the firearm possession case provided for an eight-month subordinate consecutive term for that conviction, the court indicated that it would be choosing between a two-year middle term or a three- year upper term for the section 422 threat conviction. (6/24/22 RT 41-47)

Sentencing occurred on July 1, 2022. The prosecution submitted a certified rap sheet as proof of aggravating factors. (II CT 231-241) After arguments by counsel, the court imposed the upper term of 3 years for the threat count and the agreed subordinate 8-month term for firearm possession for an aggregate term of 3 years, 8 months. In choosing the upper term, the court cited the aggravating factors of Wiley's four prior felony

18

convictions, his prior service of a prison term, the increasing seriousness of his convictions, and unsatisfactory prior performance on probation. (I CT 206-212; 7/1/22 RT 57-58) Wiley appealed on the ground that the sentencing court's determination of the "increasing seriousness" and

"unsatisfactory" probation performance factors violated his Sixth Amendment and due process rights to jury determination of sentence-enhancing aggravating circumstances under Apprendi

v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, and its progeny. In its published opinion, the Court of Appeal rejected Wiley's Sixth Amendment arguments and held that those factors came within the "prior conviction" exception to Apprendi. (People

v. Wiley (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th676.) The appellate court relied on this Court's prior opinions construing the "fact of a prior conviction" exception as broadly encompassing "other related issues" concerning a "defendant's criminal history" or

"recidivism," including the "increasing seriousness" of the convictions (People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th799, 819-820 (Black

II) and "unsatisfactory" probation "performance" (People v. Towne (2008) 44 Cal.4th63, 77-82). (Slip opn. 6-7.)3The appellate court also concluded that amended section 1170(b) did not require jury determination of those factors. (Id. at 7-12.) Wiley filed a timely petition for review on the right to jury determination of the "increasing seriousness" and

3 References to the Court of Appeal opinion will be to the slip opinion (appended to the Petition for Review), rather than to the version published in the official reporter.

19

"unsatisfactory" probation performance factors under both the Sixth Amendment and amended section 1170(b)(2). This Court granted review on March 12, 2024.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. The 2019 Threat Offense.4

Eric Wiley pleaded guilty to a criminal threat charge under section 422. The offense arose out of Wiley's mistaken belief that the victim had stolen $15,000 cash from his jacket the previous night.

On April 23, 2019, Wiley dropped by the home of his acquaintance Carla Pirovano. Co-defendant Megan Carbonneau also visited Pirovano. Wiley mentioned that he had $35,000 in cash. After a night of drinking, Wiley went to sleep in a bedroom. He left his jacket hanging in the bathroom. (I CT 37-38) While Wiley was sleeping, another acquaintance Wyatt Whitlow came to Pirovano's home. "Co-defendant Carbonneau reportedly told Mr. Whitlow about the money in [Wiley's] jacket, and they both agreed Mr. Whitlow was going to hold $20,000.00 for safekeeping. Co-defendant Carbonneau and Mr. Whitlow then left Ms. Pirovano's residence." (I CT 38)

Pirovano later asked Carbonneau to return to her house so that, when Wiley awoke, Carbonneau could explain who had his money. But Carboneau declined to return to Pirovano's house. (I

CT 38)

4 The facts are taken from the Probation Report.

20

When Wiley awoke, all the money was missing from his jacket. Pirovano told Wiley that "that Mr. Whitlow had taken $20,000, and she did not know who had the rest of the money."

However, Wiley didn't believe Pirovano and accused her and Carbonneau (who was not present) of taking the remaining $15,000. (I CT 38)

The following day Wiley called Pirovano and again accused her of taking his money. "He reportedly said something similar to, 'Bitch, I know what you did. Someone is going to come see you and you better give me my money back or you are going to get it.'"

(I CT 38)

Later that day Pirovano went to a casino where she met two other acquaintances "one of whom said part of the stolen $15,000.00 was his." (I CT 38)

Later that night Pirovano went to another house to meet that acquaintance. Wiley, Carbonneau, and two other people were also present. Carbonneau accused Pirovano of falsely claiming that she (Carbonneau) had stolen Wiley's money. Carbonneau repeatedly struck Pirovano with a liquor bottle, while Pirovano denied stealing Wiley's money. Wiley did not participate in the assault, but neither he nor the others intervened to stop Carbonneau. (I CT 39)

Shortly after the assault, Wiley accused Carbonneau of lying. Wiley reportedly said: "Is this worth your life? You are about to lose your life?" (I CT 39)

Pirovano was bleeding from Carbonneau's assault. Wiley agreed to give Pirovano a ride. Although Pirovano wanted to be

21

dropped off in Blue Lake, Wiley "told her she needed medical attention and should go to a hospital. But Pirovano insisted she didn't want to go to the hospital." Wiley ultimately drove Pirovano to Blue Lake. Pirovano contacted friends, who picked her up and drove to a police station where she reported Carbonneau's assault. (I CT 39-40)

B. Carla Pirovano's Victim Impact Statement.

Prior to Wiley's original 2020 sentencing (in which the court granted probation), Carla Pirovano submitted a victim impact statement which focused principally on the trauma she experienced during Megan Carbonneau's assault:

It is the most violent, traumatic experience I've ever had. I have never seen a human being act so viciously and without warning or provocation. …. She showed no regard or concern for what she had done and she seemed to enjoy it. (I CT 66)

Pirovano had a very different view of the degree of Wiley's culpability:

As for Eric Wiley, while he definitely made poor decisions that night, and put me under severe duress, he has since then made an effort to apologize for what happened. Although he was present during the attack and did not stop it, he had the decency to apologize and allow me the opportunity to voice my feelings on the incident. While it doesn't release him from his accountability, it does show he is remorseful for his actions and what occurred. (I CT 66)

C. The 2020 Firearm Possession Resulting in Revocation of Probation on the Threat Conviction.

On Christmas morning 2020, a sheriff's deputy stopped Wiley for an equipment violation — the rear brake light was out.

22

(I CT 107-108) Upon determining that Wiley was on probation with a search clause, the deputy searched his truck and discovered the frame and slide of a Polymer 80 handgun. But it was lacking a barrel, recoil spring, and trigger housing group. (I CT 109, 114-117, 123-125)5

D. The 2022 Sentencing Hearing.

Wiley's plea bargain in the firearm case provided for revocation of probation and imposition of a prison term for the threat conviction and a subordinate consecutive term of 8 months for the firearm possession. But the bargain did not set the term for the threat conviction.

The plea and grant of probation on the threat offense had occurred in 2020, prior to the enactment of Senate Bill 567 (eff. Jan. 1, 2022). (I CT 21-29, 34-35) Because Wiley had never admitted any aggravating circumstances, the court and counsel agreed that the court would conduct a sentencing hearing to determine whether Wiley would receive a middle or an upper term. (6/24/22 RT 41-47)

The court did not empanel a jury to determine aggravating factors. Instead, it directed the prosecution to submit a "rap sheet." The prosecution lodged a CLETS6printout. (II CT 231-

241)

5 As defense counsel argued at the preliminary hearing, these components were incapable of discharging a bullet. However, the magistrate bound Wiley over on the firearm possession charge. (I CT 130-132)

6 California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System.

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Together the original 2020 probation report prepared for the threat offense and the CLETS printout provide the following picture of Eric Wiley's prior experience in the criminal justice system:

Wiley (age 39 at the time of the 2019 threat offense (I CT 43)) had been convicted of several misdemeanor drug and alcohol offenses between 1998 and 2013, including driving while intoxicated (DUI) (Veh. Code § 23152) and possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code § 11377(a)). (I CT 48- 49; II CT 232-235)7

He had felony convictions for: DUI with three prior convictions (Veh. Code § 23550) in 2005; maintaining a place for sale of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code § 11366.5) and possession of ammunition by a felon (§ 30305) in 2015; and sale or transportation of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code § 11379(a)) in 2016. He initially received probation in the 2015 case. However, his probation was revoked based on his conviction on the 2016 drug trafficking offense. He received a 4-year upper term for the sale or transportation conviction (id., § 11379(a)), concurrent with a shorter prison term in the 2015 case. (I CT 48- 49, 52; II CT 233-237)

During the 2022 sentencing hearing, the prosecutor and the court focused principally on comparisons between the seriousness

7 The court and counsel agreed that some of Wiley's older drug- related convictions no longer qualified as felonies, and the court treated those as misdemeanors. (7/1/22 RT 51-53) We similarly will refer only to the priors the court and counsel agreed qualified as felonies.

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of Wiley's prior felony convictions and his current convictions for criminal threats (§ 422) and possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800). (7/1/22 RT 54-58)

The court imposed the upper term for the section 422 conviction based on the aggravating circumstances of "his four prior felonies," the "increasing seriousness" of Wiley's convictions (Rule 4.421(b)(2)), his service of a prior prison term (Rule 4.421(b)(3)), and unsatisfactory performance on probation (Rule 4.421(b)(5)):

I don't find that Mr. Wiley would be appropriate to sentence him to the midterm. I think that his four prior felonies, and his prior prison term as well as the fact that I do think that the 29800 and 422 is [sic] increasing in seriousness from the drug type cases he has had previously as well as the DUI though it is about the same seriousness, the 29800 as the 30305. 422 is more serious, and it is designated as such in the statute. Therefore, the Court is going to follow the negotiated disposition.

I am — having considered whether or not midterm or high term is appropriate based on his prior

convictions, poor performance on probation, and the fact that the charges are becoming more serious, the Court is going to choose the high term or three years on the 422 case.... (7/1/22 RT 57-58 (emphasis added))

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Through its enactment of Senate Bill 567 (Stats. 2021, c. 731, § 1.3), the Legislature amended section 1170, the core statute of the Determinate Sentence Law (DSL), to provide that a court may impose a sentence greater than the mid-term only if one or more aggravating factors "justify" an upper term. The legislation provides for jury determination of aggravating circumstances (§ 1170(b)(2)) but allows a judge to consider "prior convictions" based on certified judicial records (§ 1170(b)(3)). In the absence of a finding of at least one aggravating factor, no term greater than the middle term is authorized. (§ 1170(b)(2).) In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a prior version of the DSL, which had similarly conditioned an upper term on a finding of one or more aggravating factors, because the former statute had provided for judicial determination of those circumstances under a preponderance standard. (Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270.) Cunningham held that the DSL's provision for judicial determination of aggravating circumstances violated the Sixth Amendment and due process rights to jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt of any sentencing facts necessary to authorize a greater term under Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466.

Like other opinions in the Apprendi line, Cunningham's mandate for jury determination of sentence-enhancing facts was subject to an exception for the "fact of a prior conviction."

(Apprendi at 489-490; see Cunningham at 274-275), pursuant to

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the pre-Apprendi, closely divided (5-4) opinion in Almendarez- Torres v. United States (1998) 523 U.S. 224. The Legislature's initial response to Cunningham was to amend section 1170 to provide broad judicial discretion in the choice among the triad of DSL terms (lower, middle, or upper) so that the authorization of an upper term was no longer contingent upon a finding of an aggravating factor. (Stats. 2007, c. 3 § 3 (S.B. 40), eff. Mar. 30, 2007.) Because an aggravating circumstance was no longer a prerequisite for an upper term, the 2007 legislative "fix" effectively obviated the necessity for jury determination of such factors.

In 2021, the Legislature changed course. (Stats. 2021, c. 730, § 1.3 (S.B. 567), eff. Jan. 1, 2022.) Through its enactment of Senate Bill 567, the Legislature again expressly conditioned the authority for imposition of an upper DSL term upon the finding or one or more aggravating factors. (§ 1170(b).) However, unlike the original DSL statute invalidated in Cunningham, the Legislature provided for jury determination of aggravating circumstances (§ 1170(b)(2)), with an exception for judicial consideration of "prior convictions" (§ 1170(b)(3)). This Court granted in review in People v. Wiley to determine whether the "fact of a prior conviction" exception to the Sixth Amendment/Apprendi jury trial right and the similar exception under revised section 1170(b)(3) apply to aggravating factors which require findings beyond the bare existence of a prior conviction — the "increasing seriousness" of a defendant's

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convictions (Rule 4.421(b)(2)) and "unsatisfactory" "performance"

on probation or other supervised release (Rule 4.421(b)(5)). In the wake of Cunningham's invalidation of the prior version of section 1170, this Court previously construed the "fact of a prior conviction" exception to the Sixth Amendment jury trial right as broadly encompassing "other related issues" concerning a

"defendant's criminal history" or "recidivism," including the

"increasing seriousness" and "unsatisfactory" probation performance factors. (People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th799, 819 ("Black II"); People v. Towne (2008) 44 Cal.4th63, 77-82.) The continuing viability of Black II's and Towne's broad reading of the "prior conviction" exception was already in doubt at the time of this Court's review grant in Wiley, as reflected in the split of authority among the appellate courts.8Nonetheless, over the short period since the grant of review, that issue has become much easier and clearcut.

In Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. __, 144 S.Ct. 1840, the U.S. Supreme Court has made abundantly clear that the validity of the Almendarez-Torres "fact of a prior conviction"

exception is highly dubious even on its own terms, and the Court will not tolerate any extension of that exception beyond mere

"identification" of a prior conviction offense and its statutory elements.

8 E.g., compare Wiley slip opn. 6-12, with People v. Butler (2023)

8 9 Cal.App.5th953, review gr., May 31, 2023 (S269633) (requiring jury determination of these circumstances).

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In Erlinger, the Supreme Court held that a determination whether a defendant's prior convictions occurred on "separate occasions" fell outside the exception because it required additional assessments beyond bare identification of the conviction offenses, including comparisons of the prior offenses and their relationship to one another.

The same is true of the "increasing seriousness" of a defendant's convictions and "unsatisfactory" performance on probation. Like the "separate occasions" inquiry in Erlinger, those circumstances rest on ancillary assessments and comparisons beyond mere identification of the prior statutory offenses and their elements. Instead, they entail subjective and qualitative judgments about the "seriousness" of a defendant's prior and current offenses, determination of his probation status at the time of a conviction, and weighing of a defendant's successful performance of probation in one case against his violation in another. Especially in view of Erlinger's warnings that the "fact of a prior conviction" exception is on shaky ground even under the most narrow reading, the broader factual assessments required by these aggravating circumstances plainly come within the core Sixth Amendment jury trial right under Apprendi and Erlinger.

The deprivation of jury determination of the "increasing seriousness" and "unsatisfactory" performance facts was prejudicial under the rigorous framework established in this Court's just-issued opinion in People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730 [323 Cal.Rptr.3d 675]. Because both factors require

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subjective, normative judgments, there is ample room for one or more jurors to have reasonable doubts as to each of these aggravating circumstances. Moreover, the sentencing court did not "clearly indicate" that it would still have imposed the upper term if it had aware of the additional constraints on its authority to overcome the "presumption" of a middle term, as clarified in Lynch.

On all these grounds, the failure to submit these allegations contravened both the Sixth Amendment and revised section 1170(b), and this Court should remand the matter for resentencing.

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ARGUMENT

I. The Sentencing Court's Determinations on the

"Increasing Seriousness" of Wiley's Convictions and

"Unsatisfactory" Performance on Probation Violated the Sixth Amendment Under Erlinger v. United States Because Those Aggravating Factors Required Additional Factual Determinations Well Beyond the Bare "Fact of a Prior Conviction."

The Sixth Amendment and the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require jury determination beyond a reasonable doubt of any sentence-enhancing facts which increase the maximum authorized term, except "the fact of a prior conviction." (Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 489-

490.)

As amended by Senate Bill 567, section 1170(b)(2) provides that a "court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term." (§ 1170(b)(2).) Because a finding of aggravating circumstances is a prerequisite to authorization of an upper term, there is no question that the Sixth Amendment right to jury determination of sentencing-enhancing facts applies to most aggravating circumstances, including the offense-related circumstances listed in Rule 4.421(a) (e.g., weapon use, victim vulnerability, etc.). The amended statute provides for jury determination of all aggravating circumstances, except "prior convictions" (§ 1170(b)(2)-(b)(3)).

This Court previously rejected a "literal" or "narrow"

construction of the "fact of a prior conviction" and read that

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exception as encompassing "related" determinations concerning a defendant's "criminal history," including the "increasing seriousness" of prior convictions (Rule 4.421(b)(2)) and

"unsatisfactory" probation performance (Rule 4.421(b)(5)). (People

v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th799, 819 ("Black II"); People v. Towne (2008) 44 Cal.4th63, 77-82.)

Whatever the merits of that view may have been at the time of Black II and Towne, the U.S. Supreme Court has now decisively ruled otherwise in Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. ___, 144 S.Ct. 1840. Under Erlinger, to the extent that the

"prior conviction" exception remains viable at all (which remains debatable), it must be construed very narrowly and does not permit a judge to make any determinations beyond

"identification" of the prior statutory offense and its elements. Any other determinations regarding a defendant's prior criminal history, including judgments requiring comparisons of the prior offenses and their relationship to one another, come within the core Sixth Amendment jury trial right rather than the narrowly circumscribed "fact of a prior conviction" exception. Because the question of whether a defendant's prior conviction offenses occurred on "separate occasions" required additional assessments beyond the bare elements of those offenses, that sentencing enhancement required jury determination under the Sixth Amendment.

Like the "separate occasions" inquiry in Erlinger, the

"increasing seriousness" and "unsatisfactory" probation performance factors each requires factual findings, comparisons,

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and normative judgments well beyond identification of the prior statutory offenses. Hence, these too come squarely within the Sixth Amendment jury trial right.

A. A Brief History of the Determinate Sentence Law, Cunningham v. California, and the Legislature's Subsequent Revisions.

In its original form, California's Determinate Sentence Law (DSL) established triads (lower, middle, upper) of base terms for most felony offenses. The Judicial Council promulgated lists of aggravating and mitigating circumstances to guide sentencing judges in those determinations. Although the original law afforded a sentencing court considerable discretion in selecting among those terms, it allowed imposition of an upper term only if the court found one or more aggravating factors. In its landmark decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment and due process principles require jury determination of any sentencing- enhancing factual allegation which authorizes a greater maximum sentence than otherwise provided, subject to "a narrow exception": "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." (Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489-490 (emphasis added).)

Apprendi itself concerned a "hate crime" enhancement which provided for a substantially greater sentence range than otherwise authorized based on a sentencing court's findings of additional facts beyond the statutory elements of the underlying

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firearm possession offense. (Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468-469.) The Supreme Court later applied Apprendi's rationale in finding that the Sixth Amendment required jury determination of additional facts necessary to authorize an "extraordinary sentence" above the "standard range" for the underlying offense. (Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 96.)

This Court initially rejected an Apprendi-Blakely challenge to the failure of section 1170 to provide for jury determination of aggravating factors necessary for imposition of an upper term. This Court found the sentencing schemes in Apprendi and Blakely distinguishable and upheld California's assignment of those determinations to judges rather than jurors. (People v. Black (2005) 35 Cal.4th1238 (Black I).)9

The U.S. Supreme Court held otherwise in Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270. Because the then-extant version of section 1170 conditioned the authorization for an upper term on a finding of aggravating factors, the statute's failure to provide for jury determination of those facts violated the Sixth Amendment. (Id. at 288-293.) However, like other opinions in the Apprendi line, Cunningham exempted a "prior conviction" from that Sixth Amendment right. (Id. at 275, 282, 288.) The California Legislature's immediate response to Cunningham was to revise section 1170 by delinking authorization for an upper term from a finding of aggravating factors. (Stats. 2007, c. 3 § 3 (S.B. 40), eff. Mar. 30, 2017.) The

9 Vacated & remanded, (2007) 549 U.S. 119 0; opinion on remand, Black II, supra, 41 Cal.4th799.

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revised statute no longer conditioned an upper term on aggravating circumstances and instead gave a sentencing court broad discretion in its choice among lower, middle, or upper terms. The revisions thus obviated any constitutional necessity for jury determination of aggravating factors. In 2021, the Legislature dramatically changed course through its enactment of Senate Bill 567. (Stats. 2021, c. 731, § 1.3 (S.B. 567), eff. Jan. 1, 2022.) The current amended statute allows an upper term only when aggravating circumstances

"justify … a term … exceeding the middle term." The revised statute explicitly conditions authorization of an upper term on findings of one or more aggravating circumstances. (§ 1170(b)(2).) Thus, while the Legislature's initial 2007 response to Cunningham had been to "fix" the DSL in a way that preserved judicial determination of aggravating circumstances, the 2021 legislation takes the opposite approach and fully embraces jury adjudication of such circumstances:

(1) When a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three possible terms, the court shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2).

(2) The court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial. (§ 1170(b)(1)-(b)(2).)

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However, the amended statute also includes a "prior conviction" carve-out: "Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), the court may consider the defendant's prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury." (§ 1170(b)(3) (emphasis added).)

Because revised section 1170 again requires a finding of aggravating circumstances as a prerequisite for imposition of an upper term, there is no question that most aggravating factors - and certainly all those related to the current conviction offense (Rule 4.421(a)) - require jury determination. The question here is which, if any, of the defendant-related factors (Rule 4.421(b)) come within the "fact of a prior conviction" exception to the Sixth Amendment jury trial.

B. The Narrowing and Near Repudiation of the

"Fact of a Prior Conviction" Exception - From Almendarez-Torres and Apprendi Through This Year's Decision in Erlinger v. United States.

1. The Origin of the Exception - Almendarez- Torres v. United States.

The prior conviction exception derives from Almendarez- Torres v. United States (1998) 523 U.S. 224 - decided two years before Apprendi. Almendarez-Torres concerned a federal statute authorizing a greater sentence for re-entry into the United States after a prior deportation, if the deportation had followed a conviction for an "aggravated felony." The challenger argued that the "aggravated felony" represented a distinct "additional element" of the re-entry-after-deportation offense, requiring the

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usual panoply of core procedural protections for adjudication of criminal offenses, including pleading in the indictment.10(Id. at 226-227)

In its closely divided (5-4) decision, the majority construed that sentence-escalating subdivision as merely a "penalty provision" or "sentencing factor," rather than an "element." The Almendarez-Torres majority stated that historically "recidivism"

had been treated as a "sentencing factor" and had not been considered subject to constitutional protections for adjudications of "elements" of offenses. (Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226, 230, 241-247.) While Almendarez-Torres focused principally on the recidivist character of the enhancing provision, the majority also passingly commented - without deciding - that some precedents could be read as "suggest[ing] … that the Constitution requires scarcely any sentencing factors to be treated" as elements subject to those constitutional rights. (Id. at 241.) Just two years later in Apprendi, the Court repudiated any such sweeping exemption of enhancing factors from due process and jury trial rights. The Court preliminarily noted that,

"[b]ecause Almendarez-Torres had admitted" the prior convictions, he had only challenged the lack of formal charging and pleading of those priors. Thus, the Almendarez-Torres opinion had not decided any Sixth Amendment question. (Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488 (emphasis in original).)

10 Strictly speaking, the only constitutional guarantee at issue in Almendarez-Torres was the due process right to notice and charging of the sentencing provision, rather than the Sixth Amendment jury trial right.

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Apprendi primarily distinguished Almendarez-Torres as limited to charging of prior convictions for sentencing purposes. (Apprendi at 488.) But Apprendi stopped well short of ratifying Almendarez-Torres's holding on prior convictions, even on the

"unique facts" of that case. (Id. at 490.) Even though it is arguable that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided, and that a logical application of our reasoning today should apply if the recidivist issue were contested, Apprendi does not contest the decision's validity and we need not revisit it for purposes of our decision today to treat the case as a narrow exception to the general rule we recalled at the outset. (Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489-490 (emphasis added).)

The Court articulated the now-familiar formulation of the Sixth Amendment and due process principles governing adjudication of most sentence-enhancing facts: "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."

(Apprendi at 490 (emphasis added).)

The Court continued to reference that exception in its post- Apprendi opinions. (E.g., Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301; United States

v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220, 231; Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 274-275.) But, as in Apprendi, the Court continued to emphasize its narrowness and cast doubt on its continued validity. For example, in requiring jury determination of facts triggering a

"mandatory minimum," the Court cautioned: "In Almendarez- Torres v. United States [citation], we recognized a narrow exception to this general rule for the fact of a prior conviction.

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Because the parties do not contest that decision's vitality, we do not revisit it for purposes of our decision today." (Alleyne v. United States (2013) 570 U.S. 99, 111 fn. 1.) More recently, the Court described Almedarez-Torres as "an unusual and 'arguable' exception to the Sixth Amendment rule" requiring jury determination of sentence-enhancing facts. (Pereida v. Wilkinson (2021) 592 U.S. 224, 228 (emphasis added).)

2. This Court's Post-Cunningham Construction of the "Fact of a Prior Conviction" Exception as Encompassing

"Related Issues" Concerning "Criminal History" - Black II and Towne.

After Cunningham v. California struck down the original Determinate Sentence Law due to its failure to require jury trial of aggravating circumstances, this Court addressed which of the circumstances listed in Rule 4.421 came within the "fact of a prior conviction" exception to the Sixth Amendment right. (Black II, supra, 41 Cal.4th799; Towne, supra, 44 Cal.4th63.) This Court "rejected a narrow or literal application of the high court's reference to 'the fact of a prior conviction.'" (Towne at 79 (emphasis added).) The Court construed that exception as

"includ[ing] not only the fact that a prior conviction occurred, but also other related issues that may be determined by examining the records of the prior convictions. [Citations.]" (Black II at 819 (emphasis added); accord People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th1266, 1335.) The Court agreed with federal opinons allowing "a judge [to] make factual findings on a variety of issues that are related to a defendant's recidivism." (Towne at 77 (emphasis added).)

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The Court addressed the specific aggravating circumstances at issue in here - the "increasing seriousness" of a defendant's convictions and "unsatisfactory" "prior performance"

on probation. Black II concluded that the "increasing seriousness"

or numerosity of convictions (Rule 4.421(b)(2)) categorically came within the Almendarez-Torres "prior conviction" exception and never required jury determination. (Black II, 41 Cal.4that 819- 820; accord Chism, 58 Cal.4that 1335-1336; People v. Scott (2015)

61 Cal.4th363, 465.) The Court took a more qualified view of "unsatisfactory"

prior probation performance (Rule 4.421(b)(5)). Where the unsatisfactory performance consisted of the defendant's conviction of a new offense committed while on probation or parole, the Almendarez-Torres exception would apply, and the sentencing court could find that aggravating circumstance without submitting it to a jury. (Towne, 44 Cal.4that 82; accord Chism, 58 Cal.4that 1336; Scott, 61 Cal.4that 405.) Towne recognized, however, that the Sixth Amendment would not allow judicial determination of the "unsatisfactory" performance factor if the putative misconduct (such as a failed drug test or failure to report) had not been the subject of a separate conviction, because revocation proceedings "do not entail the same procedural safeguards as a criminal trial." (Towne at 83.)

3. The U.S. Supreme Court's Further Curtailment of the Almendarez-Torres Exception in Erlinger v. United States.

While Black II and Towne construed the "fact of a prior conviction" exception as encompassing "related issues" concerning

40

a defendant's "criminal history," the U.S. Supreme Court has now squarely ruled otherwise in Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. __, 144 S.Ct. 1840. Erlinger admonishes in no uncertain terms that the Almendarez-Torres exception is an anomaly. It is a departure from the historic practice of jury determination of all facts necessary to elevate the defendant's sentencing exposure and must be strictly limited to identification of the prior conviction offense and its elements. Any further determinations, including those requiring judgments on the relationship between prior offenses, require jury determination.

Erlinger concerned a provision of the federal Armed Career Criminal Act authorizing a greater sentencing range if the defendant had three or more convictions for qualifying felony convictions "'committed on occasions different from one another.""

(Erlinger at 1846.)11The Supreme Court rejected the assertion that, because the "separate occasions" question turned on a defendant's prior convictions, it came within the Almendarez- Torres exception. The Court doubled down on its prior critiques of Almendarez-Torres, even on its narrow terms:

The Court has since described Almendarez-Torres as

"at best an exceptional departure" from "historic practice." [Citing Apprendi.] That decision … parted ways from the "uniform course of decision during the entire history of our jurisprudence." [Citing Apprendi.] It was "arguabl[y]... incorrec[t]." [Citing

11 In an unusual turnabout, the federal government conceded the merits of Erlinger's constitutional challenge to judicial determination of that allegation. Nonetheless, to ensure full development of that issue, the Supreme Court appointed amicus counsel to defend the judgment. (Erlinger, 144 S.Ct. at 1848.)

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Apprendi.] And it amounted to an "unusual ... exception to the Sixth Amendment rule in criminal cases that 'any fact that increases the penalty for a crime' must be proved to a jury." [Citations.] (Erlinger, 144 S.Ct. at 1853.)

Indeed, the Supreme Court's official synopsis aptly describes Almendarez-Torres as "an outlier" (Erlinger at 1843) (although that precise term does not appear in the body of the opinion).

The Court stopped short of "revisit[ing]" Almendarez- Torres, because no party had so requested and there was no "need to do so today." (Erlinger at 1853.) Because the "separate occasions" question required additional comparisons and assessments of the relationship between the prior convictions, it fell outside the Almendarez-Torres exception under a properly circumscribed understanding of that unusual departure from the general constitutional mandate of jury determination of all sentence-enhancing facts.

The Court underscored the rigorous limitations to what it acknowledged was an anomalous exception to the basic Sixth Amendment jury trial right:

In the years since [Almendarez-Torres], this Court has expressly delimited its reach. It persists as a

"narrow exception" permitting judges to find only

"the fact of a prior conviction." [Citation.] Under that exception, a judge may "do no more, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of." [Citation.] We have reiterated this limit on the scope of Almendarez-Torres "over and over," to the point of

"downright tedium." [Citation; fn.] (Erlinger, 144 S.Ct. at 1853-1854 (emphasis added).)

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Indeed, there is "perhaps more reason to question Almendarez-Torres's narrow exception than to expand it. [Fn.]"

(Id. at 1857.)

The permissible judicial role in determining sentencing allegations related to prior convictions is limited to "identifying" a defendant's prior convictions and their "legal elements." (Erlinger at 1854, 1855 fn. 3 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1856.) That exception does not permit a court to conduct any further inquiry into those offenses, including any comparisons or assessment of their relationship to one another.

With that understanding of the strict limitation of the Almendarez-Torres exception, the Supreme Court readily found that the sentencing "court had to do more than identify his previous convictions and the legal elements required to sustain them. It had to find that those offenses occurred on at least three separate occasions. And, in doing so, the court did more than Almendarez-Torres allows." (Erlinger, 144 S.Ct. at 1854 (emphasis added).)

C. Because Almendarez-Torres Was an

"Exceptional Departure" from Fundamental Sixth Amendment Jury Trial Principles, the U.S. Supreme Court Will Not Permit Any Expansion of the "Fact of a Prior Conviction" Exception Beyond Its Literal and Narrow Terms.

At the time of Black II and Towne, this Court was in good company in viewing the "fact of a prior conviction" exception as also covering "related issues" concerning a defendant's "criminal history." (See Black II, 41 Cal.4that 819; Towne, 44 Cal.4that 78

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(each citing out-of-state and federal opinions.) Nonetheless, Erlinger v. United States represents an emphatic vindication of the Sixth Amendment jury trial right, even as to most sentence- enhancing circumstances related to recidivism. Contrary to this Court's prior view that the Almendarez- Torres "fact of a prior conviction" exception also encompassed other inquiries "related" to a defendant's prior criminal history, Erlinger instructs that Almendarez-Torres is highly dubious even on its own terms, and the U.S. Supreme Court will not countenance any "expan[sion]" of that "narrow exception."

(Erlinger, 144 S.Ct. at 1854.) Put another way, unlike some terms in constitutional jurisprudence, there is no "penumbra" to the Almendarez-Torres "fact of a prior conviction" exception. (Contrast Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) 381 U.S. 479, 483-484.) As this Court has observed in another context, quoting Bob Dylan, "'you don't need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows.'" (Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hospital Med. Center (1994) 8 Cal.4th992, 1001 fn. 4.)12Similarly, one does not need an opinion overruling Almendarez-Torres outright to know that the current U.S. Supreme Court regards it as unsound even on its own narrow terms and will not allow any expansion of that exception, even a seemingly slight one.

We should take the U.S. Supreme Court at its word in these many admonitions that a sentencing court may do no more than "identify" a defendant's prior convictions and their statutory

12 See Bob Dylan, Subterranean Homesick Blues, Bringing It All Back Home (Columbia Records 1965).

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"elements." Any additional assessment, including comparisons, contrasts, or other findings concerning the relationship between the prior offenses, requires jury determination under the Sixth Amendment.

As amplified below, the two aggravating circumstance here - "unsatisfactory" prior "performance" on probation (Rule 4.421(b)(5)) and the "increasing seriousness" of a defendant's convictions (Rule 4.421(b)(2)) — fall squarely within the broad Sixth Amendment/Apprendi right to jury determination of sentencing-enhancing facts, rather than the narrow and disfavored Almendarez-Torres exception.

D. Wiley's Sixth Amendment Arguments Are Properly Cognizable.

Out of an abundance of caution, we will briefly address the cognizability of these arguments. In the Court of Appeal, respondent asserted that these claims were waived because defense counsel did not assert them at the sentencing hearing. (Ct. Appeal RB 12-13) The Court of Appeal, however, decided the merits of the issues and found it unnecessary to address waiver. (Slip opn. 2 fn. 2)

Given the state of California law at the time of the July 2022 sentencing hearing, Wiley's defense counsel could not have plausibly demanded jury determination of these factors. As discussed above, this Court previously held that both these aggravating circumstances came within the "prior conviction"

exception. (Black II, 41 Cal.4that 819-820; Towne, 44 Cal.4that 82.) Because this Court's binding precedents foreclosed any such Sixth Amendment argument and the sentencing occurred two

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years before the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Erlinger, defense counsel was not required to assert an objection that would have been futile under the state of the law. People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th825, is closely on point. The sentencing there occurred during the interval between this Court's 2004 Black I opinion upholding the constitutionality of the former DSL and the U.S. Supreme Court's 2007 Cunningham opinion striking it down. This Court readily rejected the state's forfeiture argument: Because "our decision in Black I was binding on the lower courts until it was overruled" in Cunningham, any request for a jury trial on aggravating circumstances "clearly would have been futile." (Sandoval at 837 fn. 4.) Similarly, this Court's opinions in Black II and Towne were binding on the sentencing court, and Wiley's 2022 sentencing occurred before the 2024 opinion in Erlinger. As in Sandoval, defense counsel was not obliged to make the futile gesture of demanding a jury trial. (Ibid.)13

This Court granted review in Wiley to resolve the merits of the Sixth Amendment's applicability to these two aggravating factors. As reflected in the leading practice guide on U.S. Supreme Court practice, if a respondent-party seeks to argue that a case is not a suitable vehicle for resolution of the merits of an important issue, the most appropriate time to present that

13 See also, e.g., People v. Perez (2020) 9 Cal.5 th 1, 7-14 (failure to object to expert's recital of case-specific hearsay in case tried before People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th665, did not forfeit confrontation issue where prior California precedents had allowed such testimony).

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argument is in its answer to the discretionary review petition. (Cf. Shapiro, Geller, et al., Supreme Court Practice (10thed. 2013), ch 6.37(i)(1)-(i)(3), pp. 506-508.) Respondent had an opportunity to file an answer to Wiley's petition for review (Rules 8.500(a)(2), 8.504(c)) but declined to do so. This Court should hear and decide these important issues on the merits, as it intended in granting review.

E. Erlinger v. United States Requires Jury Determination of the "Increasing Seriousness" of Convictions, "Unsatisfactory" Probation

"Performance," and Any Other Aggravating Factor Requiring Factual Findings or Discretionary Judgments Beyond Identification of the Elements of a Prior Offense.

Under the principles articulated in Erlinger, the Sixth Amendment requires jury determination of both aggravating circumstances at issue here - the "increasing seriousness" of a defendant's convictions (Rule 4.421(b)(2)) and "unsatisfactory"

probation "performance" (Rule 4.421(b)(5)). Like the "separate occasions" inquiry in Erlinger, these circumstances require more than identification of prior conviction offenses and entail additional comparisons and determinations of their relationship to another. Hence, these too fall outside the Almendarez-Torres exception.

As this Court has long observed, many of the aggravating factors listed in Rule 4.421, "rest[] on a somewhat vague or subjective standard" and "require an imprecise quantitative or comparative evaluation of the facts." (Sandoval, 41 Cal.4that 840 (emphasis added); People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th730 [323

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Cal.Rptr.3d 675, 710].) The same is true of the "increasing seriousness" and "unsatisfactory" performance factors. Because each of these determinations involves subjective, normative, and qualitative judgments beyond mere "identification" of prior convictions, they come with the broad Apprendi mandate for jury adjudication of sentence-enhancing facts.

1. "Unsatisfactory" "Performance" on Probation (Rule 4.421(b)(5)).

In Towne, this Court sought to preserve the constitutionality of judicial determination of the "unsatisfactory"

probation performance circumstance by limiting it to instances where a defendant sustained a new conviction while on probation. (Towne, 44 Cal.4that 82-83.) In view of Erlinger, however, Towne's limitation of the "unsatisfactory" performance factor is insufficient to avoid the necessity of its submission to a jury. As Erlinger instructs, to the extent that the dubious Almendarez-Torres exception survives at all, it is a narrowly- circumscribed bright-line. Any allegation that requires any type of additional determination beyond the bare "fact of a prior conviction" falls outside that disfavored exception to basic Sixth Amendment principles, even if it predominantly rests on a prior conviction.

It is no answer to say that the "unsatisfactory performance"

factor simply rests on finding two prior convictions, the original one underlying a probationary status and a subsequent conviction resulting in its revocation. There are two problems:

First, an unsatisfactory probation performance determination rests on an additional factual inquiry subsequent

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to the first conviction and preceding the second one - the defendant's probationary status at the time of the second offense. That determination of one's status at the time of a subsequent crime represents an additional requisite factual finding, distinct from the "fact" of either the first or second conviction. Second, when the asserted "unsatisfactory performance" on the probation on one offense consists of commission of a new offense, judicial determination of that allegation infringes the Sixth Amendment right for the same reason underlying Erlinger. Like the "separate occasions" determination, the "unsatisfactory performance" aggravator requires additional factfinding on the relationship between the two prior convictions. In finding that Wiley's prior probation performance had been "unsatisfactory,"

the judge "had to do more than identify his prior convictions and the legal elements required to sustain them. It had to find" that one of "those offenses occurred" while he was still on probation for the other. "[I]]n doing so, the court did more than Almendarez- Torres allows." (Erlinger, 144 S.Ct. at 1854.) Another dimension of the Rule 4.421(b)(5) inquiry underscores this distinction. "Unsatisfactory" "performance" is not analogous to a "strike" allegation or other prior conviction enhancements, because it does not pose a simple binary finding whether the defendant has ever sustained a probation violation. The rule calls for a more holistic determination, whether "[t]he defendant's prior performance on probation … was unsatisfactory." (Emphasis added). Like the factors considered in Sandoval, the "unsatisfactory" "performance" circumstance

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employs a "subjective standard" and requires a "comparative evaluation of the facts." (Sandoval, 41 Cal.4th at 840. That

"performance" assessment becomes still more nuanced where the defendant has performed well on probation in one case but sustained a probation violation in another, as here. (See I CT 51-

52)14

Because the "unsatisfactory" "performance" circumstance requires a factual evaluation rather than a purely legal

"identification" of a conviction with the requisite statutory elements, the inquiry comes firmly within the broad Sixth Amendment/Apprendi entitlement to jury determination of sentence-enhancing facts, rather that the "narrow" and much- criticized "fact of a prior conviction" exception of Almendarez- Torres.

2. Convictions of "Increasing Seriousness" (Rule 4.421(b)(2)).

The same is true of whether a defendant's convictions are of "increasing seriousness." (Rule 4.421(b)(2). This circumstance too requires more than a mechanical and purely legal determination of a prior conviction offense and its elements. Like the "separate occasions" provision in Erlinger, the "increasing seriousness" inquiry requires a comparison and evaluation of the relationship between a defendant's offenses.

14 As the courts have noted in the context of juvenile probation, "satisfactory" probation performance does not require "perfect compliance." (In re A.V. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th697, 709; In re J.S. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th246, 253-254.)

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Black II upheld judicial determination of "increasing seriousness" on the theory that "[t]he relative seriousness of these alleged convictions may be determined simply by reference to the range of punishment provided by statute for each offense."

(Black II, 41 Cal.4th at 820.) However, a subsequent appellate opinion viewed Black II's punishment-comparison approach as merely permissive and stated that, alternatively, a court could employ "a comparison of the offenses' respective elements."

(People v. Quiles (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th612, 621-622,) Taken together, Black II's and Quiles's disparate tests demonstrate why the "increasing seriousness" circumstances falls well outside the strictures of the Almendarez-Torres exception. The very fact that a trier-of-fact may choose between alternative comparison methods (sentence range or elements), which can yield opposite conclusions, demonstrates that the nebulous inquiry into "relative seriousness" is not a purely legal or mechanical calculation. It is a normative judgment, in which different decision-makers could legitimately make different findings.

Neither the Black II nor the Quiles method represents a mere "identification" of the statutory offense. The "range of punishment" for an offense (Black II) is plainly distinct from mere identification of its statutory elements. The Quiles approach is still more problematic. The kind of

"comparison" of elements allowed in Quiles is very different than a mere "identification" of statutory elements. It is an "apples and oranges" comparison of the character of elements required for

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different kinds of offense. It is one thing to assign to a judge the task of identifying whether a prior offense required the element of entry into a residence (as when a California court determines whether an out-of-state offense satisfies the elements of a

"strike"). But it is entirely different for a factfinder to weigh, for example, whether multiple drug trafficking offenses (indicating participation in a criminal enterprise) are more, less or equally serious than an offense consisting of a verbal threat, as with the section 422 offense here.

Erlinger demonstrates that comparison or assessment of the relationship between a defendant's prior offenses falls outside the Almendarez-Torres exception, even when it rests on review of judicial records. If a determination of the relationship between offenses - whether they occurred on same or separate "occasions"

- involves judgments beyond mere identification of statutory elements, then surely the same is true of the additional weighing and subjective judgments involved in assessing the relative

"seriousness" of entirely different kinds of offenses. Black II's ratification of judicial determination of

"increasing seriousness" was part and parcel of its general holding extending the Almendarez-Torres exception to "other related issues that may be determined by examining the records of the prior convictions. [Citations; fn.]" (Black II, 41 Cal.4that 819-820.) Because Erlinger emphatically draws the line against any expansion of that exception beyond identification of a prior offense's statutory elements, Black II's holding cannot stand. This Court should hold that the "increasing seriousness"

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aggravating circumstance categorically exceeds the bounds of that exception and always requires jury determination under the Sixth Amendment.

However, this Court may find the sentencing court's finding here contrary to the Sixth Amendment on more narrow grounds. The court found that Wiley's current convictions of criminal threat (§ 422) and possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800) were more serious than his prior drug trafficking convictions. (7/1/22 RT 58) More commonly, an "increasing seriousness"

determination represents an assessment that the defendant's prior offenses grew in seriousness. Because the court's focus here was on the perceived greater seriousness of the current conviction offenses, its determination of "increased seriousness" did not exclusively rest on findings concerning Wiley's "prior conviction[s]" (Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (emphasis added)). Because this "increasing seriousness" finding was more about Wiley's current offenses than his previous ones, it cannot be dismissed as falling only slightly outside the lines of the Almendarez-Torres exception. Because it rested primarily on the court's view of the gravity of Wiley's current offenses, it comes squarely within Apprendi itself and other cases recognizing the imperative of jury determination of sentence-enhancing circumstances concerning a defendant's current offense. (Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490-496; see also, e.g., Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 288-293.)

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**** This Court was mistaken in its prior view that the "prior conviction" exception applied more loosely to "related" inquiries bearing on a defendant's "criminal history" like the

"unsatisfactory" probation performance and "increasing seriousness" aggravating circumstances. (Black II, 41 Cal.4that 819-820; Towne, 44 Cal.4that 77.) In view of Erlinger, this Court should overrule Black II and Towne and should recognize the necessity of jury determinations of these circumstances by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

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II. Under Elementary Statutory Construction Standards, As Well As the "Constitutional Doubt" Principle, this Court Should Construe "Prior Convictions" in Amended Section 1170(b)(3) As Strictly Limited to the Bare Fact of a Conviction and Not Including the "Unsatisfactory" Probation Performance or "Increasing Seriousness" Inquiries.

Because Erlinger v. United States so clearly requires jury determination of the "unsatisfactory" probation "performance"

and "increasing seriousness" circumstances, we have led this brief with the Sixth Amendment argument.

But this Court may resolve this case on statutory construction grounds instead. While section 1170(b)(2) provides generally for jury determination of any aggravating circumstances necessary for imposition of a term greater than the mid-term, section 1170(b)(3) states: "[T]he court may consider the defendant's prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury." (Emphasis added.)

Under multiple tenets of statutory construction, including the "plain meaning" rule, this Court should construe the term

"prior convictions" as meaning what it says and not as encompassing any ancillary inquires such as probation performance or comparisons between offenses. There is a still greater imperative here to adopt that literal and narrow construction in order to avoid the grave constitutional questions raised in Part I.

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A. The Court Should Adopt a Literal, Narrow Construction of Section 1170(b)(3) in Order to Avoid the "Serious and Doubtful Constitutional Questions" Raised by Removal of the Probation Performance and "Increasing Seriousness" Determinations from the Jury.

"[A] statute must be construed, if reasonably possible, in a manner that avoids a serious constitutional question." (People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131, 1161 (emphasis added); People v. Chandler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 508, 524.) "We adopt the less constitutionally problematic interpretation of a penal statute so long as that interpretation is 'reasonably possible.' [Citation.]"

(People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1374.) [T]he court will adopt the construction which, without doing violence to the reasonable meaning of the language used, will render it valid in its entirety, or free from doubt as to its constitutionality, even though the other construction is equally reasonable. …. [Citations.] (In re Friend (2021) 11 Cal.5th 720, 734 (emphasis added).)

"Constitutional doubt" has played a crucial role in construction of sentencing statutes potentially implicating the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. Jones v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. 227, concerned a federal statute that elevated the maximum punishment if a carjacking involved "serious bodily injury." The government argued that the provision represented only a "sentencing factor[] exempt from the requirements of charge and jury verdict." (Id. at 229.) Previewing the Sixth Amendment concerns that would take center stage the following year in Apprendi, the Supreme Court construed the "serious bodily injury" provision as an element of a distinct greater

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offense, requiring determination by the jury. "[A]ny interpretative uncertainty should be resolved to avoid serious questions about the statute's constitutionality." (Jones at 229.)

"As the Government would have us construe it, the statute would be open to constitutional doubt…." (Id. at 240 (emphasis added).) [T]he Government's construction would raise serious constitutional questions on which precedent is not dispositive. Any doubt on the issue of statutory construction is hence to be resolved in favor of avoiding those questions. [Fn.] (Jones, 526 U.S. at 251 (emphasis added).)

The Court again invoked that principle in construing a statute as barring a court from considering underlying evidence, such as police reports, in determining whether a prior conviction was for a form of burglary authorizing an enhanced sentence:

While the disputed fact here can be described as a fact about a prior conviction, it is too far removed from the conclusive significance of a prior judicial record, and too much like the findings subject to Jones and Apprendi, to say that Almendarez-Torres clearly authorizes a judge to resolve the dispute. The rule of reading statutes to avoid serious risks of unconstitutionality [citation], therefore counsels us to limit the scope of judicial factfinding…. (Shepard v. United States (2005) 544 U.S. 13, 25-26 (emphasis added).)

The same principles of judicial constraint favoring "the less constitutionally problematic interpretation of a penal statute"

(Gutierrez, 58 Cal.4that 1374) should guide this Court's construction of amended section 1170(b)(3). As outlined in Part I, there should be no doubt that exemption of the "unsatisfactory"

probation performance and "increasing seriousness"

determinations from the right to jury trial would "raise serious

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and doubtful constitutional questions." (Friend, 11 Cal.5that

734.)

Under traditional statutory constructions principles, it is

"reasonably possible" (Gutierrez at 1374) to construe "prior convictions" in section 1170(b)(3) as limited to the existence of the

"convictions" themselves, rather than as sweeping in miscellaneous related matters such as probation performance or the relative "seriousness" of offenses. Hence, the Court should eschew a "constitutionally problematic" construction. (Ibid.)

B. A "Prior Conviction" Is a Determination of an Adult Criminal Offense by Verdict or Plea and Does Not Include Related or Ancillary Determinations, Such as the Aggravating Circumstances Here.

1. The Established Meaning of "Conviction" in California Statutes and Case Law.

Through its passage of Senate Bill 567, the Legislature enacted two dramatic changes to the version of the Determinate Sentence Law which had been in effect since the post- Cunningham 2007 legislative "fix."

1) It provided that a sentencing court could impose a sentence exceeding the mid-term only if one or more aggravating circumstances "justified" an upper term. (§ 1170(b)(1)-(2).)

2) Rather than avoid any constitutional necessity for jury trial of aggravating facts (as it did in 2007), the Legislature embraced it and expressly provided for such jury determinations (§ 1170(b)(2).)

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The Legislature did exempt "prior convictions" from that otherwise sweeping model of jury determination. "[T]he court may consider the defendant's prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury." (§ 1170(b)(3) (emphasis added).)

The Legislature chose its words carefully. It could easily have exempted all the Rule 4.421(b) factors related to prior criminal conduct or experience by employing a broader term, such as "criminal history" or "recidivism." Instead it adopted a more formal term with a well-established meaning - "prior convictions."

"[T]he ordinary meaning of the word 'conviction' is the verdict of guilty pronounced by a jury" (Ex parte Brown (1885) 68 Cal. 176, 180) or a guilty plea (id. at 178-179). "A conviction generally means 'the result of a criminal trial which ends in a judgment or sentence that the accused is guilty as charged."' [Citation.]" (Egar v. Superior Court (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1306,

1308.)15

"Conviction" does not refer to other criminal justice proceedings. For example, although there is an adversarial trial procedure and a determination beyond a reasonable doubt, a juvenile adjudication "shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose." (Welf. & Inst. Code § 203; In re Joseph B. (1983)

15 See also § 689: "No person can be convicted of a public offense unless by verdict of a jury … by a finding of the court in a case where a jury has been waived, or by a plea of guilty."

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34 Cal.3d 952, 955.) "[J]uvenile adjudications of wardship are not criminal convictions. [Citation.]" (Egar, 120 Cal.App.4that 1308-

1309.)

2. The Legislature's Consistent Use of

"Conviction" in its Literal Legal Sense.

Statutes throughout the Penal Code provide enhanced penalties for prior "convictions" - always with that same literal meaning. These include sentence enhancements and alternative sentencing regimens that authorize greater sentences than the maximum otherwise allowed for a current offense,16as well as provisions that bar or limit the authority to grant probation.17 Where the Legislature has intended to make a sentence- elevating provision contingent upon some other circumstance or status, it has explicitly spelled out that application. Most notably, the "Three Strikes" law includes certain juvenile adjudications as

"strikes" under expressly-defined criteria. (§§ 667(d)(3), 1170.12(b)(3).) Other sentence-enhancing provisions depend on service of a prior prison term (e.g., §§ 667.5, 667.75) or commission of an offense while released on bail (§ 12022.1). In each such instance, the Legislature left no ambiguity in the matter. It expressly stated what other circumstance would support the additional punishment.

16 E.g., § 667(a) ("serious felony" enhancement); see also §§ 666, 666.5, 667.51, 667.6(a), 667.61(d)(1), 667.71, 190.2(a)(2), 273.5(f), 191.5(d).

17 E.g., §§ 1203.06(a)(2), 1203.066(a)(5), 1203.8, 1203(e)(4), 1203(e)(6).

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"Prior conviction" is not an amorphous term encompassing all manner of prior criminal proceedings or conduct. It is well- understood term of art referring to the adjudication of a charged criminal offense through a trial verdict or guilty plea. When the Legislature has intended to include other circumstances it has said so explicitly, as in the "Three Strikes" law.

"Where the language of a statute uses terms that have been judicially construed, '"the presumption is almost irresistible"' that the terms have been used '"in the precise and technical sense which had been placed upon them by the courts."' [Citations.]"

(People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 845-846; accord, e.g., People v. Johnson (2015) 60 Cal.4th966, 991.) "Indeed, 'when a word used in a statute has a well-established legal meaning, it will be given that meaning in construing the statute.' [Citation.]"

(People v. Olay (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 60, 65 (emphasis added).) Neither of the aggravating circumstances here comes within the well-established legal meaning of "prior convictions." A defendant's subsequent "performance" on probation or parole represents subsequent conduct distinct from the original

"conviction." Assessment of the "increasing seriousness" of convictions requires subjective and normative comparisons, beyond mere identification of the statutory offenses. Finally, when that circumstance rests on a comparison between prior convictions and the current offense, that determination primarily focuses on the seriousness of the current offense and falls farther outside the common meaning of "prior convictions" in other statutory contexts.

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3. The "Construction … More Favorable to the Offender."

Another elementary tenet supports a literal construction of

"prior convictions":

"If a penal statute is still reasonably susceptible to multiple constructions, then we ordinarily adopt the '"construction which is more favorable to the offender...."'[ Citation.]" (People v. Rizo (2000) 22 Cal.4th 681, 685-686; see, e.g. People v. Salmorin (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th738, 748.) To paraphrase this Court's discussion of another common term ("criminal proceeding"):

"Even if we were to assume that the precise meaning of" the term

"were somehow ambiguous, 'the policy of this state [is] to construe a penal statute as favorably to the defendant as its language and the circumstance of its application may reasonably permit' [citations]." (Weidert, 39 Cal.3d at 848 (emphasis added).) This principle exists independently of the "constitutional doubt" tenet and provides further cause for a literal construction of "prior convictions" as not encompassing any subsidiary judgments such as implicated by these circumstances.

C. The Legislature Adopted the Precise Term

"Prior Convictions" Despite Its Awareness of the Broad Range of Criminal History Factors Listed in Rule 4.421(b).

The Legislature's choice of the term "prior conviction,"

takes on greater significance in view of the legislative history of Senate Bill 567. The legislators were fully aware that Rule 4.421(b) enumerates multiple aggravating factors concerning a

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defendant's criminal history, yet still limited the exception to

"prior convictions" rather than adopting a more inclusive term. This is not a matter of imputing familiarity with a rule or statute the legislators might or might not have actually considered. The lead committee report on Senate Bill 567 expressly informed the legislators of the breadth of those factors concerning an offender's history. The report quoted Rule 4.421(b)'s list of offender-related factors in full:

There are also enumerated circumstances in

aggravation related to the defendant which may include any of the following:

(1) The defendant has engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society;

(2) The defendant's prior convictions as an adult or sustained juvenile delinquency proceedings are numerous or of increasing seriousness;

(3) The defendant has served a prior term in prison or county jail under section 1170(h);

(4) The defendant was on probation, mandatory supervision, postrelease community supervision or parole when the crime was committed; and

(5) The defendant's prior performance on probation, mandatory supervision, postrelease community supervision or parole was unsatisfactory. [Citing Rule 4.421(b).] (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Session), p.

6.)18

18 All legislative history materials reviewed as of September 3, 2024. Note: Dates and descriptions of committee reports are based on both the reports themselves and their descriptions in the links on the California Legislative Information page. https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bi ll_id=202120220SB567#

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In the body of its report, the Committee on Public Safety consistently used the bill's term "prior convictions" in describing the exception to the right to jury trial. Nowhere did the report imply that the term had any application to any other criminal history factors enumerated in Rule 4.421(b). E.g.: "This [jury trial] requirement would not apply to proving prior convictions, which could be proven by a certified record of conviction." (Id., p. 4 (emphasis added); see also pp. 2, 3.)

The same is true of the subsequent committee reports during the Legislature's consideration of Senate Bill 567. Like the initial Public Safety Committee report, those reports described the exception solely as one for "prior convictions" and never suggested that it could extend to any other criminal history factors. (Sen. Com. on Appropriations, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Session), p. 3; Sen. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis Addendum - Suspense File, Sen. Bill No. 567 (2021- 2022 Reg. Session), p. 1; Sen. Rules Com., Floor Analysis - Third Reading, Sen. Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Session), pp. 2-3; Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 567 (2021- 2022 Reg. Session) (as amended May 20, 2023), pp. 1, 5; Assem. Floor Analysis, Sen. Third Reading, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Session) (as amended July 1, 2021), p. 1; Assem. Floor Analysis, Sen. Third Reading, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Session) (as amended Sept. 3, 2021), p. 1; Sen.

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Rules Com., Sen. Floor Analysis, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 567 (2021- 2022 Reg. Session) (as amended Sept. 3, 2021), pp. 3-4.)19 The Legislature had the full list of criminal history factors before it when it considered Senate Bill 567. (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, supra, p. 6.) Yet it exempted only "prior convictions" from the jury trial right, even though Rule 4.421(b) lists multiple other factors that do not fit neatly within that term. Had the legislators intended to include these additional factors, they could easily have done so by adopting broader language. But instead they retained the more precise term "prior convictions."

D. Because Section 1170(b)(3) is Reasonably Susceptible to a Reading That Will Avoid Serious Constitutional Questions, this Court Should Construe These Circumstances As Falling Outside the Narrowly Crafted "Prior Convictions" Exception.

We return to the "constitutional doubt" principle. Multiple canons of construction caution strongly against expanding section 1170(b)(3)'s "prior convictions" exception to include other determinations concerning an offender's history. Even if there might otherwise be some uncertainty whether the plain meaning and other construction tenets compel that literal reading, the

"constitutional avoidance" principle should resolve any doubts. An expansive construction of the exception as including these aggravating factors would render section 1170(b)(3) "open

19 All legislative reports linked at California Legislative Information site for Senate Bill 567: https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bi ll_id=202120220SB567#

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to constitutional doubt." (Jones, 526 U.S. at 240.) The recent opinion in Erlinger renders the constitutionality of such a reading of the exception still more dubious.

There is a "reasonably possible" narrow construction that will spare section 1170(b)(3) from constitutional doubt. (Gutierrez, 58 Cal.4that 1374.) This Court should avoid a

"constitutionally problematic interpretation" (ibid.) and should decline to extend the "prior convictions" exception to the

"unsatisfactory" probation performance and "increasing seriousness" aggravating circumstances.

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III. The Sentencing Court Compounded Its Erroneous Adjudication of the Unsatisfactory Probation Performance and "Increasing Seriousness" Factors by Basing Those Findings, in Part, on Wiley's Consecutively-Sentenced Post-Probation Grant Firearm Offense in Violation of Rule 4.435(b)(1) and the Dual Use Proscription.

The sentencing court should not have determined the

"increasing seriousness" and unsatisfactory probation performance circumstances in the first place because both those factors come within Wiley's constitutional and statutory rights to jury adjudication of sentence-enhancing facts. But the sentencing court's findings violated state law on additional grounds. The court was selecting the term for Wiley's threat offense (§ 422) for which he had originally received probation in July 2020. But the prosecutor and the sentencing court based the aggravating factors in part on Wiley's December 25, 2022, firearm possession (§ 29800), which served as the basis for both revocation of his probation in the section 422 case and a consecutive term for the section 29800 offense. During his argument early in the sentencing hearing, defense counsel properly stated, "I think the inquiry right now is everything prior to the 422. [¶] …. [¶] ….. Because we are deciding what the terms should on the 422." The court seemingly agreed: "I will accept that …." (7/1/22 RT 53) Yet, moments later, both the prosecutor and the court relied, in part, on the subsequent section 29800 firearm possession for imposition of an aggravated term on the original section 422 conviction.

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The prosecutor expressly argued, "[T]he court should take into account that the defendant was on probation at the time the new offense, the 29800 was committed …." (7/1/22 RT 56) Moreover, notwithstanding its prior comment, the court ultimately based its findings of aggravating circumstances in part on the subsequent firearm possession ("the 29800"): "I do think the 29800 and the 422 is [sic] increasing in seriousness from the drug type cases he has had previously as well as the DUI though it is about the same seriousness, the 29800 as the 30305." (7/1/22 RT 58)20

Apart from the failure to submit the aggravating factors to a jury, the partial reliance on the subsequent firearm possession violated two elementary sentencing proscriptions. Because it post-dated the July 2020 grant of probation on the threat offense, the consideration of the December 2020 firearm possession baldly contravened Rule 4.435(b)(1), which bars consideration of conduct subsequent to an earlier grant of probation in imposing an aggravated sentence for that offense. Because Wiley received a subordinate consecutive term for the firearm offense, the consideration of that offense also contravened the "dual use"

rules. (§ 1170(b)(5); Rules 4.420(g), 4.425(b)(1).)

20 The firearm possession did not involve any actual or threatened violence. The object was found in a search of Wiley's vehicle following a traffic stop for a malfunctioning rear light. (I CT 107- 109) Wiley possessed only fragments of a firearm - the frame and slide, but no barrel, recoil spring, or trigger housing group. Although it may have qualified as a firearm for section 29800 purposes, it was not capable of discharging a bullet. (I CT 109, 114-117, 123-125, 130-132.)

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A. The Rule 4.435(b)(1) Violation.

Rule 4.435(b)(1) governs sentencing following a probation revocation: "The length of the sentence must be based on circumstances existing at the time supervision was granted, and subsequent events may not be considered in selecting the base term or in deciding whether to strike the additional punishment for enhancements charged and found." (Emphasis added.) The rule flatly bars basing the term for the offense underlying the prior grant of probation on whatever offense or other misconduct was the basis for the revocation. (People v. Colley (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 870, 873-874.)

The court was imposing sentence on Wiley's criminal threat offense (§ 422), the conviction underlying the July 2020 grant of probation. (I CT 34-35) Yet, as quoted earlier, both the prosecutor and the court relied in part on "the 29800" firearm possession in December 2022 as an aggravating circumstance. (7/1/2022 RT 56,

58) Because it postdated the grant of probation on the threat conviction, the sentencing court's consideration of the firearm possession was a patent violation of Rule 4.435(b)(1). (Colley at 873-874.)

B. The Dual Use Violation.

The court's partial reliance on Wiley's section 29800 firearm possession offense also contravened the longstanding

"dual use" rules, because the court was also imposing a subordinate consecutive term for that offense. (§ 1170(b)(5); Rules 4.420(g), 4.425(b)(1).) "[T]he same facts may not be used to impose the aggravated term and also used to impose consecutive

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sentences." (People v. Ratcliffe (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 808, 821; accord People v. Reeder (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 900, 919-921.) The reliance on the firearm possession as a partial basis for imposition of the upper term on the threat offense was a clear-cut violation of the dual use proscription because the court was simultaneously imposing a consecutive term on the section 29800 firearm possession. As with the Rule 4.435(b)(1) violation, the dual use violation could not be more plain. (Ratcliffe at 821-822; Reeder at 919-921.)

C. Cognizability and Forfeiture.

We will not ignore the elephant in the room. The sentencing court's violations of Rule 4.435(b)(1)'s bar on consideration of post-probation facts and of the "dual use"

proscription (§ 1170(b)(5); Rules 4.420(g), 4.425(b)(1)) were not raised below. Although defense counsel correctly stated at the outset that the sentencing should be "limited to everything prior to the 422," (7/1/22 RT 53), he failed to object or to expressly reference the applicable rules when both the prosecutor and the court later included "the 29800" firearm possession as a partial basis for the aggravating circumstances. (I RT 56, 58) Nor was the violation of these rules raised in the Court of Appeal. Nonetheless, as this Court has often admonished, a reviewing court has considerable discretion to determine the merits of an issue despite counsel's failure to raise that issue below:

An appellate court is generally not prohibited from reaching a question that has not been preserved for review by a party. [Citations.] Indeed, it has the

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authority to do so. [Citation] .... Whether or not it should do so is entrusted to its discretion. [Citation] (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161 fn. 6 (emphasis added).)21

Multiple considerations support exercise of that discretion here. "First of all, the error[s] here [are] clear and obvious."

(People v. Anderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th946, 963.) Moreover, both these violations "affected [Wiley's] "substantial rights" and "go[] to the overall fairness of the proceeding." (Ibid.) Rule 4.435(b)(1) reflects an important policy and "was intended to preclude the possibility that a defendant's bad acts while on probation would influence his sentence upon revocation of probation. [Fn.]" (People v. Goldberg (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d

1160, 1163.)

The dual use violation too affects "substantial rights" and implicates the "overall fairness" of sentencing. The purpose of barring use of the same conduct to aggravate the term for one offense and to impose a consecutive term for another is obvious: A dual use violation is a form of double punishment. Yet, there is a more fundamental reason for recognition of these sentencing prohibitions here. We are not asking this Court to address the violations of these rules during the July 2022 resentencing as distinct errors in their own right. Instead, we call attention to these restrictions for a more limited, but important, reason. As discussed below, in assessing prejudice from the failure to submit the "increasing seriousness" and

"unsatisfactory" probation performance factors to a jury, this

21 See also, e.g., People v. Wilson (2021 ) 11 Cal.5 th 259, 284 fn. 13.

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Court must assume that any jury trial on these factors would be properly conducted and that the jurors would not be asked to consider the subsequent firearm possession offense.

D. The Materiality of Rule 4.435 and of the Dual Use Rules to Prejudice Review of the Denial of Jury Determination of Aggravating Factors. As discussed below (Pt. IV), harmless error review of a failure to submit aggravating factors to a jury is complicated because the reviewing court must attempt to assess the prospects for a more favorable disposition if those factors were to be tried to a jury. (Sandoval, 41 Cal.4that 840.) In conducting that review, the Court must assume that the jury trial will be properly conducted in accordance with California law, including the dual use rules and Rule 4.435(b)(1)'s prohibition on aggravating a sentence based on conduct subsequent to the grant of probation. Consequently, in assessing the likelihood that a jury would sustain the "increasing seriousness" and "unsatisfactory" probation performance allegations, this Court must assume that, in accordance with those restrictions, the December 2020 firearm possession will not be submitted to the jurors.

"Error is never presumed." (Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Cal. (1937) 10 Cal.2d 307, 326; see also, e.g., In re Aufret's Estate (1921) 187 Cal. 34, 37; Atlantic Richfield Co. v. California Regional Water Quality Control Bd. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 338, 35; Evid. Code § 664 (presumption of performance of official duty).) Just as a reviewing court cannot presume that error has occurred in the past, neither should it presume that error will occur in a future proceeding. "We cannot

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presume that respondent court will repeat its error in other cases not before us." (People v. Superior Court (McPeters) (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 796, 799; see also, e.g. In re Hartmann (1938) 25 Cal.App.2d 55, 60.)

This Court should presume that, in any jury trial on these aggravating circumstances, the trial court will not permit the prosecution to present any evidence of the December 2022 firearm possession. Accordingly, in applying the Chapman prejudice standard to the "increasing seriousness" and "unsatisfactory"

performance factors (Pt. IV below), we will not discuss the post- probation firearm possession because that conduct would not be considered in any properly-conducted jury trial on aggravating circumstances.

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IV. The Deprivation of Jury Determination of the Aggravating Circumstances Was Prejudicial Under People v. Lynch, Because Both the "Increasing Seriousness" and "Unsatisfactory" Probation Performance Circumstances Were Reasonably Susceptible to Dispute.

A. The Two-Part Prejudice Framework Established by Lynch.

The deprivation of jury determination of the "increasing seriousness" and "unsatisfactory" performance factors violated the Sixth Amendment under Apprendi v. New Jersey and its progeny, including Erlinger v. United States. Until very recently, California appellate courts were split on the proper prejudice analysis for such errors,22with some courts employing a relatively forgiving standard similar to the one this Court had adopted after Cunningham struck down the original version of section 1170. (See Black II, 41 Cal.4that 812-816; Sandoval, 41 Cal.4that 839.)23

22 Because the appellate court here found no right to jury determination of these factors, it did not address prejudice. (Slip opn. 2 fn. 2)

23 The lynchpin of the Court's analysis in Black II and Sandoval was its construction of the original version of the DSL as rendering a defendant "eligible" for an upper term as long as one aggravating circumstance was properly determined. Based on that premise, the Court concluded that there was no Sixth Amendment violation so long as there was one properly determined aggravating factor, even if the sentencing court also relied on other factors. (Black II, 41 Cal.4that 812-816) "By the same reasoning, if a reviewing court concludes, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury, applying the beyond-a- reasonable-doubt standard, unquestionably would have found true at least a single aggravating circumstance had it been

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This Court has decisively resolved that split of authority in its just-issued opinion in People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th730 [323 Cal.Rptr.3d 675]. The Court recognized that it could not simply revive the Black II-Sandoval analysis because current section 1170, as revised in 2021, is materially different than the pre-Cunningham statute construed in those cases. (Lynch, 323 Cal.Rptr.3d at 695-696.) Instead, the Court has prescribed the following two-stage analysis:

[A] sentence imposed under former section 1170(b) must be reversed and remanded unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury, applying that same standard, would have found true all of the aggravating facts upon which the court relied to conclude the upper term was justified, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statute. (§ 1170(b)(2), (3).) ….. Further, similar to the situation in People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1390 [], the 2022 amendment to section 1170(b)(1) and (2) altered the scope of the trial court's discretion. As a result, for sentences imposed under the former law the record must clearly indicate that the court would have found an upper term justified had it been aware of its more limited discretion." (Lynch, 323 Cal.Rptr.3d at 681- 682 (emphasis added).)

There are two distinct components to the Lynch prejudice framework: 1) a factor-by-factor Chapman analysis24under which the sentence can only stand if the reviewing court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury "would have found true all of the aggravating facts on which the court relied" (id. at 681-682 submitted to the jury, the Sixth Amendment error properly may be found harmless." (Sandoval, 41 Cal.4th at 839.)

24 Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.

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(emphasis added); see also 692-705); and 2) a Gutierrez analysis under which remand is required unless the transcript "clearly indicate[s]" that the sentencing court would still have selected the upper term if it had understood the greater constraints on its discretion imposed by revised section 1170(b) (id. at 682, 705-709 (emphasis added)).

"The 2022 version of section 1170(b) functions differently than the pre-Cunningham statute analyzed in Black II and Sandoval." (Lynch, 323 Cal.Rptr.3d at 695.) "By referring to aggravating circumstances "that justify the imposition of" an upper term sentence (§ 1170(b)(2)), the statute contemplates all of the aggravating circumstances that the court actually relies on to justify the sentence, not some subset of those circumstances. [Citation.]" (Id. at 696 (emphasis in original).) "The current statute does not follow the blueprint provided in Black II. It does not speak in terms of a single aggravating factor making the defendant "eligible" for an upper term sentence. [Citation.]"

(Ibid.)

Consequently, even if there was no error as to some of the cited aggravating factors, an erroneous denial of jury determination of one or more aggravating circumstances requires a remand unless the reviewing court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have sustained all those circumstances. (Lynch, 323 Cal.Rptr.3d at 681-682.) In other words, if there is a reasonable doubt as to whether a jury would have found one of the aggravating circumstances true, the error is prejudicial, no matter how many other validly-determined

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circumstances may also be present. Under the second component of the Lynch analysis, a reviewing court must remand for resentencing unless the record

"clearly indicate[s] that the court would have found an upper term justified had it been aware of its more limited discretion."

(Lynch, 323 Cal.Rptr.3d at 682 (emphasis added).) The "clearly indicates" "standard for reversal … applies and must be satisfied in addition to a finding of harmlessness regarding any omitted factual finding. [Citations.] This is so because neither a Chapman nor a Watson review25'can adequately indicate that resentencing is unnecessary upon retroactive application of amended section 1170(b).' [Citations.]" (Lynch at 707 (emphasis in original).)

B. Additional Factors Relevant to Harmless Error Review of Failure to Submit Aggravating Factors to a Jury.

Before turning to the substance of Chapman prejudice review of the failure to submit the "increasing seriousness" and

"unsatisfactory" probation performance factors to a jury, we will briefly note two additional considerations bearing on the difficulties of harmless error review in this context.

1. This Court's Recognition of the Vague and Subjective Character of Many Aggravating Factors and the Differences Between Jury and Judicial Determination of Those Allegations.

In its post-Cunningham opinions and again in Lynch, this Court has candidly recognized the challenges of harmless error

25 Cf. People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 ("reasonable probability" prejudice standard for state law error).

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review of the failure to submit aggravating factors to a jury. The factors listed in Rule 4.421 are different in character than statutes defining offenses and enhancements. Many of these circumstances "rest[] on a somewhat vague or subjective standard." (Sandoval, 41 Cal.4that 840; Lynch, 323 Cal.Rptr.3d at 710.)

The sentencing rules that set forth aggravating circumstances were not drafted with a jury in mind. Rather, they were intended to 'provid[e] criteria for the consideration of the trial judge." (§ 1170.3, subd. (a).) … [B]ecause the rules provide criteria intended to be applied to a broad spectrum of offenses, they are

"framed more broadly than" criminal statutes and necessarily "partake of a certain amount of vagueness which would be impermissible if those standards were attempting to define specific criminal offenses."

[Citation.] Many of the aggravating circumstances described in the rules require an imprecise quantitative or comparative evaluation of the facts. {Sandoval, 41 Cal.4th at 840 (emphasis added); accord Lynch, 323 Cal.Rptr.3d at 710.)

As examples, this Court referenced such offense-related factors as "a particularly vulnerable" victim" and "a taking or damage of great monetary value." (Rule 4.421(a)(3) & (a)(9)). (Sandoval at 840 (emphasis in Sandoval).)

The same is true of the "increasing seriousness" of convictions (Rule 4.421(b)(2)) and "unsatisfactory" probation

"performance" (Rule 4.421(b)(5)). Indeed, an "increasing seriousness" determination is the very essence of a "comparative evaluation" (Sandoval, 41 Cal.4that 840) of a defendant's previous and current convictions.

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"[T]o the extent a potential aggravating circumstance at issue in a particular case rests on a somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be difficult for a reviewing court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the trial court." (Sandoval, 41 Cal.4that 840; Lynch, 323 Cal.Rptr.3d at 710.)

Factfinding by a jury is different than discretionary sentencing judgments by a court. That distinction may fundamentally alter how counsel tries such an allegation:

In a case such as the present one, the reviewing court cannot necessarily assume that the record reflects all of the evidence that would have been presented had aggravating circumstances been submitted to the jury. (Sandoval at 839 (emphasis added); accord Lynch at

690.)

A defense attorney's "incentive and opportunity" to contest potential aggravating circumstances in a sentencing hearing before a judge "were not necessarily the same as they would have been had the aggravating circumstances been tried to a jury."

(Sandoval, 41 Cal.4th at 839.)

Counsel's strategy might have been different had the aggravating circumstances been tried under a

beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof to a trier of fact that was responsible only for determining whether such circumstances were proved (and not for making the ultimate sentencing decision).

Accordingly, a reviewing court cannot always be confident that the factual record would have been the same had aggravating circumstances been charged and tried to the jury. (Sandoval at 840 (emphasis added).)

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In applying Chapman prejudice review to the failure to submit the "increasing seriousness" and "unsatisfactory"

performance factors to a jury, this Court should consider that the imprecise and subjective nature of these characterizations leave ample room for jurors to come to different conclusions. As addressed in Sandoval, the Court should recognize that Wiley's defense counsel may have tried this case differently and put on different evidence before a jury than he did during a discretionary sentencing hearing before a judge.

2. The Erlinger Opinion's Cautionary Comments on Prior Conviction Records and the Still More Questionable Reliability of a CLETS Printout.

In Erlinger, the U.S. Supreme Court sounded a cautionary note on the reliability of the judicial records commonly offered to prove prior conviction allegations ("Shepard documents"26in federal parlance). "Shepard documents … include judicial records, plea agreements, and colloquies between a judge and the defendant. [Citations.]" (Erlinger, 144 S.Ct. at 1854.) In finding such documents ill-suited for any other determinations beyond mere identification of a prior conviction, its date, and its statutory elements, such as the "separate occasions" question there, the Court questioned the sufficiency and the reliability of such documents to prove any ancillary allegations regarding those convictions:

Often … Shepard documents will not contain all the information needed to conduct a sensible ACCA

26 Cf. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26 .

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occasions inquiry, such as the exact times and locations of the defendant's past crimes. [Citation.] Even when Shepard documents do contain that kind of granular information, more still may be required. …. Often, a qualitative assessment about "the character and relationship" of the offenses may be required. [Citation.] (Erlinger at 1854 (emphasis added).)

Still more troubling: "Not only are Shepard documents of limited utility, they can be 'prone to error' [citations]," as reflected in an amicus curiae brief "recounting examples of material errors" in such documents. (Erlinger at 1855.) "Those realities counsel caution in the use of Shepard documents." (Id. at

1856.)

The Supreme Court's cautionary comments on the utility of prior judicial records to prove allegations beyond the bare fact of a conviction should carry still greater weight here. The document submitted as proof of aggravating circumstances was still less reliable because it was not even a judicial record. The sentencing court "ask[ed] the People to provide … a rap sheet that is certified." (6/24/22 RT 46) The prosecutor lodged a CLETS printout. (II CT 231-241; see 7/1/22 RT 51) In contrast to the judicial documents commonly submitted as proof of "strikes"

and other prior conviction allegations (such as abstracts of judgment, accusatory pleadings, plea transcripts, etc.),27a CLETS printout may be an official record, but it is not a judicial record. It is a law enforcement generated summary of judicial

27 Cf., e.g., Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26; People v. Gallardo (2017) 4 Cal.5th120, 136-137.

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records and other information. (See generally People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th106.)

While California law allows admission of a CLETS printout, it is not the same thing as the underlying judicial records. It is a secondary record, in which law enforcement staff have entered data apparently based on judicial records. Thus, a CLETS printout is once- or twice-removed from the actual judicial records.

The CLETS summary here is opaque, to put it charitably. It is frequently difficult to pin down the precise relationship between prior cases, including which charges were included in an earlier case and which were charged in a subsequent case that was later consolidated. (See, e.g., the entries re Wiley's 2015 and 2016 cases, II CT 236-237.) The CLETS printout introduced at the 2022 sentencing hearing is a much less intelligible guide to the sequence and relationship between prior charges than the probation report prepared for Wiley's original 2020 sentencing on the section 422 conviction (I CT 48-49).

We do not seek to revisit the admissibility of CLETS documents. But, in assessing prejudice from the failure to submit these aggravating factors to the jury, this Court should bear in mind the Erlinger opinion's reservations on the reliability even of judicial records as proof of allegations beyond the bare fact of a prior conviction. The Court should consider the still more questionable reliability of a "rap sheet" to prove any such additional facts. Were these allegations tried to a jury, defense counsel might not be content to submit the matter on a "rap

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sheet" and might choose to present other, more definitive records or possibly even live testimony.

C. The Failure to Submit the "Increasing Seriousness" and "Unsatisfactory" Probation Performance Factors to a Jury Was Prejudicial Under Chapman and Neder, Because Each Allegation Was Reasonably Susceptible to Dispute Such That One or More Jurors Could Harbor Reasonable Doubt.

Under Lynch, this Court must separately apply the Chapman harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard to the failures to submit the "increasing seriousness" and

"unsatisfactory" probation performance factors to a jury. (Lynch,

323 Cal.Rptr.3d at 682-683.) An especially rigorous form of Chapman review applies to a failure to submit one or more elements of a charge to a jury - or, as in this case, a failure to submit a charge to a jury altogether:

Where the defendant contested the omitted element and raised evidence sufficient to support a contrary finding - [the reviewing court] should not find the error harmless. (Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 19 (emphasis added).)

Under Neder, removal of one or more elements of a charge from the jury is necessarily prejudicial if the evidence on that element is in conflict or is susceptible to conflicting inferences. (People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th400, 417-419.) Prejudice review of an omitted element is the converse of a "substantial evidence" test. While "substantial evidence" review "views the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution" and indulges every reasonable inference in favor of the verdict, "our task in analyzing the prejudice from the instructional error is whether

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any rational fact finder could have come to the opposite conclusion." (Mil at 418 (emphasis in original).)28

"[T]he question is not whether there is evidence in the record that would support a jury finding of the missing element,"

but whether "'there is evidence in the record that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element.' [Citing Neder.]" (People v. Brown (2023) 14 Cal.5th453, 474 (emphasis added).)

Finally, the focus is on whether "a rational juror, given proper instructions, could have had a reasonable doubt" on the omitted question. (Mil at 418-419 (emphasis added).) As that formulation reflects, because the possibility of a mistrial is a more favorable outcome for purposes of prejudice review, the prospect that "at least one juror" would have harbored a reasonable doubt if that matter were submitted to a jury is sufficient to require a finding of prejudice. (See People v. Hendrix (2022) 13 Cal.5th933, 947 & fn. 6 ("at least one juror" principle applies to prejudice even under the less rigorous "reasonable probability" test for state law error).)

Because these aggravating factors do require highly subjective and comparative evaluations, rather than neatly- defined findings of historical fact (Sandoval, 41 Cal.4that 840), there was ample room for one or more jurors to have reasonable

28 See also, e.g., People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5 th 1, 119-120 (omission of element prejudicial where "the evidence did not establish this inference '"so overwhelmingly"' that ... '"the jurors could not have had a reasonable doubt on the matter"'").

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doubts as to either or both circumstances if only they had been tried to a jury as the Sixth Amendment requires.

1. The Failure to Submit the "Increasing Seriousness" Factor to a Jury Was Prejudicial Under Chapman and Neder Because the Sentence Range for Wiley's Current Section 422 Conviction Was Equal to or Lesser Than the Ranges for His Prior Felony Convictions Pursuant to Black II. The court sustained the "increasing seriousness"

aggravating circumstance (Rule 4.421(b)(2)) based on its belief that Wiley's current section 422 threat offense was more serious than his four prior felony convictions: drug trafficking (Health & Saf. Code §§ 11379(a), 11366.5), ammunition possession (§ 30305) and felony DUI (Veh. Code § 23550). (7/1/22 RT 58) In Black II, this Court approved the following measure for the "increasing seriousness" determination: "The relative seriousness of these alleged convictions may be determined simply by reference to the range of punishment provided by statute for each offense." (Black II, 41 Cal.4that 820 (emphasis added).) Wiley's threat conviction is a "wobbler," "punish[able] by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison." (§ 422(a).) Hence, the range of felony punishment is 16 months, 2 years, or 3 years. (§ 18.) Under the measurement this Court embraced in Black II - comparison of the "range of punishment … for each offense" - Wiley's section 422 conviction is less serious than his prior conviction for sale of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code § 11379(a)), which carries a sentencing triad of 2 years/3 years/4

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years. Moreover, Wiley received an aggravated term of 4 years on his section 11379(a) drugs sale conviction (I CT 49), indicating that the sentencing court there had determined that it was more serious than most convictions under that statute. By the Black II measure, Wiley's section 422 offense is equally serious as his other drug trafficking offense (Health & Saf. Code § 11366.5), ammunition possession (§ 30305), and felony drunk driving (Veh. Code § 23550), all of which similarly have 16 months/2 years/3 years triads.

The sentencing court based its "increasing seriousness"

finding on that fact that section 422 qualifies as a "serious felony"

and "strike" for purposes of sentencing on any subsequent conviction (§ 1192.7(c)(38)).29But the potential for use of a conviction for enhancement of a sentence on some future offense is not part of the "range of punishment" for section 422. It is not a direct penal consequence, but an "indirect collateral consequence." (People v. Crosby (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th1352, 1355- 1356 (no duty to give plea advisements on possible future enhancement use).)

One appellate opinion has stated that, by virtue of Black II's use of the permissive "may" ("may be determined…."), comparison of the "range[s] of punishment" for offenses is not the exclusive means for evaluation of "increasing seriousness."

(Quiles, 177 Cal.App.4that 621-622,) The Quiles court opined that

29 "422 is more serious, and it is designated as such in the statute." (7/1/22 RT 58)

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a court could also undertake "a comparison of the offenses' respective elements." (Id. at 622.)

No subsequent published opinion has followed Quiles. Moreover, in a later case, this Court reiterated Black II's formulation of comparison of "the range of punishment" without any suggestion of an alternative measurement. (Chism, 58 Cal.4th at 1336.)

Although Quiles appears to be an outlier, it is unnecessary for this Court to consider the validity of its analysis. Even assuming that comparison of sentence ranges is not the exclusive means for assessing relative seriousness, Black II states unequivocally that one "may" make that determination "simply"

through that measurement. (Black II, 41 Cal.4that 820.) Like so many California aggravating factors, "increasing seriousness" comes down to subjective judgments and comparative evaluations. (Cf. Sandoval, 41 Cal.4that 840.) Under one measure - which this Court has expressly endorsed in two opinions (Black II & Chism) - a trier of fact may assess the "relative seriousness"

of offenses by comparison of their sentence ranges. Under that yardstick, the "increasing seriousness" determination here would be an easy one because Wiley's current section 422 conviction was less serious than one of his drug trafficking convictions (Health & Saf. Code § 11379) and equally seriousness as his other prior felonies. Under a different measure (Quiles), the section 422 offense could be deemed more serious.

Where one comparison method could potentially support an aggravating circumstance but another method would preclude it,

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there is necessarily "evidence sufficient to support a contrary finding" on the "increasing seriousness" allegation. (Neder, 527 U.S. at 19.) There is ample room for a "rational fact finder [to] come to the opposite conclusion." (Mil, 53 Cal.4that 418 (emphasis in original).) If tasked with determining "increasing seriousness,"

one or more jurors could have harbored reasonable doubts because the sentence range for section 422 was less than for his prior drug sales conviction (Health & Saf. Code § 11379(a)) and equal to his other prior felonies. In view of that potential for reasonable doubt under a comparison of sentence ranges, the denial of jury determination of the "increasing seriousness"

circumstance was necessarily prejudicial.30

This Court's observations in Sandoval and Lynch are apropos. If this allegation were tried to a jury, defense counsel might have approached it very differently than in a discretionary sentencing hearing before a judge and may have presented new or different evidence. (Sandoval, 41 Cal.4th at 839; Lynch, 323 Cal.Rptr.3d at 691.) In a jury trial, defense counsel might not be content to submit the matter on the unilluminating CLETS "rap

30 One of the cases currently pending before this Court on grant- and-hold is especially instructive - People v. Butler (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th953, review gr., May 31, 2023 (S269633). The Butler court found the failure to submit the "increasing seriousness" factor to a jury prejudicial under Chapman where the offenses had similar sentence ranges. "None of the offenses is so strikingly more serious than any other by the nature of the offense or the punishment that we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the convictions were of increasing seriousness. [Citations.]" (Butler at 961.)

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sheet" (II CT 231-241). The defense could seek to raise reasonable doubts as to the degree of seriousness of Wiley's current threat offense, relative to his prior drug trafficking crimes, by developing evidence regarding its circumstances. The threat was an impulsive outburst arising from Wiley's mistaken belief that the victim was the one who had stolen a very substantial sum of cash ($15,000) from him while he was sleeping. (I CT 38-40) Wiley's earlier felonies were more serious in the sense that, rather than a mistaken and rash response to a provocation (the theft), those past drug trafficking offenses had involved ongoing engagement in a criminal business, including sale or transportation of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code § 11379(a)) and maintaining a place for drug sales or other activities (id., § 11366.5).

Some jurors could have found especially compelling that the victim of the threat offense, Carla Pirovano, took a nuanced and forgiving view of Wiley's culpability. As reflected in her victim impact statement, Pirovano recognized that Wiley was far less culpable than co-defendant Megan Carbonneau, who had viciously assaulted her. Pirovano emphasized that (unlike Carbonneau) Wiley had been remorseful and had tried to make amends. (I CT 66)

In sum, the sentence range for section 422 is less than that for one of Wiley's prior offenses and equal to those for the others, and the victim considered Wiley considerably less culpable than the co-defendant. On either or both grounds, there is room for a

"rational fact finder [to] come to the opposite conclusion" and

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entertain a reasonable doubt on the increasing seriousness factor. (Mil, 53 Cal.4that 418 (emphasis in original).) That reasonable prospect compels a finding of prejudice under Chapman and Neder.

2. The Failure to Submit the

"Unsatisfactory" Probation Performance Factor to a Jury Was Prejudicial Under Neder, Because Wiley's Prior Performance Was Mixed, Having Performed

Satisfactorily in One Case and Unsatisfactorily in Another, Such That One or More Jurors Could Have Had Reasonable Doubts as to the Overall Assessment.

The inquiry into a defendant's prior "performance" on probation or other supervised release similarly "rests on a somewhat vague or subjective standard." (Sandoval, 41 Cal.4that 840; Lynch, 323 Cal.Rptr.3d at 710.) Rule 4.421(b)(5) is not framed with the clarity and precision of statutory definitions of offenses and enhancements. It does not present a simple binary determination whether a defendant has ever sustained a probation violation but calls for a more holistic and subjective evaluation of whether his overall "performance" was

"unsatisfactory."

As with the "increasing seriousness" factor, Wiley's prior

"performance" on probation or other supervised release was equivocal rather than clearcut. Indeed, the original probation report listed both "unsatisfactory" probation performance (Rule 4.421(b)(5)) and the mitigating circumstance of "satisfactory" performance (Rule 4.423(b)(6)) as applicable sentencing

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circumstances. The explanation for this paradox is that Wiley had successfully completed probation in one case (CR091741S) but had violated probation in another (CR1503746). (I CT 52) In the former case, "defendant completed a residential drug treatment program, as well as the HART program. He obtained his driver's license and paid his Court ordered fines and fees in full. Defendant did not suffer any probation violations during his term of supervision in this case." But, in the latter case, his probation was revoked based on new convictions, and he received a prison term. (I CT 51)

Even on the case resulting in a prison commitment, there were both positives and negatives during his subsequent Post Release Community Supervision (PRCS). Early in his PRCS period, Wiley sustained a new misdemeanor conviction for which he received summary probation. However, he "was fairly compliant during the remainder of his supervision term." (I CT

51) Thus, like his probation history, Wiley prior performance on PRCS was a mixed bag.

In view of the probation department's classification of Wiley past probation performance as both "satisfactory" and

"unsatisfactory," there was certainly "evidence sufficient to support a contrary finding" on an allegation of "unsatisfactory"

performance. (Neder, 527 U.S. at 19.) Moreover, at the time of the 2020 probation report, a judge determined sentencing circumstances under a preponderance standard. But, under the Sixth Amendment and amended section 1170(b)(2), a verdict on

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an "unsatisfactory" performance allegation would require jury unanimity and application of the reasonable doubt burden. Finally, as with the "increasing seriousness" factor, in conducting harmless error analysis, this Court "cannot necessarily assume that the record reflects all of the evidence that would have been presented had aggravating circumstances been submitted to the jury." (Sandoval, 41 Cal.4th at 839; Lynch,

323 Cal.Rptr.3d at 690.) Rather than try the unsatisfactory performance allegation to a jury solely on the basis of the opaque and uninformative CLETS rap sheet (II CT 232-241), defense counsel could choose to flesh out the facts through additional evidence providing a more comprehensive picture of Wiley's compliance efforts. For example, the defense could potentially present testimony from Wiley's probation officer in case CR091741S or from the staff of the residential drug treatment program he completed. (I CT 51-52)

Under Neder, this Court may only dismiss the deprivation of jury adjudication as harmless if the evidence '""so overwhelmingly'"' compels a finding of "unsatisfactory"

performance that '""the jurors could not have had a reasonable doubt on the matter.'" [Citation.]" (Brooks, 3 Cal.5that 119-120.) Any declaration of harmless error here would be especially fraught since, in a jury trial the defense might well present additional evidence to provide the jurors with a more fully developed picture of Wiley's overall probation and supervised release performance.

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Especially factoring in that prospect of additional evidence, the defense could likely have "raised evidence sufficient to support a contrary finding." Hence, this Court "should not find the error harmless." (Neder, 527 U.S. at 19.)

D. The Matter Must be Remanded Under Gutierrez and Lynch Because the Transcript Does Not

"Clearly Indicate" That the Sentencing Court Would Have Chosen the Upper Term If Fewer Aggravating Factors Had Been Found or If It Was Aware of the More Limited Scope of its Discretion, As Clarified in Lynch. To avoid a resentencing remand, the state must establish both: 1) that the denial of jury adjudication was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to each of the aggravating factors (the Chapman component); and 2) that the record "clearly indicates"

that the sentencing court would still have imposed the same sentence if it had understood its more circumscribed discretion to impose an upper term under revised section 1170(b) (the Gutierrez component). (Lynch, 323 Cal.Rptr.3d at 681-682, 709-

712.)

If the Court finds the failure to accord Wiley a jury trial prejudicial under Chapman as to either factor, it can conclude its prejudice analysis there, and it will be unnecessary to conduct the separate Gutierrez analysis. Nonetheless, that latter prong also compels a remand because here is no such clear indication that the sentencing court would still have selected an upper term if it has been cognizant of the greater constraints on such a determination, as explained in Lynch.

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The "clearly indicates" standard derives from People v. Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th 1354, and similar cases, where an intervening legal development altered the standards governing a discretionary sentencing decision. Gutierrez addressed the standards for the choice under section 190.5 between life- without-parole (LWOP) or a 25-to-life term for a juvenile convicted of special circumstance murder. Guiterrez disapproved prior case law that had construed section 190.5 as establishing a presumption against reducing the punishment to a parole-eligible term. (Gutierrez at 1369-1390.) As in other circumstances where there has been a change or clarification in the standards governing a discretionary sentencing decision, "the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record 'clearly indicate[s]' that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion 'even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.' [Citations.]" (Gutierrez at 1391.)

As explained in Lynch, the 2021 amendments impose greater limitations on a sentencing court's authority to select an upper term than the pre-Cunningham version of the statute considered in Black II. "Based on [the pre-Cunningham] statutory structure, Black II reasoned that 'the existence of a single aggravating circumstance is legally sufficient to make the defendant eligible for the upper term.' [Citation.]" (Lynch, 323 Cal.Rptr.3d at 699.) "The current statute, by contrast, eliminates any purported distinction between eligibility and justification with respect to the finding of aggravating facts…" It "authoriz[es] the court to impose an upper term sentence 'only' when the

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'circumstances in aggravation ... justify the imposition' of that term." (Ibid.) Consequently, under the current revised statute,

"the existence of a single aggravating circumstance does not satisfy Apprendi's jury trial requirement because the trial court must justify imposition of that sentence." (Ibid.) Thus, as construed in Lynch, by establishing a presumption against an upper term and requiring that the proven sentencing circumstances "justify" a sentence greater than the mid-term, current section 1170(b) constrains a sentencing court's discretion and imposes substantially greater limitations on its authority than either the pre-Cunningham statute or the version in effect through 2021.

Consequently, an ordinary "harmless error" analysis is insufficient to vindicate the defendant's right to sentencing under the new, more favorable framework. "'[W]hen the applicable law governing the defendant's sentence has substantively changed after sentencing, it is almost always speculative for a reviewing court to say what the sentencing court would have done if it had known the scope of its discretionary powers at the time of sentencing.'" (Lynch, 323 Cal.Rptr.3d at 711 (quoting People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th416, 425).)

We acknowledge that the sentencing hearing in Lynch occurred prior to the amendment of the statute (eff. Jan. 1, 2022), while Wiley was sentenced on July 1, 2022. The sentencing court and counsel were, of course, aware of the legislation's requirement that almost all aggravating circumstances be tried to a jury. But there is no indication in the sentencing transcript

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that the court was aware that the revised statute imposes greater limitations on a court's authority to impose an upper term than any prior version of the statute and that, even where one or more aggravating factors have been properly found, a sentencing court must make a further determination that those circumstances

"justify" an upper term. (7/1/22 RT 50-58) [T]he amendment at issue did alter the trial court's sentencing discretion. …. The current statute narrows that authority by creating a presumption against the upper term, which may be overcome only if the required facts are properly proven and the court concludes that term is justified. (Lynch, 323 Cal.Rptr.3d at 707 (emphasis added).) The statutory construction questions resolved in Lynch were subtle. Not only did those questions result in a split of authority among the appellate courts,31leading to the grant of review in Lynch. The justices of this Court split 4-3 in Lynch itself. (See Lynch, 323 Cal.Rptr.3d at 722-741 (dis. opn., Guerrero, C.J.); id. at 712-722 (concur. & dis. opn., Kruger, J, joined by Jenkins, J.).)

31 A number of appellate courts wrongly continued to assume that this Court's construction of the pre-Cunningham DSL in Black II applied equally to current revised section 1170(b). That is, those courts believed that, as with that earlier regimen, a single aggravating circumstance was always sufficient to render a defendant eligible for an upper term. (See, e.g., People v. Flores (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th495, 500-501; People v. Hall (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th1084, 1096-1097, review gr., Feb. 28, 2024 (S283530); and other opinions disapproved in Lynch, 323 Cal.Rptr.3d at 704.) Any court operating under that understanding of the revised statute would not recognize the greater constraints on choice of an upper term explained in Lynch.

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This Court has required Gutierrez-type resentencing remands not only where there has been an intervening statutory change but also where an opinion of this Court has resolved questions regarding the proper construction of a recently enacted statute. People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335 - a foundational case cited in both Gutierrez and Lynch32 - is a prime example. Belmontes addressed consecutive sentencing for sex offenses under then recently-enacted section 667.6(c) and clarified a sentencing court's discretion to choose between a full consecutive term under section 667.6(c) or a subordinate consecutive one under section 1170.1 This Court prescribed that a resentencing was warranted unless the record "clearly indicated that [the court] would not have exercised its discretion to sentence under section 1170.1 even if it had been aware it had such discretion."

(Belmontes at 348 fn. 8.)

Here, as in Belmontes, this Court has resolved misconceptions regarding the scope of a sentencing court's discretion under a recent statutory revision. Consequently, the Lynch requirement of a "clear[] indicat[ion]" that the sentencing court would still have imposed an upper term even if aware of the greater constraints on its discretion should not be limited to pre- 2022 sentencings. That test should also apply to sentencing conducted after the revision of section 1170 but prior to Lynch's resolution of the split of authority and its clarification of the greater constraints on a court's authority to select an upper term.

32 Gutierrez, 58 Cal.4 th at 1391; Lynch, 32 3 Cal.Rptr.3d at 706.

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Lynch compels a remand unless the record "clearly indicates" that the sentencing court would have found the upper term "justified" even if it had been fully aware of the constraints on its discretion and the strong "presumption" of a middle or lower term. (Lynch, 323 Cal.Rptr.3d at 710-712.) The Court's application of the "clearly indicates" analysis in Lynch itself illustrates the rigor of that standard: "[T]he trial court found eight circumstances in aggravation and none in mitigation," including "among other things, that Lynch had committed repeated acts of violence; his use of multiple weapons in this case involved great violence, cruelty, viciousness, and callousness; and his criminal record demonstrated a serious danger to society." (Lynch, 323 Cal.Rptr.3d at 711 (emphasis added).) Despite those multiple aggravating circumstances and the sentencing court's conclusion that an upper term was

"appropriate," those statements did not provide the requisite clear indication that the court would still have chosen the upper term if it had understood the additional constraints on its authority:

[The record] does not necessarily speak to how the court would have exercised its discretion under the weight of the presumptive middle term maximum sentence that currently exists. [Citation] Notably, the court did not make the kind of definitive statements that we have found to clearly indicate it would not impose a lesser sentence under any circumstances. [Citation.] (Ibid. (emphasis added).)

Wiley's current offense and prior history (I CT 48-49) were decidedly less aggravated than Lynch's (compare Lynch at 682- 683), and the court found fewer aggravating circumstances - four

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not eight. (7/1//22 RT 57-58) True, the sentencing court stated that an upper term rather than a mid-term was "appropriate."

(7/1/22 RT 57-58) But the sentencing court in Lynch said the same thing. (Lynch, 323 Cal.Rptr.3d at 711.) If eight aggravating factors and an "appropriate" characterization do not represent the requisite "definitive statements … clearly indicat[ing] it would not impose a lesser sentence under any circumstances"

(ibid.), then four aggravators and a similar "appropriate" remark fall still farther short of that threshold.

This Court's opinion in Lynch is a game-changer for the California bench's and bar's understanding of the full import of Senate Bill No. 567's rigorous constraints, both procedural and substantive, on a sentencing court's authority to impose an upper term. As in Lynch, the record here cannot provide the requisite confidence that the sentencing court would have made the same decision had it fully understood those constraints. Here too, this Court should remand the matter for the court to reconsider that sentence choice in view of the newly recognized strong

"presumption" against an upper term and the additional guidance provided in the Lynch opinion.

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CONCLUSION

For all these reasons, Eric Wiley respectfully requests this Court to remand the matter for resentencing. Dated: September 6, 2024 Respectfully submitted,

JONATHAN SOGLIN

Executive Director J. Bradley O'Connell J. Bradley O'Connell Assistant Director Attorneys for Appellant

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CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT

Counsel for Eric Wiley hereby certifies that this brief consists of 19,605 words (excluding cover page information, tables, proof of service, signature blocks, and this certificate), according to the word count of the computer word-processing program. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.504(d)(1).) Dated: Sept. 6, 2024 J. Bradley O'Connell

J. Bradley O'Connell

Assistant Director

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DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY MAIL AND ELECTRONIC SERVICE BY TRUEFILING

Re: People v. Eric Wiley Case No. S283326

We, the undersigned, declare that we are over 18 years of age and not a party to the within cause. We are employed in the County of Alameda, State of California. Our business address is 1212 Broadway, Suite 1200, Oakland, CA, 94612. Our electronic service address is eservice@fdap.org. On September 6, 2024, we served a true copy of the

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF ON THE MERITS attached on each of the following, by placing same in an envelope(s) addressed as follows:

Humboldt County Superior Court Eric Wiley

Attn: Hon. Kaleb Cockrom (Appellant)

825 Fifth Street Eureka, California 95501 Each said envelope was sealed and the postage thereon fully prepaid. We are familiar with this office's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. Under that practice each envelope would be deposited with the United States Postal Service in Oakland, California, on that same day in the ordinary course of business.

On September 6, 2024, we transmitted a PDF version of this document by TrueFiling to the following:

Brady Baldwin Humboldt County District Attorney

Deputy Attorney General (districtattorney@co.humboldt.ca.us)

Office of the Attorney General

(sfagdocketing@doj.ca.gov) David Celli

(brady.baldwin@doj.ca.gov) Humboldt County Public Defender Office (Respondent) (publicdefenderdiscovery@all.co.humboldt.ca.us)

(Trial Counsel)

We declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on September 6, 2024, at Oakland and Bolinas, California.

/s/Elizabeth Wilkie /s/ Sabine Jordan

Elizabeth Wilkie Sabine Jordan

Declarant for Postal Delivery Declarant for Email and TrueFiling

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Supreme Court of California Jorge E. Navarrete, Clerk and Executive Officer of the Court Electronically FILED on 9/6/2024 by Gabriela Muca, Deputy Clerk

STATE OF CALIFORNIA PROOF OF SERVICE

Supreme Court of California STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Supreme Court of California Case Name: PEOPLE v. WILEY

Case Number: S283326

Lower Court Case Number: A165613

1. At the time of service I was at least 18 years of age and not a party to this legal action.

2. My email address used to e-serve: boconnell@fdap.org

3. I served by email a copy of the following document(s) indicated below:

Title(s) of papers e-served:

Filing Type Document Title
BRIEF Wiley_S283326_AOBM_JBOC_final
APPLICATION TO FILE OVER-LENGTH BRIEF S283326_Wiley_applic_oversized_brief-Final

Service Recipients:

Person Served Email Address Type Date / Time
J. O'connell First District Appellate Project jboc@fdap.org e- Serve 9/6/2024 11:50:13 AM
Neil Sawhney ACLU Foundation of Northern California 300130 nsawhney@aclunc.org e- Serve 9/6/2024 11:50:13 AM
J. Bradley O'Connell First District Appellate Project 104755 boconnell@fdap.org e- Serve 9/6/2024 11:50:13 AM
Edward Mahler Edward Mahler 88842 mahlerlaw@msn.com e- Serve 9/6/2024 11:50:13 AM
Brady Baldwin Office of the Attorney General brady.baldwin@jud.ca.gov e- Serve 9/6/2024 11:50:13 AM
Humboldt County District Attorney districtattorney@co.humboldt.ca.us e- Serve 9/6/2024 11:50:13 AM
David Celli, Humboldt County Public Defender (Trial Counsel) publicdefenderdiscovery@all.co.humboldt.ca.us e- Serve 9/6/2024 11:50:13 AM
Office of the Attorney General (Respondent) sfagdocketing@doj.ca.gov e- Serve 9/6/2024 11:50:13 AM
Brady Baldwin, Deputy Attorney General (Respondent) brady.baldwin@doj.ca.gov e- Serve 9/6/2024 11:50:13 AM

103

319093

FDAP Eservice eservice@fdap.org e- 9/6/2024 Serve 11:50:13

AM

This proof of service was automatically created, submitted and signed on my behalf through my agreements with TrueFiling and its contents are true to the best of my information, knowledge, and belief. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. 9/6/2024

Date

/s/Sabine Jordan

Signature

O'Connell, J. Bradley (104755)

Last Name, First Name (PNum)

First District Appellate Project

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People v. Wiley
(Jun 26, 2025)