JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF YAZOO COUNTY IS REINSTATED
AND AFFIRMED.
RANDOLPH, C.J., CHAMBERLIN, ISHEE, GRIFFIS AND BRANNING, JJ.,
CONCUR. KING, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED
IN PART BY COLEMAN, P.J., AND SULLIVAN, J. COLEMAN, P.J., DISSENTS
WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY SULLIVAN, J.
KING, PRESIDING JUSTICE, DISSENTING:
¶49. We should dismiss this certiorari proceeding as improvidently granted, as I can find no significant fault with the unanimous Court of Appeals opinion, nor any other compelling
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reason for this Court to decide this case. Further, on the merits, the invited-error doctrine does not apply to this case. Consequently, I respectfully dissent.
1. Certiorari
¶50. Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 17(a) provides standards for when this Court should review a decision of the Court of Appeals. M.R.A.P. 17(a). A grant of certiorari is
"ordinarily . . . only for the purpose of resolving substantial questions of law of general significance." M.R.A.P. 17(a). Further, review is ordinarily limited to cases in which the Court of Appeals' decision is in conflict with precedent or fails to consider a controlling constitutional provision. M.R.A.P. 17(a)(1)-(2). This case does not meet these criteria. A unanimous Court of Appeals correctly analyzed the issue under our existing precedent. And I can ascertain no general significance to this issue, unless the majority expects that the State will regularly shirk its duty to submit elements instructions, and instead generally fail to submit them or submit them for the entirely wrong crime. I, however, believe this to be a somewhat isolated oversight on the State's part, not an issue that will be generally significant. Thus, we should dismiss this certiorari proceeding and allow the opinion of the Court of Appeals to stand.
2. Invited Error ¶51. For a criminal defendant's right to a jury trial under the Mississippi Constitution to be fulfilled, the jury must be properly instructed on every element of the crime. Harrell v. State, 134 So. 3d 266, 270-75 (Miss. 2014). The responsibility for properly instructing a jury on all elements of a crime lies with the State and, ultimately, the trial court. Id. at 270.
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It is the trial court's responsibility to assure that the jury is "fully and properly instructed on all issues of law relevant to the case." Kolberg v. State, 829 So. 2d 29, 46 (Miss. 2002). "There is no doubt that the trial court is ultimately responsible for rendering proper guidance to the jury via appropriately given jury instructions, even sua sponte." Id. at 45. We also have held that the State is responsible for making sure the jury is instructed on the essential elements of the crime. Hunter v. State, 684 So. 2d 625, 635 (Miss. 1996) (stating that
"[i]t is rudimentary that the jury must be instructed regarding the elements of the crime with which the defendant is charged . . . even though the defendant did not present an acceptable instruction, the State was obligated to do so").
Id. (alteration in original). Nothing in our caselaw shifts the burden to properly instruct the jury on every element of the crime to the defendant when the State utterly fails in its duty. When the State completely fails to complete its required burden, and the trial court fails as well, it would be nearly impossible to find invited error when the defendant is essentially forced to use his instruction, an instruction that the State unequivocally accepts. In this case, the State did not meet its burden to properly instruct the jury on the crime of statutory rape; indeed, the State did not even bother to attempt to instruct the jury on statutory rape. The State admits that it submitted an elements jury instruction only on the completely wrong crime. Nor did the trial court attempt to properly instruct the jury on statutory rape. The State and the trial court both accepted Allen's instruction without correction. And these failures are the first reason that the Thomas case relied upon by the majority is distinguishable.
¶52. In Thomas, the State submitted proper jury instructions setting forth the elements of capital murder and the underlying crime of robbery. Thomas v. State, 249 So. 3d 331, 347- 50 (Miss. 2018). Thomas's counsel vociferously and, as the record laid bare, with clear knowledge of the consequences, objected to instructing the jury as to the elements of the
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underlying crime of robbery. Id. Thomas then argued on appeal that it was error not to instruct the jury as to the elements of robbery. Id. In finding invited error, the Court emphasized that "the State met its burden to instruct the jury by submitting proper instructions as to both the elements of capital murder and the underlying crime of robbery."
Id. at 349. It further stressed that "[a] reversal is not required where the trial court and the State both acted to properly instruct the jury, but the defendant—in a tactical decision—objected to the instruction." Id. In Allen's case, conversely, neither the State nor the trial court even attempted to properly instruct the jury. The State submitted an instruction for the wrong crime and both the State and the trial court simply accepted Allen's elements instructions without discussion regarding missing elements. The State and trial court in this case clearly failed to meet their burdens to properly instruct the jury. ¶53. The second reason that this case is distinguishable from Thomas is that no record evidence exists to indicate that this decision was intentional or strategic on the part of Allen. In Thomas, his attorney vociferously advocated for the removal of the robbery elements instruction, several times, citing his reasoning. Id. at 348 (quoting the record and noting that
"[t]he record demonstrates that defense counsel's successful objection to Instruction S-3 was a tactical decision"). Indeed, the Court characterized defense counsel as having "demanded"
the robbery instruction be removed. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court ultimately held that "[a] defendant cannot object to an elements instruction, succeed on the objection, use that success to minimize the issue to a jury, bolster his own credibility with the success of the objection, and then cry error . . . ." Id. at 349-50. The record bears out none
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of that in Allen's case. And the majority concedes that nothing indicating counsel's motives is in the record. Maj. Op. ¶ 25-26. Indeed, the State itself argued in its brief that the record is not developed with regard to defense counsel's trial strategy. And the only reason Allen's instruction was used in the first place was because the State failed wholesale to submit an elements instruction for the charged crime. Allen did not advocate for his instruction to be used over another proper instruction; rather, the record clearly indicates that his instruction was used merely by default. Thomas distinguishes cases in which the actions of defense counsel were "inadvertent, negligent, or without strategic or tactical grounds." Id. at 347 (citing People v. Bender, 169 N.E.2d 328, 333 (Ill. 1960); State v. Dozier, 255 S.E.2d 552, 555 (W. Va. 1979)). Nothing in the record indicates that the State or the trial court met their burdens to properly instruct the jury as to all the elements by submitting a proper instruction or attempting to correct the only elements instruction offered on the actual crime charged. The burden to properly instruct the jury did not transfer to the defendant because of the State's complete failings; indeed, the defendant was essentially forced to use his instruction due to the State's failure of its duty, and the State, further shirking its unequivocal, nontransferable duty, accepted the faulty instruction without correction, when correcting the instruction would have helped the State fulfill its duty to make sure the jury was properly instructed on every element of the crime. Equally, if not more, plausible given the record is that the omission of elements in the instruction was inadvertent or negligent. And the State's utter failures essentially forcing the defendant's hand lead to the conclusion that invited error cannot occur in this case. This is consequently not an appropriate case in which to apply the
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invited error doctrine, and I would allow the unanimous Court of Appeals decision to stand.6
3. Batson7
¶54. While I agree with the ultimate outcome reached by the majority on the Batson issue, I write to express serious concern regarding its analysis. The State used all but one of its strikes on Black jurors and the judge specifically stated that simply because the State had accepted at least one Black juror, Batson was inapplicable, stating that Batson "doesn't arise on that." The trial court relied on the incorrect notion that accepting at least one Black juror negated any Batson challenge at the outset. That is simply not the law. The majority's discussion about providing "great deference" to a trial judge's findings regarding a prima facie case is confusing, because its discussion implies that the trial court, which applied a completely incorrect legal standard, is owed deference for such. Maj. Op. ¶ 45. However, when remanding for a Batson hearing because of failure to conduct a proper analysis, the trial court is limited to the record as it stood at the time, and the majority is correct that Allen has not provided any record evidence of the racial makeup of the jury venire, the racial makeup of the empaneled jury, or other factors that would indicate that the strikes were race- based and a prima facie showing of discrimination could be made. Allen simply has not made enough of a record to indicate that enough evidence exists to enable an analysis worthy of conducting.
¶55. For these reasons, I believe that we should dismiss certiorari review of this case. If
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the case is addressed on the merits, I would hold that the invited error doctrine is inapplicable based on the record before us. I therefore respectfully dissent.
COLEMAN, P.J., AND SULLIVAN J., JOIN THIS OPINION IN PART.
COLEMAN, PRESIDING JUSTICE, DISSENTING:
I. Invited-Error
¶56. The instant case is indistinguishable from Hunter v. State, 684 So. 2d 625, 636 (Miss. 1996), abrogated by Kolberg v. State, 829 So. 2d 29 (Miss. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Rowsey v. State, 188 So. 3d 486, 494 (Miss. 2015). There, we held that the State must present adequate elements instructions for the jury when the defendant fails to do so.
Id. at 636 ("Therefore, even though the defendant did not present an acceptable instruction, the State was obligated to do so.").
¶57. On the other hand, today's case is easily distinguishable from Thomas v. State, 249 So. 3d 331 (Miss. 2018). There, we held that the record showed the defendant's objection to the element instruction was "a tactical decision." Id. at 348 (¶ 60). Regarding defense counsel's objection to the instruction that included the elements of robbery, we wrote:
He acted with full knowledge of the consequences. He did not want the jury instructed on the elements of robbery. He felt that the instruction would be confusing to the jurors, misleading them into believing the defendant was charged with a second count. The tactical decision, whether wise or not, is further brought home in defense counsel's closing argument in which he stated the defendant had admitted that he had committed the crime of robbery and used it to support the defendant's credibility on the capital-murder issue in which he argued that "The State can't pick and choose what they want you to believe."
Id. As the Thomas Court wrote, defendants may waive "their constitutional rights if they do
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so knowingly and voluntarily." Id. (¶ 61). The actions of defense counsel in Thomas, i.e., directly rejecting the correct elements instruction offered by the State, amounted to a waiver of the elements instruction.
¶58. The same cannot be said of the case before us today. Here, the incomplete elements instructions were provided by the defendant after the State submitted instructions for the wrong crime. "We absolutely and without reservation agree with this legal tenet" that "it is the trial court's responsibility to assure that the jury is 'fully and properly instructed on all issues relevant to the case.'" Id. at 349 (¶ 63) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Harrell v. State, 134 So. 3d 266, 270 (¶ 14) (Miss. 2014)). The duty of supplying proper instructions belongs to the State as well. Id. (¶ 64) (noting that the State met its burden by providing proper jury elements instructions); Hunter, 684 So. 2d at 636 ("Therefore, even though the defendant did not present an acceptable instruction, the State was obligated to do so.") At the outset, today's case is instantly distinguishable from Thomas in that, here, the State never met its duty. Of course, as more fully set out below, today, the majority relieves the State of that long-held duty.
¶59. The Thomas Court wrote: "It is important to note what this case is not. This is not a case in which the defendant successfully objected to the language of an elements instruction and the court neglected to correct the error or substitute language." Thomas, 249 So. 3d at 347-48 (¶ 58). The instant case falls squarely into the category that Thomas was not. In Thomas, the State met its duty to seek correct instruction of the jury, but the defendant explicitly rejected the correct instruction. In today's case, the State never fulfilled
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its duty to see that the jury was properly instructed. "Therefore, even though the defendant did not present an acceptable instruction, the State was obligated to do so. Reversal on this issue is warranted." Hunter, 684 So. 2d at 636 (citing Henderson v. State, 660 So. 2d 220, 222 (Miss. 1995); Neal v. State, 451 So. 2d 743, 757 n.9 (Miss. 1984); Watson v. State, 465 So. 2d 1025, 1031 (Miss. 1985)).
¶60. In Thomas, defense counsel expressly objected to the correct instruction, thereby waiving his client's right to have a jury decide Thomas's guilt on that element. Thomas, 249 So. 3d at 344-50 (¶ 65). As the Court wrote, Thomas was a case "in which the error might more appropriately be referred to as 'demanded' by the defendant rather than 'invited.'" Id.
at 348 (¶ 58). The waiver of the right to a jury trial must be made either in writing or in open court. Miss. R. Crim. P. 18.1(b). The waiver must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Miss. R. Crim. P. 18.1(b)(1). The waiver of the right to have a jury determine guilt cannot be presumed from a silent record. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). In
Thomas, the defendant's pointed and repeated objection to the elements instruction sufficed to show waiver, but the record here lacks such clarity and can provide a basis for no more than conjecture as to the motivation, if any, for the omission of the instruction. Thomas, 249 So. 3d at 348-49 (¶¶ 60-61). In the absence of adequate evidence of waiver, Allen's right to have a jury find his guilt—even of such a heinous crime as the one with which he is charged—stands.
¶61. The facts of the instant case are not meaningfully distinguishable from the facts in
Hunter. There, the defendant stood trial for capital murder with the underlying felony of
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robbery. Hunter, 684 So. 2d at 628. The trial court, in a decision affirmed by the Hunter
Court on appeal, rejected the defendant's instruction on the elements of robbery as incorrect and confusing. Id. at 634. After the trial court refused the defendant's proposed instruction, no proper instruction addressing the elements of robbery was offered by the State or the trial court to take the place of the rejected defense instruction. Id. at 635. ¶62. The Hunter Court squarely rejected the argument that "it is incumbent on the defendant to offer" a correct elements instruction, and it rejected the State's argument and cited authority to that effect. Hunter, 684 So. 2d at 635. Although Hunter did not address invited error, the State's attempted disavowal of its duty to see the jury properly instructed is at the heart of its invited error argument here as it was at the heart of its argument in
Hunter. Accordingly, Hunter stands squarely against the majority's holding today that, in the face of a flawed jury instruction offered by the defendant, the State has no duty to ensure the jury is properly instructed. "[T]he State also has to ensure that the jury is properly instructed with regard to the elements of the crime." Id. at 635. It is impossible to square today's holding with Hunter. In both cases, the defendant offered flawed jury instructions. In both cases the State argued that providing correct instructions was the defendant's responsibility, and the failure of the defendant to fulfill that responsibility warrants affirming the conviction. In Hunter, the Court rejected that argument, but today the majority accepts it. Vaughn v. State, 143 Miss. 722, 109 So. 727 (1926), does not change the result because the jury instruction at issue in Vaughn was not an elements instruction. ¶63. It is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine a set of facts that lends itself to the
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decades-old holdings from the Court that place the duty on the State and trial court to see that the court fully instructs the jury as to the elements of a crime more than the case before us here. Today's case at best confuses the law. To be frank, had all nine members of the Court not recently reaffirmed those duties in Thomas, one could easily draw the conclusion that the majority today overrules the cases that acknowledge them. Thomas, 249 So. 3d at 349 (¶¶ 63-64); see also id. at 350-51 (¶ 71) (Kitchens, P.J., dissenting). ¶64. The majority contends that the inclusion of the age-gap instruction would not have made a difference in the jury's deliberations because the fact of the age gap was not contested. Maj. Op. ¶ 28.
It is axiomatic that a jury's verdict may not stand upon uncontradicted fact alone. The fact must be found via jury instructions correctly identifying the elements of the offense under the proper standards. This is the essence of criminal justice under law. There is no directed verdict of guilt in criminal cases.
Turner v. State, 573 So. 2d 1340, 1343 (Miss. 1990) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). That the age gap between Allen and his victim was uncontested is not enough. The verdict of guilty must result from facts found "via jury instructions[.]" Id.; see also Harrell, 134 So. 3d at 273 (¶ 25) ("[A]ppellate courts may use harmless error to preserve, but not supplement, a jury's findings.").
¶65. Before closing, it is worth pointing out that, in the past, we have been reticent to apply the invited error doctrine to "a basic constitutional right." Livingston v. State, 525 So. 2d 1300, 1306 (Miss. 1988) (quoting West v. State, 485 So. 2d 681, 688 (Miss. 1985)), overruled on other grounds by Wright v. State, 958 So. 2d 158, 166 (¶ 21) (Miss. 2007). In
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Livingston, the basic constitutional right in question was the right against self-incrimination, but one would think that the right to a jury of one's peers qualifies as a basic right as well. ¶66. While the phrase "invited error" does not appear in Hunter, the invited error argument as the majority frames it today is functionally no different than the State's contention in
Hunter that it had no duty to submit correct instructions in the face of the flawed instructions offered by the defendant. Hunter, 684 So. 2d at 635. The Court should look beyond the mere use of a phrase and consider the argument advanced by it. Here, that argument is no different than the State's argument rejected by the Hunter Court.
¶67. The phrase "invited error" as the majority uses it was unknown in our cases prior to the 1996 Hunter decision. The phrase first appears in Justice Robertson's separate opinion in Hill v. State, 432 So. 2d 427, 451 (Miss. 1983) (Robertson, J., specially concurring). Justice Lee also used it in a dissent in Caldwell v. State, 443 So. 2d 806, 816-17 (Miss. 1983) (Lee, J., dissenting), rev'd and remanded, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 86 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1985), sentence aff'd, 481 So. 2d 850 (Miss. 1985), vacated and remanded, 479 U.S. 1075,
107 S. Ct. 1269, 94 L. Ed. 2d 130 (1987), sentence aff'd, 517 So. 2d 1360 (Miss. 1987). The first instance of the phrase in a Mississippi Supreme Court majority opinion can be found in
West, where the majority refused to apply it to the constitutional guarantee of the right to remain silent. West, 485 So. 2d at 687-89. The court again used the phrase but refused to accept the argument as to the question of an improper comment on the defendant's refusal to testify in Stringer v. State, 500 So. 2d 928, 940 (Miss. 1986). The first use of the phrase to reject a defense argument in a Mississippi Supreme Court majority opinion appeared in
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Weaver v. State, 497 So. 2d 1089, 1093 (Miss. 1986). There, the Court mentioned it briefly as an alternative argument affirming a decision regarding the admissibility of evidence of insurance coverage. Id. The Court again used the phrase in Booker v. State, 511 So. 2d 1329, 1332 (Miss. 1987), when it found that a prosecutor's comments regarding the defendant's access to an appeal were invited by comments made by defense counsel that touched on the issue of appeal. In Williams v. State, 544 So. 2d 782, 796-99 (Miss. 1987), the Court held that the prosecutor's improper comments on parole eligibility were not invited by defense counsel. Finally, in Livingston v. State, 525 So. 2d 1300, 1306-07 (Miss. 1988), the last opinion in a criminal case prior to Hunter to use the phrase "invited error," the Court quoted West and its statement disfavoring the application of the argument to constitutional rights.
¶68. In the above-listed cases, markedly unlike today's case, the error being invited (or not) was error on the part of the prosecution the State then argued was committed in response to some comment or action by the defendant's attorney. The Williams Court made it clear that invited error was synonymous with the concept of "opening the door." Williams, 544 So. 2d at 797. As such, they do not address the situation before the Court here: the majority uses a completely different form of invited error wherein the defendant made the error in question, and the majority affirms on the ground that the defendant got what he wanted. ¶69. Readers of today's majority will recognize, even if the majority does not say it outright, that the Court overrules the holding of Hunter that the State may not simply sit idly by in the face of improper or incomplete elements instructions from the defendant. As
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pointed out above, we have held that undisputed facts are not enough to support a conviction without the proper jury instruction, but today's holding will not apply only in cases when the facts are undisputed as to a given element. Going forward, even when the facts of a criminal charge are hotly contested, the State may sit back and wait for the defendant's jury instructions. If those instructions are flawed but favor the State, then the State may agree to them and, on appeal, simply argue invited error, i.e., that the State has no duty to correct them because the defendant got what the defendant wanted.
¶70. The Hunter Court directly addressed and rejected the argument embraced by the majority today, and we recently reaffirmed Hunter's rejection in Thomas. Thomas, 249 So. 3d at 349 (¶ 64) ("[T]he State met its burden to instruct the jury by submitting proper instructions as to both the elements of capital murder and the underlying crime of robbery."). The duty of the State to see the jury properly instructed flows from its unmistakable duty to prove each element of the offense.
This Court holds that the State had a duty to ensure that the jury was properly instructed on the elements of the underlying crime.
It is hornbook criminal law that before a conviction may stand
the State must prove each element of the offense. Not only is
this a requirement of the law of this State, due process requires that the State prove each element of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Neal v. State, 451 So. 2d 743, 757 (Miss. 1984). A logical corollary of this principle is that, because the State has to prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, then the State also has to ensure that the jury is properly instructed with regard to the elements of the crime. See also Hosford
v. State, 525 So. 2d 789, 792 (Miss. 1988) (quoting Adams v. State, 202 Miss. 68, 75, 30 So. 2d 593 (Miss. 1947) ("In conducting a criminal case, the prosecuting attorney must be fair and impartial, and see that defendant is not
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deprived of any constitutional or statutory right.") (emphasis in original).
Hunter, 684 So. 2d at 635 (first emphasis added). Yet, here we are. Today, the majority accepts the argument that the State had no duty to properly instruct the jury, may indeed sit on its hands in the face of flawed jury instructions submitted by the defense (as happened in
Thomas), and argue with success on appeal what Hunter directly rejected, i.e., that is was
"incumbent on the defendant to offer" the elements instruction. Hunter, 684 So. 2d at 635. ¶71. "In conducting a criminal case, the prosecuting attorney must be fair and impartial, and see that defendant is not deprived of any constitutional or statutory right." Hosford v. State, 525 So. 2d 789, 792 (Miss. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Adams
v. State, 202 Miss. 68, 30 So. 2d 593, 596 (1947)). Except, after today, the quoted maxim no longer applies to the constitutional right to have a jury determine guilt via complete jury instructions as to the elements of the charged crime.
¶72. Pursuant to the foregoing, I, with respect, dissent.
SULLIVAN, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.
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