is hereby ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is to pay the $300,000 currently in the
9
Registry of the Court to Mr. Duffus, in partial satisfaction of the Partial Assignment of Proceeds recorded December 17, 2008." On October 11, 2023, the court issued a separate order stating that "[a]ctual release of the funds requires Mr. Duffus [to] file a motion to release the funds." The order also provided that the court would "allow ten days for any opposition prior to ruling on the motion."
Duffus filed a motion for release of funds the same day. Baker filed a motion for extension of time to oppose the release of funds on October 23. On October 25, without ruling on Baker's motion, the court released the $300,000 to Duffus. On October 26 Baker filed a motion to stay the judgment pending his appeal and to waive the requirement that he post a supersedeas bond. Duffus argued in response that the issue was moot because the funds had already been released and that there was no procedural basis for delaying the release of funds.
On November 1 the court issued an order stating that it would defer ruling on Baker's motion to stay until liabilities for attorney's fees, costs, and prejudgment interest were finally established. Noting how long the case had been litigated, the court speculated that the total judgment might increase "to over $500,000, meaning that the funds in the court registry would fall substantially short of compensating Mr. Duffus."
Consequently, the court reasoned that "[a] supersedeas bond to supplement the funds in the registry may be necessary to protect Mr. Duffus'[s] full interest in collecting the final judgment."
On November 3 Baker filed a motion to compel the immediate return of the funds to the court registry, arguing that the court had mistakenly distributed the funds. The court granted this motion on November 14, ordering Duffus to return the funds plus interest and permitting Baker to seek "attorney's fees incurred in filing his motion." Duffus returned $300,000 to the court registry two days later. Baker moved for $2,820 in attorney's fees, arguing that the attorney's fees incurred in litigating the motion to compel the return of the funds were caused by Duffus's refusal to voluntarily return the funds. Duffus opposed the motion, arguing
10
that the funds had been released pursuant to the court's own order. Baker replied, arguing that Duffus was at fault for accepting and keeping the funds when they had been released in "obvious error." The court awarded the fees to Baker without explanation.
4. Appeal
Baker appeals the court's findings that the funds were an interim distribution and that the value of the attorney's fee lien was not proved. Both parties appeal the court's entry of a second final judgment. Duffus cross-appeals the award of attorney's fees against him.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Charging orders, attorney's liens, and priority of secured debts are governed by statute.16"The question of priority is a legal one, to which we apply our independent judgment."17We also consider questions of statutory interpretation using our independent judgment.18"Whether the settlement funds count as LLC distributions under Alaska law is a mixed question of law and fact."19The applicability of a statute
16 See AS 10.50.380 (detailing Alaska's charging order rules); see also AS 34.35.430 (delineating attorney's lien rules); AS 45.29.101-.811 (codifying UCC article 9, governing priority of secured debts).
17 Falconer v. Adams, 20 P.3d 583, 584 (Alaska 2001).
18 Mat-Su Valley Med. Ctr., LLC v. Bolinder, 427 P.3d 754, 762-63 (Alaska 2018); Anderson v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 234 P.3d 1282, 1286 (Alaska 2010) ("[W]e interpret the statute according to reason, practicality, and common sense, considering the meaning of the statute's language, its legislative history, and its purpose.").
19 Duffus, 513 P.3d at 270; cf. Bilbao v. Bilbao, 205 P.3d 311, 313 (Alaska 2009) ("A trial court's characterization of property as separate or marital may involve disputed facts and questions of law.").
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is a question of law that we review de novo, while underlying findings of fact are reviewed for clear error.20
"We review de novo a superior court's interpretation of court rules, and exercise our independent judgment in interpreting court rules."21"Under the independent judgment standard we adopt the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy."22
"We review an award of attorney's fees under an abuse of discretion standard."23"The trial court has broad discretion in awarding attorney's fees."24"[We] will not find an abuse of discretion absent a showing that the award was arbitrary, capricious, manifestly unreasonable, or stemmed from improper motive."25
DISCUSSION
The main issue in this appeal is the same as in the last one: whether Duffus or JLG is entitled to the Aurora Park settlement funds. Duffus has a secured interest in any distributions to which Baker was entitled from Aurora Park, and JLG has a valid attorney's lien for services rendered in the Aurora Park lawsuit. In the previous appeal, we remanded for the superior court to determine the value of JLG's attorney's lien and whether the settlement funds were a distribution from Aurora Park. The superior court determined that the settlement funds were a distribution from Aurora Park under Alaska
20 Duffus, 513 P.3d at 270; see also Rockstad v. Erikson, 113 P.3d 1215, 1219 (Alaska 2005) ("We review a trial court's rulings on questions of law, and the application of law to fact, de novo . . . .").
21 Shea v. State, Dep't of Admin., Div. of Ret. & Benefits, 204 P.3d 1023, 1026 (Alaska 2009) (footnote omitted).
22 Id.
23 Oakly Enters., LLC v. NPI, LLC, 354 P.3d 1073, 1079 (Alaska 2015) (quoting Ware v. Ware, 161 P.3d 1188, 1192 (Alaska 2007)).
24 Id.
25 Id.
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LLC law. The court also found that Baker and JLG failed to prove that the attorney's lien had any value.
We first conclude that the superior court correctly applied the statutory definition of distribution, did not clearly err in making its factual determinations, and did not err in its ultimate conclusion that the settlement payment was a distribution from the LLC. We also conclude that the court did not clearly err in finding that the attorney's lien had no proven value. As to the court's procedural rulings, we hold that the second final judgment and attorney's fee award were issued in error.
A. The Superior Court Did Not Err In Concluding That The Funds Paid Into The Court Registry Were Distributions Of Aurora Park, LLC, Subject To The Charging Order.
1. The superior court correctly applied the statutory definition of
"interim distribution."
Baker first contends that the superior court should have applied the operating agreement's definitions of distributions, rather than the statutory definitions. Baker argues that had the court applied the operating agreement's definitions, it would have concluded that the payments to JLG were not interim distributions because they were not paid out in the manner provided by the agreement. But we see no error in the superior court's ruling.
The Alaska LLC Act governs distributions by an LLC.26An interim distribution is "a distribution of the assets of a limited liability company to the company's members."27A final distribution occurs as part of the dissolution and winding up process and entails the distribution of company assets to certain parties in order of priority.28The Act permits LLCs to make their own provisions for these
26 AS 10.50.295-.348 (governing interim distributions); AS 10.50.425 (governing final distributions).
27 AS 10.50.990(8).
28 AS 10.50.425.
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distributions. For example, AS 10.50.295 states that a company "shall make the [interim] distribution to the members in the manner provided in an operating agreement of the company."29An LLC also has the discretion to "authorize different interim distributions for different classes of members."30
Although Alaska LLC law gives an individual LLC flexibility in determining the "manner" in which distributions are made, we noted in the previous appeal that "the laws may not necessarily give an LLC the flexibility to change the definition of a distribution."31Neither the Act's definition of "interim distribution" nor its provision allowing LLCs to determine the "manner" of distribution suggest an LLC may adopt its own definition of "distribution."32Indeed, allowing LLCs to do so would undermine the statutory scheme. A company could adopt a narrower definition of
"interim distribution" to prevent creditors from obtaining a charging order, the only remedy that allows them to reach the assets of a debtor that are tied up in an LLC.33
Therefore, we remain skeptical that Alaska law permits an LLC to define, through its operating agreement, what payments count as interim distributions. But we need not decide that issue because the Aurora Park operating agreement does not even purport to change the definition of an "interim distribution."
Section 5 of Article IX of the operating agreement provides:
From time to time, the Manager shall determine in his sole
and absolute judgment to what extent, if any, the Company's
cash on hand exceeds the current and anticipated needs,
29 AS 10.50.295.
30 Id.
31 Duffus v. Baker, 513 P.3d 264, 272 (Alaska 2022) ("Alaska laws give an LLC flexibility to deviate from the default requirement of paying each member an equal share of distributions, but the laws may not necessarily give an LLC the flexibility to change the definition of a distribution.").
32 AS 10.50.990(8); AS 10.50.295.
33 AS 10.50.380(c).
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including, without limitation, needs for operating expenses, debt service, reserves, and additional capital expenses. To the extent such excess exists, the Manager with consent of all of the Members may make distributions to the Members in accordance with their Sharing Ratios. Such distributions shall be in cash or Property (which need not be distributed proportionately) or partly in both, as determined by the Manager.
Although we previously characterized this provision as "defin[ing] 'interim distribution,' " it is more precise to say that the provision describes the manner in which these distributions are to be made.34The language of the provision indicates when distributions may be made (at the Manager's discretion, if the Company's cash on hand exceeds the current and anticipated needs), what procedural steps must be taken (the Manager must obtain the consent of all members), and the form distributions must take (cash or property, or partly in both). These requirements do not purport to redefine whether a transfer of assets does or does not qualify as an interim distribution. For that reason we see no error in the superior court's use of the statutory definition of "interim distribution" to determine whether the payments to JLG qualified as such.
2. The superior court did not clearly err in making its factual findings.
The superior court made two key findings in reaching its conclusion that the settlement funds were paid as an interim distribution. Neither of these findings is clearly erroneous.
First, the court found that the Aurora Park settlement agreement was an agreement for Baker to relinquish his interest in the LLC in exchange for a $300,000 payment to him and JLG. This finding is supported by the transfer agreement between Baker and Patricia Baker, which states that "[p]ursuant to the Settlement
34 Duffus, 513 P.3d at 272.
15
Agreement . . . Lee Baker hereby assigns, conveys[,] and transfers to Pat Baker his Percentage Interest in Aurora Park." The transfer agreement further states that upon execution of the agreement, Patricia Baker would own 100% of Aurora Park. Baker confirmed during the evidentiary hearing that he understood that he transferred his membership interests in Aurora Park to Patricia Baker as part of the settlement. As Baker received $50,000 and JLG received $250,000 under the settlement agreement, the court did not clearly err in finding that these funds were payment for his share of the LLC's assets.
Second, the court found that the funds were paid by Aurora Park, LLC, not by Patricia Baker individually. Although Patricia Baker agreed to execute a confession of judgment, she testified that Baker had requested one from her because he believed Aurora Park may not have had enough money to pay him. That is, Patricia Baker served as an independent guarantor that Aurora Park would meet its obligation. However, all of the $300,000 currently in the court registry is traceable solely to the LLC. Aurora Park deposited $178,000 into the court registry using funds from the company's trust account. Patricia Baker testified with regards to this amount,
"Everything flowed into the Aurora Park operating account, and then it went out to the court." The remaining $122,000 was paid from money held in escrow following the sale of the Apartments by Aurora Park. Patricia Baker confirmed at the evidentiary hearing that Aurora Park made the $3,000 monthly payments to JLG. She also confirmed that she did not personally contribute any of the money. Therefore, we see no clear error in the court's finding that Patricia Baker did not personally contribute any of the $300,000.
16
3. The superior court did not err in concluding that the $300,000 in the court registry was paid as an "interim distribution" from Aurora Park, LLC to Baker.
Baker also argues that the funds paid pursuant to the settlement agreement do not meet the statutory definition of "interim distribution." But we do not find his arguments persuasive.
First, Baker contends that he was not a member of Aurora Park when the charging order was issued. Baker transferred his interest in the spring of 2019, but the charging order was not issued until December 2019. Baker argues that AS 10.50.380(a) permits a court to charge only a "member's limited liability company interest" for payment of the unsatisfied judgment amount, not a nonmember's or former member's interest in the LLC.
Baker is mistaken. These payments are distributions to Baker because his right to these payments vested, at the latest, when he quitclaimed his interest in the LLC in exchange for the right to receive them.
The Bakers' settlement agreement provided that Patricia Baker would attempt for six months to refinance the property at the highest value possible and conditioned payments based on four potential outcomes. Patricia Baker testified at the evidentiary hearing that as the refinancing deadline approached, the company was still struggling to refinance the Apartments. Accordingly, on March 22, 2019, she wrote a check to the clerk of court for $100,000 — the initial $50,000 payments to Baker and JLG required under the settlement agreement. The Bakers executed the transfer agreement on April 3, 2019.
Baker's right to future payments vested when it proved impossible to refinance the property, which triggered his and Patricia Baker's promises to exchange
17
his interest in the LLC for $300,000 in payments.35Alternatively, his right to the payments vested when he actually quitclaimed his interest in the LLC to Patricia Baker on April 3, 2019, in accordance with their agreement.
Either way, these payments were distributions of Aurora Park, LLC's assets to one of its members. As we explained in the previous appeal, "[s]tructuring the settlement as monthly installments occurring in part after Baker transferred his Aurora Park interest rather than as a lump sum does not meaningfully impact the analysis."36
Second, Baker argues that the $250,000 payment flowing directly to JLG is not an interim distribution because JLG was not a company member. This argument glosses over the substance of the transaction memorialized in the settlement agreement. The payment to JLG is essentially an assignment of Baker's rights in the settlement funds to JLG.37The only conceivable possibility for why Aurora Park, LLC would pay $250,000 to JLG — the opposing counsel in the Aurora Park litigation — is that Baker intended the funds to pay JLG for its legal representation of Baker. Baker does not point to any evidence suggesting there was separate consideration for Aurora Park to make a $250,000 payment to JLG, and we see no such evidence in the record. Including JLG in the agreement constituted an implicit assignment of Baker's right to receive the distribution. Baker and JLG cannot avoid Duffus's charging order simply
35 See 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 38:1 (4th ed. 2024) ("If the condition is not fulfilled, the right to enforce the contract does not come into existence."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224 (AM. L. INST. 1981) ("A condition is an event, not certain to occur, which must occur, unless its non-occurrence is excused, before performance under a contract becomes due.").
36 Duffus, 513 P.3d at 272 n.40.
37 See 6A C.J.S. Assignments § 2 (2024) ("An 'assignment' is the transfer of some identifiable property, claim, or right from the assignor to the assignee.").
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by structuring the settlement agreement to avoid mentioning the assignment of Baker's rights in the distributions to JLG.38
The settlement agreement was a buy-out of Baker's interest in Aurora Park authorized under Article XII of the operating agreement. Baker received $300,000 from the company in exchange for his membership interest. We therefore conclude that the superior court made no errors in determining that the settlement payment to Baker from Aurora Park was an interim distribution and that the payment was subject to the 2019 charging order.
B. The Superior Court Did Not Clearly Err In Finding That Baker And JLG Failed To Prove The Value Of The Attorney's Lien.
An attorney has a lien for compensation "upon money in the possession of the adverse party in an action or proceeding in which the attorney is employed, from the giving of notice of the lien to that party."39The lien "gives an attorney the right to have fees and costs due to the attorney for services in a particular suit secured by the judgment or recovery in such suit."40Such a lien "extends only to charges and fees in the suit in which the judgment was obtained."41
A party seeking to enforce an attorney's lien must present evidence to support the fee calculation.42For instance, in Law Offices of Steven D. Smith, P.C. v. Ceccarelli, we reversed the foreclosure of an attorney's lien on summary judgment and
38 See id. § 5 ("Whether or not a transfer of a particular right or interest is an assignment or instead some other transaction depends, not on the name by which it is called, but on the legal effect of the transfer's provisions.").
39 AS 34.35.430(a)(3).
40 L. Offs. of Steven D. Smith, P.C. v. Ceccarelli, 385 P.3d 841, 844 (Alaska
2016).
41 23 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 62:11 (4th ed. 2024).
42 See L. Offs. of Steven D. Smith, P.C., 385 P.3d at 846.
19
remanded the matter for factual findings on the amount due because there was no evidence supporting the fee calculation apart from the attorney's pleadings.43
Baker contends that the value of JLG's attorney's lien is $250,000. In the last appeal, Baker pointed to the following evidence supporting the lien: (1) the complaint in the Aurora Park litigation, (2) the settlement agreement, (3) a charging order issued in a separate case in 2017, and (4) Baker's assertions that he owed JLG $250,000 for services in the Aurora Park litigation.44Describing this evidence as
"scant, at best," we explained that JLG's attorney's lien "extend[s] only to the services rendered in the Aurora Park lawsuit" and that Baker had not presented any evidence establishing the amount owed other than his own assertions.45We invited Baker to produce "more evidence outside of [his] assertions, such as fee agreements and billing records," to establish the amount he owed JLG for legal services rendered in the Aurora Park lawsuit.46
But on remand, Baker did not produce a fee agreement or any billing records for the Aurora Park litigation. While Baker testified that he had signed a fee agreement with JLG for the case, he also stated that he did not have a copy of the agreement because it is his general practice to discard documents "when the issue is over." And although Baker testified that JLG had sent him invoices, he did not produce them at the hearing.
Jones, Baker's attorney, was also unable to produce documentation confirming the amount Baker owed JLG. Jones testified that Baker had signed a fee agreement, but that no hard copies of the agreement still existed. He added that he could not locate the electronic version of the agreement, likely because of a handling
43 Id. at 842, 846-47.
44 Duffus v. Baker, 513 P.3d 264, 275 (Alaska 2022).
45 Id.
46 Id.
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error. Jones testified that JLG's bookkeeper would have sent Baker invoices, but he had no record of them. Jones produced a spreadsheet containing itemized descriptions of the tasks performed by JLG, the time spent on each task, the total number of hours spent working on the Aurora Park case, and the hourly rates for the attorneys doing the work. Jones testified that the itemization reflected actual bills sent to Baker, that JLG expected to be paid, and that Baker did not pay JLG. But, as the superior court noted, the document did not establish what amount Baker actually owed to JLG. After hearing this evidence, the superior court concluded that Baker had not proved that he owed JLG any money for work performed in the Aurora Park litigation and therefore ruled that the attorney's lien did not secure any of the settlement funds in the court registry.
Baker challenges this ruling, arguing that substantial testimony shows that the amount listed in the itemized spreadsheet was actually the amount owed. Baker also argues that the fact that Patricia Baker had agreed to pay most of Baker's legal bills as part of the Aurora Park settlement is strong evidence that the ultimate settlement amount, $250,000, was meant to approximate the alleged $253,653.50 amount Baker owed JLG.
We are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the superior court clearly erred in finding Baker's and Jones's testimony was "not credible or probative."
The superior court correctly noted that despite Baker's and Jones's assertions that there was a fee agreement and that JLG sent Baker invoices, likely monthly, over the course of the Aurora Park litigation, neither Baker nor Jones was able to produce a single document showing an agreement to pay JLG or an amount due to JLG. Indeed, neither could produce even a single document showing that JLG had ever requested payment of any kind from Baker — "not an email, not a letter, not a text message, not a memorandum," as the court put it. While we do not conclude that the only relevant evidence Baker could have produced was the fee agreement or billing records, we echo the superior court's statement that "[t]he timely creation and retention of such
21
documents by law practices is routine, unremarkable, and mandated by the ethical rules," and that their absence is noteworthy here. We therefore conclude that it was not clearly erroneous for the superior court to discount the credibility of Baker's and Jones's testimony for failing to produce these documents.
Nor do we believe that the superior court clearly erred in finding that the stated amount of the attorney's lien, $250,000, reflected "the amount agreed to during the Aurora Park settlement" rather than an amount Baker actually owed JLG for work in the Aurora Park litigation. As noted above, Baker and JLG did not present credible evidence that Baker owed JLG a $250,000 debt for work performed in the Aurora Park litigation. Baker and JLG may simply have agreed that JLG was entitled to whatever amount it was able to obtain through settlement. As the superior court noted, Patricia Baker testified that neither Jones nor any other employee at JLG had ever told her at mediation how much Baker owed JLG for the work done in the Aurora Park case. Patricia Baker further testified that the proposed settlement amount "kept changing,"
and that JLG "threw around a lot of numbers." She later testified that she was "blown away" by the $250,000 figure, and that she and Baker "never dreamed that the actual cost of [the legal work] was $250,000." She added, "There wasn't enough legal work done to cover that." When asked about the amount of the lien, Jones testified, "Ms. Baker would agree to only $250,000. That's why the attorney's fee lien was for $250,000. That's what's in the settlement document, so that's what the attorney's lien is for." Jones did later state that the number came both from what Aurora Park agreed to pay and from JLG's review of billing records. But determining a witness's credibility is the trial court's responsibility in a bench trial.47Reviewing the testimony from Patricia Baker and Jones, we cannot say that it was clearly erroneous for the superior
47 Hallam v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 91 P.3d 279, 284-85 (Alaska 2004).
22
court to conclude that the settlement amount was not evidence of the actual amount Baker owed JLG.48
Baker also argues that because AS 34.35.430(a) gives an attorney a lien for compensation that is either "specially agreed upon or implied," evidence showing the value of work JLG performed in the suit is enough to establish that the attorney's lien secured that amount of funds. But even if an attorney's right to compensation may be implied, it remains true that the lien attaches only to funds "due to the attorney for services in a particular suit."49Because we cannot say the superior court clearly erred in finding that Baker did not prove he owed JLG any money for services rendered in the Aurora Park suit, we affirm its ruling that the lien did not entitle JLG to any of the settlement funds in the court registry.
C. It Was Error To Enter A Second Final Judgment.
Two final judgments have been issued in this case. The superior court entered the first final judgment against Baker on March 11, 2013, when Duffus sought to enforce Baker's confession of judgment under Alaska Civil Rule 57(b).50The amount of this judgment, including interest, now exceeds the Aurora Park settlement
48 Because we conclude that the superior court did not clearly err in finding that Baker and JLG had failed to prove the value of the attorney's lien, we do not address the superior court's alternate ruling that the lien had no value because Patricia Baker had executed a novation in the settlement agreement. Nor do we address the superior court's other alternate ruling that Duffus's 2008 assignment had priority over JLG's attorney's lien.
49 L. Offs. of Steven D. Smith, P.C. v. Ceccarelli, 385 P.3d 841, 844 (Alaska 2016) (emphasis added).
50 Civil Rule 57(b) provides: "On the confession of the defendant, with the assent of the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney, a judgment may be given against the defendant in any action, for any amount not exceeding or relief different from that demanded in the complaint." Alaska R. Civ. P. 57(b)(1).
23
fund of $300,000. The superior court authorized execution on this final judgment on April 18, 2013.51
After the most recent proceedings, the court entered a final judgment, dated October 31, 2023, in Duffus's favor in the amount of $300,000. Both parties moved for reconsideration, arguing that the second final judgment was not required and potentially created a new liability for $300,000 by "double-count[ing]" the debt. The superior court denied the motion, stating that it "[did] not perceive any persuasive reason to grant reconsideration."
Civil Rule 58 provides that a court must enter a judgment "upon a decision by the court that a party shall recover only a sum certain or costs or that all relief shall be denied."52The purpose of the recent proceedings was to determine whether the $300,000 deposited in the court registry was subject to the April 18, 2013 execution order. The court's October 5, 2023 determination that the $300,000 held in the court registry should be given to Duffus was not a decision by the court that Duffus "shall recover only a sum certain or costs," but rather a determination that the settlement funds deposited in the court registry were subject to the 2013 order, and that the funds therefore should be delivered to Duffus as partial satisfaction of that judgment.53This ruling created no new liability, so no new final judgment should have been issued. We therefore vacate the October 31, 2023 final judgment.
51 The execution on the final judgment was authorized under Alaska Civil Rule 69, which provides that the "[p]rocess to enforce a judgment shall be by a writ of execution, unless the court directs otherwise." Alaska R. Civ. P. 69.
52 Alaska R. Civ. P. 58.
53 See Alaska R. Civ. P. 67 ("Upon notice to every other party and upon leave of court, a party may deposit with the court all or any part of any sum of money or any other thing capable of physical delivery which is the subject of the action or due under a judgment . . . . The court shall release the deposit to the party entitled to it when that party becomes entitled to it.").
24
D. The Attorney's Fee Order Against Duffus Was An Abuse Of Discretion.
Duffus appeals the superior court's award of $2,820 in attorney's fees to Baker in its January 9, 2024 order. Duffus argues that the superior court appears to have "improperly sanctioned [him] for compliance with [the terms of] its prior orders."
Because the superior court did not cite a specific court rule or otherwise explain the basis for its decision, Duffus contends that the court must have issued the award under Alaska Civil Rule 95, which allows the court to award attorney's fees as a sanction for court rule violations.54
"[W]hen assessing attorney's fees under Rule 95(a), the superior court must provide an explanation of its reasons for assessing the fees."55This requires a showing that counsel or parties have violated the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure.56
Although "the best practice is to specify which rule an attorney has violated," an order imposing sanctions may be upheld "if the violation can be gleaned from the text of the order."57
The order awarding Baker attorney's fees did not specify any rule Duffus or his attorney violated or otherwise explain why the fees had been assessed. The order states only: "Defendant Lee E. Baker, Jr. is awarded a total of $2,820 for attorney's fees necessarily incurred in litigating Plaintiff Kenneth M. Duffus's return of funds to the court registry." Nor is it apparent what rule Duffus may have violated. The October 5, 2023 findings of fact and conclusions of law ordered the court clerk to pay the settlement funds to Duffus. The October 11, 2023 order stated that Duffus was required
25
to file a motion in order for the funds to be released. Duffus filed that motion. The court then released the funds. Duffus returned the funds to the court two days after the court granted Baker's motion to compel immediate return of the funds to the court registry. There is no indication that Duffus violated any court order or any rule in this sequence of events. Because there is no apparent reason for the sanction, we vacate the order awarding attorney's fees to Baker.
CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the superior court's October 5, 2023 findings of fact and conclusions of law. We VACATE the superior court's October 31, 2023 final judgment. We VACATE the January 9, 2024 order awarding attorney's fees to Baker.
26