P. v. Aguilera

Filed 4/23/25 P. v. Aguilera CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, v.

CHRISTOPHER AGUILERA,

Defendant and Appellant.

B335959

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. NA107828) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Richard M. Goul, Judge. Remanded with direction.

Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Amanda V. Lopez and Nicholas J. Webster, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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Christopher Aguilera pled guilty to attempted murder. He thereafter petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code¹section

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Jonathan Guerra testified that he could tell from the gun's odor that it had just been fired.

A gang expert testified about the Westside Wilmas gang, its rival gang Rancho San Pedro, and that Ayala and Aguilera were Westside Wilmas gang members. Based on a hypothetical tracking the facts of this case, the expert opined that the crime was committed for the benefit of or in association with the Westside Wilmas gang and with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist the gang.

II. Charges, plea, and sentence Aguilera was charged with two counts of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)), principal gun use (§ 12022.53, subds. (c) & (e)(1)), and a gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). Ayala was charged with the same crimes and enhancements, but the information also alleged he personally used a gun (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)). On May 21, 2019, Aguilera pled no contest to one count of attempted murder and admitted the allegations. The trial court struck the willful, deliberate, and premeditated allegation. On July 24, 2019, a trial court sentenced Aguilera to five years for attempted murder plus 20 years for the firearm enhancement.

III. Section 1172.6 petition In July 2022, Aguilera filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6, and the trial court appointed counsel to represent him. The People opposed the petition on the ground that as of the date of Aguilera's plea, attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine was not a valid

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theory of liability. At a hearing on October 4, 2023,²the trial court denied the petition, finding that Aguilera pled no contest to

"a still viable theory of attempted murder and that he acted with the implied intent to kill," as demonstrated in the preliminary hearing and plea transcripts.

DISCUSSION

I. Senate Bill No. 1437 and standard of review Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) limited accomplice liability under the felony-murder rule and eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to murder, to the end of ensuring a person's sentence is commensurate with the person's individual criminal culpability. (See generally People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 986; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957, 959 (Lewis); People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843.) Then, effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 made these ameliorative changes to the law applicable to attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine and to voluntary manslaughter.

As relevant here, Senate Bill No. 1437 added section 188, subdivision (a)(3), which provides that "to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought" and malice "shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime." Under section 188, subdivision (a)(3), an accomplice no longer may be guilty of murder based on the mere determination the accomplice aided and abetted a target crime, and murder was a natural and probable

2 Aguilera's counsel appeared at the hearing and stated that he had spoken to Aguilera, who had waived his appearance.

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consequence of that target crime. (See generally People v. Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 984.)

Senate Bill No. 1437 created a procedure, codified at section 1172.6, for a person convicted of murder or attempted murder under the former law to be resentenced if the person could no longer be convicted of those crimes under the current law. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959; People v. Gentile, supra,

10 Cal.5th at p. 847.) A defendant commences that procedure by filing a petition containing a declaration that, among other things, the defendant could not presently be convicted of attempted murder under the current law. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708 (Strong).)

At this prima facie stage, the trial court takes as true the petitioner's factual allegations and assesses whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if those allegations were proved. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) In determining whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief, the trial court may look at the record of conviction, including jury instructions, verdicts and closing argument, to determine readily ascertainable facts such as the crime of conviction. (People v. Duchine (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 798, 815; see, e.g., People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 56.) When the conviction resulted from a plea, the record of conviction includes the preliminary hearing transcript and plea colloquy. (People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 563-569; People v. Gallardo (2017)

4 Cal.5th 120, 136; People v. Gaillard (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1206, 1211-1212; People v. Fisher (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1022,

1028.)

At the prima facie stage, the trial court does not engage in fact finding that involves weighing evidence or exercising

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discretion. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) If a petition establishes a prima facie case for relief, the trial court must appoint counsel if requested, issue an order to show cause, and hold an evidentiary hearing at which the parties may offer new or additional evidence and the trial court sits as an independent factfinder to determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether the defendant is guilty of murder under a valid theory. (People v. Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735, 745.)

But if at the prima facie stage the record of conviction establishes that the petition is meritless, the trial court may dismiss it. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) To deny a petition at the prima facie stage, the record of conviction must demonstrate the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. (People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 101.) We review the denial of a petition at the prima facie stage de novo. (Ibid.)

II. Aguilera made a prima facie showing for section 1172.6 relief

When Aguilera entered his plea in May 2019, appellate courts were split on whether Senate Bill No. 1437 applied to attempted murder. Our Legislature thereafter enacted Senate Bill No. 775 to make the law expressly applicable to attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (See People v. Sanchez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 191, 193 [Sen. Bill No. 775 clarified that accomplice liability no longer applies to attempted murder].) Aguilera therefore now contends that when he entered his plea, he could have been convicted under the now- invalid natural and probable consequences doctrine; therefore, the trial court erred in denying his petition at the prima facie stage. The Attorney General concedes, and we agree.

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Under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, an aider and abettor is guilty of the offense the aider and abettor intended to facilitate or encourage and of any reasonably foreseeable offense committed by the direct perpetrator. (People

v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 261.) The aider and abettor need not have intended to commit the ultimate offense and need not have harbored the malice for the ultimate offense to be guilty of it. (Ibid.) Thus, for example, if a person aids and abets an intended assault but a murder results, the person may be guilty of murder, even if the person did not intend to commit murder or harbor the requisite mental state for murder. (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117.) Accordingly, the natural and probable consequences doctrine is a doctrine of imputed malice, and as such, is no longer a valid theory of murder or attempted murder liability under Senate Bill Nos. 1437 and 775. Here, the record of conviction does not preclude the possibility that Aguilera was convicted under the now-invalid natural and probable consequences doctrine. The information charged Aguilera and Ayala with attempted murder. However, only principal gun use enhancements (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c) & (e)(1)) were alleged against Aguilera, while personal and principal gun use enhancements were alleged against Ayala. This suggests that the People were pursuing a theory that Ayala, and not Aguilera, was the shooter.

Moreover, the evidence at the preliminary hearing suggested that Aguilera was not the shooter. There was evidence that Aguilera drove the car, Ayala was in the passenger seat, and Ayala shot at Cerda and the other man. Therefore, to be valid after Senate Bill Nos. 1437 and 775, Aguilera's liability for attempted murder had to be based on an accomplice theory of

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liability, such as direct aiding and abetting, which remains a viable theory of liability. (See generally People v. Curiel (2023)

15 Cal.5th 433, 462 [after Sen. Bill No. 1437's enactment, murder

"liability requires a different, valid theory, such as direct aiding and abetting"].) However, Aguilera's accomplice liability also could have been based on a theory he aided and abetted a target offense such as assault, and attempted murder was the natural and probable consequence of that target offense. Under Senate Bill Nos. 1437 and 775, that is no longer a valid theory of attempted murder. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3); see Curiel, at pp. 448-

449.)

Because Aguilera could have been convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying Aguilera's petition at the prima facie stage.³

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DISPOSITION

The order denying Christopher Aguilera's Penal Code section 1172.6 petition is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court with the direction to issue an order to show cause and to proceed in accordance with section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3).

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL

REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

EGERTON, J.

ADAMS, J.

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