United States v. Tomas Sanchez Ramirez

24-13198 Opinion of the Court 3 detainer in April 2024, and Sanchez Ramirez was placed in federal custody in June 2024, shortly after the completion of his state sen- tence. Thereafter, Sanchez Ramirez pleaded guilty to a single count indictment charging him with illegally entering the United States after prior removal, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(1). The Presentence Investigation Report ("PSI") provided a base offense level of eight, United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2(a) (Nov. 2023), but applied a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, id. § 3E1.1(a), resulting in a total offense level of six. The PSI assessed two criminal history points for Sanchez Ramirez's 2022 Georgia DUI conviction, resulting in a criminal history category of II. The PSI also noted that, between 2003 and 2010, Sanchez Ramirez accumulated numerous criminal convictions, including multiple convictions for DUI and driving without a license, as well as convictions for battery and aggressive driving. Pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.2(e)(3), these offenses received zero criminal history points due to their age. Based on a total offense level of six and a criminal history category of II, the PSI provided an advisory guideline range of one to seven months of imprisonment. Neither party objected to the PSI's guideline calculations.

At sentencing, the district court adopted the PSI and consid- ered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, observing that illegal reentry was a "serious offense" although it "might not be the most serious of crimes." The court also stated that Sanchez Ramirez's criminal history demonstrated "zero regard for the law, zero." It opined that

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4 Opinion of the Court 24-13198 Sanchez Ramirez viewed short prison sentences, like the time- served sentence proposed by his counsel and seven-month sen- tence proposed by the government in their sentencing memo- randa, "as sort of the cost of doing the business he want[ed] to do."

The court considered Sanchez Ramirez's history and characteris- tics, the need to deter, and the need to protect the public, deter- mining that it could not ignore the danger Sanchez Ramirez posed because of his DUI history. It also believed Sanchez Ramirez was likely to return to the United States and thus would continue to be a danger following his impending removal from the country. Sanchez Ramirez explained that his request for a time- served sentence reflected the four months he already served in cus- tody and aligned with the average sentence imposed upon defend- ants with comparable guideline computations. He also emphasized the 12-year gap between his most recent convictions and noted that the older convictions were considered less probative of current character and conduct. The district court interjected that because of Sanchez Ramirez's history, it feared that "he w[ould] get out of prison, . . . be deported, . . . come back," commit similar crimes, and "hurt somebody." In further support of his requested sentence, Sanchez Ramirez explained that he was sexually assaulted while in state custody and not afforded adequate assistance and relief be- cause he did not speak English. He also highlighted his difficult childhood, work history, and desire to support his family. The district court rejected Sanchez Ramirez's arguments. It first found that his criminal history was underrepresented by the

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24-13198 Opinion of the Court 5 guideline calculation, as Sanchez Ramirez's zero-point convictions were "refreshed by his recent conduct." The court also highlighted that, in addition to his several traffic-related convictions, Sanchez Ramirez also possessed two battery convictions for committing vi- olent acts. While the court expressed sympathy for Sanchez Ramirez's experiences in state prison, it did not believe the inability to speak English prohibited him from crying out for help or that there "[wa]s any thoughtfulness" behind the request for a time-served sentence. The district court further emphasized that Sanchez Ramirez never learned from his actions, despite having "so many opportunities" to do so.

The district court then concluded that the § 3553(a) factors did not support a time-served sentence. It reemphasized that Sanchez Ramirez's lengthy criminal history was underrepresented by the calculated guideline range, so "the sentence need[ed] to pro- mote respect for the law and punishment," provide "deterrence[,] and protect[] . . . the public from somebody who drives drunk in [this] country." It elaborated that, in the past, Sanchez Ramirez's

"criminal activity . . . led to nothing more than processing time,"

and "another processing-time sentence" did not satisfy the pur- poses of sentencing. The court further noted its consideration of the Guidelines and that it did not find any unwarranted sentencing disparities.

Consequently, the district court imposed a ten-month term of imprisonment, which was a three-month variance from the guideline range, and three years of supervised release to follow.

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6 Opinion of the Court 24-13198 The court explained that it considered varying even higher, but it wanted to ensure that Sanchez Ramirez received credit for the time he already served in ICE and federal custody.

Sanchez Ramirez objected to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, and this appeal followed.¹

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing the substantive reasonableness of a sen- tence, we consider the totality of the circumstances under the def- erential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States,

552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). "A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or ir- relevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in consid- ering the proper factors." United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Section § 3553(a)'s "overarching" instruction to courts is that any sentence must be sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of sentencing. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007); see Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. These

1 We note that Sanchez Ramirez does not appear to be in Bureau of Prisons or ICE custody. Because Sanchez Ramirez's sentence includes a three-year term of supervised release, his appeal is not rendered moot by his release from custody or possible removal to Mexico. See United States v. Orrega, 363 F.3d 1093, 1095-96 (11th Cir. 2004); Dawson v. Scott, 50 F.3d 884, 886 n.2 (11th Cir.

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24-13198 Opinion of the Court 7 sentencing purposes include the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, sufficiently punish the of- fense, deter criminal conduct, and protect the public from the de- fendant's future criminal conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). A court must also consider the offense's nature and circumstances, the de- fendant's history and characteristics, the types of sentences availa- ble, the applicable guideline range, any pertinent policy statements from the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities between similarly-situated defendants, and the need to provide restitution to any of the defendant's victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7).

We will not reverse a sentence solely because we believe a different sentence would be more appropriate. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Rather, we will vacate a sentence only when "we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriv- ing at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case." Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190 (quotation marks omitted).

Sanchez Ramirez argues that his ten-month sentence is sub- stantively unreasonable because the district court relied exclusively upon his criminal history and neglected the mitigating circum- stances he presented at sentencing. He also argues that the court failed to sufficiently justify its above-guideline sentence. We disa- gree.

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8 Opinion of the Court 24-13198 Even though Sanchez Ramirez's properly calculated guide- line range incorporated his criminal history, the district court was within its discretion to find that this range did not account for the nature of his prior offenses or his pattern of continuous criminal behavior. See United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1263-64 (11th Cir. 2015); United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2010) (A "district court [is] free to consider any information rele- vant to [the defendant's] 'background, character, and conduct' in imposing an upward variance." (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3661)). The weight given to each § 3553(a) factor is left to the dis- cretion of the district judge, and, as such, the court was permitted to give substantial weight to Sanchez Ramirez's history and char- acteristics over other factors discussed at sentencing. Rosales-Bruno,

789 F.3d at 1255, 1259-60, 1263-64; see United States v. Osorio-Moreno, 814 F.3d 1282, 1287-88 (11th Cir. 2016). Also, the record demonstrates that the court did not focus exclusively on Sanchez Ramirez's criminal history, since immediately prior to im- posing its sentence, the court noted its consideration of the appli- cable Guidelines and all the § 3553(a) factors. Moreover, through- out the sentencing hearing, the district court considered and re- jected many of Sanchez Ramirez's arguments in favor of a time- served sentence, and, in any event, the failure to address every mit- igating factor does not mean that the court "erroneously 'ignored' or failed to consider this evidence." United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007).

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24-13198 Opinion of the Court 9 The record likewise does not support Sanchez Ramirez's ar- gument that the court failed to provide sufficient justification for its upward variance, as the district court clearly explained that the circumstances of the case did not support the sentences proposed by either party. The court emphasized Sanchez Ramirez's un- derrepresented criminal history, recognized that Sanchez Ramirez's actions suggested an indifference to punishment, and cited the need to protect the public from the dangerous conditions Sanchez Ramirez created with his consistent criminal conduct. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 50; United States v. McBride, 511 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 2007) ("[A] district court need not account for every § 3553(a) factor, nor must it discuss every factor and the role that it played in sentencing."). As such, the district court acted within its discretion in imposing a three-month upward variance and pro- vided sufficient justification for its chosen sentence. Sanchez Ramirez also argues that the district court failed to make the requisite findings to impose an upward departure based on the inadequacy of his criminal history category under § 4A1.3(a) of the Guidelines. However, the court, without citing any specific departure provision, correctly calculated the guideline range and found that the range did not adequately address the § 3553(a) fac- tors. Thus, Sanchez Ramirez's ten-month sentence involved an up- ward variance rather than a departure. See United States v. Hall,

965 F.3d 1281, 1295-97 (11th Cir. 2020).

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM Sanchez Ramirez's sentence.

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