Williams v. DeJoy

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

Submitted February 24, 2025^[*]

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. No. 1:22-cv-02267-JPH-CSW James Patrick Hanlon, Judge.

Before MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge

ORDER

Baseemah Williams, a former employee of the U.S. postal Service, sued the postmaster General for harassing her based on her race and age, and for retaliatory discharge. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3(a); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a). The district court entered summary judgment against her because Williams did not furnish sufficient evidence that she faced a hostile work environment or that the Postal Service fired her in retaliation for protected activity. Because Williams offered evidence from which a rational jury could find that her supervisors created a racially hostile work environment, we vacate the judgment on that claim, but we otherwise affirm.

We recount the facts and draw inferences in the light most favorable to Williams, the party opposing summary judgment. Scaife v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affs., 49 F.4th 1109, 1115 (7th Cir. 2022). Baseemah Williams is a Black woman, age 40, and was hired as a mail carrier around November 2021 for a 90-day probationary period. After receiving some training, she worked at two locations; the first was for one week in Carmel, Indiana, and the second was for two months in Linwood, Indiana.

During the one week that Williams worked in Carmel, her supervisor, Julia Dunn, called her "the help" three times. During at least one of these times, another employee heard Dunn refer to Williams as "the help." Later Williams met with Dunn and Lisa Dalton (Dunn's supervisor) to complain that calling her "the help" was demeaning. Dalton responded that Williams was "the help" and she could be fired at any time. When Dunn called Williams "the help," she also criticized Williams's productivity and reminded her that she could be fired immediately. To defend her pace of productivity, Williams explained that she was assigned to different routes each day, making it difficult for her to progress. At the end of her first week at Carmel, Williams was fired for "unsatisfactory performance."

Around January 2022, Williams was assigned to postal work in Linwood, Indiana, where she faced several problems. First, her attendance records show that she frequently arrived late, and a supervisor there accused Williams of not progressing. When Williams attributed her lack of progress to an ankle sprain from delivering mail, the supervisor responded by asking Williams why she chose to become a city mail carrier at age 40. Next, a different supervisor briefly paired Williams with a mail carrier who carried a knife and threatened Williams. Finally, Williams developed acute bronchitis, causing her to stay home for five days. Williams says that she called the Postal Service to state that she could not work, but her phone records do not show any such call. When Williams returned to work the following week, she was fired for unsatisfactory attendance.

Williams sued the Postmaster General under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3(a); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a). She alleged that by repeatedly calling her "the help," her supervisors at Carmel created a racially hostile work environment. She also alleged that the remark about her age created age-based hostility at Linwood, and that the Postal Service fired her for retaliatory reasons. Williams also sued the co-worker who allegedly threatened her. The United States substituted itself for the co-worker, see 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1), and the court entered summary judgment for it because Williams did not exhaust her administrative remedies, a ruling uncontested on appeal. DeJoy successfully obtained summary judgment. The district court reasoned that, although the references to Williams as "the help" had a "racial character," they were not severe or pervasive enough to create liability. It also ruled that the single comment about Williams's age was not age-based discrimination. Finally, the court explained, Williams's discharge was not retaliatory because she was fired for the legitimate reason of poor attendance.

On appeal, Williams first contests summary judgment on her claim that she faced a racially hostile work environment during her week at Carmel. We review that ruling de novo. Scaife, 49 F.4th at 1115. To create a triable claim, Williams needed to supply evidence from which a jury could find that: "(1) [s]he was subject to unwelcome harassment; (2) the harassment was based on h[er] race; (3) the harassment was severe or pervasive ... and (4) there is a basis for employer liability." Cole v. Bd. of Trs. of N. Ill. Univ., 838 F.3d 888, 895-96 (7th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted).

A rational jury could find that the Postal Service is liable for subjecting her to a racially hostile work environment. First, the comments from her supervisors were based on her race and unwelcome. To be based on race, comments need not be explicitly racial as long as they have a "racial character or purpose." Paschall v. Tube Processing Corp., 28 F.4th 805, 814 (7th Cir. 2022). DeJoy does not contest on appeal the district court's adverse ruling that when supervisors labeled Williams "the help," the remark had a "racial character." We therefore accept the point without deciding the matter. (In a different context, a similar comment from non-supervisors may not be racially offensive. See Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Vill. at Hamilton Pointe, LLC, 102 F.4th 387, 417 (7th Cir. 2024) (comments by patients at a long-term care facility that the staff are "the help" are "not racist on their face").) Furthermore, because Williams told the supervisors that the comments were demeaning, a jury could rationally find that she did not welcome them.

Next, a jury could find that the harassment was pervasive. The relevant considerations are the frequency of the conduct; how offensive a reasonable person would regard it; whether it was physically threatening or humiliating as opposed to verbal; whether it unreasonably interfered with an employee's work; and whether it was directed at its target. Scaife, 49 F.4th at 1116. Here, the comments were frequent: Three times over Williams's one week at Carmel, Dunn called Williams "the help." Next, Williams reasonably perceived "the help" comment as offensive. Although the Postal Service says that calling Williams "the help" inoffensively referred to her probationary status, we have reversed summary judgment when, as here, a second meaning could lead a reasonable person to perceive a comment as offensive. See Lambert v. Peri Formworks Sys., Inc., 723 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2013) (reversing summary judgment where manager referred to Black workers as "donkeys," despite manager asserting that the label referred to their status as laborers). In addition, although the conduct was only verbal, Williams heard the remarks directly from supervisors and in front of another employee. A supervisor using racist language is more serious than a co-worker, and directing such language to the plaintiff is more serious than remarks heard secondhand. Gates v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chi., 916 F.3d 631, 638 (7th Cir. 2019). Last, because the comments came in the context of criticizing Williams's work, they could have unreasonably interfered with that work.

Finally, a jury could find a basis for employer liability. Because two of Williams's supervisors-Dunn and Dalton-both joined in the harassment, it can be attributed to the Postal Service. See Montgomery v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 626 F.3d 382, 390 (7th Cir. 2010). Thus summary judgment on this racial-harassment claim was improper.

But summary judgment on the remainder of the claims was proper. To begin, a jury could not find that Williams was fired from the Linwood post office in retaliation for her prior complaints and other protected actions. In order to get to a trial on this claim, Williams needed to offer evidence showing a causal link between protected activity and her discharge. Scaife, 49 F.4th at 1118. She has not. The record shows that the Postal Service fired Williams from Linwood because it believed she had performed poorly. She does not contest that her attendance records show chronic tardiness and unexplained absences. Instead, she insists (without evidence) that the Postal Service knew that she had valid excuses for her tardiness and that she called to report her illness. But without evidence supporting these assertions, a jury could not find that the documented reasons for her discharge were lies. See Adebiyi v. S. Suburban Coll., 98 F.4th 886, 894 (7th Cir. 2024); Springer v. Durflinger, 518 F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 2008) ("[W]hen challenges to witness' credibility are all that a plaintiff relies on, and [s]he has shown no independent facts-no proof-to support h[er] claims, summary judgment in favor of the defendant is proper.").

Any remaining claims also fail. To the extent that Williams argues that she was fired from the Carmel position in retaliation for protected conduct, she lacks evidence for this claim as well. She does not contest that she failed to progress adequately at Carmel or that lack of progress is a legitimate ground for discharge. Instead, she argues that frequent route changes kept her from progressing. But to get past summary judgment on this claim, Williams had to provide evidence suggesting that the Postal Service changed her routes more frequently than other similarly situated workers who had not engaged in protected conduct. See Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 860 (7th Cir. 2012). She has not. Finally, Williams has abandoned her contentions that the supervisor at Linwood subjected her to age discrimination or that a co-worker threatened her. Thus, both claims are waived. See Ajayi v. Aramark Bus. Servs., Inc., 336 F.3d 520, 529 (7th Cir. 2003).

Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment on Williams's claim that the Postal Service created a racially hostile work environment at Carmel and REMAND to the district court for further proceedings. The balance of the judgment is AFFIRMED.

[*] We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. p. 34(a)(2)(C).