Roundtree v. Dart

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

Submitted January 27, 2025 ^[*]

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 23 CV 2948 Lindsay C. Jenkins, Judge.

Before MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge

ORDER

Lonnial L. Roundtree, Jr., a pretrial detainee at the Cook County Jail, sued jail officials and the county, alleging that he was punished with segregation in unconstitutional conditions after a defective hearing, in violation of the Due process Clause. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court screened and dismissed Roundtree's complaint, concluding that his placement in segregation and the conditions of his confinement did not implicate a protected liberty interest. Because the atypical-hardship standard for convicted prisoners does not apply to a pretrial detainee, and we are unable to determine whether Roundtree's time in segregation implicated a liberty interest, we vacate the judgment as to his procedural due process claim and remand so that the defendants can respond to the complaint; otherwise, we affirm.

We accept the allegations in the complaint as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to Roundtree. See Otis v. Demarasse, 886 F.3d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 2018). On April 5, 2023, Roundtree was transferred to his division's "rehabilitation unit" for allegedly violating jail rules. There, he "awaited to be served a ticket to inform him of the charges against him." Two days later, a correctional officer and a hearing board officer came to Roundtree's cell to conduct a hearing on the charged violation, asking Roundtree how he wished to plead. Roundtree responded that he was not given notice of the hearing or a copy of the disciplinary ticket, having learned of the charge only at that moment. He also stated that he wished to present witnesses and evidence. In reply, the officials slid him a copy of the hearing notice and pointed to the final page, which stated that the notice was delivered the day he was transferred to restrictive housing. As a result, the correctional officer stated that there was "reason to believe" Roundtree received adequate notice. Before Roundtree could respond, the officials walked to the next cell and delivered a hearing notice to another detainee, who stated he was being "ambushed." No further hearing took place, and Roundtree never received a decision. He remained in segregation without knowing why, or how long he would be there.

One month later, Roundtree filed suit against multiple administrators, one correctional officer, a hearing board officer, and the sheriff (in his official capacity). He alleged that the correctional officer and hearing board officer violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by keeping him in restrictive housing without a proper hearing. He further alleged that as of the date of his complaint, he remained in segregation with no knowledge of the hearing's outcome; the administrators denied him access to cleaning supplies and limited his access to the telephone, the law library, hygiene items, and his property boxes; while outside his cell in the dayroom, he did not have access to a functioning water fountain; and in the dayroom, deputies forced him to wear restraints that they intentionally made "extra tight," causing Roundtree pain and making it difficult for him to breathe. Lastly, he broadly alleged that the county maintains a custom or policy of violating detainees' constitutional rights by holding defective hearings, limiting access to the courts, and ignoring health and safety concerns, among other things. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). (On appeal, Roundtree says he never learned the outcome of the hearing and languished in restrictive housing until May 22, 2023-45 days after his perfunctory hearing-when he was sent back to the general population.)

The district court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and dismissed it for failure to state a claim, reasoning that Roundtree had not shown that his time in restrictive housing and the conditions of his confinement amounted to a hardship atypical of everyday life in jail. The court also dismissed the Monell claim because Roundtree alleged only violations of jail rules and regulations, which did not give rise to constitutional concerns. The court gave Roundtree leave to amend his complaint but ultimately dismissed the complaint with prejudice when Roundtree declined to amend.

Roundtree now appeals, and we review the screening decision de novo. See Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 994 (7th Cir. 2020). Roundtree first argues that the district court wrongly applied the procedural due-process standard for convicted prisoners although he is a pretrial detainee. We agree. Unlike convicted prisoners, pretrial detainees have a protected liberty interest in avoiding any nontrivial punishment. See Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 438 (7th Cir. 2002). To be entitled to procedural protections, therefore, a detainee does not have to satisfy the more exacting standard applicable to a convicted prisoner, who has a liberty interest only when a punishment results in an "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 734 F.3d 740, 743 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). Further, before being deprived of a liberty interest, a detainee has a right to receive at least the minimum procedural protections guaranteed to prisoners. See Miller v. Dobier, 634 F.3d 412, 415 (7th Cir. 2011). These are "advance written notice of the disciplinary charges," an opportunity to call witnesses, and "a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action." Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985).

We must first decide if, under the standard governing pretrial detainees, Roundtree was punished and therefore was entitled to procedural due process beforehand. A measure amounts to punishment-and triggers procedural due-process safeguards-if, among other things, jail officials show an express intent to punish. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538-39, 561 (1979); see also Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 822 (7th Cir. 2019). The initial decision of jail officials to transfer Roundtree to segregation does not constitute punishment. No process is required if a detainee is placed in segregation because of an investigation, safety and security reasons, or other non-punitive purposes. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 540. Roundtree's complaint states that he was accused of a disciplinary violation and was placed in segregation pending an investigation or a hearing. This is not a punitive purpose, and so the initial transfer did not trigger the need for pre-transfer procedural due process.

But, assuming the truth of the allegations in the complaint, Roundtree's indefinite (as far as he knew) segregation may have crossed the line to punishment. We cannot infer that Roundtree remained in restrictive housing after the pretermitted hearing for a non-punitive purpose; he may well have been found guilty of a disciplinary violation and sentenced to additional time in segregation. If so, he was entitled to a proper hearing and other procedural protections first. See Rapier, 172 F.3d at 1005. But in his complaint he alleges he did not receive notice of the hearing, was not permitted to present a defense, and never learned the outcome, let alone received a written explanation-the minimum under Hill. 472 U.S. at 454. Drawing all reasonable inferences in Roundtree's favor, his complaint states a claim that he was punished without the required procedural due process.

Roundtree does not, however, state a Monell claim with respect to the alleged procedural due-process violation. A Monell claim can survive screening if the plaintiff plausibly alleges that "(1) [he] was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the deprivation can be traced to some municipal action (i.e., a policy or custom), such that the challenged conduct is properly attributable to the municipality itself; (3) the policy or custom demonstrates municipal fault, i.e., deliberate indifference; and (4) the municipal action was the moving force behind the federal-rights violation." Thomas v. Neenah Joint Sch. Dist., 74 F.4th 521, 524 (7th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). Here, Roundtree's complaint does not plausibly suggest that the challenged conduct-insufficient procedural protections in disciplinary proceedings-resulted from the deliberate indifference of the county. Still, Roundtree needed to allege facts plausibly suggesting that Cook County was responsible for individual officials' alleged violation of Roundtree's constitutional rights. See Spiegel v. McClintic, 916 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2019).

He did not. Roundtree states, in conclusory fashion, that the county had a widespread practice or custom of violating detainees' constitutional rights including by depriving them of "24 hours' notice before disciplinary hearings" and "not giving pretrial detainees written dispositions of the disciplinary hearing board officer's decisions." But, beyond his own experience, he alleges only one other instance, when the two officers left his cell to "ambush" another detainee with an improperly noticed hearing. Allegations of "a few sporadic examples of improper behavior" do not suffice to state a widespread practice. Flores v. City of S. Bend, 997 F.3d 725, 733 (7th Cir. 2021). Therefore, Roundtree did not state a plausible claim that the alleged violation of his rights resulted from a widespread practice or policy of the county.

As for Roundtree's independent claim that the conditions he endured in segregated housing violated his constitutional rights, dismissal was proper. Roundtree needed to allege facts plausibly suggesting that he experienced conditions that posed an objectively serious risk of harm, and the defendants' response was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances. See Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 822. Roundtree alleged that the relevant officials failed to see that he received hygiene items or cleaning supplies; prevented him from showering for five days; denied him medical attention after he was physically assaulted; forced him to wear leg-irons on his ankles and chains on his body while in the dayroom (causing breathing difficulties); and neglected to provide a functioning water fountain in the dayroom where Roundtree spent "hours."

Although the lack of hygiene items (which Roundtree had to borrow from other detainees) and inconsistent access to drinking water in the dayroom are unpleasant conditions, they do not rise to the severity and duration necessary to be objectively serious risks under the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 819 (claim stated by detainees who allegedly lacked any water for three days and had cells infested with others' feces). And Roundtree did not describe the alleged assault or mention any injury, so there is no ground for a reasonable inference that the jail staff's response was objectively unreasonable. Finally, with respect to the restraints required in the dayroom-which the complaint suggests were placed on all detainees there-courts should ordinarily defer to the expert judgment of correctional officials when it comes to the need to preserve internal order or maintain institutional security. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 547-48; see also Henry v. Hulett, 969 F.3d 769, 783 (7th Cir. 2020) (en banc). Without facts plausibly suggesting that the restraints were a punitive measure, we cannot infer that it was unreasonable for the jail to require them in common spaces. Thus, Roundtree failed to state a claim that he faced an objectively serious risk of harm to which the defendants responded in an objectively unreasonable manner.

Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment as to Roundtree's procedural due process claim against the correctional officer and the hearing board officer, and REMAND to the district court for further proceedings. We express no view about what further development of the facts might reveal or about any defenses the defendants might have. The balance of the judgment is AFFIRMED.

[*] The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. p. 34(a)(2)(C).