Holland v. Prime Care Med.

Robert D. Mariani United States District Judge

MEMORANDUM

Robert D. Mariani United States District Judge

Plaintiff Thomas Holland (“Holland”), an inmate confined at the Franklin County Jail, in Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, initiated this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Prime Care Medical Inc. (“Prime Care”). (Doc. 1). The complaint is presently before the Court for preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). For the following reasons, the Court will dismiss Holland's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and grant him leave to file an amended complaint.

I. Legal Standards

The Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134,110 Stat. 1321 (April 26, 1996), authorizes a district court to review a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court is required to identify cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). This initial screening is to be done as soon as practicable and need not await service of process. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

In dismissing claims under §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, district courts apply the standard governing motions to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Smithson v. Koons, Civ. No. 15-01757,2017 WL 3016165, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 26,2017) (stating “[t]he legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim under § 1915A(b)(1), § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), or § 1997e(c)(1) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."); Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F.Supp.2d 454,471 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (explaining that when dismissing a complaint pursuant to § 1915A, “a court employs the motion to dismiss standard set forth under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”); Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236,240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)).

A complaint must be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570,127 S.Ct. 1955,167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The plaintiff must aver “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,129 S.Ct. 1937,1949,173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

“Though a complaint ‘does not need detailed factual allegations,... a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'” DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Prop. Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In other words, “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Covington v. Int'l Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114,118 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A court “take[s] as true all the factual allegations in the Complaint and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those facts, but... disregard[s] legal conclusions and threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Ethypharm S.A. France v. Abbott Laboratories, 707 F.3d 223,231, n.14 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Twombly and Iqbal require [a district court] to take the following three steps to determine the sufficiency of a complaint: First, the court must take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, the court should identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief. Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 2013).

“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not show[n] - that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). This “plausibility” determination will be a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.

However, even “if a complaint is subject to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008).

[E]ven when plaintiff does not seek leave to amend his complaint after a defendant moves to dismiss it, unless the district court finds that amendment would be inequitable or futile, the court must inform the plaintiff that he or she has leave to amend the complaint within a set period of time.

Id.

Because Holland proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and his complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted).

II. The Complaint

Holland asserts that the events giving rise to his claims occurred when he was a pretrial detainee at the Franklin County Jail from November of 2022 to January of 2023. (Doc. 1, p. 3). He alleges that on November 25, 2022, he informed a nurse that he had a swollen gland. (Id.). The nurse advised that he was likely “getting a cold” and she would monitor his gland. (Id.). Holland alleges that the gland continued to swell, and he developed severe pain. (Id. at pp. 3-4). He reported his pain and symptoms to nurses and was eventually treated by a doctor on December 27,2022. (Id.). Upon examination, the doctor transferred Holland to an outside hospital on December 27,2022, where he underwent surgery to remove the gland and some of his teeth. (Id. at p. 4). Holland was discharged from the outside hospital on January 8, 2023, and returned to the Franklin County Jail.

Holland seeks monetary relief, free health care coverage, and dental implants. (Id. at p. 6).

III. Discussion

The Court construes Holland's complaint as bringing claims for violations of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,48 (1988). The complaint does not state a plausible claim for the following reasons.

The Eighth Amendment governs claims brought by convicted inmates challenging their conditions of confinement. Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150,166 (3d Cir. 2005). Unconstitutional punishment, be it under the Eighth Amendment applicable to convicted prisoners or the Fourteenth Amendment applicable to pretrial detainees, typically includes both objective and subjective components. Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62,68 (3d Cir. 2007). To satisfy the objective component, inmates must demonstrate that they are “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,834 (1994). “To satisfy the subjective component, the plaintiff must allege facts which, if true, would show that the official being sued subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the inference, and then disregarded that risk.” Id. In general, a prisoner must assert that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference, meaning that they consciously disregarded a serious risk to the detainee's health or safety. See Wilson v. Setter, 501 U.S. 295,298-99 (1991); see also Wilson v Burks, 423 Fed.Appx. 169,173 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“'[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial harm exists, and he must also draw that inference.”') (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837/ of. Edwards v. Northampton Cnty., 663 Fed.Appx. 132,135 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (“[W]e agree with the District Court and find no reason to apply a different standard here as we have applied the ‘deliberate indifference' standard both in cases involving prisoners and pretrial detainees.” (internal citations omitted)).

Holland indicated in his complaint that he is a pretrial detainee. (Doc. 1, p. 2). To the extent that he was a pretrial detainee at the time of the events in question, the Fourteenth Amendment governs his claims. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150,166 (3d Cir. 2005).

To state a constitutional claim based on the failure to provide medical treatment, a prisoner must allege facts indicating that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. A prison official is not deliberately indifferent “unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. “A medical need is serious,...if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326,347 (3d Cir. 1987) (internal quotations omitted). Deliberate indifference is properly alleged “where the prison official (1) knows of a prisoner's need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical treatment based on a nonmedical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended medical treatment.” Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192,197 (3d Cir. 1999). Allegations of medical malpractice and mere disagreement regarding proper medical treatment are insufficient to establish a constitutional violation. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218,235 (3d Cir. 2004). Furthermore, as noted above, “[a] defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs” to be liable. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).

The standard under the Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment for claims related to a prisoner's medical needs is essentially the same for purposes of the analysis. See Parkell v. Morgan, 682 Fed.Appx. 155,159 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam)', see also Moore v. Luffey, No. 18-1716, 2019 WL 1766047, at *3 n.2 (3d Cir. Apr. 19,2019) (declining to address whether a new standard applies to claims raised by pretrial detainees based on issues related to medical care).

Here, Holland has named Prime Care as the only Defendant in this case. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that “a private health company providing services to inmates ‘cannot be held responsible for the acts of its employees under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.'” Sims v. Wexford Health Sources, 635 Fed.Appx. 16, 20 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (quoting Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575,583 (3d Cir. 2003)). Rather, in order to hold a private health care company like Prime Care liable for a constitutional violation under § 1983, Holland must allege the provider had “a relevant...policy or custom, and that the policy caused the constitutional violation [he] allege[s].” Natale, 318 F.3d 575,583-84 (citing Bd of the Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,404 (1997)); see also Lomax v. City of Philadelphia, Civ. A. No. 13-1078, 2017 WL 1177095, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2017) (“Because [defendant] is a private company contracted by a prison to provide health care for inmates,... it can only be held liable for constitutional violations if it has a custom or policy exhibiting deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs.”) (citations and quotations omitted). “To satisfy the pleading standard, [the plaintiff] must...specify what exactly that custom or policy was.” McTernan v. City of York, PA, 564 F.3d 636,658 (3d Cir. 2009).

Holland has not identified any policy or custom of Prime Care that caused him to be deprived of proper care or caused any other constitutional deprivation. There is no mention of Prime Care in the factual allegations of the complaint. While it is possible that Holland is attributing to Prime Care the facility's allegedly deficient response to his medical condition, Holland does not clearly allege that Prime Care is, in fact, responsible. Accordingly, Holland has not stated a claim against Prime Care and the claims against it must be dismissed. However, because the Court cannot say at this time that Holland could never state a plausible claim based on a policy or custom, the claims will be dismissed without prejudice, and Holland will be granted leave to file an amended complaint to attempt to cure the defects discussed above.

IV. Conclusion

Consistent with the foregoing, the Court will grant Holland leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss his complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Court will allow Holland to file an amended complaint in the event he can state a plausible claim against an appropriate defendant or defendants. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103,114 (3d Cir. 2002).

A separate Order shall issue.