TUCHER, P. J.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(City &County of San Francisco Super. Ct. No. CCH-23-586051)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
We resolve this case by a memorandum opinion pursuant to California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1. (See also People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 853-855.)
TUCHER, P. J.
Appellant Nkechi Emeruwa-Neuberg is a tenant of Respondent Frank Lucchetti and sought a civil harassment restraining order against him. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6; all undesignated references are to this code.) After issuing a temporary order, the trial court held a hearing and denied permanent relief, a decision we affirm.
Emeruwa-Neuberg supported her request for a restraining order with a declaration summarizing, in general terms, conduct she characterized as harassing and attributed to Lucchetti. The only event Emeruwa-Neuberg's declaration described in any detail was a pair of 911 calls Lucchetti was said to have made on April 25, 2023 to report issues at the multi-unit building where Emeruwa-Neuberg lived.
The request for a restraining order came on for a contested hearing on January 22, 2024. Lucchetti appeared remotely, but Emeruwa-Neuberg did not attend the hearing. Instead, her counsel presented testimony from a national certified counselor who, having interviewed Emeruwa-Neuberg a few days earlier, reported she had recommended Emeruwa-Neuberg not attend because seeing Lucchetti could prove detrimental to her mental health. Without Emeruwa-Neuberg in attendance, her counsel attempted to prove her case through exhibits already filed and through cross-examination of Lucchetti, who admitted his was the voice calling 911 on both audiotapes and who explained some of his actions with regard to the property.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied the requested restraining order. It found Emeruwa-Neuberg had not met her burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Lucchetti had harassed her. Specifically, the court found "there was no course of conduct directed at [Emeruwa-Neuberg] that seriously alarmed or harassed her and that served no legitimate purpose.... [¶] Mr. Lucchetti's actions all appear to have constituted business related dealings." Having listened to the 911 calls, the court expressed sensitivity to Emeruwa-Neuberg's concern, as an African American, that police officers were summoned on a report that a dangerous person was attempting to enter the building via a fire escape, but the court nonetheless found that, under the circumstances, Lucchetti "did have the right to call 9-1-1 to report, at the very least a trespass or [what he] believed to be an attempted trespass" at "the building.... [H]e was calling with regards to building relating matters and not to harass." Supporting this finding, the court found that Emeruwa-Neuberg had ascended the fire escape and entered the building through her neighbor's window, and that there was no sufficient evidence to conclude Lucchetti had lied when reporting the incident to 911.
On appeal, Emeruwa-Neuberg contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying her the permanent restraining order. Nowhere in her appellate briefing does Emeruwa-Neuberg recount the trial court's specifically relevant factual findings, nor does she argue there is no substantial evidence to support them. Instead, she contends this "court has broad discretion in making factual determinations," citing section 909, and should find that "the 911 calls alone constitute unlawful violence and credible threats of violence." (See § 527.6, subd. (b)(3) [defining" '[h]arassment'" to include "unlawful violence" and "a credible threat of violence"].) We cannot accept Emeruwa-Neuberg's invitation.
Emeruwa-Neuberg's opening brief devotes a couple of pages to arguing that she is entitled to a restraining order for two reasons unrelated to the 911 calls-because Lucchetti "violently caused a board to be placed over the back stairs, creating a fire hazard and endangering [Emeruwa-Neuberg]," and because he created "an extremely dangerous situation" by "sealing over [a] large wood panel." Emeruwa-Neuberg appears to abandon these arguments on reply, choosing not to address them in her reply brief and acknowledging that the "heart of this case" is the two 911 calls. In any case, Emeruwa-Neuberg does not show that these alleged events compelled issuance of a restraining order.
This is not the rare case where we, as an appellate court, can exercise our authority under section 909 to find facts in the first instance. Such factfinding"' "authority should be exercised sparingly" '" and in"' "exceptional circumstances" '" not present here. (Bombardier Recreational Products, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Canada ULC (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 591, 605, italics omitted.) For example, section 909 may be invoked when new evidence arises" 'after judgment or was unavailable to the movant before judgment,'" and " 'supports the affirmance of the court's judgment.'" (Glassman v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1281, 1309.) No such new, or newly discovered, evidence is proffered here. We thus must abide by the "basic principle of appellate review, [that] appellate courts will not use Code of Civil Procedure section 909 to resolve conflicts in the evidence or to substitute their own factual determinations for those of the trial court, especially for the purpose of outright reversal or remand for a new trial or hearing, as doing so 'would effectively usurp the power of the trial court as an arbitrator of the facts.'" (Glassman, at p. 1309.)
Even if Emeruwa-Neuberg had framed her argument as a conventional attack on the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's factual findings, she would not prevail here. Emeruwa-Neuberg asserts Lucchetti knew, when he called 911, that it was she and not a dangerous homeless person ascending the fire escape, but substantial evidence admitted at trial supports the trial court's findings. Lucchetti testified that only later did he learn Emeruwa-Neuberg had been locked out of her apartment and was using the fire escape to get back into the building. At the time of his call, he had seen a photograph or video from the building's security camera that did not show faces clearly-neither the face of the person climbing onto the fire escape nor those of the two men on the sidewalk hoisting her up. And the mental health counselor who had recently spent several hours meeting with Emeruwa-Neuberg testified, after careful study of a photograph of the incident, that even she couldn't tell that the person being hoisted onto the fire escape was Emeruwa-Neuberg. The record also includes declarations made by tenants of another apartment, who had access to the building's security camera. They stated that the camera's feed showed two homeless people, one of whom had recently been the subject of complaints about noise and drug use in front of the building, standing on a suitcase and helping Emeruwa-Neuberg climb the fire escape. One of the tenants called Luchetti and let him know what was happening. True, Lucchetti was wrong when he informed the 911 dispatcher the person actually on the fire escape was a homeless man who had caused problems in the neighborhood, but, even acknowledging this discrepancy, the trial court could reasonably have concluded that Lucchetti placed the call to protect tenants from a potential intruder, not to harass Emeruwa-Neuberg.
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: PETROU, J. RODRÍGUEZ, J.