ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County Nos. 23PDRO00582, 23PDRO00682 Timothy Martella, Judge. Affirmed.
Serobian Law and Liana Serobian for Plaintiff, Defendant, and Appellant Sahin Ersoz.
The Olen Firm and Jared W. Olen for Plaintiff, Defendant, and Respondent Siobhan Farley.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
Sahin Ersoz sought a civil harassment restraining order pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 against his neighbor, Siobhan Farley. Ersoz claimed that Farley had been stalking him using home security cameras facing his apartment, and that she had twice threatened him with physical violence.
Unless otherwise specified, all statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
In response, Farley filed her own request for a section 527.6 restraining order against Ersoz. Farley alleged that she had installed the cameras for security reasons unrelated to Ersoz. She alleged further that, when she refused to remove the equipment, Ersoz began to harass her, including by photographing and videotaping her inside her apartment.
The trial court conducted a single hearing on the dueling restraining order requests. Ersoz and Farley testified, but the court excluded the testimony of all other proffered witnesses-including testimony Ersoz sought to introduce from his daughter, who had witnessed Farley's purported stalking behavior, and from another neighbor, who allegedly had witnessed Farley make violent threats against Ersoz. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied Ersoz's request for a restraining order against Farley and granted Farley a one-year restraining order against him.
Ersoz now asks us to reverse the trial court's orders, contending that (1) Farley failed to present sufficient evidence that he engaged in harassment, and (2) the court abused its discretion by excluding his two proffered witnesses.
We conclude that Ersoz's challenge to Farley's restraining order is moot, and that the court acted within its discretion by excluding the testimony of Ersoz's proffered witnesses as cumulative. We therefore affirm.
FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
We summarize here only the facts and procedural history relevant to our resolution of this appeal.
In February 2021, Farley moved into an apartment on the top floor of a complex located in Glendale, California. The front door of Farley's apartment faces the front door of Ersoz's unit where he has lived for the past 19 years. The doors are separated by approximately 10 feet.
The living room of Farley's unit-accessible via sliding glass doors-faces a balcony overlooking the city. The balcony functions as a communal corridor. Ersoz can access his apartment without utilizing the balcony, but the alternate route to and from his unit is "very narrow," and it is "almost impossible" to take out his trash using that route.
Shortly after moving in, Farley installed a Ring video doorbell adjacent to her front door and several other security cameras outside her apartment. She later moved the security cameras to the interior of her unit. The doorbell and some of the cameras face Ersoz's apartment and are visible from the windows in his kitchen and bedroom. At least one camera faces the communal balcony. Farley also placed some furniture on the balcony and installed a gate blocking access to it, although she removed both the furniture and the gate at Ersoz's request.
Ersoz soon grew concerned that Farley was using the security equipment to stalk him and to surveil his family. He expressed his concerns to building management in several April 2021 emails. Farley disputed Ersoz's claims and claimed that, to the contrary, it was Ersoz who had been harassing her.
In May 2023, Ersoz filed a request for, and obtained, a temporary restraining order against Farley. That same day, Ersoz filed a request for a longer-term civil harassment restraining order pursuant to section 527.6. Two weeks later, Farley filed her own request for a section 527.6 restraining order against Ersoz.
The trial court conducted a single hearing on the competing requests. Ersoz testified on his own behalf, claiming that Farley used her security cameras to monitor when he left his apartment so that she could follow when he walked his dog. Ersoz also testified about two separate incidents during which Farley allegedly had threatened him with violence: (1) a September 2021 incident during which two of Ersoz's neighbors "heard [Farley] saying that she would stab [him] if she had a knife" (although Ersoz conceded he "didn't hear this [him]self"), and (2) an April 2023 incident during which Farley said to Ersoz "she would get a shotgun" after she observed him taking additional photographs of her apartment.
Following his direct examination, Ersoz sought to present testimony from two additional witnesses: (1) his neighbor, Maria, who allegedly had heard both of Farley's purported threats, and (2) one of his daughters, who had been present during many of his interactions with Farley. The court refused to permit the testimony:
"The court: . . . You don't have another witness; correct?
"[Defense counsel]: I do, one short witness. "The court: What is that person
"[Defense counsel]: It's Maria. She'll be testifying, if Your Honor needs to hear-she'll be testifying to the statements from 2021. On September of 2021, there is a statement regarding- that was made by [Farley] that she is going to get a knife and stab [Ersoz].
"The court: That wasn't what [Ersoz] said. [Ersoz] said that if [Farley] had a knife, she would stab him.
"[Defense counsel]: Yes, if she had a knife.
"The court: Because I'm sure she had plenty of knives in her kitchen.
"[Defense counsel]: Yes, that's correct.
"The court: Okay.
"[Defense counsel]: So she would testify to that, and she would testify to the most recent incident. She's the neighbor that . . . heard the shotgun comment.
"The court: Okay. I don't think I need to hear that. That's just cumulative.
"[Defense counsel]: And the other witness would be [Ersoz's] daughter, who was present on-that visits him frequently and is present with him a lot of days when they're outside walking the dog, would testify to the frequency and how often [Farley] comes outside or within minutes of them being outside.
"The court: All right. He's already testified to all that.
"[Defense counsel]: Right.
"The court: I don't need to hear that all that [sic] over again." The court then received testimony from Farley. She explained that she installed the surveillance equipment "for [her] personal security and safety," and that the apartment complex's management company permits residents to install such equipment. And she presented an email from the management company to Ersoz confirming that "residents are allowed to have cameras as long as they are in the interior of the [resident's] unit." She testified further that, when she refused to remove the equipment, Ersoz attempted to intimidate her by using the communal balcony to photograph and videotape her inside her apartment through her sliding glass doors.
Farley admitted that she stated," '[b]ecause of [Ersoz], [she] ha[s]-feel[s] like [she] ha[s] to get a shotgun.'" But she claimed she made the statement only following an incident during which
Ersoz "kept cursing at [her] and flipping [her] off" through her sliding glass doors, and she denied ever threatening to stab Ersoz. In addition, she testified that Ersoz once had attempted to hit her with his car and that she felt threatened by Ersoz. The court refused Farley's request to present two witnesses who allegedly would corroborate her testimony.
Without allowing argument, the court dissolved Ersoz's temporary restraining order against Farley, denied his request for a longer-term restraining order, and granted Farley a one-year restraining order:
"The court: . . . As to the restraining order requested by . . . Ersoz against . . . Farley, that is denied. It doesn't meet clear and convincing evidence. He seems to be obsessed with this doorbell camera which has got the whole ball rolling.
"He continually takes pictures of her and her-whatever equipment she has, including the doorbell camera, and her, which is at least ten times, if not more-I'm kind of thinking it's more-to try to build some kind of case.
"He's reported it to the police. They don't think he has anything. He's reported to management. They don't seem to think he has anything; but, yet, he persists. And I don't see her as a threat to him.
"She made this shotgun statement, but it was saying that if he bothered her anymore, she was going to get a shotgun, which doesn't sound like a particular threat to me.
"So that one is dismissed. All orders are dissolved.
"As to . . . Farley versus . . . Ersoz, that one is granted. I'm finding his behavior as just harassment. Clearly, he's obsessed by the doorbell camera. He admits it. I appreciate his honesty on that. And he just can't get over it and can't stop.
"And he's photographed it numerous times, and he thinks that he has the right to walk in that common area without being photographed, which the court doesn't agree with.
"[¶] . . . [¶] "And I'm not going to have any stay-away orders. I don't think he's a physical threat to her.
"But I'm going to make the order that [Ersoz] can't harass, intimidate, disturb the peace, stalk, threaten, destroy any personal property of [Farley]. [Ersoz] can't contact her in any way other than by a letter.
"[¶] . . . [¶] "[Ersoz] can't photograph-no photographs of . . . Farley anywhere....
"[¶] . . . [¶]
"I don't really believe he was trying to run her over with the car. I don't find that to be believable. But there is harassment going on, and I'm going to get in between, and hopefully it will get better.
"[¶] . . . [¶]" . . . So I'm only going to make this for one year, hoping things calm down.
"However, when it gets near the expiration date, you can file if you wish to extend it. And we'd have another hearing to decide whether that's appropriate or not."
Ersoz filed a timely notice of appeal. While the appeal was pending, Farley's restraining order against Ersoz expired and nothing in our appellate record indicates she attempted to renew the order.
DISCUSSION
A. Overview of Section 527.6 and Standards of Review
"' "Section 527.6 was enacted 'to protect the individual's right to pursue safety, happiness and privacy as guaranteed by the California Constitution.' [Citations.] It does so by providing expedited injunctive relief to victims of harassment."' [Citations.]" (Hansen v. Volkov (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 94, 103 (Hansen).)
The statute "defines 'harassment' to include not just actual violence or threats of violence, but also 'a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person,' that serves no legitimate purpose, and that is not constitutionally protected activity." (R.D. v. P.M. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 181, 188.) A" '[c]ourse of conduct' is a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an individual." (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1).) "To constitute harassment, the course of conduct 'must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.' [Citation.]" (R.D., supra, at p. 188.)
Once a petitioner files a request for a restraining order, subdivision (i) of section 527.6 requires the court to hold a hearing at which it "shall receive any testimony that is relevant" to the request. (§ 527.6, subd. (i).) We review a court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion. (See People v. Young (2019) 7 Cal.5th 905, 931.)
If the trial court finds by "clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists and is reasonably likely to recur," (Hansen, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 103), "an order shall issue prohibiting the harassment." (§ 527.6, subd. (i).)" '[W]hen presented with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence associated with a finding requiring clear and convincing evidence,'" we" 'must determine whether the record, viewed as a whole, contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the finding of high probability demanded by this standard of proof.' [Citation.] 'Consistent with well-established principles governing review for sufficiency of the evidence, in making this assessment [we] must view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give due deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.' [Citation.]" (Hansen, supra, at p. 104.)
Finally," '[w]hether the facts, when construed most favorably in [petitioner's] favor, are legally sufficient to constitute civil harassment under section 527.6 . . . [is a] question[ ] of law subject to de novo review.' [Citations.]" (Hansen, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 104.)
B. Ersoz's Challenge to Farley's Restraining Order Is Moot
Ersoz contends that the trial court's decision to grant Farley's request for a restraining order is not supported by substantial evidence. But because the restraining order already has expired, Ersoz's challenge is moot. (See Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 495 ["' "[i]f relief granted by the trial court is temporal, and if the relief granted expires before an appeal can be heard, then an appeal by the adverse party is moot"' "].) And we are not persuaded by Ersoz's arguments that we should exercise our discretionary authority to consider his moot appeal because the "controversy could recur and is of public interest." (See ibid. [discretionary exceptions to mootness doctrine include "when the case presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur" and "when there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the parties"].) Nothing in the record indicates that Farley has sought to renew the restraining order, and Ersoz fails adequately to explain how the dispute here "presents an issue of broad public interest." (Ibid.)
Accordingly, we decline to address the merits of Ersoz's challenge to the restraining order Farley obtained against him.
C. The Trial Court Acted Within Its Discretion in Excluding Ersoz's Additional Witnesses
We are unconvinced by Ersoz's contention that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding testimony from his two additional witnesses at the section 527.6 hearing.
Although the statute provides that the trial court "shall receive any testimony that is relevant" at the hearing on a petitioner's request for a restraining order (§ 527.6, subd. (i)), the court nonetheless retains its power under Evidence Code section 352 to exclude cumulative evidence. (See Evid. Code, § 352 ["[t]he court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will . . . necessitate undue consumption of time"]; Schraer v. Berkeley Property Owners' Assn. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 719, 733, fn. 6 [a trial court's duty under section 527.6 to receive "any" relevant testimony is subject "to such reasonable limitations as are necessary to conserve the expeditious nature of the harassment procedure set forth by [the statute]"].)
On appeal, Ersoz contends the testimony of the additional witnesses would not have been cumulative because it "would have shown [that Farley] was the one harassing Ersoz and stalking him, not the other way around," and would have "impeach[ed] Farley's claims that she feared him." But, this testimony was indeed cumulative to his own. Further, he did not, as he might have, request to present the witnesses to impeach Farley after she testified.
Accordingly, we affirm the court's order denying Ersoz's request for a restraining order against Farley.
DISPOSITION
Ersoz's challenge to the trial court's June 21, 2023 order granting Farley's request for a restraining order is dismissed as moot. The court's June 21, 2023 order denying Ersoz's request for a restraining order is affirmed. The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.
We concur: BENDIX, J. WEINGART, J.
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