Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion addresses a Motion for Reconsideration filed by pro se Debtor-Defendant Teresa Nadeau in an adversary proceeding related to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. The court previously issued a Memorandum of Decision and Judgment on September 28, 2023, following an evidentiary hearing held on November 29, 2023. The Motion to Reconsider challenges certain factual and legal conclusions related to pre-bankruptcy state court litigation, in which Danberry Co. obtained summary judgment against Teresa Nadeau in the Lucas County Common Pleas Court. The state court judgment was affirmed by the Sixth District Court of Appeals in 2020. Meanwhile, the Plaintiff-Trustee Douglas A. Dymarkowski has filed an appeal with the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio concerning a separate issue regarding the Ohio Homestead Exemption, not directly challenging the Memorandum of Decision or Judgment at issue in the Motion for Reconsideration.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the court should grant the Debtor-Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of its September 28, 2023 Memorandum of Decision and Judgment.
  2. Whether the court retains jurisdiction to decide the Motion for Reconsideration despite the pending appeal filed by the Plaintiff-Trustee.
  3. Whether the court may review and reconsider factual and legal findings derived from prior state court litigation under doctrines such as Rooker-Feldman and issue preclusion.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant-Debtor's Arguments

  • The Motion asserts certain factual findings by the court are incorrect.
  • Arguably, the Motion contends reconsideration is necessary to prevent manifest injustice.
  • The Motion does not cite case law, statutes, or rules, nor does it assert a clear error of law, newly discovered evidence, or an intervening change in controlling law.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the Plaintiff-Trustee's legal arguments regarding the Motion for Reconsideration.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
City of Cookeville v. Upper Cumberland Elec. Membership Corp, 484 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 2007) General rule that filing a notice of appeal divests the lower court of jurisdiction. Supported the court's understanding of jurisdictional divestiture upon appeal but noted exceptions.
Cochran v. Birkel, 651 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir. 1981) Jurisdiction divestiture upon appeal. Quoted to emphasize general rule of jurisdiction transfer to appellate court.
Pittock v. Otis Elevator Co, 8 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 1993) Jurisdictional principles related to appeals. Reinforced jurisdictional divestiture rule.
Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co, 459 U.S. 56 (1982) Exception to jurisdiction divestiture: lower court retains control over aspects not involved in appeal. Supported court's authority to decide Motion for Reconsideration not involved in the appeal.
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8008(a) Procedures for relief pending appeal, including denying motions when court lacks authority. Allowed court to deny the Motion for Reconsideration despite pending appeal.
Hall v. Callahan, 727 F.3d 450 (6th Cir. 2013) Rooker-Feldman doctrine preventing federal court review of state court errors. Precluded court from reviewing state court judgments as appellate review.
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp, 544 U.S. 280 (2005) Rooker-Feldman doctrine and Full Faith and Credit Act. Reinforced binding effect of state court judgments and limited federal review.
Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290 (6th Cir. 2012) Rooker-Feldman bars lower federal courts from appellate review of state judgments. Supported court's refusal to reconsider state court rulings.
Singleton v. Fifth Third Bank (In re Singleton), 230 B.R. 533 (6th Cir. BAP 1999) Application of Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Confirmed court's lack of appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments.
In re Underwood, 568 B.R. 785 (E.D. Mich. 2017) Rooker-Feldman concerns in bankruptcy context. Illustrated limits on federal review of state court judgments.
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (Full Faith and Credit Act) Requires federal courts to give preclusive effect to state court judgments as state courts would. Mandated the court to apply Ohio preclusion law to state court judgment.
Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991) Principles of estoppel and preclusion in bankruptcy proceedings. Supported application of state preclusion law in bankruptcy case.
Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984) Federal courts must apply state law of preclusion to prior state judgments. Guided court to apply Ohio res judicata and collateral estoppel doctrines.
State ex rel. Davis v. Pub. Emp. Ret. Bd., 120 Ohio St. 3d. 386 (2008) Definition of claim preclusion and issue preclusion under Ohio law. Defined scope of preclusion doctrines applied to bar relitigation.
Grava v. Parkman Twp., 73 Ohio St.3d 379 (1995) Claim preclusion and issue preclusion principles. Clarified that claims or issues previously litigated are barred from relitigation.
Thompson v. Wing, 70 Ohio St.3d 176 (1994) Requirements for issue preclusion and privity concept. Applied to find Defendant-Debtor and Trust in privity for preclusion purposes.
Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. ___ (2020) Rule 59(e) allows motion to alter or amend judgment to rectify mistakes. Established legal standard for reconsideration motions in bankruptcy.
Hamerly v. Fifth Third Mortg. Co. (In re J & M Salupo Dev. Co.), 388 B.R. 795 (6th Cir. BAP 2008) Application of Rule 59(e) in bankruptcy context; reconsideration is extraordinary remedy. Informed court's discretion in denying Motion for Reconsideration.
Howard v. United States, 533 F.3d 472 (6th Cir. 2008) Rule 59(e) does not permit re-argument of a case. Supported denial of reconsideration based on mere disagreement with prior ruling.
Bank of Ann Arbor v. Everest Nat'l Ins. Co., 563 Fed.Appx. 473 (6th Cir. 2014) Clarifies limits on reconsideration motions. Reinforced requirement that reconsideration is not for new arguments.
In re Nosker, 267 B.R. 555 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2001) Movant bears burden to show manifest error of fact or law for reconsideration. Applied to deny motion lacking demonstration of manifest error.
Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Indian Head Indus., Inc., 941 F.3d 828 (6th Cir. 2019) Enumerates grounds for altering or amending judgment under Rule 59(e). Guided court's evaluation of grounds asserted in Motion for Reconsideration.
GenCorp, Inc. v. Am. Int'l Underwriters, 178 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 1999) Clarifies requirements for newly discovered evidence in reconsideration motions. Supported rejection of unsupported claims of new evidence.
Duha v. Agrium, Inc., 448 F.3d 867 (6th Cir. 2006) Statements in briefs are not evidence. Supported court's rejection of factual allegations unsupported by evidence.
In re Shefa, LLC, 649 B.R. 881 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2023) Arguments and evidence cannot be presented for first time in motion for reconsideration. Supported court's refusal to consider new evidence or arguments.
Bus. Dev. Corp. of S.C. v. Ruter & Russin, LLC, 37 Fed.4th 1123 (6th Cir. 2022) Ohio courts follow claim and issue preclusion doctrines. Supported application of collateral estoppel to state court findings.
Juhasz v. Secretary, Dept. of Treasury, 38 Fed.Appx. 307 (6th Cir. 2002) Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues decided by competent court. Supported binding effect of state court findings on this court.
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979) Collateral estoppel principles. Supported preclusive effect of prior state court determinations.
Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashion Group, Inc., 590 U.S. ___ (2020) Reinforces collateral estoppel doctrine. Confirmed binding effect of prior adjudications.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first addressed its jurisdiction to decide the Motion for Reconsideration despite the pending appeal filed by the Plaintiff-Trustee. It recognized the general rule that a timely appeal divests the lower court of jurisdiction, but noted exceptions where the lower court retains authority over matters not involved in the appeal. Since the Trustee's appeal concerned a different issue, the court retained jurisdiction to rule on the Motion for Reconsideration.

The court then reviewed the legal doctrines barring reconsideration of state court judgments, including the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prohibits federal courts from exercising appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions, and the Full Faith and Credit Act, which requires federal courts to give state court judgments the same preclusive effect as state courts. Applying Ohio's law of claim and issue preclusion, the court found the state court judgments binding and not subject to collateral attack in this federal bankruptcy proceeding.

Regarding the substance of the Motion for Reconsideration, the court noted that the motion failed to identify any clear error of law, newly discovered evidence, or change in controlling law. The motion primarily challenged factual findings and argued manifest injustice without substantiating these claims with evidence or legal authority. The court emphasized that new arguments or evidence cannot be introduced for the first time in a reconsideration motion and that pro se factual allegations do not constitute evidence.

The court concluded that the Motion to Reconsider did not meet the high standard required for relief under Rule 59(e) and related bankruptcy rules. It found no manifest injustice requiring correction and reaffirmed that the prior decision was consistent with applicable bankruptcy law and policy balancing debtor relief and creditor rights.

Holding and Implications

The court's final ruling is DENYING the Defendant-Debtor's Motion for Reconsideration of the September 28, 2023 Memorandum of Decision and Judgment.

This decision leaves the prior judgment intact and reaffirms the binding effect of the state court rulings under federal bankruptcy law and related doctrines. No new precedent was established, and the ruling primarily affects the parties by denying the Debtor-Defendant a second opportunity to challenge the court's prior decision in this adversary proceeding.

In Re: Teresa Nadeau, Debtor. v. Teresa Nadeau and Teresa Nadeau, Trustee of the 858 Revocable Living Trust, Defendants. Douglas A. Dymarkowski, Plaintiff,

John P. Gustafson Judge

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT-DEBTOR'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

John P. Gustafson Judge

This matter comes before the court on pro se Debtor-Defendant Teresa Nadeau's Motion to Reconsider [Doc. #43] filed on October 12, 2023, and is decided in light of the filing of documents commencing an appeal filed by Plaintiff-Trustee Douglas A. Dymarkowski's ("Plaintiff") with the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. [Case No. 21-31239, Docs. #45-47].

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The district court has jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §1334(b) as a civil proceeding arising in or related to a case under Title 11. The Chapter 7 case and all proceedings in it arising under Title 11, including this adversary proceeding, have been referred to this court for decision. 28 U.S.C. §157(a); General Order 2012-7 of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §157(b)(2)(H). Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. §1409(a).

When a timely appeal is filed, the filing of the notice of appeal generally divests the lower court of its jurisdiction in favor of the appellate court. See, City of Cookeville v. Upper Cumberland Elec. Membership Corp., 484 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 2007)(quoting Cochran v. Birkel, 651 F.2d 1219, 1221 (6th Cir.1981), "As a general rule the filing of a notice of appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction and transfers jurisdiction to the court of appeals."); see also, Pittock v. Otis Elevator Co., 8 F.3d 325, 327 (6th Cir.1993).

However, there are exceptions to this general rule. "The filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance - it confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal." Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58, 103 S.Ct. 400, 402, 74 L.Ed. 225 (1982). Thus, one exception is that this court is not divested of control over aspects of the case that are not involved in the appeal.

More directly on point is Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8008(a), which provides:
(a) Relief Pending Appeal. If a party files a timely motion in the bankruptcy court
for relief that the court lacks authority to grant because of an appeal that has been docketed and is pending, the bankruptcy court may:
(1) defer considering the motion;
(2) deny the motion; or
(3) state that the court would grant the motion if the court where the appeal is pending remands for that purpose, or state that the motion raises a substantial issue.

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure will be referred to as "Bankruptcy Rule ___."

Here, an appeal has been filed by the Plaintiff-Trustee, not seeking to overturn the court's decision in the above captioned Adversary Case, but instead requesting reversal of the court's earlier decision allowing the Debtor to claim the Ohio Homestead Exemption in her life-estate interest in the 920 Bury Road property.

Accordingly, the Motion for Reconsideration of the September 28, 2023 Memorandum of Decision [Doc. #39] and the corresponding Judgment [Doc. #40], are not the direct subject of the Trustee's Appeal. Further, it appears that the court still has the authority, if such authority is needed under the facts presented here, to "deny the motion" under Bankruptcy Rule 8008(a)(2). Accordingly, the court will deny Debtor-Defendant's Motion to Reconsider [Doc. #43] for the reasons that follow.

FACTS

The court entered its Memorandum of Decision on September 28, 2023, after an evidentiary hearing held on November 29, 2023.

Parts of the Debtor-Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration appear to attempt to challenge factual and legal conclusions from the pre-bankruptcy state court litigation. That state court litigation resulted in a written decision in the Lucas County Common Pleas Court granting Danberry Co. summary judgment against Teresa Nadeau [Ex. 7, Opinion and Judgment Entry, file stamped May 23, 2019], and reconsideration of that judgment was denied in a short written decision file stamped August 9, 2019 [Ex. 10]. A Notice of Appeal of the judgment against Teresa

Nadeau was filed on October 31, 2019, and on November 20, 2020 the Sixth District Court of Appeals issued a Decision and Judgment affirming the lower court judgment. [Ex. 14, Decision and Judgment].

LAW

A number of related legal principals prevent this court from reviewing the state court decisions as an appellate court.

"The Rooker-Feldman doctrine 'prevents a federal court from exercising jurisdiction over a claim alleging error in a state court decision.'" Hall v. Callahan, 727 F.3d at 453 (quoting Luber v. Sprague, 90 Fed.Appx. 908, 910 (6th Cir. 2004)). "Federal courts' 'authority to review a state court's judgment' is vested 'solely in the Supreme Court.'" Id. (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 1526, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005)); Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290, 298 (6th Cir. 2012)("The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars lower federal courts from conducting appellate review of final state-court judgments because 28 U.S.C. §1257 vests sole jurisdiction to review such claims in the Supreme Court."); Singleton v. Fifth Third Bank (In re Singleton), 230 B.R. 533, 536 (6th Cir. BAP 1999).

Thus, this court is bound by the final judgment of the state court. See e.g., In re Underwood, 568 B.R. 785, 795 (E.D. Mich. 2017)("Underwood was asking the bankruptcy court to declare the Oakland County Circuit Court's judgment void because the state court violated his due process rights and erred in calculating damages. This directly implicates Rooker-Feldman concerns.").

There are additional binding legal doctrines that prevent this court from finding that the judgment of the state court should be disregarded.

"The Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, originally enacted in 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122, requires the federal court to 'give the same preclusive effect to a state-court judgment as another court of that State would give.'" Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293, 125 S.Ct. at 1527 (quoting Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 523, 106 S.Ct. 768, 771, 88 L.Ed.2d 877 (1986)).

Principles of estoppel apply in bankruptcy proceedings. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 284 n.11, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991). Thus, to determine the preclusive effect a prior state court judgment would have on the present federal action, the court must apply the law of preclusion of the state in which the prior judgment was rendered. Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984). Here, state law prevents attacks by Defendant-Debtor on the judgment in favor of Danberry Co.

In Ohio, the doctrine of res judicata encompasses the two related concepts of claim preclusion and issue preclusion. State ex rel. Davis v. Pub. Emp. Ret. Bd., 120 Ohio St. 3d. 386, 392, 899 N.E.2d 975, 981 (2008).

"Claim preclusion prevents subsequent actions, by the same parties or their privies, based on any claim arising out of a transaction that was the subject matter of a previous action." Grava v. Parkman Twp., 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 382, 653 N.E.2d 226, 229 (1995). Claim preclusion also bars subsequent actions whose claims "could have been litigated in the previous suit." Id.

In contrast, issue preclusion, or "collateral estoppel," prevents the "relitigation of any fact or point that was determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in a previous action between the same parties or their privies," even if the causes of action differ. Id. Issue preclusion applies when a fact or issue "(1) was actually and directly litigated in the prior action; (2) was passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction; and (3) when the party against whom [issue preclusion] is asserted was a party in privity with a party to the prior action." Thompson v. Wing, 70 Ohio St.3d 176, 183, 637 N.E.2d 917, 923 (1994); see also, Lundeen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2023 WL 4847686, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131402 (N.D. Ohio July 28, 2023); Hall v. Davis, 2023 WL 2734690, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57547 (N.D. Ohio March 31, 2023).

As the court in Thompson v. Wing further stated: "We have previously held that a person is in privity with another if he or she 'succeeds to an estate or an interest formerly held by another.'" 70 Ohio St.3d at 184, 637 N.E.2d at 923. Here, Defendant-Debtor is the same party who was the defendant in the state court litigation, and the 858 Revocable Living Trust is in privity with her, under Thompson v. Wing.

In the Motion for Reconsideration, the Defendant-Debtor asserts that the court should reconsider its decision.

Rule 59(e) allows a litigant to file a "motion to alter or amend a judgment." Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. ___, 140 S.Ct. 1698, 1703, 207 L.Ed.2d 58 (2020). "Bankruptcy Rule 9023 makes Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally applicable in bankruptcy cases." Hamerly v. Fifth Third Mortg. Co. (In re J & M Salupo Dev. Co.), 388 B.R. 795, 805 (6th Cir. BAP 2008). The Rule gives a court the chance "to rectify its own mistakes in the period immediately following" its decision. Id. (citation omitted); accord Howard v. United States, 533 F.3d 472, 475 (6th Cir. 2008).

A motion under Rule 59(e) is not to be treated as an opportunity to re-argue a case. Howard, 533 F.3d at 475 (explaining that "Rule 59(e) allows for reconsideration; it does not permit parties to effectively 're-argue a case'" (citation omitted)); Bank of Ann Arbor v. Everest Nat'l Ins. Co., 563 Fed.Appx. 473, 476 (6th Cir. 2014); Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir.1998). The party seeking reconsideration cannot simply seek a second bite of the apple and it bears "[t]he burden of demonstrating the existence of a manifest error of fact or law." In re Nosker, 267 B.R. 555, 565 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2001). Altering or amending a judgment is an extraordinary remedy and should be granted sparingly with the disposition of such a motion being entrusted to the court's discretion. Hamerly v. Fifth Third Mortg. Co. (In re J & M Salupo Dev. Co.), 388 B.R. 795, 805 (6th Cir. BAP 2008).

The moving party "may offer any of four reasons for the alteration or amendment: (1) there was 'a clear error of law' in the judgment, (2) the movant has 'newly discovered evidence,' (3) there has been an 'intervening change in controlling law,' or (4) the alteration or amendment is needed 'to prevent manifest injustice.'" Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Indian Head Indus., Inc., 941 F.3d 828, 833 (6th Cir. 2019)(citation omitted); see also, Howard, 533 F.3d at 475; GenCorp, Inc. v. Am. Int'l Underwriters, 178 F.3d 804, 834 (6th Cir. 1999).

DISCUSSION

The Motion to Reconsider does not cite any case law, statute or bankruptcy rule. Nor is there a specific assertion that the decision of the court contained an error of law, or that there has been a change in the relevant case law. Nor does the Motion assert any "newly discovered evidence."

Instead, the Motion asserts that certain factual findings of the court are incorrect and, arguably, that reconsideration is necessary to prevent manifest injustice.

To the extent that the Defendant-Debtor challenges the facts found by the court after trial, the court finds no basis for reconsideration. Similarly, Defendant-Debtor arguments and proffers of evidence not presented at trial are not a basis for altering or amending the court's judgment. "Such arguments and evidence cannot be made for the first time in a motion for reconsideration, only after the Court has made its ruling." In re Shefa, LLC, 649 B.R. 881, 883-84 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2023).

Further, to constitute "newly discovered evidence," the evidence must have been previously unavailable. GenCorp, Inc., 178 F.3d at 834. There was no showing or allegations in the Motion that evidence was "newly discovered." Moreover, there is no "evidence." The arguments and factual allegations of pro se litigants, are not evidence. See, Duha v. Agrium, Inc., 448 F.3d 867, 879 (6th Cir. 2006)("It is well established that statements appearing in a party's brief are not evidence."). The court notes that there was no Affidavit filed with the Motion for Reconsideration.

In addition, the court notes that the findings of the state court, and the state appellate court, are facts that the court is entitled to accept as true under the legal doctrine of "issue preclusion." Bus. Dev. Corp. of S.C. v. Ruter & Russin, LLC, 37 Fed.4th 1123, 1129 (6th Cir. 2022)("Like most courts, Ohio courts follow the well-known doctrines of claim preclusion (res judicata) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel)"). "Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, an issue actually and necessarily decided by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive in subsequent lawsuits based upon a different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation." Juhasz v. Secretary, Dept. of Treasury, 38 Fed.Appx. 307, 308 (6th Cir. 2002), citing Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54, 99 S.Ct. 970, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979); see also, Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashion Group, Inc., 590 U.S. ___, 140 S.Ct. 1589, 1594, 206 L.Ed.2d 893 (2020); Thompson v. Wing, 70 Ohio St.3d at 183, 637 N.E.2d at 923 (1994).

Thus, all of the findings of the Lucas County Common Pleas Court support the conclusion that Danberry Co. was entitled to a judgment for its commission (to the extent those findings were not contradicted by the Sixth District Court of Appeals) and are binding on this court. In addition, the facts as found by the Sixth District Court of Appeals in affirming the lower court's decision, reviewing its findings de novo [Ex. 14, p. 8], are similarly binding on this court.

Finally, the court finds that there is no basis for reconsideration 'to prevent manifest injustice.' The showing of 'manifest injustice' requires that there "exist a fundamental flaw in the court's decision that without correction would lead to a result that is both inequitable and not in line with applicable policy." Int'l Union United v. Bunting Bearings Corp., 321 B.R. 420, 423 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 2004); see also, In re Marshall, 636 B.R. 396, 404 n. 3 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2021). The decision was based upon Bankruptcy Code provisions that Congress enacted, balancing the benefits of the relief given to debtors with the remedies afforded to creditors through the avoidance powers provided to Chapter 7 trustees.

CONCLUSION

For all these reasons, the court finds no basis for reconsideration of the court's September 28, 2023 Memorandum of Decision and separate Judgment. Based on the foregoing, the court finds that the Debtor-Defendant has failed to meet her burden, and the Motion for Reconsideration [Doc. #43] will be, and is hereby, Denied.

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Dymarkowski v. Nadeau (In re Nadeau)
(Nov 3, 2023)