People v. Diaz, Cal., Judgment, Law, casemine.com

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Attorney(S)

Robinson, Beatty & Botts, for Appellant. Wm. T. Wallace, Attorney-General, for the People.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The defendant was indicted and arraigned on a charge of murder and pleaded not guilty. At trial the defendant moved for a continuance because a material witness was absent. The motion was supported by an affidavit setting forth the testimony the absent witness would give, and the affidavit showed diligence and the materiality of the evidence for the defense. The District Attorney admitted that, if the witness were present, the witness would testify as stated in the affidavit, but stated this admission was subject to contradiction by other evidence and consented that the affidavit might be used in evidence. The trial court overruled the motion for continuance on that basis. The defendant excepted to the ruling, was convicted, and appealed. The opinion was delivered by Chief Justice Murray, with Justice Terry concurring.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the trial court properly denied a motion for a continuance for an absent material witness where the affidavit demonstrated diligence and materiality but the District Attorney only admitted that the witness would testify as alleged "subject to contradiction" and permitted the affidavit to be used in evidence.
Whether a mere admission by the prosecution that a witness would, if present, testify to certain facts (qualified or subject to contradiction) suffices in lieu of the witness's oral testimony in open court.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Hook v. Manny, 4 Hen. & Munford, 157, note	Cited in support of the proposition that refusal to grant a continuance is an exercise of discretion reviewable by an appellate court.	Cited in the opinion's preliminary discussion as authority for the cited discretionary-review proposition.
Ross v. Monell , 3 Munf. 170	Cited in support of the proposition that refusal to grant a continuance is an exercise of discretion reviewable by an appellate court.	Cited in the opinion's preliminary discussion as authority for the cited discretionary-review proposition.
Syme v. Montague, 4 H. & M. 180	Cited in support of the proposition that refusal to grant a continuance is an exercise of discretion reviewable by an appellate court.	Cited in the opinion's preliminary discussion as authority for the cited discretionary-review proposition.
Jacob v. Sale, Gilmer, 123, (Va. R.)	Cited in support of the proposition that refusal to grant a continuance is an exercise of discretion reviewable by an appellate court.	Cited in the opinion's preliminary discussion as authority for the cited discretionary-review proposition.
Miss. R. 28; Id. 359; 1Black. 50; 3d Id. 504	Listed among authorities relating to the rule on continuances and review of discretionary refusals.	Cited in the opinion's preliminary discussion as additional authorities on the subject.
People v. Vermilyea, 7 Cowen, 383	Cited for the proposition that, to avoid a continuance upon a proper affidavit, it is not enough that the prosecutor admit the witness would testify as alleged; the fact must be unqualifiedly admitted.	Cited to support the legal principle that a qualified admission by the prosecutor is insufficient to deny a continuance.
Brill v. Lord, 14 Johns. 341	Cited for the proposition that, to avoid a continuance upon a proper affidavit, the fact the witness would prove must be unqualifiedly admitted and a mere qualified admission is insufficient.	Cited to support the legal principle that a qualified admission by the prosecutor is insufficient to deny a continuance.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by noting that at common law applications for continuances in criminal cases were addressed to the court's sound discretion and refusals could not be assigned as error, but that statutory modification permits appellate review of such orders. The court observed that the affidavit in this case was sufficient and that the materiality and diligence in attempting to procure the witness were properly shown.

The court held that, when materiality is shown and there is no evidence discrediting or casting suspicion on the application, the trial court had a duty to postpone the cause to afford the accused reasonable time to procure his witness. The prosecutor's offer to admit that the witness would, if present, swear to the facts contained in the affidavit "subject to contradiction by other evidence" was insufficient. The prosecution should have admitted the truth of those facts absolutely if it sought to avoid a continuance.

The court emphasized the importance of oral testimony and the right of the accused to have his witnesses orally examined in court. It explained that oral, in-court testimony allows the jury to assess demeanor and credibility, permits confrontation between the accused's witnesses and impeaching witnesses, and enables the jury to better ascertain the truth. Consequently, the court concluded that the accused's right to the presence and oral examination of his witness could not be "frittered away" by compelling a trial in the witness's absence based on a qualified statement of expected testimony.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The judgment of conviction was reversed and a new trial was ordered.

Implications: The direct effect is that the defendant's conviction was vacated and the case remanded for a new trial. The court's ruling requires that when a defendant establishes the materiality of an absent witness and shows diligence, the trial court must grant reasonable time to procure that witness unless there is evidence discrediting the application; a mere qualified admission by the prosecution that the witness would testify as alleged (for example, "subject to contradiction") is not sufficient to deny a continuance. The opinion stresses the accused's right to have witnesses orally examined in court and the importance of the jury's ability to observe witness demeanor.

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THE PEOPLE v. DIAZ

In this case the prisoner was indicted and arraigned on a charge of murder, and plead not guilty. He moved to continue the cause, on account of the absence of a material witness. The diligence of the prisoner, in attempting to procure said witness, and the materiality of his testimony, is fully shown; but the District Attorney admitted that if said witness were present he would state the facts set forth in the affidavit, and upon this the Court overruled the motion for a continuance.

This practice is not authorized by the statute in criminal cases. It would seem to be a dangerous one, inasmuch as that frequently the witness, when produced, might be able to substantiate his testimony by reference to any matters which the prisoner was not aware of; and, if his testimony is attacked or contradicted, the witness might be able to explain it, and to sustain himself by further details of facts in the case.

Besides, the bearing and manner of deposing of a witness who is personally present in Court, under examination, is frequently of the utmost importance, in order that the jury may give proper weight to his evidence.

Our practice is unsettled in this particular, and this case is submitted to the Court with these views.

JUDGES: The opinion of the Court was delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Murray. Mr. Justice Terry concurred.

OPINION

MURRAY, Judge

The accused, who was indicted and arraigned upon a charge of murder, moved for a continuance, on the ground of the absence of a material witness.

The affidavit is sufficient, in all particulars, and the materiality of the evidence properly shown. The Court overruled the motion--the District Attorney offering to admit that said witness would, if present, swear to the facts contained in the affidavit, subject to contradiction by other evidence, to which the prisoner excepted.

At common law, applications for continuances in criminal cases were addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, and the refusal could not be assigned as error. This rule has been modified by our statutes, which authorizes us to review these orders, upon appeal.

The materiality of the evidence having been shown, it was the duty of the Court, in the absence of evidence tending to discredit or throw suspicion upon the application, to postpone the cause, to afford the prisoner reasonable time to procure the attendance of his witness. It was not sufficient that the District Attorney agreed that the witness would have deposed to certain facts, if present; he should have admitted the truth of these facts, absolutely. It was the right of the accused to have his witnesses orally examined in Court; and this right could not be frittered away by compelling him to go to trial in their absence, without the benefit of their testimony, upon a statement of what that evidence would be, subject to impeachment.

The value of oral testimony, over all other, is too well understood to suppose, for a moment, that such declarations would have the same weight on the minds of the jury as the testimony of the witness, if he had been examined before them in open Court. The prisoner would lose another important advantage, that of confronting his witness with those called to impeach him; and the jury would have been better able to arrive at the truth, from a personal observation of the manner of each while testifying.

Judgment reversed, and new trial ordered.

People v. Diaz