The recorder had no power or authority to make the alteration, after the deed had been recorded. It was the duty of the grantee, when he discovered the omission, to have his deed re-recorded; and then, so far as this block is concerned, it would be notice from the latter date, which would be officially certified to, by the recorder or auditor.
Where there is a mistake in the recording of an instrument, a subsequent bona fide purchaser is bound only to the extent set forth in the record. (Frost v. Beckman, 1 John. C. 288, 299.)
In Price v. Webb, 2 Brown Ch. 15, note, a forged deed was ordered to be canceled, though the forgery was provable at common law; and the books are full of similar cases, where the facts which rendered the instrument liable to cancellation were triable in an action at law, but complete relief could only be given in equity.
JUDGES: Terry, J., after stating the facts, as above, delivered the opinion of the Court. Murray, C. J., concurring.
OPINION
TERRY, Judge
The evident design of the Registration Act was, by establishing a notice equally accessible to all, to protect subsequent bona fide purchasers. The doctrine of constructive notice, under registration laws, has always been regarded as a harsh necessity, and the statutes which create it have always been subjected to the most rigid construction. (Call v. Hastings , 3 Cal. 179.) So far as the lots in controversy are affected, the deed of Reynolds was not recorded, until the title of plaintiff's grantor was perfected; and, conceding the propriety of the interlineation, it could only impart notice from the time it was made, and could in no way impair or defeat a title previously acquired. Our statute provides that " every conveyance, certified and recorded in the manner prescribed in this act, shall, from the time of filing the same with the recorder for record, impart notice to all persons of the contents thereof." (See Sec. 25, p. 251.)
We think the design and intention of this act was to give constructive notice of the facts which appeared upon the face of the record, and that it could not operate as notice of such portions of the deed as, through mistake or carelessness, are not entered of record.
In this view, we are sustained by decisions of various States. In Frost v. Beckman, 1 John. Ch., a mortgage for three thousand dollars, which by mistake was recorded as a mortgage for three hundred dollars, was held valid, as against a subsequent purchaser, only for three hundred dollars. So, in Sawyer v. Craige , 10 Vt. 555, a deed for the east half of a certain lot was erroneously recorded as a deed to the west half. It was held invalid, as against a subsequent bona fide purchaser of the east half. (See also 20 Ohio, 266.)
Judgment affirmed, with costs.