People v. Rodriguez, Cal., Judgment, Law, casemine.com

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Attorney(S)

Mills & Myers, for Appellant. Attorney-General, for Respondent.

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Factual and Procedural Background

The defendant (Martin Rodriguez, joined by John Ballinger in the indictment) was indicted for murder in the first degree for the shooting and subsequent death of Andrew Hollenburgh following an incident at a cabin near the South Fork of the North Fork of the American River in Placer County in December 1857. The grand jury returned an indictment charging that Rodriguez discharged a rifle, wounding Hollenburgh on about December 20, 1857, and that Hollenburgh died on about December 21, 1857.

In the trial court the defendant challenged the entire grand jury panel and raised defects in the manner of summoning and drawing the grand jury; the challenge was denied. The defendant demurred to the indictment on multiple grounds (including alleged omission of the State in the venue allegation, insufficiency of the description of the offense and its degree, multiplicity, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense); the demurrer was overruled. During empanelment the defendant sought to interpose a peremptory challenge to one of eleven jurors after those jurors had been sworn but before the twelfth was sworn; the court refused. At trial a prosecution witness testified to admissions by the defendant; the court refused to strike that testimony. The jury convicted Rodriguez of murder in the first degree and judgment was entered. The defendant's motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were denied. The defendant appealed to the Court (opinion delivered by Judge Burnett), and the appellate court affirmed the judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the grand jury was lawfully summoned and empaneled (timing, notice, and manner of drawing ballots and presence of designated officers).
Whether the indictment was defective for failing to state the State as place of offense, for failing to state facts in ordinary and concise language sufficient to show first-degree murder, for multiplicity, or for other deficiencies that would bar prosecution.
Whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow a peremptory challenge to a juror after eleven jurors had been sworn but before the twelfth was sworn.
Whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony of the defendant's admissions (confessions) without first establishing they were voluntary.
Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial (based on surprise and that the verdict was contrary to the evidence) and in arresting judgment based on the grounds raised in the demurrer.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The presiding judge of the Court of Sessions improperly summoned the grand jury after the commencement of the term instead of the Court doing so (citing Wood's Dig. 510, § 4).
The requisite number of ballots were not drawn from the county jury-box as required by law (citing Wood's Dig. 510, 284, §§ 5, 182).
Notice of the drawing of the grand jury was not given as prescribed by law (citing Wood's Dig. 511, 284, §§ 5, 182).
The drawing was not conducted in the presence of the designated officer(s) as required by statute (citing Section 182 of the Act to Regulate Proceedings in Criminal Cases).
The District Court erred in overruling the motion to set aside the indictment and in overruling the demurrer to the indictment (citing various statutory and case authorities).
The court erred in overruling the challenge to the entire panel and in refusing to allow a peremptory challenge to one of the eleven jurors after they had been sworn and before the twelfth was sworn (citing Wood's Dig. and The People v. Kohle).
The District Court erred in refusing to strike out testimony of a witness recounting defendant's admissions and in the court's charge to the jury.
The District Court erred in overruling the motion for a new trial and in overruling the motion in arrest of judgment.

Respondent's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's legal arguments beyond the court's summary treatment of the points raised by the appellant and references to compliance with statutory provisions and controlling authorities.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
People v. Dolan, 9 Cal. 576	Support for the proposition that an indictment in the common-law form is sufficient and that the degree of murder is to be determined by the jury, not by the indictment.	The court relied on this authority to conclude the indictment's form was sufficient and to uphold the overruling of the demurrer on that ground.
The People v. Kohle, 4 Cal. 198	Establishes that the right to challenge a juror before swearing is secured by statute and relevant precedent concerning challenges to jurors.	The court cited this decision to explain that the challenge must be made before a juror is sworn; because no good cause for a post-sworn challenge was shown here, the refusal to allow the peremptory challenge was upheld.
State v. Adams, Mart. N.C. 33	Cited by appellant in support of the contention that the indictment was insufficient (context: demurrer authorities).	The court did not adopt this authority to sustain the demurrer; the demurrer was overruled and the court did not rely on this case in its disposition.
Jane v. State, 3 Mo. 61	Cited by appellant among authorities supporting the demurrer challenging indictment sufficiency.	The court did not rely on this authority to sustain the demurrer; the demurrer was overruled.
Williams' case (as cited in Roscoe's Cr. Ev. 57)	Expresses the principle that a confession is presumed voluntary unless the contrary is shown.	The court invoked this principle to justify refusing to strike the witness's testimony recounting the defendant's admissions, finding the testimony prima facie showed voluntariness and noting the defendant had the burden to show otherwise.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed each contested issue by reference to the record and statute. First, the objections to the manner of summoning and drawing the grand jury were resolved by inspection of the record, which the court found conformed to the statutory provisions (Sections 11–13 of the Act Concerning Jurors, Wood's Dig.), so the objections were dismissed as without merit.

On the demurrer to the indictment, the court held that the statute required identification of the county and that the indictment need not name the State; consequently the objection that the indictment did not charge the offense as committed in California was unfounded. The court further stated that the indictment followed the common-law form and that it is unnecessary to charge murder with more particularity as to degree in the indictment because degree is a matter for the jury (citing People v. Dolan). The court therefore declined to further consider the demurrer and overruled it.

Concerning jury challenges, the court explained the statutory rule securing the right to challenge a juror before he is sworn and recognized prior decisions (The People v. Kohle). Here, because eleven jurors had been examined, challenged, and sworn without objection and the defendant sought to make a peremptory challenge to one of those eleven after their swearing — without naming the juror or asserting newly discovered facts or good cause — the court properly refused the belated challenge.

On the admissibility of the defendant's admissions, the court acknowledged the rule that a confession must be voluntary to be received, but noted the presumption of voluntariness (as stated in Williams' case via Roscoe) and that the objection to voluntariness should have been timely raised at introduction. Because the defense did not timely object and because the witness's testimony prima facie indicated voluntariness, the court found no error in admitting the testimony; the burden of proving coercion rested upon the defendant once the testimony was admitted.

The court reviewed the motion for a new trial (asserting surprise and that the verdict was contrary to the evidence) and held that the statutory grounds for a new trial are limited to those enumerated; surprise of the type alleged did not qualify because the defendant could have sought a continuance and because the allegedly surprised witness was one of the defendant's own attorneys. The motion in arrest of judgment was grounded on the same demurrer arguments, which the court had already rejected.

Having considered the charge to the jury, the court concluded the instructions were full and complete on the issues presented; the court found no reversible error in the charge or in the trial rulings and thus affirmed the conviction.

Holding and Implications

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Holding: The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment convicting Martin Rodriguez of murder in the first degree.

Implications: The direct effect is that the conviction and sentence entered in the trial court remain in force. The court rejected the appellant's challenges to the grand-jury empanelment, the sufficiency of the indictment, the late peremptory challenge to a sworn juror, the striking of testimony concerning the defendant's admissions, the motion for a new trial, and the motion in arrest of judgment. The opinion does not announce or rely upon any novel legal principle beyond applying existing statutory provisions and controlling authorities to the facts; no broader new precedent was declared by this opinion beyond its application to the case at bar.

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THE PEOPLE v. RODRIGUEZ

The first objection urged in this case was as to drawing, summoning, etc., of the grand jury. An inspection of the record will show a precise conformity to Sections eleven, twelve, and thirteen of the " Act Concerning Jurors," p. 511 Wood's Dig.; further comment is therefore unnecessary.

The defendant then demurred, stating several grounds.

The first is, that " the indictment does not charge the offense to have been committed in the State of California." This was not necessary--the statute only requires the county to be given, and as the prosecution is in behalf of " People of the State of California," our law-makers conceived it unnecessary to name the State further in either the title or body of the indictment. See Wood's Dig. § 238, p. 288.

The second is, " that the facts constituting the offenses are not stated in ordinary and concise language, and that the kind or character of deliberation is not shown."

The indictment is in the common law form, which I presume is sufficient under our practice, and it is unnecessary to charge murder in any other than the ordinary form, as the " degree" must be determined by the jury at the trial, and not in the indictment. People v. Dolan , 9 Cal. 576.

I shall not further notice the demurrer.

The objection that the jury was summoned after commencement of the term, in obedience to an order of the Court, was frivolous. " Act Concerning Jurors," Wood's Dig. § 16, p. 512.

The refusal of the Court to permit a challenge after the jurors were sworn, was authorized by statute. Wood's Dig. 296, § 341.

The Court acted properly in refusing to strike out the testimony of defendant's admissions; the presumption is, that confessions are voluntarily made, and the defense had the privilege, by cross-examination or independent testimony, to rebut such presumption. Roscoe Crim. Ev. 57.

The defendant moved for a new trial upon two grounds, the latter of which was accident and surprise. The statute (Wood's Dig. 304, § 440) specifies the grounds upon which a new trial may be granted, and confines it to those named. This does not fall within the category. If the defendant was taken by surprise, he should have asked a continuance, to procure his testimony. But it seems that his principal witness was one of his attorneys, (Mr. Tweed,) then conducting the cause, and I apprehend that he would not have even been entitled to a continuance for the mere purpose of procuring cumulative testimony.

The motion in arrest of judgment was based upon the same grounds stated in the demurrer which I have noticed.

JUDGES: Burnett, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Terry, C. J., and Field, J., concurring.

OPINION

BURNETT, Judge

Indictment and conviction for murder in the first degree.

The objections to the mode of summoning and empanneling the grand and trial jurors were not well taken. The demurrer to the indictment was properly overruled, as the form laid down in the statute was substantially pursued.

After eleven jurors had been examined by both parties, and each having exercised its right of challenge, both peremptory and for cause, and these eleven had been sworn to try the case without any objection from the counsel of defendant, and the twelfth juror having been called and accepted by both parties, the defendant, by his counsel, before the last juror was sworn, offered to interpose a peremptory challenge to one of the eleven jurors who had been already sworn, without naming the juror, or stating any fact that came to their knowledge since he was sworn; which offer was refused by the Court, and the counsel of the defendant duly excepted.

Had the eleven jurors been sworn against the objection of defendant, and then his challenge refused, the question would have presented another aspect. The right to challenge the juror before he is sworn, is expressly secured by the statute, and settled by the decision of this Court in the case of The People v. Kohle (4 Cal. 198; Wood's Dig. 296, § 341). The challenge may be allowed, for good cause, after the juror is sworn. In this case no good cause was shown, and the offer to challenge was rightfully refused.

During the trial, a witness for the prosecution proved certain admissions made by the prisoner to the witness, the day after the deceased was shot by the defendant. The counsel of the prisoner moved to strike out this testimony, upon the ground that it had not been first shown by the prosecution that these admissions were made freely, and not under the influence of fear or other improper inducements. This motion was refused; and this is assigned as one ground of error.

It is laid down as a rule, that " before any confession can be received as evidence in a criminal case, it must be shown that it was voluntary ." (1 Greenl. Ev. p. 327, § 219.) The same rule is stated in 1 Phil. Ev. 401. But in Williams' case, cited in Roscoe's Cr. Ev. 57, it was said by Taunton, J., that " a confession is presumed to be voluntary unless the contrary is shown."

We think there was no error in this refusal of the Court to strike out the testimony, for two reasons: first, the objection should have been made to the introduction of the testimony, but by not making it at the proper time, the onus of proving that the confession of the prisoner was made under the influence of improper inducements was thrown upon the defendant; second, the facts stated in the testimony of the witness showed, prima facie, that the confession was voluntary.

It is insisted only in general terms that the charge of the Court to the jury was erroneous. The charge is very full and complete upon all the points arising in the case, and we can see no error in it.

There was no error in refusing a new trial; and we can see nothing in the other points made by the defendant's counsel.

Judgment affirmed.

People v. Rodriguez