I. That defendant first assumed to pay the mortgage debt to plaintiff is shown by the recital in their deed, and by the context and the subject of the agreement. Burlingame was selling his lot for $ 10,000. He received $ 4,000 down, and agreed to let the other $ 6,000 go to pay his debt to Lewis. He was interested in paying this debt. If not paid, he was personally liable to Lewis. After sale of the property to Covillaud and Nye, he had no interest in releasing the mortgage. The question to be determined here is, whether Burlingame appropriated $ 6,000 of his money to pay his own debt, or appropriated that amount to procure the release of a mortgage in which he had no interest. It is only necessary to determine that Burlingame was a sane man, and not an idiot or a lunatic, to determine that he appropriated his own money to pay his own debt.
II. What was the nature of the agreement made between Covillaud and Lewis in 1857, when Covillaud paid Lewis the $ 8,000? Did Covillaud, by that transaction, do what Covillaud and Nye had promised to do--that is, did he pay the debt to Lewis, and thereby relieve Burlingame from responsibility, as under his contract with Burlingame, he and Nye were bound to do, or did he, regardless of his promise to Burlingame, only release the mortgage from his own property, and totally fail to perform the promise of Covillaud and Nye to Burlingame?
That Lewis only intended to release the mortgage and not the mortgage debt, is evidenced by the following facts: 1st. The indorsement on the mortgage is peculiar--(" Satisfied by being released." ) 2d. He delivered the mortgage to Covillaud, but retained the note. 3d. He indorsed as a credit on the note the $ 8,000 received of Covillaud. 4th. Soon after he brought suit for balance due upon note against Burlingame. 5th. The note was pasted to the mortgage and he tore it off, showing deliberate intention to keep it. 6th. Lawton, who was the witness and agent of Covillaud, did not understand that Lewis was releasing Burlingame, or giving up his claim against Burlingame for the balance of the debt.
That Covillaud understood Lewis retained his debt against Burlingame, is rendered equally certain by numerouscircumstances. He knew Lewis held a note against Burlingame; he knew it because the note had been pasted to the mortgage; he knew it because the note is referred to in the mortgage; he must have known that it is usual in all cases where large sums of money are secured by mortgage to give a note with the mortgage. Yet, while he was careful to take up the mortgage, he says never a word about the note. Covillaud did not pay the $ 8,000 in cash, but gave notes payable on time. He never made any objection to the payment of these notes. Surely he would have done so if he had been cheated out of the consideration.
The District Court has found this point in favor of Lewis. When this finding is sustained by such a weight of testimony, and there is such an absence of testimony on the other side, will this Court interfere with the finding of facts of the District Judge?
III. Admitting that Covillaud and Nye agreed with Burlingame to pay his debt to Lewis, could Lewis sue in his own name and without assignment upon that promise or undertaking of Covillaud and Nye? We do not deem this a material question in the case, for if Lewis originally had no right of action, Burlingame certainlydid have, and he assigned that cause of action to Lewis. So that Lewis, whether he originally had a cause of action or not, certainly did have it by assignment. But we think, as the law is now settled by most if not all the modern decisions, Lewis had a right of action in his own name and without assignment. We refer the Court to the following cases: (Barker v. Bucklin , 2 Denio, 45; The Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v. The Westchester County Bank , 4 Id. 97; Arnold et al. v. Lyman et al. , 17 Mass. 400.)
IV. Did the vendor's lien of Burlingame pass by his assignment to plaintiff?
Under our statute nobody doubts the assignability of the debt itself. If the debt may be assigned why not the lien? This Court, in the case of Phelan v. Olney, (6 Cal. 478) decided, that the assignment of note, secured by mortgage, carried with it an equitable assignment of the mortgage. The Court, also, in the case of Ritter v. Stevenson, (7 Cal. 388) expresses the opinion that the written assignment of an account, secured by a mechanic's lien, would carry the lien itself. The authorities as to whether the mere assignment of a note which was given for the purchase money of real estatecarries with it the right to enforce the vendor's lien by the holder of the note, are conflicting. The Kentucky, Indiana, and some other authorities, hold that the assignee of the note has the same right to enforce the vendor's lien which the vendor himself had, while some other authorities hold that the mere assignment of the note does not carry with it the right to enforce the vendor's lien. But the very same authorities, or at least some of them, which held that the assignment of the note would not carry the vendor's lien, held or intimated that a special assignment of the lien by deed would entitle the assignee to enforce the lien, and we believe no single authority can be found contradicting this latter proposition where there was a real or attempted assignment of the lien. (See on this point White v. Williams, 1 Paige's Ch. 502; 7 Maryland, 132.)
JUDGES: Cope, J. delivered the opinion of the Court. Field, C. J. and Norton, J. concurring.
OPINION
COPE, Judge
Covillaud and Nye purchased of one Burlingame a lot with the improvements thereon in the city of Marysville, and as a part of the consideration assumed the payment of a mortgage upon the property, in favor of the plaintiff, for the sum of $ 6,000. Nye conveyed his interest in the property to Covillaud, and the latter arranged with the plaintiff for a release of his mortgage, agreeing to pay him the sum of $ 8,000, in two installments of $ 4,000 each, and to secure the payment by a mortgage on the same property. This arrangement was carried out by the execution of the notes and mortgage as agreed on, and the release of the original mortgage, but as the debt and interest due from Burlingame amounted to more than the sum for which the notes were given, the note of Burlingame was retained by the plaintiff. The amount of the Covillaud notes was credited upon it, and a suit brought against Burlingame for the balance, and a judgment recovered, and the present action is against Covillaud and Nye upon their agreement to pay off the original mortgage. The action is based upon that agreement, and upon a written assignment from Burlingame to the plaintiff of his cause of action against Covillaud and Nye, including his lien as vendor, and the plaintiff asks a judgment for the amount claimed, and a decree enforcing the lien. The case comes up on appeal from an order refusing a new trial, and from a judgment granting the relief asked, and various objections are urged as grounds of reversal. It is objected that the agreement sued on does not bind Covillaud and Nye for the payment of the mortgage debt, and that it only amounted to an undertaking on their part to obtain a discharge of the mortgage as a lien upon the property. The intention obviously was to assume the payment of the debt, and any other construction would be inconsistent with the circumstances under which the agreement was entered into, and could not be maintained even upon the strictest interpretation of the language used. It would be absurd to hold, that an agreement to pay a mortgage is complied with by procuring a discharge of the mortgage, leaving the debt unsatisfied; and particularly where the person agreeing to pay receives the amount of the mortgage debt as the consideration for the agreement. It is clear that the objection taken cannot be sustained, and that Covillaud and Nye in assuming the payment of the mortgage, retaining for that purpose the amount of the mortgage debt, assumed and intended to assume the payment of the debt.
It is objected further, that the plaintiff cannot sue upon the agreement for want of privity, and the case of McLaren v. Hutchinson (18 Cal. 80) is relied upon in support of the objection. In that case the suit was upon an agreement made by the defendant with a third person to pay a debt owing by the latter to the plaintiff, and we held that as the plaintiff was not a party to the agreement the action could not be maintained. The decision was placed upon the ground that there was no privity, but since the case was decided the matter has frequently been called to our attention, and we are by no means satisfied with the rule laid down. The agreement was founded upon a sufficient consideration, and the modern doctrine in such cases seems to be in favor of the maintenance of the action, and we are inclined to hold the question open for further investigation. It is unnecessary to pass upon it in this case, as the assignment of the cause of action enables the plaintiff to sue as the assignee of Burlingame, and in any event the point raised is untenable. It is claimed with reference to the lien, however, that it was not assignable, being a mere personal equity in the vendor, and not transferable by him to another. This point is covered by the decision just rendered in the case of Baum v. Grigsby, ante, 172, and under the rule there laid down the objection is well taken. The more important question in the case arises upon the arrangement between Covillaud and the plaintiff, this arrangement being pleaded in discharge and satisfaction of the original debt. The question, of course, is one of intention, and being purely a question of fact, we cannot interfere with the decision of the Court below, unless there is a want of evidence to sustain it, and the conclusion drawn is legally erroneous. The Court finds that the parties did not intend by the arrangement to extinguish the debt, and concludes that the effect was to release the mortgage and to pay the debt to the extent of $ 8,000. If the finding is correct, the conclusion can hardly be complained of, and to sustain the finding the plaintiff relies upon the fact that the note was not surrendered with the mortgage, and upon the language used in discharging the latter as a lien. The words are, " satisfied by being released," and it is claimed that these words imply the existence of a debt, and show that the intention was to discharge the lien, and hold the debt as a personal obligation. There is some plausibility in this view, and taking the circumstances together, we are of opinion that there is sufficient evidence to support the finding, or at least to render interference on our part improper. We cannot consider the matter as an original question, for to do so would be to throw off our distinctive character as an appellate Court, and assume powers which the Constitution and laws have vested elsewhere. It is possible that upon the weight of evidence we should have arrived at a conclusion different from that of the Court below, but the question for us is, whether the finding is so plainly contrary to the evidence as to raise necessarily the inference of error. So far as mere opinion is concerned the finding is conclusive, and it is clear that upon the evidence before us we cannot interfere without overstepping the bounds of our legitimate authority. There are undoubtedly some embarrassing circumstances in the case, and it may be that due weight and proper consideration were not given to these circumstances, and that the finding is not in accordance with the intention of the parties. If so, it is unfortunate that relief cannot be administered, but it is one of those misfortunes for which no remedy seems to exist, for we cannot set aside the decision of the Court below upon a difference of opinion as to the weight of evidence. The rule is well settled that where the evidence is conflicting, or where the conclusion drawn from it is not necessarily erroneous in point of law, the decision cannot be disturbed.
Our conclusion is, that as to the lien the judgment should be reversed, but that in other respects it should be affirmed.
Ordered accordingly.