All offices of the Government, not only those provided for in the Constitution, but those created by the Legislature also, belong to one of the three departments of Government. (McCauley v. Weller , 16 Cal. 40.) The main, primary duties of the Mayor of a city are executive in their character. The corporation of the city is so constituted that the services of the Mayor, in his executive capacity, are indispensable to the working of the municipal government, and the corporation could have no vitality without the executive services of such an officer.
All of the duties of the Mayor of San Jose as enumerated in the charter, except the judicial functions conferred upon him ex officio by the ninth section, are executive, and so essential in their character that the municipal government must entirely fail if he should be deprived of his executive powers in order that he might properly discharge judicial powers.
The decisions of the Supreme Court upon the question of the exercise of executive powers by judicial officers have been uniform against the constitutionalityof the acts conferring such powers. Burgoyne v. Supervisors , 5 Cal. 9; Dickey v. Hurlburt, Id. 343; People v. Town of Nevada , 16 Id. 143.
The question in this case is not whether the several departments of Government are independent in all respects, for it is admitted that they are not; nor is it whether certain officers can be authorized by law to discharge certain duties, the precise nature of which it is difficult to determine, they partaking of those of two or more of the departments of Government--as the approving of bonds and the taking of acknowledgments of deeds by the Judges, or the laying out of roads by Boards of Supervisors, or the veto power of the Mayor of a city. Nor does the question relate to the powers of the Legislature to establish a municipal government and prescribe the duties of its officers; but conceding that the Legislature may create municipal offices with duties of a mixed character like those of a Supervisor, and in view of the fact that the duties of a Justice of the Peace in the trial of actions, as actions for the unlawful detainer of lands, are purely judicial, the question is, can such judicial duties and functions be conferred uponthe Mayor of a city (who under the provisions of the charter is the chief executive officer of the city) under the provisions of the Constitution authorizing the Legislature to establish a city government?
If the propositions of the appellant can be maintained, and his arguments are sound, there is no restriction upon the Legislature in organizing municipal corporations, and there can be no good reason why the powers usually conferred upon Mayors cannot be exercised by a Justice of the Peace, or why the Mayor could not be vested with appellate powers, or why the Common Council could not be constituted a Court to try cases for the violation of their own ordinances, or why the Mayor, Marshal, and Assessor could not be constituted the legislative branch of the city government.
JUDGES: Crocker, J. delivered the opinion of the Court. Cope, C. J. and Norton, J. concurring.
OPINION
CROCKER, Judge
This is an action for the unlawful holding over of land brought before the Mayor of San Jose, who is by law ex officio Justice of the Peace. The defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction, claiming that the law conferring judicial powers upon the Mayor was in violation of Art. 3 of the Constitution. The Mayor overruled the demurrer, the case was tried, and a judgment rendered for the plaintiff, from which the defendant appealed to the County Court, where he moved to dismiss the action on the same ground. The County Court sustained the motion, dismissed the action, and rendered a judgment in favor of the defendant for costs, from which the plaintiff appeals.
The Forcible Entry Act gives Justices of the Peace jurisdiction to hear and determine actions of this character. Sec. 9 of the act incorporating the City of San Jose, provides that the Mayor shall, ex officio, be a Justice of the Peace within and for the township of San Jose, with the same power and jurisdiction as is conferred by law upon Justices of the Peace, both in criminal and civil cases. (Statutes of 1859, 111.) Article 3 of the Constitution of this State reads as follows: " The powers of the Government of the State of California shall be divided into three separate departments: the legislative, the executive, and the judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases hereinafter expressly directed or permitted." It is insisted that the Mayor of San Jose holds an office pertaining to the executive department of the Government of the State of California, that he cannot therefore exercise any functions appertaining to the judicial department, and that this provision of the Act of 1859, which attempts to confer such powers upon him, is unconstitutional and void.
This third article of the Constitution excepts such cases as are thereinafter expressly directed or permitted. Article 6, sec. 1, provides that " the judicial power of this State shall be vested in a Supreme Court, in District Courts, in County Courts, and in Justices of the Peace. The Legislature may also establish such municipal and other inferior Courts as may be deemed necessary." The term " Municipal Courts" has a legal meaning and signification, and clearly includes Mayors' and Recorders' Courts, as those were well known and universally recognized as being of that character. The office of Mayor was one in which the same person exercised the mixed duties of an executive and judicial officer, and comes within the exception of Art. 3. The Constitution has not defined the jurisdiction of such Courts, and it is therefore left to be regulated by the Legislature under its general powers. The act in question does not confer upon the Mayor of San Jose any jurisdiction which is by the Constitution vested in any other Court, and the Legislature has not therefore exceeded its powers in conferring upon him the same powers and jurisdiction as a Justice of the Peace. The principles laid down in the case of the People v. El Dorado County , 8 Cal. 58, are applicable to the present question. The case of Santo v. The State of Iowa, 2 Iowa Clarke, 220, is also directly in point. In our judgment the act in question is constitutional and valid.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings.