The late Superior Court of the City of San Francisco was a Court of general jurisdiction, so far as concerned the presumptions in favor of its judgments. Counsel for appellants admit that the rule in Hahn v. Kelly, 34 Cal. 391, covers judgments like that rendered in Barker v. Austin, if rendered by a District Court; but contend that the rule does not apply to judgments rendered by the late Superior Court, because of its alleged limited jurisdiction. That is to say, although the jurisdiction of the Superior Court embraced all civil cases where the amount in controversy exceeded two hundred dollars, exclusive of interest; although this was exactly the jurisdiction in money matters of the District Court; although both were equally Courts of record; although the judgments of both were enforced in the same way; yet the records of the one import absolute verity, while the records of the other are mere scrawls upon the sand.
The deed of February 22d, 1855, from Austin to his wife, was never recorded, and is, therefore, void as against plaintiff, who was a subsequent bona fide purchaser, for value, without notice. (Act concerning Conveyances, Sec. 26.)
Vassault was a bona fide purchaser. He was owner of the judgment on which the lot was sold by the Sheriff, and the real purchaser at the sale. Such a purchaser, whetherhe be the judgment creditor or a stranger, is a bona fide purchaser within our Registry Act. (Hunter v. Watson, 12 Cal. 377; Pixley v. Huggins, 15 Cal. 131.)
The fact that Vassault was assignee of the Barker judgment, instead of the original judgment creditor, does not affect the question. (1 Hittell, Art. 3, 166, Sec. 22.)
JUDGES: Rhodes, J. Crockett, J., concurring.
OPINION
RHODES, Judge
Rhodes, J., upon petition for rehearing:
The point urged by the defendants in the petition for rehearing is, that, as the deed of Compton to Mrs. Austin was of record at the time the plaintiff purchased the property under execution, the plaintiff had notice of her title; and the point is again urged on the supposition that it was overlooked by the Court on the previous examination of the record. It was not overlooked, but it was passed because we thought, as we still think, the answer quite obvious. Both Mrs. Austin and the plaintiff claim through Austin. She took nothing, as against the plaintiff, under her deed from Compton, for it was found, upon sufficient evidence, that the deed of Austin and wife to Compton was void as to the plaintiff, and under section twenty-four of the Statute of Frauds, her deed from Compton afforded her no protection, because she was not a purchaser for a valuable consideration. She, then, can rely only upon her unrecorded deed from Austin, and not upon that of Compton, unless the plaintiff purchased with notice. We have heretofore disposed of the deed of Austin and wife to Compton, as related to the question of notice of her unrecorded deed. The deed of Compton is equally valueless as notice. Whatever force there might be in the point, if the plaintiff claimed through her--as the plaintiff in Ramsdell v. Fuller claimed through the deed to Mrs. Fuller--it was no merit whatever, when he not only claims in opposition to her, but shows that her deed is void. We know of no principle justifying us in holding that the record of a deed, void as to any person, was notice to such person of anything, except, perhaps, of the existence of the void instrument. It certainly furnishes no clue to an earlier deed to the same grantee, executed by another grantor.
The general rule is, that the record of a deed is notice to subsequent purchasers--that is to say, the subsequent purchasers from the same grantor--and it is not intended by anything that has been said to infringe upon this rule.
CONCUR
CROCKETT
Crockett, J., concurring:
I concur in the judgment; but, in my opinion, the fact that Mrs. Austin united with her husband in the deed to Compton, was not only insufficient to put the plaintiff on inquiry as to her unrecorded deed, but it was not sufficient to excite even a suspicion of it. It is so common a practice in this State for wives to unite with their husbands in conveyances of common property, where it is not pretended that they have any separate estate in it, that to hold that fact alone to be sufficient to put the purchaser on inquiry as to her secret equities, would extend the doctrine of constructive notice beyond all reasonable limits.