At common law the recordation of a deed was not necessary, nor did recording impart notice. Upon the due execution of the conveyance, accompanied by all legal formalities, the title passed out of the grantor and vested in the grantee as against all the world. No act subsequently done by the vendor, or any other person, could affect the title of the vendee. (4 Cal. 173.) There is nothing in the statutes of this State which gives a creditor greater rights in this respect than he would have at the common law. An attachment operates only in the interest of the debtor in the property at the time of the levy. (Practice Act, Sec. 124.) In this case Vest had no interest in the property at the time of defendants' levy. In order to divest the vendor of his title it is not essential that the deed be recorded. (Hittell's Digest, Sec. 666; 32 Barb. 611; 4 Paige, 15; 3 Kernan, 190: 38 Penn. State R. 385.)
OPINION By the Court:
The fact being conceded that at the time the defendant sued out his writ of attachment against Vest the latter had already conveyed the premises to the plaintiffs, by delivering to them a deed of conveyance thereof, it follows that the levy of the attachment was ineffectual as against the plaintiffs.
The fact that the deed of conveyance had not been recorded is immaterial, nor would it be worth while to inquire if the attaching creditor had actual notice of the existence of the unrecorded deed, or such information as would put him upon inquiry as to its existence.
The Registry Act does not make an unrecorded deed void as against subsequent attaching creditors, but only against subsequent purchasers, or mortgagees, for a valuable consideration, and without notice of the prior unrecorded conveyance.
Judgment affirmed.