In re: LAUREL CANYON, INC., Debtor.
ARTHUR MENALDI, Appellant,
v.
EDWARD M. WOLKOWITZ, Chapter 7 Trustee, Appellee
BAP No. CC-07-1267-DMkMo United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit
March 3, 2008
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Submitted Without Oral Argument: February 21, 2008
Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California. Bk. No. LA 06-10831-ER. Honorable Ernest M. Robles, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding.
Before: DUNN, MARKELL and MONTALI, Bankruptcy Judges.
MEMORANDUM
The appellant, Arthur Menaldi (" Menaldi"), appeals the bankruptcy court's order disallowing his claim. We AFFIRM.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Driving this appeal in large part is Menaldi's continuing dissatisfaction with the sale by the trustee in bankruptcy of the real property that was the only substantial asset of the Laurel Canyon, Inc. (" Laurel Canyon") bankruptcy estate. Therefore, it makes sense to provide some general background with respect to the Laurel Canyon bankruptcy.
A. Laurel Canyon and the Property
The subject real property (" Property") consists of 11.95 acres located in the vicinity of Laurel Canyon Boulevard in Los Angeles, California. The Property was acquired in February 2004, as a tenancy in common by Joseph Menaldi, as to an undivided fifty percent interest, Dominic Menaldi, as to an undivided twenty-five percent interest, and Frank D'Errico, as Trustee of the Frank D'Errico Living Trust Dated January 15, 1998 (" D'Errico"), as to an undivided twenty-five percent interest. Dominic and Joseph Menaldi are Menaldi's brothers.
D'Errico subsequently commenced an action to partition the Property in the Los Angeles County Superior Court (" Superior Court"), Case No. BC 325918 (the " State Court Action"). On December 17, 2004, D'Errico caused a notice of pending action (" Lis Pendens") to be recorded against the Property. On or about December 6, 2005, the Superior Court entered an interlocutory judgment directing the partition by sale of the Property, appointing a referee to sell the Property, and determining and directing the distribution of net sale proceeds from the Property among D'Errico, and Dominic and Joseph Menaldi. On or about January 31, 2006, the Superior Court entered an order authorizing the referee to retain an auctioneer to conduct the sale of the Property.
On February 2, 2006, Dominic and Joseph Menaldi quitclaimed their respective interests in the Property, along with two other parcels of real property, to Menaldi Hills, Inc., a California corporation (" Menaldi Hills"). On March 13, 2006, a deed of trust was recorded, pursuant to which Menaldi Hills purported to grant to Dominic Menaldi a lien against the Property to secure indebtedness of $180, 000 (" Dominic Trust Deed"). On the same date, a deed of trust was recorded, pursuant to which Menaldi Hills purported to grant Joseph Menaldi a lien against the Property to secure indebtedness of $380, 000 (" Joseph Trust Deed").
Laurel Canyon was formed on or about February 7, 2006 to engage in real estate development. On March 10, 2006, Menaldi Hills quitclaimed its interest in the Property to Laurel Canyon. Laurel Canyon filed its petition for relief under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on March 15, 2006. Menaldi signed Laurel Canyon's Schedules and Statement of Financial Affairs as President of Laurel Canyon.
Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter, section and rule references are to the federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § § 101-1532, and to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Rules 1001-9037, as enacted and promulgated as of October 17, 2005, the effective date of most of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23.
Edward M. Wolkowitz was duly appointed as the chapter 7 trustee (" Trustee") in Laurel Canyon's bankruptcy case. Pursuant to orders of the bankruptcy court entered on May 18 and July 14, 2006, the Trustee sold the Property as of September 1, 2006, including the interests of D'Errico and Laurel Canyon, free and clear of liens, including the liens of the Dominic Trust Deed and the Joseph Trust Deed, with liens attaching to the sale proceeds. Laurel Canyon appealed the sale of the Property to this Panel, but that appeal was dismissed on Laurel Canyon's motion on August 29, 2006.
By order entered on April 19, 2007, the Trustee was authorized to satisfy the Dominic Trust Deed and Joseph Trust Deed liens for a total payment of $100, 000. Currently, the balance of proceeds from the sale of the Property is being held by the estate pending determinations as to the allowance of professional fees and disputed liens and claims.
B. Menaldi's Claim
Menaldi filed a proof of claim (the " Claim") in the Laurel Canyon bankruptcy on July 6, 2006. The amount of the Claim is not clear from the number scrawled on the proof of claim form, but further pleadings and documents in the record indicate that Menaldi claimed $198, 000. Although the proof of claim form indicates real property valued at $10, 000, 000 as security, no documentation was attached to the proof of claim filed with the court.
The Trustee moved (the " Motion") to disallow the Claim on or about May 15, 2007, and noticed the Motion for hearing on June 14, 2007. In the Motion, the Trustee asserted four grounds for disallowing the Claim:
1) The Claim asserted an obligation owed by third parties that arose before Laurel Canyon was formed. 2) The Claim was not supported by sufficient documentation pursuant to Rules 3001(c) and (f). 3) Laurel Canyon was not liable on the Claim. 4) To the extent the Claim related to the Debtor at all, it represented a capital contribution. The Motion was supported by the declaration (the " Declaration") of the Trustee's counsel.
In the Declaration, Trustee's counsel stated that on or about January 25, 2007, the bankruptcy court entered an order for a Rule 2004 examination of Menaldi (the " 2004 Examination") and production of documents. The 2004 Examination originally was scheduled to take place on February 8, 2007, but was rescheduled to March 14, 2007, due to a scheduling conflict of Menaldi's counsel. Menaldi failed to appear at the rescheduled 2004 Examination. Menaldi further failed to produce any documents in response to the Trustee's subpoena.
However, on October 13, 2006, in conjunction with a substitution of counsel, Menaldi filed certain documents with the bankruptcy court, including:
a) a letter dated September 29, 2006, in which Menaldi purportedly states that he is seeking $198, 000 that he claims he was to receive based upon an order in the State Court Action; and b) a subsequent letter in which Menaldi purportedly characterized the amount claimed as capital contributions made through a corporation other than Laurel Canyon.
Menaldi apparently filed a number of documents (the " Documents") pro se in support of his Claim that are not identified in the record before us (see Docket Nos. 92, 93, 95 and 96), and Menaldi's counsel filed an opposition (the " Opposition") to the Motion, with a number of documents attached as exhibits, but without any authenticating declaration. The Trustee filed a reply to the Opposition, supported by a further declaration of Trustee's counsel. In addition, the Trustee objected to the documents submitted as exhibits to the Opposition as not supported by a declaration and further " objectionable and inadmissible on grounds of lack of personal knowledge, hearsay, lack of foundation and/or improper opinion testimony by a lay witness, " pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 602, 701 and 802.
In the meantime, the bankruptcy court considered and ruled on what it interpreted to be a motion by Menaldi for a continuance of the hearing (the " Hearing") on the Motion. What the bankruptcy court characterized as Menaldi's " Apparent Motion" stated, " I can't make 14th June working England do by phone 909-844-2886?" To the extent the Apparent Motion requested a continuance of the Hearing, the bankruptcy court denied the request. However, the bankruptcy court authorized Menaldi to appear by telephone. Menaldi's " Apparent Motion" for continuance of the Hearing or leave to appear by telephone is not included in the record on appeal and does not appear on the bankruptcy court's docket.
On June 12, 2007, the bankruptcy court posted a tentative written ruling (the " Tentative Ruling") granting the Motion and disallowing the Claim.
C. The Hearing
At the Hearing, counsel for the Trustee was in court and Menaldi appeared by telephone. In addition, two witnesses in behalf of Menaldi, David Gibson (" Gibson") and Diane Glenbocki (" Glenbocki"), appeared by telephone.
At the outset of the Hearing, the bankruptcy judge noted that, just before taking the bench, he received a copy of a letter from Menaldi's counsel, signed by counsel's paralegal and directed to counsel for the Trustee, advising that she would not be able to appear at the Hearing due to a trial conflict. The bankruptcy judge further noted that no request for a continuance of the Hearing was included in the letter, and " In any event, it would have been too late to request that . . . ." Transcript of June 14, 2007 Hearing at 2. Counsel's letter is not included in the record on appeal, and no such letter is reflected in the bankruptcy court's docket. Menaldi objected and requested a continuance, but the bankruptcy judge overruled his objection and proceeded to conduct the Hearing.
The bankruptcy judge noted that he had not authorized any appearances by witnesses at the Hearing, and he did not listen to testimony from Gibson and Glenbocki. From the transcript of the Hearing, and as argued in Menaldi's Opening Brief (Appellant's Opening Brief at 16), Menaldi's witnesses were present to testify with respect to alleged defects in the sale process for the Property, not in support of his Claim.
The bankruptcy court did give Menaldi the opportunity to state his position, and Menaldi stated the following:
Menaldi: On case number BC325918 (indiscernible), she--the judge originally said that the money should be disbursed to people who put money into the deal first. [Trustee's counsel] released money to (indiscernible) over the phone before reimbursing the people with the costs. I had $290, 000 of my personal money in this deal. I haven't received a penny.
Menaldi: The other lawsuits (indiscernible.) I gave him all his money. And these other people know that. The auctioneer said he spent $14, 000. If he spent more than $100, 000 [sic] advertisement, I would be shocked.
Transcript of June 14, 2007 Hearing at 6-7.
After hearing the presentations of Menaldi and Trustee's counsel, the bankruptcy judge stated that he would rule consistent with his Tentative Ruling, and Trustee's counsel advised that he would submit an order with the bankruptcy court's tentative ruling attached. The bankruptcy court entered a corresponding order disallowing the Claim on June 28, 2007. Menaldi appealed.
Oral argument in this appeal was scheduled for February 21, 2008 in Pasadena, California. At the time scheduled for oral argument, counsel for the Trustee appeared, but Menaldi did not, and without opposition from the Trustee's counsel, we took this appeal as submitted on the briefs and the record. However, on February 20, 2008, Menaldi filed with this Panel a document entitled, " Art Menaldi's Notice of Appeal Filed on 6/26/07 Regarding the the [sic] Opposition to Trustee's Opposition to Trustee's Motion to Disallow Art Menaldi's Claim" (the " 2/20/08 Document"). On page 3 of the 2/20/08 Document, hand written following the printed matter on the page, is the statement, " I ask for oral Argument in March 2008." No certificate or other evidence of service of the 2/20/08 Document was included with it or subsequently filed by Menaldi. Counsel for the Trustee did not mention having received a copy of the 2/20/08 Document at the oral argument. We have interpreted the quoted statement from the 2/20/08 Document as a request for a continuance of the oral argument, and by separate order, entered on March 3, 2008, we denied Menaldi's request.
II. JURISDICTION
The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(B). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158.
III. ISSUES
1) Whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in denying Menaldi's request for a continuance of the Hearing.
2) Whether the bankruptcy court committed reversible error in disallowing the Claim.
IV. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A decision to deny a request for continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 783 (9th Cir. 2002). To reverse for abuse of discretion, we must have a definite and firm conviction that the bankruptcy court committed a clear error of judgment in the decision it made. Hansen v. Moore (In re Hansen), 368 B.R. 868, 875 (9th Cir. BAP 2007).
A bankruptcy court's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Miller v. United States, 363 F.3d 999, 1003 (9th Cir. 2004). We review the bankruptcy court's findings of fact for clear error. Poonja v. Alleghany Properties (In re Los Gatos Lodge Inc.), 278 F.3d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 2002). Clear error will only be found if we are " left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242, 121 S.Ct. 1452, 149 L.Ed.2d 430 (2001).
V. DISCUSSION
1. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying Menaldi's request for a continuance at the Hearing
Menaldi argues that the bankruptcy court committed reversible error in denying his request for a continuance at the Hearing in light of his counsel's inability to appear due to a trial conflict. He asserts that his attorney should have been able to present his evidence before the bankruptcy court.
The grant or denial of a motion for continuance is a discretionary case management matter, and our review for abuse of discretion depends upon the facts of each case before us.
In reviewing a denial of a motion to continue, we consider four factors: diligence of the requesting party, usefulness of the continuance, inconvenience to the court and other side, and prejudice from the denial.
Hasso v. Mozsgai (In re La Sierra Fin. Servs.), 290 B.R. 718, 726 (9th Cir. BAP 2002) (citing United States v. Pope, 841 F.2d 954, 956 (9th Cir. 1988); and United States v. 2. 61 Acres of Land, 791 F.2d 666, 671 (9th Cir. 1985)).
In this case, the Motion was noticed on May 15, 2007 for the Hearing on June 14, 2007. Thereafter, the bankruptcy court considered Menaldi's pro se question, " I can't make 14th June working England do by phone 909-844-2886?" in the " Apparent Motion" as 1) a request for a continuance of the Hearing, or 2) in the alternative, a request to appear by telephone at the Hearing. By order entered on June 1, 2007, the bankruptcy court denied Menaldi's request to continue the Hearing, but granted his request to appear by telephone. Menaldi in fact appeared and participated by telephone at the Hearing.
Apparently, the day before the Hearing, Menaldi's counsel sent a letter to counsel for the Trustee, signed by her paralegal, advising that she would not be able to attend the Hearing due to a trial conflict. Contrary to the assertion in Menaldi's Opening Brief (Appellant's Opening Brief at 15), the letter was not directed to or received by the bankruptcy court from Menaldi's counsel. See Transcript of June 14, 2007 Hearing at 2. The bankruptcy court was given a copy of the letter just before taking the bench for the Hearing and noted that the letter did not request a continuance of the Hearing. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court announced that the Hearing would proceed.
Menaldi objected and requested that the hearing be continued. The bankruptcy court overruled his objection and proceeded with the Hearing.
Menaldi had two witnesses, Gibson and Glenbocki, present on the telephone for the Hearing. However, as reflected from the transcript of the Hearing (Transcript of June 14, 2007 Hearing at 5 and 7) and confirmed in Menaldi's Opening Brief (Appellant's Opening Brief at 16), Menaldi's witnesses were prepared to testify with regard to alleged improprieties concerning the sale of the Property and had nothing to add concerning the validity of Menaldi's Claim. The sale of the Property was final and had nothing to do with the subject matter of the Motion before the bankruptcy court at the Hearing. The bankruptcy court had not authorized witness testimony at the Hearing and did not allow Menaldi's witnesses to testify.
Attached to the 2/20/08 Document is a purported affidavit of Glenbocki that discusses issues relating to the sale of the Property but states nothing with regard to Menaldi's Claim.
However, again contrary to Menaldi's assertion in his Opening Brief (Appellant's Opening Brief at 16), the bankruptcy court did allow Menaldi to tell him whatever he wanted to in support of his Claim. Transcript of June 14, 2007 Hearing at 6-7.
The merits of the Motion had been fully briefed by the parties in advance of the Hearing, and the bankruptcy court had posted the Tentative Ruling two days in advance, so that the parties could comment on it at the Hearing. Presumably, Menaldi's counsel presented Menaldi's arguments and evidence in support of his Claim as effectively as she could in the Opposition. The Tentative Ruling reflects that the bankruptcy court had read and considered the Opposition along with the Documents Menaldi filed pro se. The bankruptcy court had dealt with Menaldi's timely request for a continuance or to be allowed to appear by telephone, and Menaldi appeared by telephone at the Hearing. The last minute letter from Menaldi's counsel advising counsel for the Trustee of her inability to appear at the Hearing did not include a request for a continuance of the Hearing. Nothing in the record indicates that a continuance of the Hearing would have resulted in anything other than a delay in resolution of the Motion.
In these circumstances, we do not have a " clear and definite conviction" that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in denying Menaldi's oral request at the Hearing for a continuance.
2. The bankruptcy court did not err in disallowing Menaldi's Claim
As relevant to this appeal, a " claim" is defined in the Bankruptcy Code as a " right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured." Section 101(5)(A). A creditor who wishes to establish a claim in a bankruptcy case files a proof of claim. Section 501(a). Where a proof of claim has been filed, the claim is deemed allowed unless an interested party, including the trustee in bankruptcy, objects. Section 502(a); American Express Travel Related Serv. Co., Inc. v. Heath (In re Heath), 331 B.R. 424, 429 (9th Cir. BAP 2005).
The Ninth Circuit has described the claim allowance and objection process as follows:
A proof of claim is deemed allowed unless a party in interest objects under
11 U.S.C. § 502(a) and constitutes "
prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of the claim" pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 3001(f). See also
Fed.R.Bankr.P. 3007. The filing of an objection to a proof of claim " creates a dispute which is a contested matter" within the meaning of Bankruptcy Rule 9014 and must be resolved after notice and opportunity for hearing upon a motion for relief. See Adv. Comm. Notes to
Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9014.
Upon objection, the proof of claim provides " some evidence as to its validity and amount" and is " strong enough to carry over a mere formal objection without more."
Wright v. Holm (In re Holm), 931 F.2d 620, 623 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting 3 L. King, Collier on Bankruptcy § 502.02, at 502-22 (15th ed. 1991); see also
Ashford v. Consolidated Pioneer Mort. (In re Consol. Pioneer Mort.), 178 B.R. 222, 226 (9th Cir. BAP 1995), aff'd,
91 F.3d 151,
1996 WL 393533 (9th Cir. 1996). To defeat the claim, the objector must come forward with sufficient evidence and " show facts tending to defeat the claim by probative force equal to that of the allegations of the proofs of claim themselves."
In re Holm, 931 F.2d at 623.
. . .
" If the objector produces sufficient evidence to negate one or more of the sworn facts in the proof of claim, the burden reverts to the claimant to prove the validity of the claim by a preponderance of the evidence."
In re Consol. Pioneer, 178 B.R. at 226 (quoting
In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 954 F.2d 167, 173-74 (3d Cir. 1992)). The ultimate burden of persuasion remains at all times upon the claimant. See
In re Holm, 931 F.2d at 623.
Lundell v. Anchor Const. Specialists, Inc., 223 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2000).
Under § 502(b)(1), a specific basis for disallowing a claim is " such claim is unenforceable against the debtor and property of the debtor, under any agreement or applicable law for a reason other than because such claim is contingent or unmatured."
Before the bankruptcy court and on appeal, Menaldi has focused on two arguments, both of which miss the mark. Relying heavily on this Panel's decision in In re Heath, Menaldi argues that " the failure to file copies of the writings upon which a claim is based is, by itself, an insufficient basis for the disallowance of an otherwise valid proof of claim." Appellant's Opening Brief at 8. That is a true enough statement of the law. See In re Heath, 331 B.R. at 433. And one of the bases argued by the Trustee in the Motion for disallowance of Menaldi's Claim was that Menaldi's proof of claim was not supported by sufficient documentation pursuant to Rules 3001(c) and (f).
Rule 3001(c) provides:
However, by the time of the Hearing, that argument was no longer relevant. As set forth in the Tentative Ruling, the bankruptcy court had considered 1) the documents filed by Menaldi in conjunction with substitution of counsel on October 13, 2006, as described in the Declaration, 2) the Documents filed by Menaldi pro se, in opposition to the Motion, and 3) the documentary exhibits filed by Menaldi's counsel as part of the Opposition. In fact, as the bankruptcy court specifically stated:
In the instant case, it appears that the BAP's decision in
In re Heath, 331 B.R. 424 (9th Cir. BAP 2005) is no longer applicable to the extent that Claimant has now provided documentation in support of [the Claim]. In short, the issue is no longer the lack of supporting documentation, but the sufficiency of such documents now that they have been provided.
Tentative Ruling at 9.
Attached as part of the 2/20/08 Document are some additional exhibits (the " Exhibits") that Menaldi proffers in support of his Claim. There is no indication that any of the Exhibits were submitted as evidence before the bankruptcy court or included in Menaldi's excerpts of record in this appeal. We generally limit our review of the record to an examination of the excerpts of the record as provided by the parties. We further have no obligation to examine evidentiary material submitted by parties on appeal that are not included in the excerpts of record. See In re Kritt. 190 B.R. 382, 386-87 (9th Cir. BAP 1995); In re Anderson, 69 B.R. 105, 109 (9th Cir. BAP 1986). However, we have reviewed the Exhibits as part of our review of the 2/20/08 Document, and nothing in the Exhibits alters our analyses or conclusions in this Memorandum.
Menaldi further focuses on his argument that the sale of the Property was tainted by improper actions of the Trustee and his counsel. This argument in effect rakes old coals and has no real relevance to the disallowance of Menaldi's Claim. No matter how impassioned Menaldi is on the subject, the fact, as noted above, is that pursuant to the bankruptcy court's orders, the Property was sold as of September 1, 2006. Laurel Canyon appealed the sale to this Panel, but that appeal was dismissed on the appellant's motion on August 29, 2006. As the bankruptcy court noted in its Tentative Ruling, " The Court is well aware of Claimant's dissatisfaction with the sale. However, that matter is over." Tentative Ruling at 9.
The bankruptcy court ultimately disallowed the Claim for two reasons. First, Menaldi did not meet his ultimate burden of proof. The bankruptcy court interpreted the various documents submitted by Menaldi and his counsel as basing the Claim on the interlocutory judgment of the Superior Court, entered on or about December 6, 2005, ordering that " additional capital contributions" be paid from the proceeds from sale of the Property. In at least one fax letter, Menaldi asserted a total claim of " $198, 000 due WNBA, Inc, Arthur T. Menaldi, President, " set forth on a " Mechanic's Lien, " and calculated from the following:
In the 2/20/08 Document, Menaldi asserts that the Superior Court awarded him expenses which " totaled $198, 000" in an order, referencing the Exhibits. There is no such order in the Exhibits or anywhere else in the record before us.
| Soil Report |
$45, 000 |
| 21 Loan Payments |
$48, 300 |
| Feasibility Study |
$10, 000 |
| Road Plans |
$25, 000 |
| Fence/Back Hoe |
$25, 000 |
| Dig Paths for Soil |
$25, 000 |
| Pay Back Broker |
$20, 000 |
| |
|
| Actual Total |
$198, 300 |
The bankruptcy court noted that the copy of the asserted " Mechanic's Lien" provided by Menaldi was undated and bore no evidence that it was recorded. Tentative Ruling at 10. In any event, since no such Mechanic's Lien was found in determining liens of record against the Property when it was sold, it reasonably can be assumed that Menaldi's alleged Mechanic's Lien was not recorded. See Declaration at 11-12. At the Hearing, Menaldi told the bankruptcy court that he had " $290, 000 of my personal money in this deal." Transcript of June 14, 2007 Hearing at 7.
The bankruptcy court observed that Menaldi provided no evidence of payment of the amounts alleged, and even if they were paid, how they qualified as the " additional capital contributions" covered by the Superior Court's distribution order in the December 2005 interlocutory judgment in the State Court Action. Tentative Ruling at 10.
Second, the bankruptcy court pointed out that Menaldi had provided no explanation as to why Laurel Canyon should be found liable for the Claim when it had no ownership interest in the Property, and indeed, had not yet been formed, when the interlocutory judgment was entered in the State Court Action. Tentative Ruling at 10. Menaldi presented no evidence, documentary or otherwise, tending to establish that Laurel Canyon had assumed any liability to pay his Claim for § 502(b)(1) purposes. In Menaldi's Opening Brief (Appellant's Opening Brief at 18), he finally argues that his Claim should have been allowed because he was the president of Laurel Canyon and a former owner of the Property, in spite of the lack of any evidence in the record that he ever held a title interest in the Property.
In the 2/20/08 Document, Menaldi describes himself as the " 100% shareholder" of Laurel Canyon, which would entitle him to an equity distribution but not an unsecured claim in the Laurel Canyon bankruptcy. He later describes himself as a " 75% partner" with respect to the Property, ignoring the fact that it was the corporation, Laurel Canyon, that held title to the 75% ownership interest in the Property prior to its sale.
On the record before us, we conclude that the bankruptcy court committed no error in determining that Menaldi had not met his burden to establish his Claim by a preponderance of the evidence in light of the Trustee's objections and appropriately disallowed the Claim.
VI. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis of the issues raised in this appeal, we AFFIRM the bankruptcy court's disallowance of Menaldi's Claim.
CLAIM BASED ON A WRITING. When a claim, or an interest in property of the debtor securing the claim, is based on a writing, the original or a duplicate shall be filed with the proof of claim. If the writing has been lost or destroyed, a statement of the circumstances of the loss or destruction shall be filed with the claim.
Rule 3001(f) provides:
EVIDENTIARY EFFECT. A proof of claim executed and filed in accordance with these rules shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of the claim.