NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 05F03831
HULL, J.
A jury convicted defendant Carlos Foster of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211; unspecified section references that follow are to the Penal Code) and first degree murder committed in the course of a robbery (§ 187, subd. (a)), and found various charged enhancements to be true. (§§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17); 12022.53, subd. (d).) On appeal, defendant challenges (1) the admissibility of a witness’s statement to investigators, (2) several jury instructions, and (3) the imposition of a parole revocation fine. We affirm the judgment.
Facts and Proceedings
On May 6, 2005, just before dawn, Adri Ann J. and the victim were asleep in their Sacramento house. Three armed intruders fired a shotgun and came through an open bedroom window. The first intruder, Clark Robinson, was masked and carried a “Rambo-style” gun. He climbed onto the bed and hit the victim in the head with the butt of his gun as he asked the victim where he kept his money. Another intruder, Gerald Ellis, was also masked and ran through the bedroom. The third intruder, defendant, did not wear a mask. He also had a gun and stood by the bed while Robinson searched through the victim’s pants pockets for money.
Robinson told defendant to take the victim into the bathroom and put him in the bathtub. Defendant held the victim there at gunpoint. Robinson asked Adri Ann for the victim’s car keys and then asked the victim where the rest of his money was. The victim directed him to a drawer in the bedroom, where more cash was found. As Robinson stopped by the bathroom on his way out of the house, he said something to defendant; defendant shot the victim in the head and killed him.
Neighbors saw a person jump over a fence and heard gunshots and the sounds of people running. One witness saw a 1990’s model Ford Taurus with body damage drive off.
Officers found footprints in the ground and on the bedroom windowsill.
At approximately 8:30 a.m. the same day, the three intruders and a fourth man, Markus Mayers, arrived at Ellis’s house in Sparks, Nevada. Ellis’s mother-in-law, who was at the house, knew three of the four men and gave a description of the fourth that matched defendant. The men borrowed a car for the ostensible purpose of driving to Sacramento to pick up Ellis’s family. They did not return the car.
Two days later, on May 8, officers found the car parked on an Oakland street with defendant and Robinson asleep inside. The driver’s door was open and the driver’s legs were out of the car. The driver, defendant, had a gun in his waistband; the passenger, Robinson, had a shotgun between his legs. Officers were able to disarm the men before waking them.
In a subsequent search of Ellis’s home, officers found burned clothing and a blue Taurus with a damaged bumper.
When officers showed Adri Ann a photographic lineup, she focused on defendant’s picture and said he looked familiar, although she could not make a definitive identification. Ellis’s mother-in-law identified defendant’s photograph as the person she saw at the house.
The victim was a known drug seller and a large quantity of pills was found in his bedroom. Witnesses testified that the victim and some of the intruders had known each other.
Forensic evidence presented at trial established that the gun found in defendant’s waistband was the murder weapon. Defendant’s shoes matched prints left on the scene. Shotgun shells found in the bedroom matched the shotgun Robinson had in the car. Gloves seized from defendant and Robinson bore traces of gunshot residue. Defendant matched the physical identification given by witnesses, although there was some dispute as to whether the defendant sported braids or dreadlocks.
The prosecution also introduced a statement Renell T. made to investigators. Renell had been arrested in Oakland with a gun that defendant asked him to hold. He told officers that he had been visiting with Mayers and others and heard three or four people discussing a plan to “lick [rob] the pill man.” He said that the victim had been known by that name. He was invited to participate in the crime, but he declined. However, he drove with Mayers and Ellis to Oakland, where they planned to get guns. Later that night, he saw defendant drive off in a car with others, and Renell assumed that they were going to commit the robbery.
At trial, however, Renell testified that he had lied to detectives. While he overheard unknown individuals talking about a plan to rob the pill man, he did not know who made that statement and he did not know that the victim was the “pill man.” He said Mayers had never asked him to participate in anything, but he drove to Oakland with Mayers and Ellis. When they arrived, Mayers and Ellis walked off, and Renell never saw them again. He ran into Robinson and defendant in Oakland, but did not see them leave town. He never saw anyone in a car with guns.
Defendant’s brother testified that defendant lived with him in Oakland. He saw defendant asleep in the living room on the night of the murder and saw him asleep there when he woke in the morning.
At trial, defendant relied on this alibi evidence, challenged the certainty of the identifications, pointed out inconsistencies in testimony, and characterized the evidence against him as inconclusive and circumstantial.
The jury convicted defendant of first degree murder committed in the course of a robbery, and found defendant personally discharged a firearm in the commission of that offense. The jury also convicted defendant of robbery and related enhancements. The court sentenced defendant to a term of life without possibility of parole plus 25 to life for murder, and the midterm of six years plus 25 to life on the robbery count, stayed pursuant to section 654. This appeal followed.
Discussion
I
Admissibility of Witness Statement and Related Issues
After being arrested in Oakland, witness Renell T. said that he might know the group of people involved in the murder. He said he heard Mayers talk about plans to rob “the pill man” and he was asked to participate in the robbery. He declined, but drove with Mayers and Ellis to Oakland to obtain guns. They met a “little bitty short dude” “with dreads” there, and he identified a photograph of defendant as this person. Renell saw defendant drive off with the others, and he assumed they were going to commit the robbery. Renell met them the following night and defendant gave him a gun. Officers arrested Renell for possession of this weapon.
At trial, however, Renell said he did not tell detectives the truth. He did not know who had mentioned robbing the “pill man,” and he had lied when he implicated Mayers. He did not remember telling officers that “a little short dude with dreads” drove with them to Oakland. He said that he was high on Ecstasy during the interview and that he identified suspects only in order to get out of jail and to get paid for naming names.
On appeal, defendant asserts for the first time that Renell’s post-arrest statement to police officers was involuntary. He contends that not only was Renell high during the interview and therefore in no condition to be giving a statement, but that the officers offered Renell money and leniency in exchange for his testimony, and threatened to prosecute him for the crime if he did not give them a “story.” He also asserts, again for the first time, that since evidence of coercion was uncontradicted, the court had a sua sponte duty to give a cautionary instruction on the jury’s use of that statement.
Recognizing that he may have forfeited these claims by failing to raise them earlier, defendant filed a supplemental brief asserting that his attorney was ineffective for failing to challenge the admissibility of Renell’s statement. Defendant’s claim is without merit.
“To secure reversal of a conviction for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, to a reasonable probability, defendant would have obtained a more favorable result absent counsel’s shortcomings. [Citation.] If the record on appeal fails to show why counsel acted or failed to act in the instance asserted to be ineffective, unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation, the claim must be rejected on appeal.” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1068-1069.)
In the present case, defense counsel reasonably could have concluded that an objection to the admissibility of Renell’s confession would have been futile.
“A statement is involuntary when ‘among other circumstances, it “was ‘“extracted by any sort of threats..., [or] obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight....”’” [Citations.] Voluntariness does not turn on any one fact, no matter how apparently significant, but rather on the “totality of [the] circumstances.”’ [Citation.]... Additionally, ‘such activity must be, as it were, the “proximate cause” of the statement in question, and not merely a cause in fact.’” (People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 814.) A statement is involuntary only if the party’s will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the statement. (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1093.)
Here, the only evidence that Renell was under the influence of drugs during his statement came near the end of his interview, when he told detectives that he was “high right now.” Throughout the interview, Renell had answered questions rationally and intelligently. There was no reason for officers to suspect that Renell was under the influence of drugs to the extent that his will was overcome when he made his statement, and defense counsel had no reason to raise such a claim in the trial court.
An objection that Renell’s testimony was the product of promises of leniency or payoff would have fared no better. Renell himself was the one who asked the officers how much they would pay him for the information, but he eventually rejected payment in favor of a demand to get of jail. The detective’s offer to speak to Renell’s probation officer in exchange for information does not demonstrate coercion. Defense counsel could not have established that, under the totality of the circumstances, Renell’s statement was “extracted” in reliance on a promise of payment or offer of leniency, and any objection on that basis would have been futile.
Nor is there any evidence that the officers threatened Renell into making a false statement. Officers told Renell that they wanted information, but did not suggest what they wanted Renell to say or otherwise put words in Renell’s mouth. Officers told Renell that he could be implicated in the crime if the weapon they had found in his possession was linked to the murder, but that statement of fact does not constitute coercion.
In sum, there was no reason for defense counsel to raise any claims challenging the voluntariness of Renell’s statement, and defendant therefore cannot prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Defendant’s contention also founders on the second prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim: he cannot demonstrate prejudice. Even without Renell’s testimony, the evidence was overwhelming that defendant was involved in the robbery and murder and was, in fact, the person who actually shot the victim. Adri Ann described the shooter as a short young man with dreadlocks. Defendant was 5’3” tall, weighed 120 pounds, and wore braids. Adri Ann identified this individual as the shooter and another witness described seeing defendant hours after the shooting with the other defendants. Defendant was arrested in a car with one of these defendants, and had the murder weapon in his pants. The other defendant in the car had a shotgun also linked to the scene. Defendant’s glove had particles of gunshot residue, and the wear pattern of his shoes matched imprints left at the scene.
Notwithstanding this evidence, defendant contends that admission of Renell’s statement was prejudicial because the witnesses’ identifications were less than definitive, and defendant’s brother testified that defendant was with him when the murder occurred. He also asserts that there is little likelihood that defendant would have carried a known murder weapon around on the streets of Oakland.
While defendant made these arguments to the jury, the strong evidence to the contrary explains the jury’s verdicts. The alibi witness was less than compelling. The identifications comported with the physical evidence. And whether defendant acted wisely in holding onto the murder weapon was beside the point.
Defendant errs in suggesting that Renell’s statement to officers provided crucial evidence of a preexisting plan to rob the victim. Because the prosecution presented this case as one of felony-murder, not premeditated first degree murder, any evidence of planning was irrelevant.
In short, Renell’s testimony was not critical to the prosecution’s case, and defendant cannot establish the prejudice necessary for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. His contention to the contrary is unpersuasive.
II
Instructions on Witness Credibility
Defendant challenges two instructions on witness credibility, CALCRIM No. 316 and CALCRIM No. 318. He contends that these instructions limited the jury to evaluating Renell’s trial testimony and not the credibility of his statement to police. For the reasons already explained, defendant cannot establish any prejudice resulting from Renell’s testimony. But defendant’s claims are erroneous on their merits as well.
As read to the jury, CALCRIM No. 316 instructed: “If you find a witness has been convicted of a felony, you may consider that fact in evaluating the credibility of the witness’s testimony. The fact of a conviction does not necessarily destroy or impair a witness’s credibility. It is up to you to decide the weight of that fact and whether that fact makes the witness less believable.” (Italics added.)
CALCRIM No. 318 provided: “You have heard evidence of statements that witnesses made before the trial. If you decide that a witness made those statements, you may use those statements in two ways: [¶] One, to evaluate whether the witness’ testimony in court is believable; and [¶] Two, as evidence [that] the information in those earlier statements is true.” (Italics added.)
Defendant contends that the italicized clauses permitted the jury to consider Renell’s prior inconsistent statement and prior felony conviction only to evaluate the credibility of Renell’s trial testimony, and not his overall credibility.
The correctness of jury instructions is to be determined from the instructions as a whole. (People v. Anderson (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 919, 928-929.) The court here also instructed the jury pursuant to CALCRIM No. 226, which provides in relevant part: “You may believe all, part, or none of any witness’ testimony. Consider the testimony of each witness and decide how much of it you believe. [¶] In evaluating a witness’ testimony, you may consider anything that reasonably tends to prove or disprove the truth or accuracy of that testimony. Among the factors that you may consider are:... [¶]... [¶] Did the witness make a statement in the past that is consistent or inconsistent with his or her testimony?... [¶]... [¶] Has the witness been convicted of a felony?”
CALCRIM No. 226 explained that the jury could accept or reject a witness’s testimony in whole or in part and, in making that determination, could consider past inconsistent statements and prior felony convictions. This instruction negated any possibility that the jury would believe itself obligated to rely on out-of-court statements it found incredible. It also eliminated the possibility that the jury could believe a prior felony conviction reflected on credibility in one setting but not another.
In a related claim, defendant contends that CALCRIM No. 316 represents a “critical change” from CALJIC No. 2.23, which provides, “The fact that a witness has been convicted of a felony, if this is a fact, may be considered by you only for the purpose of determining the believability of that witness. The fact of a conviction does not necessarily destroy or impair a witness’s believability. It is one of the circumstances that you may consider in weighing the testimony of that witness.” Defendant asserts that the CALJIC instruction properly focuses the jury’s instruction on the overall credibility of a witness, while CALCRIM No. 316 limits attention to trial testimony.
However, as noted in People v. Thomas (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 461 the two instructions “say precisely the same thing.” (Id. at p. 466.) We agree that, when taken as a whole, the basic principle enunciated in both instructions is identical: a prior conviction can be considered only in evaluating a witness’s credibility. (See also People v. Anderson, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at pp. 940-941.)
III
CALCRIM No. 366
Defendant contends, and the People concede, that the trial court erred in giving CALCRIM No. 366 relating to the testimony of in-custody informants. However, the error was harmless.
The court instructed the jury pursuant to CALCRIM No. 366 as follows: “The testimony of an in-custody informant should be viewed with caution and close scrutiny. In evaluating such testimony, you should consider the extent to which it may have been influenced by the receipt of, or expectation of, any benefits from the party calling that witness. This does not mean that you may arbitrarily disregard such testimony, but you should give it the weight to which you find it to be entitled in light of all the evidence in this case. [¶] Renell [T.] is an in-custody informant.”
Section 1127a, subdivision (a) defines an in-custody informant for these purposes as “a person, other than a codefendant, percipient witness, accomplice, or coconspirator whose testimony is based upon statements made by the defendant while both the defendant and the informant are held within a correctional institution.”
As defendant and the People point out, Renell testified as a percipient witness to events, not as an in-custody informant, and this instruction should not have been given. However, defendant cannot establish that he was prejudiced by this instruction. As we have explained, the testimony of other witnesses and the physical evidence, most notably the matching shoe prints and defendant’s possession of the murder weapon, were compelling. There is no reasonable probability that defendant would have fared better had the instruction not been given. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
IV
CALCRIM No. 371
The trial court instructed the jury on consciousness of guilt pursuant to CALCRIM No. 371, alternative (c) as follows: “If someone other than the defendant tried to conceal or destroy evidence, that conduct may show the defendant was aware of his guilt, but only if the defendant was present and knew about the conduct, or, if not present, authorized the other person’s actions. It is up to you to decide the meaning and importance of this evidence. However, evidence of such conduct cannot prove guilt by itself.”
Defendant contends that this instruction permits the jury to draw an irrational permissive inference of consciousness of guilt based solely on presence and knowledge of the conduct of others without requiring any affirmative acts of authorization on the part of a defendant. Defendant asserts that there is no authority for such an instruction. He is wrong.
In People v. Hannon (1977) 19 Cal.3d 588, evidence of consciousness of guilt related to attempts to suppress evidence. The California Supreme Court reaffirmed that “‘“[g]enerally, evidence of the attempt of third persons to suppress testimony is inadmissible against a defendant where the effort did not occur in his presence. [Citation.] However, if the defendant has authorized the attempt of the third person to suppress testimony, evidence of such conduct is admissible against the defendant.”’” (Id. at p. 599.) The court continued, “[T]he admission of evidence purporting to show suppression or attempted suppression of evidence is erroneous absent the prerequisite of proof that the defendant was present at such an incident or proof of authorization of such illegal conduct.” (Id. at p. 600.)
Thus, Hannon held, consciousness of guilt can be demonstrated in two distinct ways. If a defendant is not present when someone tries to conceal or destroy evidence but the defendant authorized that conduct, a jury may infer a consciousness of guilt. Or, if the defendant is present when a third party tries to conceal or destroy evidence, consciousness of guilt on the part of defendant may also be inferred. That is precisely what CALCRIM No. 371 instructs.
Contrary to defendant’s claim, such an inference is not irrational. Acts of omission can be just as telling as acts of commission, and standing by while someone else conceals or destroys evidence can indicate consciousness of guilt. We note that such an inference is not mandated but is only permissive. The California Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the propriety of giving consciousness of guilt instructions. These instructions are proper where there is “some evidence in the record that, if believed by the jury, would sufficiently support the suggested inference.” (People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 102 (Coffman); People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1222-1225; People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1235-1236.) Because CALCRIM No. 371, like related CALJIC instructions, permits the jury to infer a consciousness of guilt only if it first finds from the evidence that defendant engaged in the described conduct, and because it further informs the jury that such evidence is not, in itself, sufficient to prove guilt, the instruction does not lessen the prosecution’s burden of proof. (Coffman, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 102.)
CALCRIM No. 371 is a proper statement of law.
V
CALCRIM No. 418
Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support instructing the jury on the conspiracy exception to the hearsay rule pursuant to CALCRIM No. 418. We do not agree.
The trial court instructed the jury that the four members of the alleged conspiracy were defendant, Mayers, Robinson and Ellis. The court then gave CALCRIM No. 418, which provides in relevant part: “In deciding whether the People have proved that defendant committed any of the crimes charged, you may not consider any statement made out of court by any of the other alleged co-conspirators in the case unless the People have proved by a preponderance of the evidence that: [¶] One, some evidence other than the statement itself establishes that a conspiracy to commit a crime existed when... the statement was made; [¶] Two, the person who made the statement was a member of and participated in the conspiracy; [¶]... Three, the person who made the statement made the statement in order to further the goal of the conspiracy; and [¶] Four, the statement was made before or during the time that defendant was participating in the conspiracy.”
Defendant contends that this instruction related to Renell’s statements to investigators that Mayers had talked about robbing the “pill man” and had invited him to participate in the crime. Defendant asserts that because these statements were made before the conspiracy was formed, there was no evidence to support giving this instruction. He contends “the only evidence attributed to a possible co-conspirator were the statements of Markus Mayers in Oak Park.”
However, as the People point out, these were not the only out-of-court statements that fell within the conspiracy exception. Adri Ann testified about several statements made by the intruders during the course of the robbery and murder. These statements fell within the hearsay exception described by CALCRIM No. 418, and the court properly gave the instruction.
VI
Instructions on Eyewitness Identification and Alibi
Defendant contends that the instructions on eyewitness identification (CALCRIM No. 315) and alibi (CALCRIM No. 3400) are unbalanced and favor prosecution eyewitness testimony over defense alibi testimony. He notes that CALCRIM No. 315 informs the jury that there was “eyewitness testimony identifying the defendant”; CALCRIM No. 3400, the alibi instruction, does not refer to alibi “evidence” but instead instructed that defendant “contends he did not commit the crime and that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed.” He argues that the conflict between the defense and prosecution theories “was not presented as a conflict in evidence, but a conflict between actual eyewitness identification testimony and the defendant’s mere contention that he was somewhere else.” This imbalance, he asserts, violated due process. We disagree.
As we have already noted, jury instructions must be viewed in their entirety. (People v. Anderson, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at pp. 940-941.) CALCRIM No. 315 begins by stating, “You have heard eyewitness testimony identifying the defendant,” but continues, “As with any other witness, you must decide whether an eyewitness gave truthful and accurate testimony.” The instruction then outlines numerous factors for the jury to consider in evaluating identification testimony, and concludes, “The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that it was each defendant who committed the crime. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty.”
CALCRIM No. 3400, the alibi instruction, provided: “The People must prove that the defendant committed the crimes charged. The defendant, Carlos Foster, contends he... did not commit this crime and he was somewhere else when the crimes were committed. The People must prove that the defendant was present and committed the crimes with which he is charged. The defendant does not need to prove he was elsewhere at the time of the crime. [¶] If you have a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant was present when the crime was committed, you must find him not guilty.”
Initially, we note that CALCRIM No. 3400 was given at defendant’s request, and defendant therefore has no basis for complaint. (See People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 629.)
Defendant’s argument is meritless in any event. A comparison of these two instructions does not reveal any “imbalance.” Both require the jury to evaluate evidence and emphasize the prosecution’s burden of proof. The fact that one instruction mentions evidence and the other a contention does not change this calculation, particularly given that other instructions told jurors how to evaluate evidence and reminded them that their decision was to be based only on the evidence presented at trial. (See, e.g., CALCRIM Nos. 200, 220, 222, 302.)
Defendant also suggests that CALCRIM No. 315 should not have been given because, contrary to the instruction’s first sentence, no eyewitnesses identified defendant. Defendant’s claim is essentially a challenge to the veracity and certainty of those identifications, matters which were properly left for the jury to evaluate. The instruction properly explained to the jurors how to assess that evidence, and included such factors as whether the witness ever failed to identify the defendant, how certain the witness was in his or her identification, and whether the witness was able to identify the defendant in a photographic lineup. There was no error.
Finally, defendant contrasts CALJIC No. 2.92, the former instruction on eyewitness identification, with CALCRIM No. 315 and asserts that only the CALJIC instruction is a correct statement of law. He contends that CALJIC No. 2.92 properly instructed that “[e]yewitness testimony has been received in this trial for the purpose of identifying the defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes charged,” but that CALCRIM No. 315 erroneously presents the identification as fact by providing, “You have heard eyewitness testimony identifying the defendant.” Defendant posits a distinction without a difference. The two instructions convey the same information to the jury. CALCRIM No. 315 is a correct statement of law.
VII
Cumulative Error
Defendant contends that the cumulative effect of the claimed errors compels reversal. We disagree. The jury’s verdicts reflected the strong case against defendant and we are confident that, had any errors not occurred, the verdict would have been the same. (People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 410.)
VIII
Parole Revocation Fine
Defendant contends that a parole revocation fine of $10,000 must be stricken because (1) the trial court did not mention such a fine when imposing sentence and (2) such a fine is unauthorized when a sentence of life without possibility of parole is imposed. The fine was proper.
Section 1202.45 provides in pertinent part: “In every case where a person is convicted of a crime and whose sentence includes a period of parole, the court shall at the time of imposing the restitution fine pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 1202.4, assess an additional parole revocation restitution fine in the same amount as that imposed pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 1202.4....” This parole revocation fine must be suspended unless and until parole is revoked. (§ 1202.45.)
Citing People v. Oganesyan (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1178, defendant argues that because he was sentenced to life without possibility of parole, a parole revocation fine is unauthorized. Defendant ignores the fact that he was also sentenced to a determinate term of 6 years (plus 25 years to life) on count 2, robbery. The California Supreme Court recently held that where a defendant is sentenced to death and is also sentenced to a determinate term, that term is required to include a period of parole, and therefore a parole revocation fine is appropriate. (People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1075 (Brasure).)
The fine in Oganesyan was unauthorized because the sentence in that case did not involve a determinate term of imprisonment. However, here, as in Brasure, the sentence included both determinate and indeterminate terms. Under these circumstances, a parole revocation fine is mandated.
Defendant argues that the holding in Brasure should not apply because here, unlike Brasure, the determinate term was stayed pursuant to section 654. We do not find this distinction material. Defendant was sentenced on the robbery count to a determinate term of six years pursuant to section 1170. Even though this sentence was stayed, it was nevertheless imposed. Under these circumstances, a parole revocation fine pursuant to section 1202.45 was mandatory. As in Brasure, defendant “is unlikely ever to serve any part of the parole period on his determinate sentence. Nonetheless, such a period was included in his determinate sentence by law and carried with it, also by law, a suspended parole revocation restitution fine. Defendant is in no way prejudiced by assessment of the fine, which will become payable only if he actually does begin serving a period of parole and his parole is revoked.” (Brasure, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1075.)
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: SCOTLAND, P. J., CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.
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