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THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MICHAEL EUGENE KINCADE, Defendant and Appellant.

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MICHAEL EUGENE KINCADE, Defendant and Appellant. C062695 California Court of Appeal, Third District, Sutter September 10, 2010

         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

         Super. Ct. No. CRF083403

          RAYE, J.

         Defendant Michael Eugene Kincade sexually molested 13-year-old M.C. Evidence was also presented that in May 2000 he raped 18-year-old J.M. He appeals his conviction, contending that Evidence Code section 1108, which permits the introduction of prior incidents of uncharged sexual offenses, is unconstitutional on its face and, as applied in this case, that the court abused its discretion in permitting introduction of the evidence of his prior sexual offenses; that the jury instructions relating to the prior sexual offenses permit a finding of guilt based on facts not proved beyond a reasonable doubt; and that the trial court erred in failing to give sua sponte instructions regarding voluntary intoxication. We shall affirm.

All further statutory references are to the Evidence Code unless otherwise indicated.

         FACTUAL BACKGROUND

         On December 8, 2008, defendant was at home with his family. As was usual, he had taken Vicodin that morning and an Excedrin PM before bed. He had also consumed six 32-ounce bottles of beer and two or three 24-ounce cans of beer. Defendant drinks daily and this was not an unusual amount of beer for him to drink. He was “a little drunk” but not abnormally so and was not behaving in an unusual manner. On occasion when defendant drinks, he blacks out and does not remember what he has done.

         At approximately 11:00 o’clock that night, 13-year-old M.C. went to bed on a couch in the living room, wearing her pajama pants, underwear, and a T-shirt. Sometime later, M.C. woke up. Defendant was standing next to her. Her pajama pants were off and then her underwear was taken off. Defendant then touched M.C.’s vagina. She cried and repeatedly told him to stop, but he did not.

         Defendant’s wife Casey woke up around 12:15 a.m. and noticed defendant was not in bed. She yelled his name and jumped out of bed when he did not answer. While she was coming downstairs, defendant stopped touching M.C. and went to the kitchen, where Casey found him. He told Casey he was getting water.

         Casey noticed M.C. was awake and went over to her. She could not see M.C.’s pajamas from under the blanket and this struck her as unusual. M.C. looked scared, and when Casey pulled the blanket off, M.C. did not have on her pajama pants or underwear. Casey asked M.C. where her clothes were and M.C. pointed to defendant. She told Casey defendant had taken off her pants and had touched her. Casey started yelling at defendant and left the home with M.C. and her half sister. They went to the store down the street.

         Defendant went to his brother Adam’s house next door. He was upset about M.C.’s accusation. Adam called Casey to find out what was happening, and eventually convinced her to come back to the house. At the house, M.C. told Adam that defendant had touched her. She remained consistent about what defendant had done. When defendant challenged her to “say it out loud” she responded, “You did it.” Adam told Casey to call the police, and Casey took the girls to Adam’s house. Other than his anger at the situation, defendant’s behavior was not unusual.

         After his arrest and while in jail, defendant repeatedly called Casey. He demanded she not accept subpoenas and suggested she not show up to testify and not bring M.C. to testify, because if they did not testify there would be “no case.” Defendant also assured Casey, and possibly M.C., that it would never happen again. Defendant and Casey also discussed family issues and problems Casey was having.

M.C.’s voice could not be positively identified on the phone recording.

         Casey stated M.C. is not a child who makes up stories, and she had never made molestation accusations against anyone else. Adam also testified that M.C. is not the type of girl to make things up.

         Evidence was also admitted under section 1108 of a prior uncharged sexual offense. In May 2000 J.M. was 18 years old. She was coming home from a party when she met a young man, and the two went looking for methamphetamine. The young man had a friend who could get them drugs, so they went to that friend’s apartment. The friend was not home, but defendant was. He came out of his apartment, said he was waiting for drugs, and offered to let them wait with him. J.M. waited with defendant in his apartment while the young man went down the street to use a telephone. Defendant expressed concern for J.M.’s safety since she was wandering around with a stranger. He offered to let her stay at his place for the night. Because of the expressed safety concerns, they did not answer the door when the young man returned. They talked for a while, watched a movie, and J.M. fell asleep.

         When J.M. woke up, defendant was “spooning” her and fondling her chest and hips. She confronted him and he grabbed her, flipped her down, pressed her face into the cushions, and tried to remove her clothes. His hand was over her throat and he was suffocating her. J.M. passed out.

         When J.M. regained consciousness, defendant was raping her. She could not get up because he was pinning her down. She tried to scream but he told her no one could hear her. She told him to stop, but he did not stop until he ejaculated. He then threatened to “get” her boyfriend once he was in jail. J.M. immediately went to the hospital and reported the rape. She had bruising on her chin and neck, and broken blood vessels in her face.

         PROCEDURAL HISTORY

         Defendant was charged with committing a lewd or lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a).) It was also alleged defendant had a prior strike conviction and a prior serious felony conviction, and had served five prior prison terms. The prior conviction allegations were bifurcated. Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty as charged. On the prosecutor’s motion, the prior prison term allegations were dismissed. Defendant then admitted the prior strike and serious felony conviction allegations.

         Defendant was sentenced to state prison for an aggregate term of 17 years. Various fines and fees were imposed.

         DISCUSSION

         I

         Defendant contends section 1108, allowing the admission of a prior incident of an uncharged sexual offense, violates due process and is therefore unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to him. He acknowledges this claim has been rejected by the California courts, but raises it to preserve the issue for federal review.

         Defendant’s claim regarding the constitutionality of section 1108 requires little comment. The due process claim was rejected by the California Supreme Court in People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 907, 916-922, and we are bound by that decision (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 (Auto Equity Sales)).

         Defendant also contends that section 1108, as applied in this case, was “prejudicially unconstitutional.” He contends that not only was the evidence unduly inflammatory, a claim addressed in part II, post, it was admitted “without effective limitation.”

         “To show a violation of due process, a defendant must show that the statute, as applied, offended a principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and consciousness of the country that it is considered fundamental.” (People v. Manning (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 870, 877 .) By the express language of section 1108, the court is required to engage in the weighing process under section 352 before admitting propensity evidence. The court did that. As we discuss fully below, the court properly exercised its discretion under section 352. Where, as here, the court properly exercised its discretion under section 352, it is difficult to conceive how application of section 1108 could have violated any such fundamental principle of due process.

         Defendant also argues that the application of section 1108 violated his due process rights because the court in this case failed to limit the use of evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct to drawing an inference of propensity. He suggests the jury therefore could have relied upon the prior sexual misconduct as direct evidence that he committed the charged offense against M.C. even if it found the evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt he was guilty of the charged offense. The record does not support this contention. The court instructed the jury on the limited purpose for which the prior uncharged conduct could be considered, and specifically informed the jury that the prosecutor had the burden of proving the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Consistent with these instructions, the prosecutor’s argument asked the jury only to draw an inference of “disposition, ” and inferences regarding intent, motive, and common plan. We therefore conclude that section 1108, as applied in this case, did not violate defendant’s state or federal due process rights.

We separately address defendant’s contention that the standard instruction the court gave permits a finding of guilt based upon a fact not proved beyond a reasonable doubt in part III, post.

         II

         Defendant next contends the trial court prejudicially abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the uncharged prior sexual offense. The evidence of the 2000 rape of J.M. was admitted under both sections 1101 and 1108. He contends that the evidence was insufficiently similar to qualify for admission as to intent, common design, or identity; the evidence was exceedingly inflammatory; the jury was not informed defendant had been punished for the offense; and the prior sexual offense was remote in time. We find no error in the admission of this evidence.

         Factual Background and Procedural History

         The People made a motion in limine to admit evidence of a prior uncharged sexual offense, specifically the rape of J.M. The motion contained the following proffer: “Defendant met [J.M.] on May 22, 2000. [J.M.] was 18 years old at the time. [J.M.] went to the defendant’s apartment with a man identified as Tony. Tony left the apartment in the middle of the night but [J.M.] stayed. [J.M.] and the defendant had a conversation regarding sex, and [J.M.] communicated clearly to the defendant that she did not want to have sex with him. [J.M.] was laying [sic] on the floor and the defendant attempted to touch her in a sexual manner and she told him to stop. [J.M.] stood up and began gathering her things. She was standing by the couch and the defendant came up behind her and placed his arm around her throat, cutting off her air supply. The defendant forced [J.M.] to the floor and her pants and underwear were removed. The defendant inserted his fingers into [J.M.]’s vagina. After using his fingers, the defendant raped [J.M.] with his penis. [¶] After the rape, [J.M.] gathered her belongings and attempted to leave. The defendant instructed [J.M.] that she should not say anything and that he knew her boyfriend was in jail and he (the defendant) had friends in the jail.”

         The motion sought to have the evidence admitted under section 1101 to show a common scheme or purpose and intent. It also sought admission of the evidence under section 1108. As to both sections, the People addressed section 352 and argued the evidence was highly probative of defendant’s “use of fear to sexually assault young women, using his fingers first, and in the middle of the night.” As to prejudice, the People argued the evidence was not unduly prejudicial, as it was not inflammatory, proper jury instruction would limit the purpose for which the evidence was considered, and defendant had pled no contest to an assault charge in the prior case. At the hearing, the People also noted that J.M. was a very young-looking adult, and argued her obviously youthful appearance was also a relevant consideration.

         Defendant responded that the uncharged conduct was irrelevant. He claimed the evidence was not admissible under section 1101 to prove intent, as that was not a disputed issue, and was not admissible to show a common design or plan, identity, or motive because there was insufficient similarity between the prior uncharged sexual offense and the current charged offense. Defendant also argued the evidence was inadmissible under section 352, as it was not factually similar enough to show propensity, there was not a conviction for rape on the prior offense, and at nine years old it was remote in time.

Defendant contended the prior offense was nine years old. The prior offense took place in May 2000. The current offense took place in December 2008. Thus, there were eight and one-half years between offenses.

         In ruling the evidence admissible, the court noted, “we’re talking about incidents that are eight years apart, and we’re talking about incidents that are similar, that being with some digital touching of the vagina and even though there was a rape allegedly in the 2000 case, I think the District Attorney will be -- it’s within their ability to argue to the jury that had there not been an interruption in this case perhaps the same thing might have happened. So the two cases to me look very similar. [¶] So the Court having conducted its balancing considerations, the Court will grant the People’s motion to bring in evidence of this prior act.” The court found the danger of undue prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence, and admitted the evidence under both sections 1101 and 1108.

         Analysis

         Defendant argues on appeal the evidence offered as to the uncharged offense was too dissimilar to the charged offense to support its admission on the issues of intent, common design, or identity. He points out the dissimilarities that the offense against J.M. was a violent, forcible rape committed against an adult stranger when no one else was in the home and there was no evidence defendant was intoxicated. In contrast, he describes the offense against M.C. as a nonviolent, nonforcible fondling with no penetration committed against a 13 year old he had known for most of her life, in a home where the victim’s family was nearby and where he had “consumed copious quantities of beer.”

         Even accepting defendant’s characterization of the evidence, it would not follow that evidence of his prior conduct would be inadmissible. But defendant’s characterization and his legal analysis are based, incorrectly, on the evidence presented at trial, not on the evidence proffered at the time the ruling on admissibility was made. In reviewing the trial court’s ruling, we must consider the facts that were before the trial court at the time of its ruling. (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 739; People v. Hernandez (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 417, 425 [“[w]e may assess the trial court’s ruling only on the facts made known to it at the time it made that ruling”].) Thus, we evaluate whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining the evidence was admissible, based on the evidentiary proffers made.

We recognize that the proffer differed from the evidence adduced at trial in some significant respects. In particular, J.M. did not testify about the digital penetration that preceded the rape. There were, however, also areas where the trial testimony indicated greater similarity with the charged offense than the proffer had. For example, at trial it was revealed that although it was for a brief period of time, defendant worked to put himself in a position of trust with J.M., inviting her into his home to wait for drugs and cautioning her about the danger of wandering around with strangers. Based on the long-term relationship with M.C., defendant was also in a position of trust with her. In addition, J.M. testified that she fell asleep at defendant’s house and when she woke up he was fondling her. This is similar to defendant’s conduct with M.C., in that he started the sexual offense when she was asleep and the conduct began with “fondling.” Despite these variances, at trial defense counsel did not move to strike J.M.’s testimony.

         In arguing that it was an abuse of discretion under both sections 1101 and 1108 to admit the evidence of defendant’s prior sexual misconduct, defendant relies heavily on People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 404 (Ewoldt) and its analysis under section 1101, subdivision (b) of the similarities between the uncharged and charged offenses. This is not the correct analytical framework.

         Section 1108 “‘permit[s] the jury in sex offense... cases to consider evidence of prior offenses for any relevant purpose’ (People v. James (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1353, fn. 7..., italics added), subject only to the prejudicial effect versus probative value weighing process required by section 352.” (People v. Britt (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 500, 505 (Britt).) Section 1101, subdivision (b)’s test for admissibility of prior uncharged offenses in a sex offense case did not survive the enactment of section 1108. “‘In enacting Evidence Code section 1108, the Legislature decided evidence of uncharged sexual offenses is so uniquely probative in sex crimes prosecutions it is presumed admissible without regard to the limitations of Evidence Code section 1101 .’ [Citation.] When section 1108 swept away the general prohibition on character evidence set forth in section 1101, it rendered moot the exceptions to that prohibition created by section 1101, subdivision (b).” (Britt, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at pp. 505-506.) Thus, the similarity analysis of Ewoldt simply does not apply when evidence is admitted pursuant to section 1108. (Britt, at pp. 505-506; see also People v. Frazier (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 30, 40-41 (Frazier).) The relevant analytical framework in this case is whether the evidence was “subject to exclusion” under section 352.

The similarity of the crimes is still a consideration in the section 352 analysis required by section 1108. However, it plays a smaller role on the question of admissibility under section 1108 than it does under section 1101, as under section 352 it is one of many factors for the trial court to consider. (See Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 916-917; Frazier, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at pp. 40-41.)

         Under section 352, “‘the probative value of the evidence of uncharged crimes “must be substantial and must not be largely outweighed by the probability that its admission would create a serious danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘The principal factor affecting the probative value of an uncharged act is its similarity to the charged offense. Other factors affecting the probative value include the extent to which the source of the evidence is independent of the charged offense, and the amount of time between the uncharged acts and the charged offense. The factors affecting the prejudicial effect of uncharged acts include whether the uncharged acts resulted in criminal convictions and whether the evidence of uncharged acts is stronger or more inflammatory than the evidence of the charged offenses.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hollie (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1274 (Hollie).) “A trial court ‘may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.’ (§ 352.)” (People v. Wesson (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 959, 969.)

         We review a challenge to admission of prior bad acts under section 352 for abuse of discretion and will reverse only if the trial court’s ruling was “‘arbitrary, whimsical, or capricious as a matter of law. [Citation.]’” (People v. Branch (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 274, 282 (Branch).)

         The proffered evidence on the uncharged sexual offense was that 18-year-old J.M. was lying on the floor with defendant in his home during the middle of the night. He started touching her sexually. She told him to stop and tried to leave, at which point he came up behind her and cut off her air supply. He removed her pants and underwear, and digitally penetrated her. After digitally penetrating her, he raped her. He then attempted to dissuade her from reporting the crime by threatening her boyfriend. In the charged offense, M.C. was asleep on the couch in defendant’s home in the middle of the night. She awoke to find him standing next to her, having removed her pants and underpants. He then touched her vagina with his hand. She cried and told him to stop but he did not. Casey then called out from another room and defendant stopped. From jail, defendant made a number of attempts to dissuade M.C. and Casey from testifying.

         “We reject defendant’s claim that because the distinctions between the two incidents render their similarities more apparent than real, the evidence was inadmissible.” (People v. Dancer (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1677, 1690, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Hammon (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1117, 1123.) Defendant has noted specific differences in the two matters; however, these specific differences “do not negate the basic similarity between the two incidents.” (Dancer, at p. 1690.)

         Despite defendant’s claimed dissimilarities in the cases, the evidence on the uncharged offense was highly probative. Each offense showed defendant, in the privacy of his own home with a sleeping or relaxed teenage girl late at night, fondling her, removing her pants and underpants, beginning a sexual assault with his hands on her genitals, and refusing to stop despite her pleas for him to do so. In each, he also made efforts to dissuade the girl from reporting the offense or testifying about it. The offenses were sufficiently similar that the prior uncharged offense had substantial probative value, despite the differences between the offenses. (See People v. Escudero (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 302, 311.)

         Relatedly, because of the similarity between the offenses, we cannot say the uncharged offense was significantly stronger or more inflammatory than the charged offense. Both cases rested on the testimony of the victims and the victims’ credibility. Both involved defendant disregarding the pleas of his victims. Both were nonconsensual sexual offenses committed against teenaged girls in defendant’s home. (See Hollie, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1276.)

         While the prior uncharged offense occurred some eight years before the offense at issue, “[n]o specific time limits have been established for determining when an uncharged offense is so remote as to be inadmissible.” (Branch, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 284.) An offense that occurred eight years ago is not something out of the “remote” past, especially when defendant spent two of those intervening years in jail. (See Frazier, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 41 [sexual offenses occurring 15 or 16 years prior to the charged offenses still probative and not too remote]; accord, People v. Waples (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1389, 1393-1395 [prior sexual offenses 18 to 25 years earlier still probative].)

         The evidence regarding J.M.’s rape came from a source entirely unrelated to the charged offense. This increased its probative value. (People v. Lewis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1255, 1287 (Lewis).) Nor did the admission of the evidence require an undue consumption of time. The proffer required the testimony of only one witness and was not overly complicated or likely to confuse or mislead the jury.

         Defendant was not convicted of raping J.M., but pled guilty to an assault of her. The disposition of this offense was a point of discussion during the hearing on the motion in limine. Thus, the court was aware of this conviction and able to properly consider it in balancing the proffered evidence under section 352. Because defendant was not convicted of rape, but rather assault, there was a risk that the jury might seek to punish him for the rape of J.M. “This risk, however, is counterbalanced by instructions on reasonable doubt, the necessity of proof as to each of the elements of a lewd act with a minor, and specifically that the jury ‘must not convict the defendant of any crime with which he is not charged.’” (Frazier, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 42.)

It does not appear from the record the jury was advised of this information.

         “Upon consideration of both the probative value of the evidence and its prejudicial effect we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the uncharged acts evidence under Evidence Code section 1108.” (Hollie, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1277.) On this record, we cannot say that the trial court “acted in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice” in admitting evidence of the 2000 rape. (People v. Yovanov (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 392, 406.) Since the trial court properly admitted J.M.’s testimony under section 1108, we need not reach the issue of its admissibility under section 1101. (Britt, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 506.)

To the extent defendant’s complaint as to section 1101 relates to the purpose(s) for which the evidence could be considered by the jury (i.e., propensity, intent, motive, or common scheme or plan), that complaint goes to the propriety of the instructions given to the jury, not the admissibility of the evidence. (People v. Walker (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 782, 797.) Defendant did not complain at trial, and does not contend on appeal, that the jury was misinstructed as to the purposes for which the jury could consider the evidence.

         III

         Defendant next contends CALCRIM Nos. 375 and 1191 violate the federal Constitution by permitting a finding of guilt based on a fact not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

         The People contend this claim was forfeited by a failure to object below. Because his claim of error would affect defendant’s substantial rights, we address it nonetheless. (Pen. Code, §§ 1259, 1469; Lewis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1294, fn. 28.)

         Defendant contends his due process rights were violated when the trial court instructed the jury in accordance with CALCRIM No. 1191. He states that by instructing the jurors to use the preponderance of the evidence standard to determine whether defendant committed the previous acts, and then instructing them that they could use that determination to conclude that defendant did commit the charged acts, the reasonable doubt standard was unconstitutionally undermined. Defendant concedes that the California Supreme Court has already ruled that similar instructions pass constitutional scrutiny and declares he is asserting this argument only to exhaust the due process claim for federal review.

Defendant relies primarily on a federal appellate court decision in support of his appeal. (Gibson v. Ortiz (9th Cir. 2004) 387 F.3d 812, 817 [habeas corpus review of a California conviction], overruled on other grounds by Byrd v. Lewis (9th Cir. 2009) 566 F.3d 855, 866.) Gibson does not aid his claim, as it addressed the constitutionality of the 1996 version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01. That instruction is distinguishable from the instruction provided in defendant’s case in that the Gibson instruction did not advise the jury that the uncharged sex offense “is only one factor to consider along with all the other evidence” or that “It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is guilty. The People must still prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.” (See CALJIC No. 2.50.01 (6th ed. 1996).) Defendant does not cite to the relevant California authority on these instructions.

         “Although the instruction considered in [People v.] Reliford [(2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007 (Reliford)] was the older CALJIC No. 2.50.01, there is no material difference in the manner in which each of the instructions allows the jury to conclude from the prior conduct evidence that the defendant was disposed to commit sexual offenses and, therefore, likely committed the current offenses. CALCRIM No. 1191, as given here, cautions the jury that it is not required to draw these conclusions and, in any event, such a conclusion is insufficient, alone, to support a conviction.” (People v. Cromp (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 476, 480 (Cromp); see also People v. Schnabel (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 83, 87.) Following the holdings of Reliford, Cromp, and Schnabel, we find no error.

         Similarly, with respect to CALCRIM No. 375, our Supreme Court has rejected a similar argument regarding CALJIC No. 2.50.1. (See People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 762-764 (Medina); People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 380-383 (Carpenter).) In Medina, the court held that CALJIC No. 2.50.1 was a correct statement of the law. “[T]he facts tending to prove the defendant’s other crimes for purposes of establishing his criminal knowledge or intent are deemed mere ‘evidentiary facts’ that need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt as long as the jury is convinced, beyond such doubt, of the truth of the ‘ultimate fact’ of the defendant’s knowledge or intent. [Citation.]” (Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 763.) Carpenter also addressed and rejected defendant’s contention that the combination of the CALJIC instructions given unconstitutionally diluted the reasonable doubt standard. (Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 381-383.) The court noted that a criminal defendant has a due process right to have each fact necessary to convict proven beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the court did not find this burden diminished by an instruction that other crime evidence need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. It further found that when the instruction was viewed in context with instructions on the presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, and burden of proof (which were also given here), it was not reasonably likely a jury would find the necessary elements of the charged offense true on a standard less than beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at p. 383.)

         The version of CALJIC No. 2.50.1 considered in Medina and Carpenter is similar in all material respects to CALCRIM No. 375 as given here in its explanation of the burden of proof. Each of the instructions allows the jury to conclude from the prior conduct evidence that defendant was the person who committed the offenses alleged in this case and/or that defendant had the intent, motive, or a plan or scheme to commit the offenses alleged. CALCRIM No. 375 cautions the jury that it is not required to draw these conclusions and, in any event, that such a conclusion is insufficient, alone, to support a conviction. Based on Medina and Carpenter, we therefore reject defendant’s contention that CALCRIM No. 375 violated his due process rights. (Cf. Cromp, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 480; see also Auto Equity Sales, supra, 57 Cal.2d at p. 455.)

         Our Supreme Court has rejected similar challenges to these instructions. (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1188; Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 380-383; Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 762-764; Reliford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 1015-1016.) Following the reasoning of those cases, we also reject defendant’s challenge.

         IV

         Defendant’s final contention is that the court was required to instruct, sua sponte, on voluntary intoxication. He concedes that this argument has also been rejected by the California Supreme Court in People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1117-1120 (Saille). As above, where there is a California Supreme Court opinion rejecting a defendant’s claim, we are bound by that decision. (Auto Equity Sales, supra, 57 Cal.2d at p. 455.)

         Defendant also contends counsel was ineffective in failing to request instruction on the issue of defendant’s intoxication. “The law regarding claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is settled. Defendant must show that counsel’s performance was both deficient and prejudicial, i.e., that it is reasonably probable that counsel’s unprofessional errors affected the outcome. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687, 693-694 [... 80 L.Ed.2d 674]; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-217....) We have also said that if the record sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the challenged manner, we must reject the claim on appeal unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or there could be no satisfactory explanation for counsel’s performance. (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266....)” (People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1014-1015.)

         A defendant is entitled, upon request, to an instruction on voluntary intoxication only where there is substantial evidence of the defendant’s voluntary intoxication and that the intoxication affected the defendant’s ability to meet an element of the charged offense, such as premeditation, deliberation, or specific intent. (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 677; Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1120.) There must be “evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude defendant’s mental capacity was so reduced or impaired as to negate the required criminal intent. [Citation.]” (People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 848 (Marshall).)

         We conclude the evidence in this case would not have required giving instructions on intoxication. Although the offenses were committed after defendant consumed Vicodin, Excedrin PM, and a large amount of alcohol during the course of the day, evidence of the effect of defendant’s alcohol consumption on his state of mind is lacking. At most the evidence showed that defendant occasionally blacked out or had memory lapses when he drank. There was no evidence either of those things occurred in this case. There was no evidence of the amount of alcohol defendant would usually consume prior to such a blackout or memory lapse, or evidence of how that amount compared to the amount he consumed on the night of the molestation. Casey testified the large amount of alcohol consumed by defendant on that night was usual for defendant. On the night of the molestation, he was “a little drunk” but not abnormally so and he was not behaving unusually. Defendant’s brother also testified that other than being angry at the accusation, defendant’s behavior was not unusual on the night of the molestation. There was no evidence of defendant’s blood-alcohol content or any evidence indicating defendant was impaired to the point that he could not form the requisite criminal intent. There simply was no “evidence of the effect of defendant’s alcohol consumption on his state of mind.” (Marshall, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 848.) “The fact that a defendant has been drinking, without evidence that he became intoxicated thereby, provides no basis for an instruction on intoxication. [Citations.]” (People v. Sanchez (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 718, 735.) On this record, if counsel had requested the instruction, the trial court properly would have refused it. Accordingly, counsel was not ineffective for not requesting the instruction. Counsel’s failure to make an unmeritorious request is not ineffective assistance. (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 387.)

         DISPOSITION

         The judgment is affirmed.

          We concur: SCOTLAND, P. J. SIMS, J.

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