OPINION
ARONSON, J.
Defendant Reginald Charles Tinsley, Jr., pleaded guilty to second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c); all further statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless indicated), and admitted the robbery was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).)
Counsel filed a brief setting forth a statement of the case. Counsel does not argue against his client, but advises this court he has found no issues to support an appeal. We provided defendant 30 days to file his own written argument. That period has passed, and we have received no communication from him. Consequently, we now review the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.
The evidence produced at defendant’s preliminary hearing reflected that on the afternoon of May 13, 2008, two Black men entered a credit union in Buena Park. One of the two employees, Jane Doe 2, directed the other, Jane Doe 1, to assist the men. One of the men, later identified as codefendant Shawn Owens, grabbed Jane Doe 1 by the neck and moved her 30 to 40 feet into the teller area. He demanded, “‘Give me your money’” and ordered her to get on the ground. He opened the cash drawers and began removing money. The second man, later identified as codefendant Joshua Fergerson, grabbed the sole customer, Jane Doe 3, by the neck and began to push her, but Owens said to leave her alone. She “hid under a desk.” Video cameras captured the incident.
Shortly after the robbery, officers set up a checkpoint near the credit union and stopped a black Chevrolet Monte Carlo without a front license plate. Two Black men occupied the vehicle. Defendant, a resident of Los Angeles County, was the driver and registered owner.
While engaged with defendant, the officers spotted Fergerson walking quickly away from the direction of the credit union. Blood dripped from his right forearm, and he had scuffed the knee area of his pants. Officers detained him, and Fergerson misidentified himself as Joshua Michael Brooks. He had two $50 bills and one $100 bill in his front right pocket. Meanwhile, defendant drove off.
A robbery detective driving in a residential neighborhood near the credit union spotted Owens, who matched the description of the robbery suspect at the credit union. The officer apprehended Owens, who was sweating profusely and had scratches on his arms and knees.
The credit union customer Fergerson accosted during the robbery identified Fergerson and Owens at the scenes of their respective detentions about 20 minutes after the robbery. Interviewed later at the police station after receiving a Miranda advisement, Fergerson admitted his involvement and stated he committed the robbery with Owens. Fergerson’s role was to act as lookout and to order the customers to the ground. He had received a ride to Orange County by two “Rollin’ 60s” gang members for the ostensible purpose of meeting girls. On the ride down, Owens disclosed he wanted to “make some money, ” i.e., commit a robbery. Fergerson said he “wasn’t feeling it” but went along because he was scared. Owens took “the money.” As they ran out, Owens dropped $300 and defendant picked it up. Owens told Fergerson he was now on his “‘own mission’” and they fled separately. Fergerson felt betrayed because he was in an unfamiliar area.
Arrested in Los Angeles and transported to Orange County the following day, defendant said he had given Owens, his cousin’s friend, a ride to Buena Park to visit someone. Defendant admitted he once belonged to the Rollin’ 60s crip gang and his moniker was “Concrete, ” but he claimed he no longer was a member. Defendant could not identify Fergerson.
A Los Angeles police officer assigned to the gang enforcement detail identified the Rollin’ 60s as a large criminal street gang in South Central Los Angeles. According to the officer, robbery was a primary activity of the gang and Owens and defendant were both members of Rollin’ 60s. The gang officer opined the charged robberies and associated crimes were for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang.
Following the preliminary hearing, the court found insufficient evidence of aggravated kidnapping, but found sufficient evidence to support robbery and false imprisonment charges, and to sustain the gang enhancement. The court subsequently denied defendant’s motion to set aside the information. (§ 995, subd. (a)(2)(B) [defendant “committed without reasonable or probable cause”].)
On February 5, 2010, defendant pleaded guilty as indicated above on the understanding he would receive a four-year prison term. The trial court imposed the agreed-upon four-year term as follows: the three-year midterm for the robbery against Jane Doe 1, and a one-year consecutive term for a prior conviction pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b). The court struck the section 186.22, subdivision (b), enhancements for sentencing purposes. Defendant received credit for 627 days of actual custody and 94 days of conduct credit. The court also imposed statutorily required fines and fees, and the court retained jurisdiction to determine victim restitution.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal in propria persona, checking boxes indicating the appeal was based on the sentence or matters occurring after the plea, and on the denial of a motion to suppress under section 1538.5.
DISCUSSION
Appellate counsel raises no potential issues. We have reviewed the record and likewise find no arguable issues. A defendant’s guilty plea admits all matters essential to the conviction. The issues cognizable on appeal are those based on “reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings” resulting in the plea. But review of these issues requires a certificate of probable cause, which defendant did not obtain. (§ 1237.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(4)(B), (5).) Section 1237.5 is designed “to promote judicial economy by screening out wholly frivolous guilty” plea appeals before time and money are spent on such matters as the preparation of the record on appeal, the appointment of appellate counsel, and consideration and decision of the appeal itself. (People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 (Mendez).) Appealable issues cognizable without a certificate of probable cause include the sentence or other matters occurring “after entry of the plea, ” and the denial of a suppression motion. But in the case of a negotiated plea with specification of penalty, a certificate is required because the defendant’s challenge to the sentence implicates the plea. (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 79.) As to the other ground raised in defendant’s notice of appeal, he failed to move to suppress evidence under section 1538.5.
Moreover, defendant expressly waived his right to appeal in conjunction with his guilty plea: “I understand I have the right to appeal from decisions and orders of the Superior Court. I waive and give up my right to appeal from any and all decisions and orders made in my case, including motions to suppress evidence brought pursuant to... section 1538.5. I waive and give up my right to appeal from my guilty plea. I waive and give up my right to appeal from any legally authorized sentence the court imposes which is within the terms and limits of this plea agreement.”
In short, the appeal is wholly frivolous and must be dismissed. (See Mendez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 1096-1099 [the Supreme Court has directed appellate courts to apply section 1237.5 strictly].)
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
WE CONCUR: RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J., MOORE, J.