PERREN, J.
Shannon Butler appeals the judgment entered after she pled guilty to first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced her to an indeterminate state prison term of 25 years to life.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Because appellant pled guilty, the relevant facts are derived from the preliminary hearing transcript and probation report. Appellant and codefendants Nancy Braswell and Matthew Toerner met as United States Navy Seabees while stationed in Port Hueneme. The victim, John Marmo, was Braswell's ex-husband. Appellant believed that Braswell had been wronged by Marmo and the judicial proceedings related to the dissolution of their marriage. Appellant expressed this to several colleagues and asked them to help her obtain a gun and find someone willing to kill Marmo.
Marmo was shot and killed as he arrived at home on December 1, 2006. Toerner later told the police he shot Marmo with a gun given to him by appellant, who drove Toerner to Marmo's home and waited there with him until Marmo arrived.
Appellant, Braswell, and Toerner were all charged with first degree murder with the special circumstance of lying in wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)), and conspiracy to commit murder (§ 182). Appellant initially entered a plea of not guilty. She subsequently filed a Marsden motion to replace her court-appointed attorney, Willard Wiksell. The motion was denied. After Braswell and Toerner were convicted in separate trials, appellant withdrew her plea, waived her constitutional rights, and entered a plea of guilty to the first degree murder charge. On her plea form and during her plea colloquy, appellant expressly waived her right to appeal her conviction. In exchange for her plea, the special circumstance allegation and conspiracy charge were dismissed.
People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 123.
On June 2, 2009, Wiksell filed a timely notice of appeal on appellant's behalf that identified the denial of her Marsden motion as a ground for the appeal. Wiksell also submitted a declaration in support of a certificate of probable cause stating, "The Defendant wishes to appeal on the grounds of ineffective assistance of Counsel [sic] based on the denial of a Marsden motion that was filed on June 10, 2008." Attached to the declaration was a letter appellant wrote to Wiksell on May 27, 2009, in which she stated her desire to file an appeal alleging ineffective assistance. Appellant also sought Wiksell's assistance in obtaining a certificate of probable cause, stating her belief that a certificate "should be easily obtained based on the denial of my Marsden Motion filed on 6/10/2008." Wiksell also included a proposed certificate of probable cause for the court's signature. The trial judge, Kevin J. McGee, signed and dated the certificate of probable cause that same day.
We appointed counsel to represent appellant in this appeal. After counsel's examination of the record, he filed an opening brief raising no issues.
On September 29, 2009, we advised appellant that she had 30 days within which to personally submit a letter brief identifying any contentions or issues she wished us to consider. Appellant filed an untimely response in which she contends (1) her trial attorney prevented her from filing a second Marsden request; (2) counsel denied her requests to seek a lesser charge and coerced her into pleading guilty; (3) she was wrongfully subjected to questioning by the police while under the influence of anesthesia and pain medication; (4) she was coerced into consenting to the search and seizure of her vehicle; and (5) she was arrested while under the influence of narcotics and was led to believe she was speaking to an attorney instead of a homicide detective. She also asks us to review and consider the entire record, "including the letters to and from the victims [sic] family and the prosecutions [sic] admission that I was manipulated by Braswell."
None of these claims are cognizable. Appellant waived her right to appeal as part of her plea by initialing the applicable paragraph on the plea form. During the plea colloquy, she also stated her understanding to the prosecutor's advisement "[y]ou also give up your right to appeal in this case by pleading guilty now. You would not [be] able to go to a higher court and contest this plea."
The paragraph, entitled WAIVER OF APPEAL, states: "I understand that unless I give up the right to appeal, the law would permit me to appeal to a higher court following my plea of guilty or no contest in order to raise reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings, or to challenge a search or seizure ruling made in a motion to suppress evidence. I now waive and give up my right to appeal in this case. (People v. Olson (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d601.)"
"[A] defendant may validly waive his right to appeal as part of a plea bargain. A waiver of appeal is proper, 'provided such waiver is knowing, free and intelligent.'" (People v. Kelly (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 533, 535.) Here, "[t]he record demonstrates defendant's waiver of the right to appeal was made with full knowledge and understanding of the consequences...." (Id. at p. 536.) "In exchange, defendant received, and well understood [s]he was receiving, significant benefits, including the dismissal of [one count of conspiracy to commit murder, a special circumstance allegation to the charge of first degree murder,] and a sentence limit." (Ibid.) Because appellant effectively waived her right to file the instant appeal, it must be dismissed.
Appellant's supplemental brief is also subject to being stricken as untimely. It was due to be filed no later than October 29, 2009, yet appellant did not submit it for mailing until November 2.
In any event, appellant fails to identify any issues that would warrant the relief she seeks. Appellant's claim that Wiksell coerced her into accepting a plea and prevented her from seeking to replace him is based on matters that occurred outside the record. The claims must therefore be brought, if at all, in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Besides, the fact that appellant may have been persuaded to accept a plea bargain even though she was reluctant to do so does not establish that her plea was involuntary. (People v. Ravaux (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 914, 919.) Wiksell was required to advise appellant of the consequences of either going to trial or pleading guilty. Nothing in the record suggests that Wiksell's professional performance was deficient in this regard. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687.)
Appellant's Marsden motion was essentially based on her frustration regarding "the snail's pace" of the proceedings, her belief that Wiksell did not have enough contact with her, and her impression that he had not done enough to address her concerns about jail security. Wiksell stated that he shared appellant's frustration regarding the pace of the proceedings, and stated his commitment to maintain contact with her. The court also offered a solution to the security problem. At the conclusion of the hearing, Wiksell stated that despite appellant's concerns "we do appear to get along fairly well." Appellant did not disagree with this assessment. The court concluded there was no indication that appellant was receiving ineffective representation or that there had been a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. Appellant offers nothing to undermine this conclusion.
The record on appeal is also devoid of any evidence supporting appellant's claims that she was subjected to improper law enforcement tactics or lacked the capacity to consent to questioning or the search and seizure of her vehicle. To the extent appellant claims that statements she made to the police and evidence obtained from her vehicle were illegally obtained, no motion to suppress was ever filed. Moreover, by pleading guilty to first degree murder, appellant effectively conceded that the prosecution possessed legally admissible evidence sufficient to prove her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Thurman (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 36, 43.)
Having independently reviewed the entire record, we are satisfied that appellant's attorney has fully complied with his responsibilities and that no arguable issue exists. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.)
The appeal is dismissed.
We concur: GILBERT, P.J., COFFEE, J.