OPINION
RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J.
After a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of defendants Profit Recovery Partners, LLC, Donald Steiner, and Todd Wyles (collectively PRP) and against PRP’s former employee, plaintiff Richard W. Brittain. Plaintiff sued for breach of contract seeking commissions. He appeals contending that under the terms of the operative contract he was entitled to a commission on fees received by PRP after he left his employment. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
FACTS
PRP is a cost-reduction consulting firm. It assists its clients in saving money on business expenses. Plaintiff was employed by PRP in April 2002. His compensation, in the form of commissions on fees received from clients upon initial retention and for subsequent services, was determined at approximately the beginning of each year; this was communicated in the form of a document entitled “[c]ompensation [p]lan.” Plaintiff agrees that his employment was at will.
Each of the annual compensation plans provided that commissions were earned “based on customer payments received” and, with one exception discussed below, contained the following paragraph: “Termination of Employment Procedures: No future commissions or bonuses will be paid after date of termination as a result of no longer managing the accounts. All commission will be paid on any moneys received by PRP from your customers before the date of termination.” The exception was the January 2006 plan; it omitted this paragraph. Defendants assert in their brief that this omission was inadvertent but fail to support this claim with any record reference. We therefore ignore this contention.
In April 2006, plaintiff was furnished a revised plan, to be effective in July, which again contained language similar to the above quoted paragraph. This appears to be a draft and a number of employees, including plaintiff, apparently requested changes not relevant to any issues here but which were accepted and confirmed in a memorandum dated May 8, 2006. During the trial, plaintiff was asked, “And you understood that the January 2006 agreement was going to no longer be effective, correct?” He responded in the affirmative. The trial court found that plaintiff was aware of the changed document and that he read the documents he received.
On October 31, plaintiff gave PRP “two weeks notice.” PRP paid him his earned commissions through November 15 and paid him an additional $22, 221 in commissions through December 15. Again without any record reference, PRP contends the latter payment was made by mistake. In any event, there is no issue pertaining to the alleged overpayment.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contends that, because of the omission of the paragraph defining the term for which commissions would be paid in the January 2006 plan, he is entitled to commissions on moneys earned and received by PRP after his termination. So the issue is simple: what were the terms of plaintiff’s employment contract when he terminated his employment effective November 15, 2006? The short answer: the most recent contract preceding his termination. And this contract provided that no commissions would be earned after termination. The trial court so found and substantial evidence supports the conclusion.
Plaintiff’s argument that the financial relationship between the parties continued to be governed by the superseded contract is confusing, to put it mildly. As noted, he agrees his employment was at will. And he acknowledges in his opening brief “the employer’s absolute right to terminate an at-will employee also includes the right to change prospectively any of the terms of the employee’s at-will employment at any time, including the employee’s pay or benefits, based on the implied concept that the employer first terminated the employee’s existing at-will employment under the old terms and then offered the employee new at-will employment under the new terms.” In support he cites Scott v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 454, 464-465, disapproved in another ground in Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 352, fn. 17, and DiGiacinto v. Ameriko-Omserv Corp. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 629, 635-636, which so hold.
But then plaintiff discusses cases that create exceptions to the at-will employment status, including Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654. But those deal with implied-in-fact contracts not to terminate an employee without good cause. (E.g., id. at p. 675.) And plaintiff does not argue there was such an implied-in-fact contract, nor does the evidence support such a conclusion. Plaintiff again relies on Scott v. Pacific Gas & Electricity Co., supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 463. But this case also iterates the basis for an implied-in-fact contract not to terminate except for good cause. The same is true for the third case cited by plaintiff in this context, Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc., supra, 24 Cal.4th 317, 335-337. These cases bear no relevance to the issues here.
Plaintiff’s statement that “[t]here is no authority that allowed PRP to make his facially binding contract ‘at will’ simply because [he] was an at-will employee” falls outside the bounds of reason. Plaintiff acknowledges he was an at-will employee. There is nothing in the January 2006 contract that contradicts this. How can there be a contract that is “binding, ” by which plaintiff apparently means it survives subsequent modifications, where the law provides that employment conditions of an at-will employee are subject to change by the employer? It is probably not necessary to note that plaintiff fails to provide legal authority for this novel take on the law.
The trial court found and the evidence supports the proposition that plaintiff was aware of the changes in his employment contract effected by the revised 2006 plan. This plan provided that upon termination, plaintiff’s earnings were limited to “monies received by PRP from their clients prior to the date of your termination or resignation.” The trial court properly applied this clause in the most recent employment contract preceding termination.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: BEDSWORTH, J., O’LEARY, J.