OPINION
BEDSWORTH, J.
Appellant Dione Lamar McKinnon was convicted of gang, gun and drug charges based on evidence found in his car during a warrantless search. The legality of that search was the subject of two suppression hearings, the first of which was held before trial. At that hearing, the trial court ruled the search was lawful as being incident to appellant’s arrest. That ruling was consistent with the then-prevailing view that, under New York v. Belton (1981) 453 U.S. 454 (Belton), the police may always search an arrestee’s vehicle to look for weapons. However, while this appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court ruled “Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle.” (Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. ___, ___ [129 S.Ct. 1710, 1714] (Gant).) In light of Gant, we remanded the matter for a new suppression hearing. At that hearing, the trial court found Gant was directly on point because, according to the undisputed evidence, appellant was handcuffed in the back of a police car at the time his car was searched. Therefore, the court found the search was illegal and granted his motion to suppress the evidence the search produced. As the People have not challenged that ruling, we will reverse appellant’s convictions.
FACTS
On the night of June 25, 2004, Riverside Police Officer Joshua Ontko and his partner were dispatched to an area in downtown Riverside that is known for drug and gang activity. The officers were responding to a call from a woman who was concerned about three black men who were standing in front of her residence. Suspecting the men were carrying on drug activity, she asked them to leave. They gave her a hard time, so she called the police.
When the officers arrived at the scene, they parked behind a blue Monte Carlo that was located across the street from the complainant’s residence. There were four black men congregated in the area, and upon the officers’ arrival, a fifth one exited the driver’s seat of the Monte Carlo and joined the others. Ontko got out of his squad car and ordered the men to sit on the curb. After they did so, Ontko noticed appellant in the front passenger seat of the Monte Carlo. (Ontko had encountered appellant earlier that day and knew he was a gang member.)
Ontko ordered appellant to exit the car, but appellant refused. Ontko then repeated his command, and this time appellant got out of the car. However, he was still defiant, telling Ontko, “Fuck you. I don’t have to do what you tell me.” Appellant then started walking back toward the Monte Carlo. Ontko told him not to reenter the vehicle, but appellant got back into the passenger seat and began “fishing around” inside the car.
Ontko walked toward the car and again ordered appellant to step outside. Appellant complied and walked toward Ontko with his hands up by his face. Taking what Ontko perceived as a “fighting stance, ” appellant told the officer he would “kick [his] ass” if he touched him. Undeterred, Ontko grabbed appellant’s arm and forced him to the ground. Appellant stiffened his body in response, but Ontko managed to handcuff him and place him under arrest. He then searched the Monte Carlo, which was appellant’s car.
Not finding anything in the car, Ontko transported appellant to the police station. The police wanted to keep him in custody and have him prosecuted for this incident. However, due to an administrative error, appellant ended up being released.
About three weeks later, on July 13, 2004, the police obtained a warrant to arrest appellant, based on the earlier incident. The following day, undercover police detective Joe Miera spotted appellant at Bobby Bonds Park in Riverside. Miera knew appellant was wanted on the warrant. He also knew the park had a reputation for gang and drug activity. However, Miera did not notice anything suspicious while he was watching appellant. Appellant was hanging around with a group of black men, including at least one other member of his gang, but he was not doing anything illegal. Still, Miera thought it would be dangerous to attempt to arrest appellant in the park, so he continued his surveillance.
About 30 minutes later, appellant left the park alone in his blue Monte Carlo. Miera followed him and instructed officers in the area to pull him over, which they did. The stop occurred in a drug store parking lot. Miera arrived at the scene shortly thereafter, at which time appellant was arrested on the warrant. He was then handcuffed and placed in the back of a police car. At that point, the officers searched appellant’s car and found a loaded handgun and an ounce of rock cocaine in a secret compartment inside the dashboard.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Based on the June incident, appellant was charged with forcibly resisting arrest and street terrorism. Based on the July incident, he was charged with transporting cocaine, possessing cocaine for sale, possessing a firearm as a felon, and street terrorism. It was also alleged appellant acted for the benefit of a criminal street gang and suffered seven prior “strikes” arising from a single case in 1995 in which he was convicted of multiple drug counts.
Before trial, appellant moved to suppress the evidence found in his car during the July incident on the ground it was obtained without a search warrant. Relying on Belton, the prosecution argued the evidence was lawfully seized pursuant to the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement. No other theory of admissibility was offered by the People. At the suppression hearing, defense counsel claimed the search of appellant’s car was too far removed from his arrest to come within that exception. He argued, “Just because [the officers] had a warrant for [appellant’s] arrest, that didn’t give [them] the right to search” his car.
The court disagreed. After taking judicial notice of appellant’s arrest warrant, the court stated, “Once [the officers] have arrested [appellant] on a lawful arrest warrant, they have a right to search the vehicle. That’s the law. [¶] So their searching of the vehicle and their finding the items in it, there is nothing unusual whatsoever as to that.” Therefore, the court denied appellant’s motion to suppress.
The case then proceeded to trial. Appellant testified the police used excessive force in arresting him during the June incident. He also claimed he did not know about the contraband found in his car during the July incident. The trial ended in a hung verdict, but appellant was retried and convicted on all counts. After finding the prior strike allegations to be true, the court sentenced him to 68 years to life in prison.
Appellant’s testimony in this regard was corroborated by a resident in the neighborhood who said she saw the police slam appellant into a police car while they were taking him into custody.
In his opening brief, appellant argued the trial court erred in admitting improper character evidence, failing to consider his request for a new attorney prior to sentencing, and refusing to strike his prior strike convictions. Four months later, in April 2009, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Gant. Appellant then obtained leave to file a supplemental brief in which he argued the search of his car was illegal.
As noted at the outset, Gant narrowed the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement in the context of vehicle searches. Although courts had been construing Belton to allow vehicle searches whenever the driver was arrested - even if he had already been secured in a patrol car - Gant ruled the “[p]olice may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.” (Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at p. ___ [129 S.Ct. 1710 at p. 1723].)
Given that appellant was not within reaching distance of the passenger compartment of his car at the time it was searched, the Attorney General abandoned the prosecution’s claim the search could be justified as being incident to appellant’s arrest. However, the Attorney General sought to uphold the search on the grounds there was a reasonable basis and/or probable cause to believe that some evidence related to the June incident would be found in appellant’s car. The Attorney General also argued the search could possibly be upheld under the inventory or good faith exceptions to the warrant requirement, although the record was not developed with those theories in mind.
We remanded the matter with instructions for the trial court to conduct a new suppression hearing in light of Gant. At that hearing, the prosecution did not present any new evidence. Instead, it simply relied on the probable cause and good faith exceptions to the warrant requirement. However, the trial court found those exceptions inapplicable and granted appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence that was found in his car during the search. The court stated, “As Gant pointed out, when a person is in cuffs and away from the car..., there’s no way that person can reach a gun or destroy evidence. So, that exactly applies in this case, and therefore the [motion to suppress] is granted.”
We invited the parties to address the court’s decision by way of oral argument and/or written briefing. However, despite being given the opportunity to do so, the Attorney General has not challenged the trial court’s ruling. Therefore, that ruling is dispositive for purposes of the appeal, and appellant’s convictions on the counts stemming from the July incident must be reversed. Appellant’s convictions on the counts stemming from the June incident also must be reversed because, in considering those counts, the jury was exposed to the gun and drug evidence involved in the July incident. As a matter of fairness, appellant is entitled to have a jury decide the truth of the charges stemming from the June incident without reference to this highly prejudicial evidence.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded for a new trial on counts one and two.
WE CONCUR: SILLS, P. J., RYLAARSDAM, J.