OPINION
THE COURT
Before Wiseman, Acting P.J., Kane, J., and Franson, J.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant, G.V., appeals from the juvenile court’s order denying her petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 to modify the court’s prior order terminating reunification services for her children, J.A.C. and J.C.C. The court denied appellant’s petition and terminated her parental rights. Appellant contends she demonstrated changed circumstances and the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her petition. Appellant further contends the juvenile court erred in failing to find that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception applied to this case. We reject these contentions and affirm the juvenile court’s judgment.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Earlier Proceedings
Appellant was living with J.A.C., J.C.C., their father, J.C., and two older children, D.V. and M.V. The Merced County Human Services Agency (agency) filed a petition in June 2008 pursuant to section 300, subdivision (a) alleging the parents caused serious physical harm to D.V. and section 300, subdivision (b) alleging the parents failed to protect their children. The petition alleged that both parents physically hit D.V.
The petition was filed also as to D.V. and M.V. but they are not included in appellant’s appeal.
At the jurisdiction hearing on July 8, 2008, the juvenile court found the allegations true. At the disposition hearing on July 28, 2008, the court ordered reunification services for the parents. The court removed the children from their parents’ custody. The court ordered weekly visitations between the parents and children. Appellant was ordered to attend and demonstrate progress in a certified domestic violence prevention program, show understanding of age appropriate behavior for her children, comply with medical or psychological assessment and treatment, attend a parenting education program, and participate in an anger management program.
At an interim review hearing on October 27, 2008, the social worker reported that it took appellant time to open up to her counselors. Appellant completed the anger management program and received a certificate of completion but planned to attend further sessions at her own expense. Appellant had attended eight parenting classes, missing only one. Appellant could only miss two parenting classes before being dropped from the program.
A social worker’s report prepared for a six-month review hearing on March 18, 2009, stated appellant had asked J.C. to move out, though they were still trying to work things out. Appellant was maintaining weekly supervised visits with her children. Overall, the visits were going well, though appellant was having some control issues and continued to involve her oldest son, M.V., in adult issues.
Appellant was in partial compliance with her case plan in receiving mental health services. Although appellant attempted to apply for services, she did not qualify for Medi-Cal. Appellant was on a wait list to participate in individual therapy sessions with a mental health care professional. Appellant completed domestic violence classes, but continued to display an inability to control her anger and reports of violence against her had been made. Appellant had been verbally abusive with a social worker and had a police report filed against her by J.C. because appellant chased him and a female companion in her car with one of her children in the car.
Appellant started a 15-week parenting class, completed 14 of 15 sessions, and received a certificate of completion. Appellant demonstrated she could actively engage all of her children and interacted well with the two younger children. Appellant sought additional skills to deal with D.V.’s behaviors and was enrolled in a positive discipline class. The social worker recommended that reunification services be continued to appellant. On March 18, 2009, the court continued reunification services to appellant.
Appellant filed a petition pursuant to section 388 in June 2009 seeking custody of the children. Appellant alleged she had complied with her case plan and wanted continued services. At the hearing for appellant’s petition in August 2010, the social worker testified that appellant’s one-hour visits with the children were consistently chaotic. The children were running, fighting, and out of control. Appellant completed her parenting class and was working with her counselor. Appellant was opposed to her counselor and another social worker observing her visits with the children.
The social worker was also opposed to overnight visitation because appellant still had difficulty controlling her anger. Appellant’s therapist can employ Parent Child Interactive Therapy. In this form of therapy, the parent wears an ear bud and the therapist coaches the parent through difficult situations with misbehaving children. This was the form of therapy the social worker and appellant’s therapist were trying to use with appellant that appellant rejected. At the conclusion of the hearing the trial court denied appellant’s petition.
In October 2009, the social worker filed a report recommending termination of reunification services for both parents. The social worker stated appellant was living with J.C. in her mother’s home. The two continued to engage in domestic disputes with each other and appellant continued to show a lack of control over her anger during visitations with the children. J.C. was intoxicated on more than one visitation by the children.
Appellant’s counselor reported that appellant only sporadically participates in her counseling sessions. Appellant had failed to demonstrate that she was in control of her anger. Appellant also failed to show she could control her children or have positive interactions with them. Appellant did not know how to set boundaries for her children and caused her children to become upset both during and after their visitations with her. J.C. failed to complete a domestic violence program. There was not a substantial probability that the younger children would be returned to either parent.
The court conducted a 12-month review hearing on January 6, 2010. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court noted appellant had failed in her testimony to demonstrate what she had learned and was impulsive in her testimony. The court terminated reunification services for both parents as to the two younger children.
Section 388 and Section 366.26 Hearing
The agency prepared a report in June 2010. The agency recommended that a plan of adoption be selected for J.A.C. and J.C.C. and the parental rights of both parents be terminated. The social worker reported that between July 2008 and early January 2010, appellant began most visitations by creating an issue, problem, or concern. Appellant spoke negatively about the assigned social worker. The oldest child spent most of his time directing the younger children. One child listened to age-inappropriate music. J.A.C. had outbursts and tantrums that appellant could not control. Appellant became upset if the children were a few minutes late for visitation.
Between January 2010 and June 2010, appellant participated in monthly visitations with the children, bringing them food, drinks, and snacks. During most visits, J.A.C. played independently and was not interested in interacting with appellant. In the past, appellant told social workers that she wanted her children back. As of June 2010, however, appellant had not made statements concerning her desires for her children’s future. J.A.C. is extremely happy in his current placement. J.C.C., who is young, smiles and shakes his head affirmatively when asked if he likes his current placement. The caretakers report the children are happy. The caretakers for each child stated their willingness to adopt each child.
The social worker reported both children were adoptable. J.C.C., who was four at the time of the evaluation, has few if any health problems and no diagnosed behavior issues. Although J.C.C. will not be adopted in the same home as J.A.C., his caregivers want to adopt him. It would not be detrimental to J.C.C. to be adopted in a different home because J.A.C. was physically aggressive to J.C.C. in the past.
J.A.C., who was six years old at the time of the report, is adoptable. J.A.C. has no health problems. The social worker acknowledged that if the current caretakers do not proceed with adoption, it may be difficult to find other adoptive parents because of J.A.C.’s aggressive behaviors toward other foster children. J.A.C. and J.C.C. will have the opportunity to maintain contact in the future.
On July 2, 2010, appellant filed a petition pursuant to section 388 seeking family maintenance services, or alternatively, family reunification services as well as the return of J.A.C. and J.C.C. Appellant alleged she completed all aspects of her case plan, participated in individual and group counseling, and completed domestic violence training. Appellant was also searching for individual counseling.
The juvenile court conducted a combined hearing on appellant’s petition and the agency’s request to terminate parental rights on July 12, 2010. Appellant testified she was living with friends who had a five bedroom home and there would be ample space for her four children. Although appellant did not have a job, she could stay with her friend in exchange for house and yard work. Appellant stated that she participated in her case plan for 12 months in 2009. Appellant also obtained individual counseling from Mountain Crisis Services and attended one session the week before the hearing.
Appellant had a domestic violence safety plan. Appellant was starting to attend group counseling sessions. The last time appellant was the victim of domestic violence was December 2009. Appellant no longer had a romantic relationship with J.C. and had no plans to reunite with him. Appellant stated she had never missed a visit with her children.
Mirella Martinez was the social worker most recently assigned to this case and had worked on it about one year. Martinez was present during appellant’s visits with J.A.C. and J.C.C. and had seen the two children interact with each other. When the siblings are together, J.A.C. tended to play independently from J.C.C. The two were placed in separate homes because J.A.C. picked on J.C.C. a lot. J.C.C. had been quiet before but has started talking more and becoming open with his foster parents.
The court noted the most dramatic change of circumstance was that appellant no longer had a relationship with J.C. The court further found, however, that it would not be in the best interests of J.A.C. or J.C.C. to be returned to appellant and denied her petition. The court found the permanence of adoption for J.A.C. and J.C.C. would significantly outweigh the reinstatement of services or the maintenance of parental rights for appellant. The court found the children were adoptable and terminated the parental rights of both parents.
DISCUSSION
Appellant argues the court abused its discretion by denying her section 388 petition and for failing to find that the parent al benefit exception applied to this case. We disagree.
Section 388 Petition
It was appellant’s burden of proof to show there was new evidence or there were changed circumstances that made a change of the children’s placement in their best interest. (§ 388; In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317 (Stephanie M.).) The parent need only make a prima facie showing to trigger the right to proceed by way of a full hearing. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 310.) If the petition presents any evidence that a hearing would promote the best interests of the child, the court will order the hearing. (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415 (Jasmon O.).) The petition must be liberally construed in favor of its sufficiency. (Ibid.)
“The references in In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at page 310, to a ‘prima facie’ showing is not an invitation to section 388 petitioners to play ‘hide the ball’ in pleading changed circumstances or new evidence. A ‘prima facie’ showing refers to those facts which will sustain a favorable decision if the evidence submitted in support of the allegations by the petitioner is credited. (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 719, fn. 6.) If a petitioner could get by with general, conclusory allegations, there would be no need for an initial determination by the juvenile court about whether an evidentiary hearing was warranted. In such circumstances, the decision to grant a hearing on a section 388 petition would be nothing more than a pointless formality.” (In re Edward H. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 584, 593.)
The mandate for liberal construction of a section 388 petition does not entitle a petitioner to avoid describing the changed circumstances or new evidence. Section 388 and the pertinent rule of court (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570) require the petition to allege changed circumstances or new evidence that requires changing a prior order. (Jasmon O., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 415.) As the moving party, it was appellant’s burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence to show there was new evidence or there were changed circumstances that called for a change of the previous order denying reunification and that reunification services would be in the child’s best interest. (§ 388; Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.)
Appellant argues the problems leading to the detention of her children, domestic violence and inappropriate discipline of her children, were not serious and had been completely ameliorated. She also argues that she had strong bonds with J.A.C. and J.C.C.
Although appellant finished the classes set forth in her case plan, appellant continued to struggle with issues related to her anger. Appellant continued to have difficulty controlling her children, even during one-hour visitations. Earlier in the proceedings, appellant refused Parent Child Interactive Therapy to improve her ability to discipline her children. Appellant acknowledged she had still been the victim of domestic violence as late as December 2009. The record supports the juvenile court’s finding that the only significant change of circumstances appellant made was to end her relationship with J.C., but this occurred late in the proceedings. Appellant’s addition of counseling services through Mountain Crisis Services happened only one week before the joint hearing on her petition and the termination of parental rights.
The issues leading to the detention of appellant’s children were very serious. Appellant’s attempts to ameliorate these issues were largely unsuccessful because she did not show substantial progress. Appellant’s bond with J.A.C. and J.C.C. was not as strong as she asserts on appeal.
The parent bears the burden of showing in a section 388 petition both a change of circumstance exists and that the proposed change is in the best interests of the child. A petition only alleging changed circumstances, which would lead to a delay in the selection of a permanent home, to see if a parent could eventually reunify with a child at some future point, does not promote stability for the child or the child’s best interests. (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 47.)
To understand the element of best interests in the context of a section 388 petition, we look to the Supreme Court’s decision in Stephanie M. After the termination of reunification services, a parent’s interest in the care, custody, and companionship of his or her child is no longer paramount. Rather, the focus shifts, once reunification efforts end, to the child’s needs for permanency and stability; there is, in fact, a rebuttable presumption that continued out-of-home care is in the best interests of the child. (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.) A court conducting a modification hearing at this stage of the proceedings must recognize this shift of focus in determining the ultimate question before it, that is, the best interests of the child. (Ibid.) Notably, both here and in the juvenile court, appellant ignores her children’s need for permanence and stability in advocating her position. Neither the juvenile court nor this court, however, may do so.
Parent Benefit Exception
Finally, appellant contends the juvenile court erred because of her close relationship with J.A.C. and J.C.C. She argues the parental benefit exception to termination of parental rights (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) should have been applied in this case because terminating her parental rights would be detrimental to her children.
Appellate courts have interpreted the phrase “benefit from continuing the relationship” to refer to a parent-child relationship that promotes the well-being of the child to such an extent as to outweigh the benefits the child would gain in a permanent home with adoptive parents. Courts balance the strength and quality of the natural parent-child relationship against the security and sense of belonging the new family would provide. If severing the natural parent-child relationship would deprive the child of substantial, positive emotional attachment so that the child would be greatly harmed, only then is the preference for adoption overcome and the parents’ rights are not terminated. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 953 (L.Y.L.); In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.)
To meet the burden of proof for this exception, the parent must show more than frequent and loving contact or pleasant visits. (L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 953-954.) The relationship arises from day-to-day interaction, companionship, and shared experiences. The parent must show he or she occupies a parental role in the child’s life that results in a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent. (Id. at p. 954.)
While we agree appellant had frequent visits with J.A.C. and J.C.C., she failed to demonstrate a true parental role with her children. The quality of appellant’s visits was not very high. She failed to successfully discipline J.A.C. and J.C.C. In fact, her older child acted more as a parent than appellant. J.A.C. tended to play by himself and had little interaction with appellant. Furthermore, J.A.C. preferred living with his caregiver than with appellant. J.C.C., though very young, expressed a preference to live with his caregivers as well.
Appellant did not demonstrate more than frequent visits. Appellant did not show that she occupied a parental role in her children’s lives that resulted in a significant, positive, emotional attachment from her to them. The juvenile court did not err in failing to employ the parent benefit exception in this case.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders denying appellant’s section 388 petition and terminating her parental rights are affirmed.