HART, JUSTICE
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals
Attorneys for Petitioner: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General Melissa D. Allen, Senior Assistant Attorney General L. Andrew Cooper, Senior Assistant Attorney General Denver, Colorado
Attorney for Respondent: Joseph T. Goodner Englewood, Colorado
JUSTICE GABRIEL dissents, and JUSTICE HOOD joins in the dissent.
OPINION
HART, JUSTICE
¶1 Two years ago, in People v. Morehead, 2019 CO 48, 442 P.3d 413, we recognized that when a suppression ruling is reversed on appeal, the trial court has discretion on remand to entertain new arguments and evidence from either party in its resolution of any remaining suppression-related issues not foreclosed by the decision of the appellate court. In this case, a division of the court of appeals, purporting to apply Morehead, announced a new two-step, multifactor test that trial courts would be required to apply when exercising that discretion. See People v. Tallent, 2020 COA 14, ¶¶ 18-20, 490 P.3d 557, 562 ("Tallent III"). Because the trial court relied on new arguments without explicitly applying that novel test, the division reversed Joseph Tallent's conviction and remanded for the trial court to apply the test retroactively. Id. at ¶¶ 25-26, 28, 490 P.3d at 563.
¶2 We reject the division's approach, which strays from our decision in Morehead and imposes unnecessary constraints on trial courts. Further, based on the existing record in Tallent's case, we conclude that the trial court did not err in considering the People's new arguments on remand. We therefore reverse the division's judgment and remand for consideration of Tallent's remaining arguments on appeal.
I. Facts and Procedural History
¶3 In January 2007, police arrested Tallent after he spontaneously ran when he saw nearby police officers, eluded the officers in a chase through several backyards, and hid on a covered porch. After the arrest, police discovered an outstanding felony warrant for Tallent. Subsequent searches of his person, his car, and an unlocked garage where he was first sighted uncovered a variety of stolen and unlawful items. Police also monitored Tallent's phone calls in jail over the following months, which led them to more stolen property.
¶4 Before trial, Tallent moved to suppress all evidence and statements obtained as a result of his arrest, his interactions with police, and the various searches they had conducted. The court held an evidentiary hearing, during which the parties and the court engaged in colloquy as to whether the initial interaction between Tallent and the police was in fact an arrest or whether it was better characterized as an investigatory stop, for which the police would need only reasonable suspicion. During that hearing, the People began to discuss the doctrines of inevitable discovery and independent source-both exceptions to the exclusionary rule-but the court said "[c]ome back with other doctrines." On July 18, 2007, the trial court issued an oral ruling that the police had lacked probable cause for the arrest. At that hearing, the court acknowledged that "perhaps you would want to make additional comments in light of the actual ruling as to the arrest." The People indicated that they might want to take an interlocutory appeal of the ruling. On July 20, 2007, however, the court, "upon further analysis," issued a written order concluding that Tallent's arrest was in fact constitutional. The court thus admitted the evidence at trial. Tallent was convicted as charged.
Although the trial court concluded that the arrest was constitutional and thus permitted introduction of evidence obtained from Tallent's person incident to his arrest, the court suppressed evidence obtained in the subsequent search of Tallent's car. The People challenged that ruling on interlocutory appeal, and this court reversed. See People v. Tallent, 174 P.3d 310 (Colo. 2008) (holding that police had authority to search the car incident to Tallent's arrest). The trial, therefore, included evidence found on Tallent's person and in his car.
¶5 On direct appeal, a division of the court of appeals reversed Tallent's conviction and remanded for a new trial. People v. Tallent, No. 09CA0981 (Aug. 16, 2012) ("Tallent I"). The division concluded that "[b]ecause Tallent was arrested without probable cause, evidence obtained as a result of that arrest should not have been admitted at trial." Id. at 21.
¶6 On remand, the People argued that even though the arrest was unconstitutional, the evidence they found could still be admitted under various exceptions to the exclusionary rule because the police had the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify their initial stop as an investigatory stop. Tallent disputed the exceptions' applicability and argued that all of the evidence should be suppressed. After reviewing the parties' briefing, the record of the prior suppression proceedings, and additional evidence presented by the parties on remand, the trial court issued a written order analyzing which post-arrest evidence could be admitted on retrial and which should be excluded. The court rejected the People's claim that no evidence should be suppressed because the outstanding felony warrant discovered after Tallent's arrest attenuated the link between the illegal arrest and the subsequent searches. However, the court agreed that certain evidence (such as Tallent's phone calls in jail and some of his statements to police) could be admitted under the attenuation and inevitable discovery exceptions to the exclusionary rule. Accordingly, the court admitted that evidence at retrial, suppressed the remaining post-arrest evidence, and dismissed the charges supported only by the latter. In this second trial, Tallent was otherwise convicted as charged.
¶7 Tallent appealed this conviction, challenging (1) the admission of post- arrest evidence on retrial, (2) the court's denial of his request for a continuance, and (3) the constitutionality of the habitual criminal statute. A division of the court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. People v. Tallent, No. 15CA0040 (May 24, 2018), vacated, (Colo. No. 18SC483, July 1, 2019) (unpublished order) ("Tallent II"). The division agreed that the post-arrest evidence was improperly admitted. Id. at ¶ 24. In doing so, it did not consider the arguments Tallent raised to challenge the admission of the evidence. Id. at ¶ 10. Instead, it relied on the reasoning of another division in People v. Morehead, 2015 COA 131, ¶ 42, 450 P.3d 733, 741, rev'd in part, 2019 CO 48, 442 P.3d 413, to conclude that "the People were 'precluded from arguing on remand that any of the evidence derived from the unconstitutional [arrest] should still be admitted under . . . exceptions to the exclusionary rule' because they had not raised such arguments in the initial suppression hearing." Tallent II, ¶ 14 (quoting Morehead, ¶ 42, 450 P.3d at 741). Shortly thereafter, however, we disapproved of the court of appeals Morehead decision, granted the People's petition for certiorari, vacated the Tallent II division's opinion, and remanded to the court of appeals for reconsideration in light of our opinion in Morehead.
¶8 In a published opinion, the same division t applicable standard of review. In the course of that discussion, I point out what I perceive to be the inconsistency between the majority's concluding that Tallent did not preserve the issue that the prior divisions ruled on (and that formed the basis for the People's certiorari petition) and its simultaneously allowing the People to advance arguments that they indisputably did not raise during the initial suppression hearing in this case. I then turn to the question on which we granted certiorari, explaining my understanding of our decision in Morehead and of the division's opinion below and why I disagree with the majority's analysis and conclusions in this case. Finally, I discuss why I disagree with the majority's decision to address the merits of the People's newly presented arguments below.
A. Standard of Review
¶34 The majority begins by addressing the applicable standard of review and concludes that Tallent did not preserve the issue now before us. Maj. op. ¶¶ 11- 13. The majority so concludes despite the fact that the People never argued that the issue was unpreserved and the divisions below ruled on that very issue. I disagree with the majority's conclusion.
¶35 As a preliminary matter, it is unclear to me why the majority is even discussing whether Tallent preserved the issue before us, given that the petition was brought by the People, and not by Tallent. Appellate courts do not ordinarily ask whether the respondent preserved for appellate review the issue that the petitioner is raising. And to the extent that preservation of the question now before us was ever an issue, it would have been an issue in People v. Tallent, No. 15CA0040 (May 24, 2018) ("Tallent II"), not in the matter presently before us.
¶36 More to the point, I believe it to be well settled that when an issue is sufficiently brought to the attention of the court below and that court then rules on the matter, the question is properly preserved for appellate review. See Brown v. Am. Standard Ins. Co., 2019 COA 11, ¶ 23, 436 P.3d 597, 600 (concluding that because the district court had ruled on the issue raised in the appellate court, the issue was preserved for appeal); Battle N., LLC v. Sensible Hous. Co., 2015 COA 83, ¶ 13, 370 P.3d 238, 244 (concluding that an issue was properly preserved for appeal when, despite ambiguity in the request to the trial court, the trial court had ruled on the issue); cf. Comm. for Better Health Care for All Colo. Citizens v. Meyer, 830 P.2d 884, 888 (Colo. 1992) ("It is axiomatic that in any appellate proceeding this court may consider only issues that have actually been determined by another court or agency and have been properly presented for our consideration.").
¶37 Here, the division in Tallent II, at ¶ 14, expressly ruled on the very issue now before us, and our remand order after we announced our decision in Morehead placed the issue squarely before the division in Tallent III. Moreover, the Tallent III division directly addressed the very issue on which we granted certiorari, which is perhaps why no party raised any question about preservation in this case.
¶38 For all of these reasons, I believe that the issue was properly presented for our review.
¶39 In ruling to the contrary, the majority does not appear to recognize what I perceive to be the inconsistency in its approach to issue preservation. On the one hand, the majority, acting on its own, concludes that Tallent failed to preserve an issue presented by the People, on which the divisions below ruled, and on which we granted certiorari. On the other hand, the majority not only allows the People to advance arguments that they did not raise at the initial suppression hearing in this case but also proceeds to rule favorably for the People on those arguments. ¶40 In my view, fundamental fairness demands a more consistent approach to issue preservation, and I cannot subscribe to what appears to me to be the double standard reflected in the majority's approach.
B. The Division's Reading of Morehead
¶41 Turning then to the issue on which we granted certiorari, I note that in Morehead, ¶ 8, 442 P.3d at 416, we granted certiorari to decide whether a court of appeals division properly limited a trial court's authority on retrial to consider additional arguments for the admission of evidence that the division concluded should have been suppressed by the trial court before the defendant's first trial. We ultimately reversed the division's judgment, concluding that it had erred in restricting the trial court's discretion to consider such additional arguments. Id. at ¶ 20, 442 P.3d at 420. In reaching this conclusion, we observed that trial courts have great discretion in managing suppression hearings, including in prescribing the order of evidence and related matters. Id. at ¶ 13, 442 P.3d at 418. We made clear, however, that the trial court's discretion in this regard is not unlimited. Thus, we observed that a trial court may determine the most expeditious way to proceed and the need to take additional evidence, as long as no party would be unfairly prejudiced by the court's chosen procedure. Id. In addition, we noted, as pertinent here, "The scope and conduct of the suppression hearing are within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court is therefore in the best position to determine whether the parties are at fault for having failed to preserve arguments on a matter the court considered to be at issue before it." Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, a trial court may preclude a party from presenting new arguments after a remand if the party was at fault for not having presented those arguments when the matter was first before the court.
¶42 In light of our decision in Morehead, we entered an order remanding the present case, in which certiorari was then pending, to the division for further proceedings. Tallent (Colo. No. 18SC483, July 1, 2019) (unpublished order). The division, in turn, issued an opinion remanding the case to the trial court with instructions that that court consider (and make findings regarding) (1) whether allowing the People to present new evidence and arguments on remand would unfairly prejudice Tallent, (2) whether the People were at fault for having failed to preserve their new arguments at the initial suppression hearing, and (3) "any other factor [the court] deems relevant." Tallent III, ¶¶ 18, 25, 490 P.3d at 562-63.
¶43 Although this remand order did no more than seek findings on the very factors that we identified in Morehead, the majority today concludes that the division below adopted a more restrictive standard than that which we set forth in Morehead and, on that basis, reverses the division's judgment. Maj. op. ¶ 25. For several reasons, I disagree with the majority's premise and therefore with the conclusions that flow from that premise.
¶44 First, I do not agree that the division below adopted a more restrictive standard than that which we set forth in Morehead. In my view, the division did no more than (1) recite the two factors that we said in Morehead were pertinent to the trial court's exercise of its discretion (i.e., whether allowing new arguments would unfairly prejudice another party and whether the party seeking to present new arguments was at fault for having failed to preserve those arguments in an earlier proceeding) and (2) make clear that these factors were not exclusive. See Tallent III, ¶ 18, 490 P.3d at 562 (noting that the trial court should consider the two factors expressly identified in Morehead and "any other factor [the trial court] deems relevant"). Assuredly, giving the trial court leeway to consider any factor that it deems relevant cannot be said to limit anything that we said in Morehead. Moreover, I believe that the division's decision to remand this case to the trial court with instructions that the court make findings consistent with Morehead made perfect sense, given that the re-opened suppression hearing in this case occurred over five years before Morehead was decided and Tallent had been given no opportunity to address (and the trial court had had no opportunity to make findings regarding) the Morehead factors.
¶45 I am not persuaded otherwise by the fact that the division below phrased its instructions in terms of a "two-step analysis." Tallent III, ¶ 19, 490 P.3d at 562. That analysis simply required that the trial court consider the Morehead factors (and any other factor the court deems relevant), and, if the court decided to allow the People to present new evidence and arguments, to rule on the new contentions. Id. In my view, this "test" says nothing different from what we said in Morehead. Nor did it erode the trial court's discretion in any way. To the contrary, it authorized the trial court to consider any factor that the court deemed relevant.
¶46 Second, by concluding that the division erred in requiring the trial court to consider the factors that we set forth in Morehead and "any other factor [the trial court] deems relevant," the majority effectively concludes that Morehead establishes no standards at all, which renders the trial court's determination as to whether to re-open the suppression hearing virtually unreviewable. (Indeed, in their opening brief in this court, the People made clear that this is precisely the result that they were seeking, arguing, remarkably, "The fact that [the division below] set any parameters at all on how a trial court exercises its discretion demonstrates that it overstepped its bounds.") In my view, such an analytical regime will likely ensure that, in the future, suppression hearings (and any number of other matters on remand) will be conducted by installment, with relitigation of an almost unlimited range of issues (by any party) being freely permitted. Unlike my colleagues, I cannot justify the costs in time and resources that will befall both litigants and our already exceptionally busy trial courts as a result of a rule that, contrary to the well-settled law of the case doctrine, places essentially no limits on a party's right to relitigate just about any issue previously decided by a trial court (and, as here, an appellate court). See People v. Dunlap, 975 P.2d 723, 758 (Colo. 1999) (noting that under the law of the case doctrine, "prior relevant rulings made in the same case are to be followed unless such application would result in error or unless the ruling is no longer sound due to changed conditions"); People v. Roybal, 672 P.2d 1003, 1005 (Colo. 1983) (noting that the law of the case doctrine "serves the dual purpose of protecting against the reargument of settled issues and assuring the adherence of lower courts to the decisions of higher courts").
¶47 Third, I note that the majority's ruling in this case does not account for the facts that the re-opened suppression hearing at issue took place more than five years before Morehead was decided and that, therefore, Tallent was given no opportunity to be heard on (and the trial court did not address) the propriety of the court's allowing further evidence and argument on the motion to suppress. Indeed, contrary to Morehead, the majority's ruling deprives Tallent of any opportunity to try to show the potential prejudice resulting from the trial court's allowing the People a second bite at the apple a decade after the original suppression hearing. Nor will Tallent have an opportunity to make a record regarding the People's alleged fault in not presenting its new evidence and arguments at the initial suppression hearing.
¶48 I do not read Morehead as stretching as far as my colleagues do. Nor can I subscribe to a procedure that deprives Tallent of a meaningful opportunity to be heard and that in future cases will essentially eliminate any basis for appellate review. As we have consistently observed, a trial court's discretion in matters like the one before us is not unlimited, and we may not abdicate our responsibility as a reviewing court to assess the propriety of the trial court's exercise of its discretion. In my view, the majority's opinion ensures just such a result.
C. Merits
¶49 Finally, I respectfully disagree with the majority's decision to address and determine the merits of the new arguments that the People raised for the first time at the re-opened suppression hearing.
¶50 Although I understand and sympathize with the majority's apparent desire to move this case forward, we have consistently declined to address issues beyond the scope of those on which we have granted certiorari. See, e.g., People in Int. of R.D., 2020 CO 44, ¶ 32 n.16, 464 P.3d 717, 726 n.16; Bermel v. BlueRadios, Inc., 2019 CO 31, ¶ 18 n.4, 440 P.3d 1150, 1154 n.4.
¶51 In my view, the merits of the issues that the People raised for the first time at the re-opened suppression hearing are beyond the scope of the very limited question on which we granted certiorari. Moreover, for the reasons noted above, by ruling on these questions, the majority has deprived Tallent of any opportunity to make a record on the issues that we identified in Morehead as relevant to the trial court's exercise of its discretion. Because Morehead was decided years after the pertinent proceedings in the trial court, I believe that fundamental fairness demands that we give him that opportunity.
III. Conclusion
¶52 For these reasons, I believe that the division properly followed our mandate in Morehead, and its ruling ensured that Tallent would be given a full and fair opportunity to make a record on the factors that we, in Morehead, deemed pertinent to the trial court's exercise of its discretion. The majority's opinion, in contrast, deprives him of any opportunity to do so.
¶53 I would therefore affirm the judgment of the division below. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that JUSTICE HOOD joins in this dissent.
Whether the court of appeals failed to follow this Court's decision in
People v. Morehead, 2019 CO 48,
442 P.3d 413, by attempting to define and constrain the trial court's exercise of its discretion on remand.