THEODORE D. CHUANG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
MEMORANDUM OPINION
THEODORE D. CHUANG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff Verniece Rorie, a 62-year-old African American woman currently employed as a Vice Principal by the Charles County Public Schools, has filed suit against the Board of Education of Charles County (“the Board”); Kimberly Hill, Superintendent of Charles County Public Schools (“CCPS”); and Amy Hollstein, Deputy Superintendent of CCPS, alleging race discrimination, age discrimination, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2018), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2018); race discrimination, age discrimination, and due process violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”); race discrimination in violation of § 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“§ 1981”); and state law claims of defamation and breach of contract based on her demotion from Principal to Vice Principal in the wake of an October 29, 2019 playground incident at Gale-Bailey Elementary School in Charles County (“the October 29, 2019 Incident”). Defendants have filed a Partial Answer responding to Rorie's Title VII and ADEA retaliation claims and a Partial Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint as to her remaining claims. Having reviewed the briefs and submitted materials relating to the Motion, the Court finds no hearing necessary. See D. Md. Local R. 105.6. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
BACKGROUND
I. October 29, 2019 Incident
On October 29, 2019 between 2:15 p.m. and 2:45 p.m., a number of fourth grade students at Gale-Bailey Elementary School (“Gale-Bailey”) in Charles County, Maryland were playing a game of “monster tag” on the school playground. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21-29, ECF No. 14. At some point during the game, one of the boys approached three of the girls, stated an interest in having sex with them using graphic language, and grabbed the hand of one of the girls. Two other boys stood nearby during the incident. All six of the students were about 10 years old at the time. The girls told the teachers supervising the playground about the incident, and at about 3:00 p.m., the three girls were sent to report it to Vice Principal Timothy Rosin, who was in charge of disciplinary matters. Rorie was on sick leave that day and was not present at Gale-Bailey.
CCPS had no written procedure for handling sexual incidents like the one on the playground, nor had CCPS provided staff with training on how to address such issues. Rosin instructed the three girls to each complete an Incident Statement Sheet (“Incident Sheet”). He then summoned to his office the three boys who had been present for the incident and directed them to complete Incident Sheets. By 4:00 p.m., the end of the school day, the girls had not completed their Incident Sheets, but Rosin dismissed them to ensure that they would not miss the school buses taking them home and instructed them to return to his office the next day to complete their Incident Sheets. Rosin instructed the students to inform their parents of the incident and separately made phone calls to the parents and spoke to or left messages for them. At some point that day or the next, Rosin discussed the incident with Rorie.
The following day, on October 30, 2019, the three girls returned to school to complete their Incident Sheets but then left the school because their parents had decided that their children would not return to Gale-Bailey. The same day, Officers Eugene Caballero and James Plunkett, who were school resource officers employed by the Charles County Sheriffs Office, arrived at GaleBailey to conduct an investigation of the incident, which included assessing whether criminal charges should be brought against the boys. In accordance with protocol, Rosin did not take any disciplinary action while the investigation was ongoing.
Also on October 30, Rorie returned to Gale-Bailey from sick leave and contacted CCPS Executive Director of School Administration Linda Gill for instructions on how to proceed. Gill directed Rorie to contact CCPS Title IX Coordinator Kathy Kiessling to inform her of the incident, to contact the parents of the three boys to inform them that the students could face disciplinary action following the investigation, and to consider suspending the boys and moving them to another class. When Rorie spoke to Kiessling, Kiessling reiterated Gill's suggestion that all three boys be suspended, and Rorie inquired as to the possibility of transferring the boy who had made sexually explicit comments to another school.
On November 1, 2019, Officers Caballero and Plunkett concluded their investigation and told Rorie that the boy who had made the sexual comments would be charged as a juvenile with fourth-degree sexual assault and second-degree assault. He was transferred to another school and never returned to Gale-Bailey. Consistent with Kiessling's recommendation that the boys be suspended, the other two boys received and served three-day suspensions, then returned to school. Rorie was the school official who notified the boys of their suspensions.
The decision to charge one of the boys with a criminal offense was controversial and became a topic of discussion and rumor on social media. In the wake of the incident, more than 50 parents contacted Rorie seeking information about what had occurred. CCPS, citing the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2018), tightly restricted what Rorie and Rosin were allowed to say about the incident, even to the parents of the students involved, and Deputy Superintendent Hollstein refused to allow Rorie to send a letter to all Gale-Bailey parents informing them of the incident.
On November 11, 2019, Rorie and Rosin met with Superintendent Hill, Hollstein, and Gill to discuss the October 29, 2019 incident. According to Rorie, Hill made unfounded accusations that Rosin had mishandled the incident On November 13, 2019, Rorie submitted an Incident Report about the October 29, 2019 Incident and its aftermath, and that same day CCPS issued its first public statement about the incident. With the ensuing media coverage, which included reporting that the parents of the girls were upset . 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the Amended Complaint, Rorie alleges claims against Superintendent Hill and Deputy Superintendent Hollstein under § 1983 for race discrimination (Counts 3 and 4) and age discrimination (Counts 5 and 6) under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and due process violations (Counts 7 and 8) under the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. Official Capacity
As a threshold matter, Defendants argue that the § 1983 claims against Hill and Hollstein must be dismissed because, although asserted against them in their personal capacities, those claims in fact relate to actions those Defendants took in their official capacities. In turn, claims against state officials in their official capacities are effectively claims against the state and are thus not proper claims against a “person, ” as required for a § 1983 claim. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons' under § 1983.”). The Court disagrees. Distinctions in § 1983 claims between official capacity and personal capacity suits are “best understood as a reference to the capacity in which the state officer is sued, not the capacity in which the officer inflicts the alleged injury.” See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26 (1991) (rejecting the argument that a state agent may not be sued in the agent's personal capacity under § 1983 for actions taken within the agent's authority). The United States Supreme Court has expressly rejected the proposition Defendants advance here, that acts taken pursuant to a state official's authority cannot give rise to a personalcapacity action, finding that such an argument “finds no support in the broad language of § 1983” and “ignores” Supreme Court precedent holding that § 1983 was enacted “to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment against those who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it.” Id. at 28 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 243 (1974)).
Defendants' cited authority does not lead to a contrary conclusion. In particular, Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56 (4th Cir. 1995), the only controlling authority offered by Defendants, did not hold that acts taken as part of a state actor's official duties cannot give rise to a personalcapacity action, but instead sets forth a test to determine whether, when a complaint does not specify in which capacity a state actor is sued, the state actor should be construed as sued in an official or personal capacity. Id. at 58, 61. Here, Rorie has sued Hall and Hollstein in their personal capacities, so the problem addressed by Biggs is not presented here. Hall and Hollstein are thus properly subject to suit in their personal capacities for actions taken in the course of their duties.
B. Age Discrimination
Rorie's § 1983 age discrimination claims against Superintendent Hall and Deputy Superintendent Hollstein in their personal capacities must be dismissed because “the ADEA provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of age discrimination.” Zotnbro v. Balt. City Police Dep't, 868 F.2d 1364, 1369 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that the ADEA “foreclose[d] age discrimination suits under § 1983”). The Motion will therefore be granted as to Counts 5 and 6.
C. Race Discrimination
The standards for Title VII race discrimination claims apply to § 1983 race discrimination claims. Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 786 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting that “the McDonnell Douglas framework, developed for Title VII, has been used to evaluate race discrimination claims under [Title VII, § 1983, and § 1981]”). Because the Court has already found that Rorie has pleaded a viable race discrimination claim under Title VII, her allegations are sufficient to support a race discrimination claim under § 1983. Defendants, however, also argue that these officials are entitled to qualified immunity from these claims.
Government officials sued in their personal capacities may invoke the protection of qualified immunity to bar a claim for civil damages under § 1983. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Henry v. Purnell, 501 F.3d 374, 376-77 (4th Cir. 2007). When qualified immunity is asserted, a court must consider two questions: (1) whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the official violated a constitutional right; and (2) “whether the right was clearly established, ” that is, “whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Henry, 501 F.3d at 377. For qualified immunity to apply, only one of the questions has to be resolved in favor of the defendant. See Henry, 501 F.3dat377. Courts may address the questions in any order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
Where, as discussed above, the Court has already found, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, sufficient allegations to support a claim of an equal protection violation based on race, qualified immunity would apply only if the right allegedly violated was not “clearly established” at the time of the incident. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999) (citations omitted). Whether a right was “clearly established” turns on whether “the contours of the right [were] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what [the official] is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). In assessing this question, a court generally considers whether the right is found in “cases of controlling authority in [this] jurisdiction”-here, the Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and the Court of Appeals of Maryland-but it may also consider “a consensus of cases of persuasive authority from other jurisdictions” as a basis to find that the conduct was barred by clearly established law. Booker v. SC. Dep't of Corrs., 855 F.3d 533, 538-39 (4th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). A court seeks to identify a case in which a government official “acting under similar circumstances ... was held to have violated” the right. White v. Pauly, 137 S.Ct. 548, 552 (2017); see Safar v. Tingle, 859 F.3d 241, 246 (4th Cir. 2017). Although the facts of such a case need not be “identical” to the present facts, Safar, 859 F.3d at 248, it should be “obvious” that the case applies to the facts, White, 137 S.Ct. at 552. Even if no court has found that the specific conduct in question violated an individual's rights, “if a general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law applies with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question, ” the right may be clearly established. E. W. ex rel. T. W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 185 (4th Cir. 2018).
Here, at the time of the events at issue, it was clearly established that a government employee may bring a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim under § 1983 based race discrimination in employment. Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823, 828 (4th Cir. 1989). It was also clearly established by controlling precedent that race discrimination in violation of Title VII also violates § 1983 when perpetrated by a state actor, see Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 786 (stating that the elements to establish a Title VII and § 1983 race discrimination claim are “the same”), and that such a discrimination claim may be based on discriminatory discipline-when an employee of one race is intentionally given more severe discipline for a similar infraction than a person of a different race. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 276, 281-83 (1976) (finding a valid Title VII race discrimination claim based on the claim that a worker of one race was fired for misappropriating cans of antifreeze while a Black employee who engaged in the same misconduct was retained); see also McDonell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 801, 803-04 (holding that a company that refused to re-employ a Black employee because he had participated in an unlawful activity to block access to the company's plant could still be subject to a race discrimination claim unless “this criterion is applied alike to members of all races”). Where Rorie's race discrimination claim is likewise grounded in the clearly established right to be free from racially discriminatory discipline, Hill and Hollstein are not entitled to qualified immunity from Rorie's § 1983 race discrimination claims. The Motion will be denied as to Counts 3 and 4.
D. Due Process
In Counts 7 and 8, Rorie alleges § 1983 claims against Hill and Hollstein in their personal capacities on the grounds that they did not provide her with notice of her right to a hearing on her demotion and suspension without pay, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process of law. Although Defendants generally state that they are seeking dismissal of these counts, they offer no specific argument for dismissal. Their argument therefore appears to be confined to their general claim that Hill and Holstein are entitled to qualified immunity on all § 1983 claims.
Based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint, dismissal based on qualified immunity is not warranted because Rorie has asserted a violation of a clearly established right and has provided sufficient allegations to state a plausible claim of a violation of that right. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. As to the clearly established right, determining whether a plaintiffs procedural due process rights have been violated is a two-step process. First, the court must determine “[w]hether any procedural protections are due” by deciding whether a “liberty or property” interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause is at stake. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). Second, should the Due Process Clause attach, the court determines “what process is due, ” keeping in mind that “due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Id.
“The Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of property is a safeguard of the security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits.” Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972). “A person's interest in a benefit is a ‘property' interest for due process purposes if there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support [a] claim of entitlement to the benefit.” Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972). A property interest in public employment can be created by state statute, local ordinance, or contract. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976); Roth, 408 U.S. at 576-77 (1972). The Supreme Court has found that the imposition of discipline against a public employee in violation of such procedures, including procedures that require that the employee have an opportunity to respond, can constitute a violation of procedural due process rights. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538, 547-48 (1985) (holding that an Ohio statute that entitled civil service employees to retain their positions unless there was cause for dismissal and set forth certain disciplinary procedures including an opportunity to respond “plainly creates” a property interest, and thus the plaintiff s allegation that he was deprived of a statutorily required chance to respond adequately stated a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim). The Fourth Circuit has likewise found that a public employee with a statutory right to be terminated or suspended only for cause has, as a matter of due process, a right to notice and “some kind of a hearing” before such action is taken. See Garraghty v. Jordan, 830 F.2d 1299, 1299 (4th Cir. 1987). The right at issue was therefore clearly established at the time of Rorie's demotion and suspension.
Further, at that time and through the present, Maryland law included expressly adopted procedures to govern the suspension or dismissal of a public school employee, including a “teacher, principal, supervisor, assistant superintendent, or other professional assistant, ” by the relevant county board of education “on the recommendation of the county superintendent” on grounds including “[w]illful neglect of duty.” Md. Code Ann., Educ. § 6-202(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2018). Before such an employee may be removed from a position for that reason, “the county board of education shall send the individual a copy of the charges against the individual” and give the individual an opportunity to request a hearing. Id. § 6-202(a)(2)(i). Based on this statutory scheme, at the time of the events at issue, it was clearly established that Rorie had a protectable due process property right relating to her removal from the position of Principal, namely the process set forth in section 6-202. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 547-48; Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614; Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640.
Turning to whether Rorie has alleged sufficient facts to state a plausible violation of her due process rights, Rorie has alleged that she was suspended without pay, removed from her position as Principal, and demoted to the position of Vice Principal without having received the statutorily required copy of the charges against her and was not given an opportunity to request a hearing before the discipline was imposed. Where state law sets forth specific disciplinary procedures and Rorie asserts that those procedures were not followed, the Court finds that, at this stage, she has sufficiently alleged a violation of a protected property interest in her position as Principal for purposes of a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 547-48.
However, whether Hill and Hollstein can each be held liable in their personal capacities for a violation of that right is a separate question. Notably, section 6-202 requires the “county board” to provide the required notice, and the county board's decision to suspend, dismiss, or remove an individual is to be taken “on the recommendation of the county superintendent.” Md. Code Ann., Educ. § 6-202(a)(2)(i), (a)(1). Where the statute confers no power or duties on a deputy superintendent in the disciplinary process, the Court concludes that Hollstein had no due process obligations to Rorie, such that Rorie has failed to state a § 1983 procedural due process claim against her.
The Motion will therefore be granted as to Count 8, Rorie's § 1983 due process claim against Deputy Superintendent Hollstein, but will be denied as to Count 7, Rorie's § 1983 due process claim against Superintendent Hill in her personal capacity.
E. Defamation
Defendants seek dismissal of Rorie's defamation claims on the grounds that Rorie has not sufficiently pleaded actual malice, and that the relevant statements are constitutionally protected opinions. To establish a prima facie case of defamation under Maryland law, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the defendant made a defamatory statement to a third person (a requirement known as publication); (2) the statement was false; (3) the defendant was legally at fault in making the statement; and (4) the plaintiff thereby suffered harm. Gohari v. Darvish, 767 A.2d 321, 327 (Md. 2001). Under the first element, a defamatory statement is one “which tends to expose a person to public scorn, hatred, contempt or ridicule, thereby discouraging others in the community from having a good opinion of, or associating with, that person.” Id. (quoting Rosenberg v. Helinski, 616 A.2d 866, 871 (Md. 1992)). Under the second element, a statement is “false” if it was “not substantially correct.” Piscatelli v. Van Smith, 35 A.3d 1140, 1147 (Md. 2012).
Generally, establishing the third element that a defendant is legally at fault requires a showing that, at a minimum, the party making the false statement acted negligently. Hearst Corp. v. Hughes, 466 A.2d 486, 490-92 (Md. 1983). However, when, as here, the plaintiff is a public figure, the standard is actual malice. Capital-Gazette Newspapers, Inc. v. Stack, 445 A.2d 1038, 1043 (Md. 1982); Kapiloff v. Dunn, 343 A.2d 251, 258 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975) (finding that the plaintiff, a high school principal, was a public figure for purposes of his libel claim). Actual malice is established by showing that the speaker made the statement with actual knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for its truth. Hearst Corp., 466 A.2d at 490.
On the fourth element, harm is presumed if the statement was defamatory per se in that the injurious character of the statement is self-evident, and if the plaintiff can demonstrate actual malice. Hearst Corp., 466 A.2d at 493; Samuels v. Tschechtelin, 763 A.2d 209, 245 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000). If the defamation is per quod, in that the factfinder must determine whether the statement is in fact defamatory, the plaintiff must show that the words caused actual damage. Metromedia, Inc. v. Hillman, 400 A.2d 1117, 1123 (Md. 1979); Samuels, 763 A.2d at 245.
Rorie asserts two claims of defamation, one against Superintendent Hill and the other against the Board, based on the same two statements. The first is CCPS Communications Director O'Malley-Simpson's November 22, 2019 statement to the Southern Maryland Chronicle, “This is not the way this type of case should be handled and the individuals involved in making that decision are being retrained in the proper procedures and responses.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 123, 224, 228. The second is Hill's November 24, 2019 statement on local news station Fox 8 that staff members would be retrained and that “I apologize to you for what happened to your daughter and any other children in this situation because it shouldn't happen.” Id. ¶¶ 127, 225, 229.
Construing the allegations facts in the light most favorable to Rorie, the Court finds that her defamation claims may proceed. As to O'Malley-Simpson's statement, Rorie alleges that the statement that “the individuals involved in making that decision are being retrained in the proper procedures and responses, ” Am. Compl. ¶ 123, was knowingly false because “the individuals involved” was a clear reference to Rorie and Rosin, and neither received or ultimately received any retraining, nor were any new, proper procedures or responses put in place. Where this statement could reasonably be construed as taking the position that Rorie and Rosin had mishandled the October 29, 2019 incident, the statement could qualify as defamatory in that it tended “to expose a person to public scorn, hatred, contempt or ridicule, ” particularly in light of the significant criticism that Gale-Bailey parents were already expressing, including calling for Hill's resignation and the removal of Rorie and Rosin from their positions. Gohari, 767 A.2d at 327.
Because O'Malley-Simpson was speaking on behalf of the Board and had been participating in the internal discussions about CCPS's response to the incident, including informing Rorie that she was not to issue a letter to parents about the incident, it would be reasonable to infer that O'Malley-Simpson either had knowledge of the fact that Rorie had not mishandled the incident and instead had faithfully followed directions from CCPS leadership, and that Rorie was not being subjected to any retraining to address mistakes, or at a minimum that O'Malley-Simpson made the statement with reckless disregard for whether it was true. See Hearst Corp., 466 A.2d at 490. Finally, Hill could be legally responsible for O'Malley-Simpson's statement because, “[a]n officer or managing employee may be liable for a co-employee's tortious conduct if he or she participated in or directed the conduct.” Balt. Police Dep't v. Cherkes, 780 A.2d 410, 440 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001). At this preliminary stage, where Rorie's allegations reflect that Hill was actively involved in managing the response to the October 29, 2019 incident, the allegations can be construed as supporting the inference that O'Malley-Simpson's statements were made at the direction of, or with the participation of, Hill.
As for Hill's statement, the part in which she said, “I apologize to you for what happened to your daughter and any other child in this situation because it shouldn't happen, ” is not alone actionable because there is nothing false about it, and the view that “it shouldn't happen” is a clear reference to the misconduct of the fourth grade boys. Am. Compl. ¶ 127. However, for the same reasons discussed in relation to O'Malley-Simpson's similar statement, Hill's additional statement that staff members would be retrained was false. Where Hill was the Superintendent of CCPS and, like O'Malley-Simpson, was actively involved in the response to the October 29, 2019 incident, it can likewise be fairly inferred that Hill had knowledge of the falsity of her statement about retraining, or that, at least, she had a reckless disregard for its truth. The defamation claims may therefore proceed.
Defendants' argument that certain portions of the statements at issue are opinions, including O'Malley-Simpson's statement, “This is not the way this type of case should be handled, ” does not alter this conclusion. Id. ¶ 123. Although Defendants are correct that this statement can be categorized as an opinion, they are incorrect that such opinions are necessarily constitutionally protected speech that cannot form the basis for a defamation claim. Opinions based on disclosed facts are protected speech. See, e.g., Biospherics, Inc. v. Forbes, Inc., 151 F.3d 180, 185 (4th Cir. 1998) (“When the bases for the conclusion are fully disclosed, no reasonable reader would consider the term anything but the opinion of the author drawn from the circumstances related.” (citation omitted)). However, ‘“[a] statement, even if expressed in terms of an opinion, can be defamatory under certain circumstances, ” including “[w]hen the underlying facts used to form the opinion are not given along with the defamatory statement, ” in which case “the statement itself may be treated as being factual and therefore potentially defamatory.” Murray v. United Food & Com. Workers Int'l Union, 289 F.3d 297, 306 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Peroutka v. Streng, 695 A.2d 1287, 1297 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997)); see Hearst, 466 A.2d at 496 (noting that the Restatement of Torts (Second) “distinguishes between ‘pure' and 'mixed
Peroutka v. Streng, 695 A.2d 1287, 1298 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts).
On this theory, O'Malley-Simpson's statement that the October 29 Incident had not been properly handled could potentially be the basis for a defamation claim, because it implies undisclosed facts as to errors in how the case was handled and how that handling may have diverged from existing, proper procedures. Crediting Rorie's assertion that she handled the incident entirely in accordance with the instructions she received from Hill and Hollstein and that no procedures were in place to which she could have adhered, the Court can plausibly infer that the implied, undisclosed facts that Rorie mishandled the incident were false and that O'Malley-Simpson, as an allegedly active participant in handling the case, knew as much.
The Court thus finds that Rorie has adequately pleaded claims for defamation. The Motion will be denied as to Counts 13 and 14.
F. Breach of Contract
Rorie also asserts a breach of contract claim. In Maryland, “to prevail in an action for breach of contract, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant owed the plaintiff a contractual obligation and that the defendant breached that obligation.” Taylor v. NationsBank, NA., 776 A.2d 645, 651 (Md. 2001).
Here, Rorie does not identify any particular contract and instead asserts only that the Board was in breach of “its contract with Ms. Rorie” when it violated her due process rights. Am. Compl. ¶ 232. In particular, Rorie nowhere describes any employment contract she had with the Board or any of the terms of such a contract. Although she references the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, that doctrine applies only when there is an actual contract between the parties. See E. Shore Markets, Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 182, 184 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that Maryland law recognizes an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in all negotiated contracts, but that the implied covenant imposes no “new obligations about which the contract is silent” because “(a]n implied duty is simply a recognition of conditions inherent in expressed promises”). Where the Amended Complaint does not even allege facts showing that there was a contract between Rorie and the Board, the breach of contract claim will be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. It will be granted as to Rorie's § 1983 age discrimination claims (Counts 5 and 6), § 1983 due process claim against Deputy Superintendent Hollstein (Count 8); § 1981 claims (Counts 9 and 10), and breach of contract claim (Count 15). It will otherwise be denied. A separate Order shall issue.