Richard B. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

MTCHAEL J. ROOMER United States Magistrate Judge

DECISION AND ORDER

MTCHAEL J. ROOMER United States Magistrate Judge

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c), the parties consented to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct all proceedings in this case. (Dkt. No. 26).

Plaintiff Richard B. ("plaintiff') brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner" or "defendant") denying him Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under the Social Security Act (the "Act"). Both parties have moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the following reasons, plaintiffs motion (Dkt. No. 19) is denied and defendant's motion (Dkt. No. 21) is granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff protectively filed an application for DIB on September 24, 2018 alleging disability since April 1, 2012 due to brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, and anxiety. (See Tr. 203-04, 235-42). Although Plaintiff alleged disability since April 1, 2012, he was receiving disability benefits from a prior claim through November 17, 2017, at which time those benefits were ceased. That cessation is not at issue in this case, and the Administrative Law Judge determined that the relevant period for this application began on November 17, 2017. (Tr. 15). Plaintiffs SSI application was initially denied on February 14, 2019. (Tr. 134-36). Plaintiff sought review of the determination, and a hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Stephen Cordovani on November 18, 2019. (Tr. 33-95). ALJ Cordovani heard testimony from plaintiff, who was not represented by counsel, and Michael Smith, an impartial vocational expert ("VE"). (Id.). On December 31, 2019, ALJ Cordovani issued a decision that plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. (Tr. 12-31). Plaintiff sought review by the Appeals Council and his request was denied. (Tr. 1-6). The ALJ's December 31, 2019 denial of benefits became the Commissioner's final determination, and the instant lawsuit followed.

Born on April 27, 1979, plaintiff was 32 years old on the alleged disability onset date and 40 years old on the date of the hearing. (Tr. 233). Plaintiff is able to communicate in English, has a high school education, and previously worked as a form carpenter, machine operator, stock person, and dairy farm herdsman/milker/hood trimmer. (Tr. 237).

DISCUSSION

I. Scope of Judicial Review

The Court's review of the Commissioner's decision is deferential. Under the Act, the Commissioner's factual determinations "shall be conclusive" so long as they are "supported by substantial evidence," 42 U.S.C. §405(g), that is, supported by "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the] conclusion," Richardson v. Persies, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "The substantial evidence test applies not only to findings on basic evidentiary facts, but also to inferences and conclusions drawn from the facts." Smith v. Colvin, 17 F.Supp.3d 260, 264 (W.D.N.Y. 2014). "Where the Commissioner's decision rests on adequate findings supported by evidence having rational probative force," the Court may "not substitute [its] judgment for that of the Commissioner." Veino v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 578, 586 (2d Cir. 2002). Thus, the Court's task is to ask "'whether the record, read as a whole, yields such evidence as would allow a reasonable mind to accept the conclusions reached' by the Commissioner." Silvers v. Colvin, 67 F.Supp.3d 570, 574 (W.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982)).

Two related rules follow from the Act's standard of review. The first is that "[i]t is the function of the [Commissioner], not [the Court], to resolve evidentiary conflicts and to appraise the credibility of witnesses, including the claimant." Carroll v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 705 F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 1983). The second rule is that "[g]enuine conflicts in the medical evidence are for the Commissioner to resolve." Veino, 312 F.3d at 588. While the applicable standard of review is deferential, this does not mean that the Commissioner's decision is presumptively correct. The Commissioner's decision is, as described above, subject to remand or reversal if the factual conclusions on which it is based are not supported by substantial evidence. Further, the Commissioner's factual conclusions must be applied to the correct legal standard. Kohlerv. Astrue, 546 F.3d 260, 265 (2d Cir. 2008). Failure to apply the correct legal standard is reversible error. Id.

II. Standards for Determining "Disability" Under the Act

A "disability" is an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A). The Commissioner may find the claimant disabled "only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to doentitled to weigh all of the evidence available to make findings that are consistent with the record as a whole. See Matta v. Astrue, 508 Fed.Appx. 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order) (in the context of RFC assessments) (citing Perales, 402 U.S. at 399 ("We therefore are presented with the not uncommon situation of conflicting medical evidence. The trier of fact has the duty to resolve that conflict.")). "The ALJ may reject the conclusions of any medical expert, whether hired by the claimant or the government, if they are inconsistent with the record as a whole." Wagner v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 842, 848 (8th Cir. 2007).

Here, the ALJ's RFC determination is supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ found that plaintiff was capable of simple, unskilled, light work with limited social interaction and a low stress environment. He explained that he made such a determination based on plaintiffs disposition during examinations; intact immediate memory recall, attention, and concentration; ability to maintain friendships; live with others; shop in stores; take the bus; work part-time construction, plumbing, and heating jobs; and perform various other daily activities. (Tr. 20-24). He also relied on the opinions of Dr. Khanam, Dr. Fabiano, Dr. Juriga, Dr. Krist, Dr. Poss, and Dr. Hoffman, all of which he found "generally persuasive." (Tr. 23-24).

Plaintiffs argument that the ALJ failed to reconcile the opinions of Dr. Khanam and Dr. Fabiano with the RFC findings and other persuasive opinions is without merit because plaintiff has not shown that the cited opinions are inconsistent with the others or the RFC. In fact, the ALJ incorporated each of those opinions into the RFC and plaintiff has not established that he is more limited than the ALJ determined. See Smith v. Berryhill, 740 Fed.Appx. 721, 726 (holding that a plaintiff has the duty to prove a more restrictive RFC).

More specifically, Dr. Khanam's opinion that plaintiff was limited in social interaction and adaption is not inconsistent with the ALJ's determination that plaintiff was limited to unskilled, low stress work with only occasional interaction with others. Indeed, the ALJ cited those specific opinions of Dr. Khanam in his decision. (Tr. 23). Further, the ALJ's conclusions about plaintiffs mental functioning are supported, and informed, by the opinions of Dr. Hoffman and Dr. Juriga, who found that plaintiff could perform simple directions, could have brief interactions with others, and could handle supervision in customary work settings. (Tr. 24, 104, 123). See Ward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec, 18-CV-1317, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99036, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. June 4, 2020) (collecting cases) ("many courts have found that where, as here, an ALJ properly gave considerable weight to a medical opinion stating a claimant's ability to handle brief and superficial contact, an RFC containing a limitation to 'occasional interaction' is supported by substantial evidence").

It is also inaccurate to say that the ALJ implicitly rejected Dr. Fabiano's opinion regarding plaintiffs marked limitations in ability to understand, remember, or apply complex directions; interact adequately with supervisors, co-workers, and the public; and regulate emotions, control behavior, and maintain well-being. It is apparent to this Court that the ALJ incorporated Dr. Fabiano's opinion when crafting the RFC. See Miller v. Berryhill, 16-CV-06467, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153578, at *19-20 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2017) ("[0]pinions assigning "marked" limitations in various work-related functions do not conclusively demonstrate that a claimant is unable to work."). Consistent with Dr. Fabiano's finding of marked limitations in interacting with others, the ALJ limited plaintiff to only occasional interaction with supervisors, co-workers, and the public. This assessment was not in error. See Fiducia v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec, 13-CV-285, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86974, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. July 2, 2015) (finding that a medical report of "marked" limitation in social interaction was consistent with the ALJ's limitation to work that does not require more than occasional interaction with the public and co-workers). Similarly, Dr. Fabiano's opinion of plaintiffs marked limitations in regulating emotion and controlling behaviors was reflected in the RFC's provision for simple and low-stress work with no independent decision-making or goal setting, no strict production quotas, and minimal changes in work routine and processes. See Hill v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec, 18-CV-1161, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29247, at *12 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2020) (finding that limitation to simple and routine tasks, simple work-related decisions, and only occasional interaction with other adequately accommodates marked limitations in a claimant's ability to adapt or manage oneself); but see Terry M. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec, 19-CV-6550, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77817 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2021) (rejecting conclusion that plaintiff could occasionally interact with supervisors and coworkers despite moderate to marked limitations in appropriately dealing with stress because the ALJ failed to explicitly consider how plaintiffs stress tolerance could affect her RFC). Lastly, the RFC appropriately incorporated Dr. Fabiano's assessment of plaintiffs mild limitations in understanding, remembering, and applying simple directions and instructions; mild to moderate limitations and sustaining concentration and performing tasks at consistent pace; and marked limitations in understanding, remembering, and applying complex directions and instructions. These limitations are consistent with an RFC for simple, unskilled work without strict production quotas. See Mclntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 152 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding substantial evidence that a plaintiff could engage in "simple, routine, low stress tasks" notwithstanding her limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace); Lewis v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec, 18-CV-150, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123543, at *13-14 (W.D.N.Y. July 24, 2019) ("It is well settled that a limitation to unskilled work sufficiently accounts for moderate limitations in work-related functioning, including stress."). Contrary to the plaintiffs assertion, nowhere in Dr. Fabiano's statement does he opine that plaintiff was "limited in his ability to meet all of the basic mental demands of unskilled work." (See Tr. 334). For these reasons, the Court also rejects plaintiffs assertion that the opinions of Dr. Khanam and Dr. Fabiano needed to be reconciled with the other opinion evidence. The Court sees no significant inconsistencies between the opinions which the ALJ found generally persuasive, nor with the RFC. Therefore, the ALJ made no error in failing to explain such.

In sum, the Court finds that the ALJ's decision was based on proper application of the law and is supported by substantial evidence.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 19) is denied and Commissioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 21) is granted.

SO ORDERED.