The Honorable Andrea L. Rocanelli
Upon Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief
DENIED Upon Defendant's Request for Appointment of Postconviction Counsel
DENIED ORDER
Upon consideration of the motion for appointment of postconviction relief counsel filed by Defendant Edward Mujica ("Defendant"); Rule 61 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure ("Rule 61"); the facts, arguments and legal authorities set forth in Defendant's motion; statutory and decisional law; and the entire record in this case, the Court finds as follows:
1. This case involves domestic violence. Defendant was arrested on January 23, 2019 and charged with Stalking, Wearing a Disguise During the Commission of a Felony and Non-Compliance with Conditions of Release, specifically, a No-Contact Order.
2. Defendant was committed to the custody of the Department of Correction in default of bail and was appointed counsel ("Defense Counsel").
3. On October 17, 2019, Defendant pled guilty to Felony Stalking. In connection with the Plea Agreement, the State dismissed the charges of Wearing a Disguise During the Commission of a Felony and Non-Compliance with Conditions of Release, specifically, a No-Contact Order.
4. Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Procedural Rule 11(c)(1), the Court addressed Defendant personally in open court and determined that Defendant understood the nature of the charges to which the plea was offered and the maximum possible penalty provided by law. Accordingly, Defendant acknowledged in open court that the range of possible penalties included the sentence that was imposed by the Court in this case. In addition, the Court addressed with Defendant the fact that the federal government had lodged a detainer for Defendant's deportation.
The Court addressed Defense Counsel as well as Defendant in open court.
The Court: All right. [Defense Counsel] your presentation regarding your client's waiver of his constitutional trial rights and any collateral consequences as well as the statutory consequences he will face.
[Defense Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor, we have discussed the factual allegations. We have discussed the trial rights that he waives. He understands very well that this could have an effect on his immigration status and talked about this for months. I believe he is doing this knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.
The Court: Mr. Mujica, you are before the Court on a felony allegation of stalking, and a felony allegation of wearing a disguise during the commission of a felony, and a misdemeanor of noncompliance with conditions of release. You are entitled to have a trial. At a trial, the jury would be told that you are presumed innocent. You could only be convicted if the jury unanimously agreed that you were guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. You would have the opportunity to challenge the State's evidence and to confront the witnesses who testified against you. [Defense Counsel] would represent you at trial. The trial was scheduled to begin today and the witnesses are present in the courtroom. At a trial, it's possible that you would be found not guilty. It's also possible that you would be found guilty of both felony offenses as well as the misdemeanor offense. [Defense Counsel] has negotiated a plea whereby if you plead guilty to stalking Count 1, the lead charge, the State will dismiss the other two charges you face. Do you understand your constitutional trial rights?
The Defendant: I do understand them.
The Court: Do you understand the risks and benefits of going to trial?
The Defendant: I do understand them.
The Court: Do you understand the risks and benefits of pleading guilty?
The Defendant: I do understand them.
The Court: Specifically for the crime of staking, you can be incarcerated up to three years; is that your understanding?
The Defendant: Yes.
See id. at 9.
The Court specifically addressed Defendant's potential deportation consequences in open court.
The Court: Mr. Mujica, it is also possible that the conviction for this offense will have other consequences with respect to your status of being able to live in this country. Do you understand that?
The Defendant: Yes, I do understand.
5. The Court exercised its broad discretion to impose a prison sentence in excess of the State's recommendation, but within the range of penalties set by statute. Additionally, the Court found that public safety would be enhanced by an extended period of probation pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4333(d)(2).
6. Defendant was sentenced by Order dated October 17, 2019, effective January 23, 2019 for Felony Stalking (3 years at Level V/DOC Discretion, suspended after 2 years, 6 months, for 6 months at Supervision Level III/GPS).
7. Defendant did not appeal the conviction or his sentence to the Delaware Supreme Court.
8. Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief ("Defendant's Rule 61 Motion") as a self-represented litigant as well as a request for appointment of counsel on October 19, 2020. On November 10, 2020, Defendant requested the opportunity to amend or supplement his motion. Defendant's request was granted on December 2, 2020, and the Court provided Defendant with an additional 15 days to supplement his motion. As of February 26, 2021, the Court had not received any additional submissions. The Court was concerned that the delayed submission was related to interruptions created by the COVID-19 pandemic, therefore, the Court conducted a conference with Defendant on March 11, 2021 via Zoom to discuss the status of Defendant's postconviction motion and whether he still intended to supplement his submission. Defendant requested additional time, which was granted by the Court. Defendant's supplemental briefing was received by chambers on April 6, 2021.
9. The Court was notified by DOC that Defendant was deported in or about April 2021.
10. Defendant challenges his October 17, 2019 Guilty Plea on the grounds that he was denied the right to effective assistance of counsel in connection with his plea.
11. Postconviction relief is a "collateral remedy which provides an avenue for upsetting judgments that have otherwise become final." Before addressing the merits of Defendant's Rule 61 Motion, the Court must consider procedural requirements for relief set forth in Rule 61(i). If a procedural bar exists, the Court will not consider the merits of the postconviction claim.
Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 745 (Del. 1990).
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
Id.
12. Rule 61(i)(1) i>client as to the means by which they are to be pursued." (emphasis added)).
In support of Defendant's contention that Defense Counsel should have communicated with Defendant's family, Defendant submitted exhibits consisting of emails and text messages in Spanish allegedly sent by Defendant's family to Counsel. Because Defense Counsel's duty is to Defendant, and not to Defendant's family, the Court declines to consider these exhibits.
See Del. Lawyers' R. Prof'l Conduct 1.6 (client confidentiality).
20. Finally, as the sentencing judge who considered the entire record, the Court is satisfied that Defendant's decision to accept the plea negotiated by Defense Counsel was a reasonable decision in consideration of the very serious charges that were dismissed as a result of Defendant's acceptance of responsibility for Stalking. As noted, in connection with the Plea Agreement, the State dismissed the charges of Wearing a Disguise During the Commission of a Felony and Non-Compliance with Conditions of Release, specifically, a No-Contact Order. If Defendant had gone to trial and was convicted of all charges, the maximum statutory penalty would have been nine years.
21. Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are conclusory and lack any factual support or citation to the record. Based on the record, Defendant's Rule 61 Motion fails to overcome Defendant's representations to the Court during his guilty plea colloquy and on the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form. Further, Defendant's Rule 61 Motion fails to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel under the Strickland standard. The Court finds that Defense Counsel met the objective standard of reasonableness for representation of Defendant. The plea deal offered to Defendant was fair and reasonable based on the facts and the charges that arose from the allegations of repeated domestic violence.
Defendant argues in his motion that he did not understand the statements made during the plea colloquy; however, Defendant is well-educated.
The Court: How far did you go in school?
The Defendant: I have a degree in business administration. I also have media technology degree in industrial relations and career of-to become a lawyer. I completed three of five years.
The Court: So you are well-educated?
The Defendant: Fortunately, yes.
At the plea and sentencing hearing, Defendant was served by New Castle County Police with a Lifetime Protection from Abuse Order related to the victim in this case.
22. With respect to Defendant's motion for postconviction counsel, the Court has discretion to appoint counsel for a first timely postconviction motion in a guilty plea case under Rule 61(e)(3) only if:
See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(3) ("The judge may appoint counsel . . . .").
(i) the conviction has been affirmed by final order upon direct appellate review or direct appellate review is unavailable;
(ii) the motion sets forth a substantial claim that the movant received ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to the plea of guilty or nolo contendere;
(iii) granting the motion would result in vacatur of the judgment of conviction for which the movant is in custody; and
(iv) special circumstances warrant the appointment of counsel.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(3) (emphasis added). --------
23. Defendant is not entitled to appointment of postconviction counsel in this case. The Court has the discretion to appoint counsel if the postconviction motion sets forth a substantial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, among other things. Defense Counsel represented Defendant when he pled guilty. The Court accepted Defendant's guilty plea as knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. As explained above, the record demonstrates that both Defense Counsel and the Court explained the consequences associated with pleading guilty. Moreover, the record shows that Defendant's counsel explained, and Defendant understood, the risks associated with proceeding to trial and the length of jail time Defendant could serve if convicted by a jury. Accordingly, the requirements of Rule 61(e)(3) are not satisfied.
24. The Court shall not appoint counsel. Defendant is not entitled to postconviction relief.
NOW, THEREFORE, this 3rd day of May 2021, Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief is hereby DENIED, and Defendant's request for appointment of postconviction counsel is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/
The Honorable Andrea L. Rocanelli
State v. Mujica, No. 1812004090, at 7-9 (Del. Super. Oct. 17, 2009) (TRANSCRIPT).
Id.
State v. Mujica, No. 1812004090, at 4-5 (Sept. 30, 2019) (TRANSCRIPT).