S.Y. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc.

JOHN E. STEELE SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

OPINION and ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on review of the following two motions to dismiss: (1) defendant Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc.'s Motion To Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. #14) filed on September 30, 2020; and (2) defendant Laxmi of Naples, LLC's Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Strike, or For a More Definite Statement and Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof (Doc. #13) filed on September 28, 2020. Plaintiff filed an Opposition (Doc. #20) on September 28, 2020. Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition to each motion (Doc. #37; Doc. #41) on November 2nd, and November 4, 2020. Defendant Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc. filed a Reply (Doc. #48) on November 30, 2020. For the reasons set forth below, the motions are denied.

The origins of this case began on October 30, 2019, when Plaintiff and another alleged victim of sex trafficking filed a case in the Circuit Court of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit in and for Collier County, Florida. See S.Y. et al v. Naples Hotel Co.et al, Case No. 2:20-cv-118 (Doc. #1, p. 3). On December 31, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint which asserted ten claims against over forty defendants. Id. at (Doc. #1, pp. 2-4). The case was removed to federal court in February 2020. Id. at (Doc. #1). On April 15, 2020, the Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint. Id. at (Doc. #85). On August 5, 2020, the undersigned denied various motions to dismiss, but determined severance of the parties was appropriate. S.Y. v. Naples Hotel Co., 476 F. Supp. 3d 1251, 1258-59 (M.D. Fla. 2020). Following the Court's severance order, plaintiff and the other alleged victim filed nearly thirty new actions against various defendants, including this case.

The Complaint (Doc. #1) in this case was filed on August 19, 2020, alleging that plaintiff S.Y. was a resident of Collier County, Florida, and was a victim of continuous sex trafficking at a certain Super 8 Wyndham Hotel in Naples, Florida (the Super 8) between 2014 and February 2016. (Id. at ¶¶ 13-14, 22-24.) The Complaint further alleges that during this time period defendants Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc. and Laxmi of Naples, LLC (Defendants, or Wyndham or Laxmi) are hotel owners, operators, managers, supervisors, controllers, and/or entities responsible for hotels at which sex trafficking has taken place, including the Super 8. (Id. at ¶ 2.)

The Complaint sets forth the following six claims: violation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA), 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (Count I); violation of the Florida RICO statute, § 772.104, Florida Statutes (Count II); premise liability (Count III); negligent hiring, supervision, and retention (Count IV); negligent rescue (Count V); and aiding and abetting, harboring, confining, coercion, and criminal enterprise (Count VI). (Id., pp. 33-49.) Counts I through IV are asserted against both Defendants, while Counts V through VI are asserted against only Laxmi. (Id.)

Defendant's motions seek to have the Court strike several allegations in the Complaint, as well as raise several arguments as to why the Complaint in its entirety, and each individual claim should be dismissed. (Doc. #13, pp. 4-23; Doc. #14, pp. 5-25.) The Court will address each of these arguments in turn.

A. Shotgun Pleading

Each Defendant argues in its motions, that the Complaint constitutes a shotgun pleading based upon Plaintiff grouping the Defendants together as the "Super 8 Defendants" (Doc. #1, p. 1 introductory paragraph) and should be dismissed. (Doc. #13, pp. 7-9; Doc. #14, pp. 5-6.)

One way in which a complaint may constitute an impermissible shotgun pleading is if it "assert[s] multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against." Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Barmapov v. Amuial, 986 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2021). Such a pleading fails "to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests," Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323, and violates the requirement that a plaintiff provide "a short and plain statement of the claim," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

The Complaint does in fact repeatedly references the defendants collectively as the "Super 8 Defendants." The failure to specify a particular defendant is not fatal, however, when "[t]he complaint can be fairly read to aver that all defendants are responsible for the alleged conduct." Auto. Alignment & Body Serv. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 953 F.3d 707, 733 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Kyle K. v. Chapman, 208 F.3d 940, 944 (11th Cir. 2000)). The Complaint typically (but not always) alleges that "each and every" such defendant was involved in the activity described in the particular paragraph of the Complaint. See (Doc. #1, ¶¶ 4-5, 8-18, holds a tortfeasor liable for injuries to a third party who is hurt in attempting to rescue the direct victim of the tortfeasor. Zivojinovich v. Barner, 525 F.3d 1059, 1070 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). "The basic precept of this doctrine 'is that the person who has created a situation of peril for another will be held in law to have caused peril not only to the victim, but also to his rescuer, and thereby to have caused any injury suffered by the rescuer in the rescue attempt.'" Menendez v. W. Gables Rehab. Hosp., LLC, 123 So. 3d 1178, 1181 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (quoting N.H. Ins. Co. v. Oliver, 730 So. 2d 700, 702 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)).

As plaintiff correctly argues in response (Doc. #37, p. 21), the rescue doctrine is not implicated by plaintiff's negligent rescue claim. See Krajcsik v. Ramsey, 2017 WL 3868560, *2 n.4 (D. Md. Sept. 5, 2017) ("The rescue doctrine is related to, but separate from, the affirmative duty to rescue an imperiled party that the courts impose on persons in some situations."). Accordingly, because the rescue doctrine is not applicable, Laxmi's request for dismissal based on the doctrine is denied.

6. Aiding and Abetting, Harboring, Confining, Coercion and Criminal Enterprise

Finally, Count VI of the Complaint asserts a claim of aiding and abetting against Laxmi. (Doc. #1, ¶¶ 226.) Plaintiff accuses Laxmi of "aiding and abetting unlawful activity including unlawful confinement, imprisonment, assault and battery by [plaintiff's] sex traffickers and 'Johns.'" (Id.) Laxmi argues the claim must be dismissed because (1) it asserts Laxmi "aided and abetted the criminal act of sex trafficking in violation of the TVPRA," and (2) the TVPRA does not provide a cause of action for aiding and abetting. (Doc. #13, p. 22.) Having reviewed the allegations in the Complaint and the relevant case law, the Court finds Laxmi is misinterpreting the claim.

Florida courts have recognized aiding and abetting the commission of a tort as a standalone claim. See Gilison v. Flagler Bank, 303 So. 3d 999, 1002 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (aiding and abetting fraud); MP, LLC v. Sterling Holding, LLC, 231 So. 3d 517, 527 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty). This Court has previously listed the following elements that must be alleged "to state a claim for aiding and abetting a common law tort" under Florida law: "(1) an underlying violation on the part of the primary wrongdoer; (2) knowledge of the underlying violation by the alleged aider and abetter [sic]; and (3) the rendering of substantial assistance in committing the wrongdoing by the alleged aider and abettor." Angell v. Allergan Sales, LLC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142768, 2019 WL 3958262, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2019); see also Lawrence v. Bank of Am., N.A., 455 F. App'x 904, 906 (11th Cir. 2012) (applying the above elements to three Florida tort claims). These cases demonstrate Florida recognizes a common-law claim of aiding and abetting tortious conduct.

Here, the Complaint alleges Laxmi aided and abetted plaintiff's unlawful harboring, confinement, imprisonment, assault and battery, and to the extent the claim alleges Laxmi has actual knowledge, the Court finds it sufficient to state a claim. Accordingly, the Court denies Laxmi's request for dismissal.

D. More Definite Statement

Finally, Laxmi asserts that the Complaint is vague, ambiguous, and fails to provide sufficient information to allow Laxmi to formulate a response. (Doc. #13, pp. 22-23.) Laxmi requests the Court exercise its discretion and order plaintiff provide a more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Id.)

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e), "[a] party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e); see also Euro RSCG Direct Response, LLC v. Green Bullion Fin. Servs., 872 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1358 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (quoting Ramirez v. FBI, No. 8:10-cv-1819-T-23TBM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132271, 2010 WL 5162024, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 14, 2010)) ("A Rule 12(e) motion is appropriate if the pleading is so vague or ambiguous that the opposing party cannot respond, even with a simple denial, in good faith, without prejudice to [itself].").

The Court finds the Complaint is not "so vague or ambiguous" that Defendant could not reasonably respond. Euro RSCG Direct Response, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 1358 ("[A Rule 12(e)] motion is intended to provide a remedy for an unintelligible pleading, rather than a vehicle for obtaining greater detail."); Eye Care Int'l, Inc. v. Underhill, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1316 (M.D. Fla. 2000) (noting that "motions for a more definite statement are not favored in light of the liberal discovery practice," and that "a motion for more definite statement is not to be used as a substitute for discovery"); cf. LeBlanc v. LVNV Funding, LLC, No. 2:19-cv-285-FtM-99MRM, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99983, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 14, 2019) (granting motion for more definite statement, finding "the Complaint contains no facts" and was "not sufficiently specific to place defendant on notice of the claims against it").

Here, Plaintiff has provided specific facts about the elements of each cause of action, Defendant's purported knowledge and participation in ongoing and continuous sex trafficking at the Super 8 by Wyndham Naples in Naples, Florida, that occurred from 2014 through February 2016 with respect to Plaintiff, and its failure to prevent this criminal conduct, which ultimately resulted in Defendant profiting from the trafficking. The Court finds such allegations are sufficiently specific to place Defendant on notice of the claims against it, and as such, Defendant's Motion for a More Definite Statement is denied.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED:

1. Defendant Laxmi of Naples, LLC's Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Strike, or For a More Definite Statement and Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof (Doc. #13) is DENIED.

2. Defendant Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. #14) is DENIED.

/s/_________

JOHN E. STEELE

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Copies:
Counsel of Record