PER CURIAM.
After our opinion was filed in the above-entitled case the petitioner, by leave of court, filed a motion for reargument substantially on the ground that we misinterpreted the language of general laws 1938, chapter 300, article II, § 12, which provides that "Where any bodily member or portion thereof has been rendered stiff so as to be useless" specified compensation shall be paid as if it were severed.
She construes such language to mean "stiff so as to be useless at the wrist, stiff so as to be useless at the elbow, etc." (Emphasis hers.) Such is not the language of the statute. On the contrary it provides for compensation for loss of the arm by severance at or above the elbow or where it or any "portion thereof has been rendered stiff so as to be useless."
If we were to adopt the petitioner's construction she would receive compensation for the loss of use of her arm notwithstanding that there is a certain movement in the shoulder and that she has the use of her hand to a considerable degree. What the statute contemplates is compensation for loss of use of the arm at or above the elbow as though it were served. While there is use at the wrist and in the thumb and fingers it cannot be reasonably found that the arm is stiff so as to be useless.
It may well be, however, that petitioner could show that a portion of some of her finders are useless, but this could not be done under her present petition as she does not specifically allege therein that any portion of such members are still so as to be useless.
In view of the petition and evidence which were before us we see no reason for granting a reargument, and the petitioner's motion is therefore denied.