James R. Ahler United States Bankruptcy Court
Chapter 7
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OF DECISION DENYING MOTION TO WITHDRAW ADMISSIONS
On March 20, 2017, Plaintiff Markeeta Latrise Harris-Teamer ("Harris-Teamer"), pro se, filed a complaint seeking a determination that her educational loans should not be excepted from discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). On July 11, 2018, Defendant Educational Credit Management ("ECM") filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the subject loans would impose an undue hardship upon Harris-Teamer. In support of this motion, ECM principally relies on an unanswered set of Request for Admissions. On April 18, 2019, Harris-Teamer filed her response to the motion for summary judgment, along with a Motion to Withdraw Admissions (the "Motion"). The Court held a final hearing on the foregoing Motion and subsequently took the issue under advisement.
The Request for Admissions are attached to ECM's motion for summary judgment as Exhibit "A"
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36, made applicable to this proceeding by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7036, governs requests for admissions and provides that: "[a] party may serve on any other party a written request to admit, for purposes of the pending action only, the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1) relating to: (A) facts, the application of law to fact, or opinions about either; and (B) the genuineness of any described documents." Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(1); Wells v. EMF Corp., 757 F. Supp.2d 791, 796 (N.D. Ind. 2010). Most relevant to this dispute, Rule 36(a)(3) provides: "[a] matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after being served, the party to whom the request is directed serves on the requesting party a written answer or objection addressed to the matter and signed by the party or its attorney. A shorter or longer time for responding may be stipulated to under Rule 29 or be ordered by the court." Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3). However, upon missing that deadline, the rule is "self-executing." Harmless v. Elec. Control Sec., Inc., No. 1:07-cv-146-SEB-WTL, 2008 WL 686999, at *1 (S.D. Ind. March 10, 2008).
Once a request is admitted under Rule 36(a)(3), the "proper procedural vehicle through which to attempt to withdraw admissions made in these circumstances is a motion under Rule 36(b) to withdraw admissions." Kalis v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 231 F.3d 1049, 1059 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Kasuboski, 834 F.2d 1345, 1349 (7th Cir. 1987)). Subject to Rule 16(e), "[a] court, in its discretion, may permit a party to rescind admissions when doing so better serves the presentation of the merits of the case and the party who benefits from the admissions (usually by relying on them) is not prejudiced." Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b); Banos v. City of Chicago, 398 F.3d 889, 892 (7th Cir. 2005). "However, even if a court determines that both of these prerequisites are met, it may still in the exercise of its discretion refuse to permit amendment." In re Narowetz Mech. Contractors, Inc., 99 B.R. 850, 860 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.1989); Kasuboski, 834 F.2d at 1350 n. 7 ("[R]ule 36(b) allows withdrawal of admissions if certain conditions are met and the district court, in its discretion, permits the withdrawal."); Donovan v. Carls Drug Co., Inc., 703 F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir.1983) ("Because the language of the Rule is permissive, the court is not required to make an exception to Rule 36 even if both the merits and prejudice issues cut in favor of the party seeking exception to the rule.").
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(b) provides in relevant part that "[a] matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court, on motion, permits the admission to be withdrawn or amended. Subject to Rule 16(e), the court may permit withdrawal or amendment if it would promote the presentation of the merits of the action and if the court is not persuaded that it would prejudice the requesting party in maintaining or defending the action on the merits." Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b).
In this case, allowing Harris-Teamer to withdraw her admissions may "promote the presentation of the merits of the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b). However, granting her Motion would be both prejudicial and unfair to ECM. The instructions accompanying the Request for Admissions clearly specify that they are "to be answered fully within thirty (30) days after service hereof" and that "[e]ach of the following statements...shall be admitted unless appropriate action is taken within the time prescribed in Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as made applicable by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 7036." Harris-Teamer does not dispute that: (1) she in fact received the Request for Admissions; (2) she failed to respond timely; or (3) the Requests for Admissions were deemed admitted by operation of law. Instead, she argues that her failure to respond was "due to lack of legal counsel" and that she believed that ECM already had the information it was seeking and, therefore, a response was not necessary.
Exhibit "A" attached to ECM's motion for summary judgment.
Although the Court is aware that pro se litigants face unique challenges, it is generally recognized that procedural rules must be complied with in order to promote an interest in the uniform administration of justice. Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001). To ensure fairness, "rules apply to uncounseled litigants and must be enforced." Members v. Paige, 140 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 1998). Harris-Teamer has not demonstrated good cause as to why she failed to respond to ECM's Request for Admissions. Additionally, ECM relied on her admissions and incurred the expense of preparing its motion for summary judgment, along with all the supporting documents. Thereafter, ECM waited many months for Harris-Teamer to obtain counsel and/or file a response to its motion for summary judgment. When Harris-Teamer finally filed her response to the motion for summary judgment, it was accompanied with this Motion.
Over the course of this adversary proceeding, Plaintiff has failed to take any material action to prosecute her case and has received the benefit of several lengthy continuances. She also has failed to appear at several scheduled hearings, causing further delay and causing ECM to incur additional legal expenses. To illustrate, on March 13, 2018, the Court entered an order setting this matter for an April 18, 2018 status conference. Despite receiving notice of this hearing, Harris-Teamer failed to appear. Subsequent to that hearing, the Court entered an order setting a June 29th discovery deadline and scheduled another status conference for August 3, 2018. Meanwhile, on July 11, 2018, ECM filed its motion for summary judgment based upon the unanswered Request for Admissions.
The record reflects that this order was also served upon Harris-Teamer. --------
At the August 3rd status conference, ECM appeared by counsel and once again, despite receiving notice of the hearing, Harris-Teamer failed to appear. After that hearing, the Court entered an order requiring ECM to comply with Local Bankruptcy Rule B-7056-1(c). This rule provides that unrepresented parties must be served with a separate notice advising them that a summary judgment was filed and that specifically sets out the response time to the pending motion. On September 19, 2018, ECM filed and served the foregoing notice on Harris-Teamer. The Court then proceeded to set a hearing on the motion for summary judgment for December 14, 2018. However, rather than responding to the motion for summary judgment, or attempting to address the unanswered Request for Admissions in any appreciable way, four days before the hearing Harris-Teamer filed a motion to continue it; which the Court granted and reset it for February 15, 2019. Harris-Teamer appeared for this hearing only to request yet another continuance so she could try to obtain counsel. The Court, once again, accommodated her. At a hearing held on April 12th, she reported to the Court that she was unable to find an attorney and the Court gave her until April 19th to respond to ECM's summary judgment motion; which she filed on April 18th, along with her Motion. In sum, given the foregoing facts, it is apparent that Harris-Teamer filed her Motion as a last-ditch effort to prevent the resolution of ECM's motion for summary judgment. The Court cannot permit this as it would prejudice ECM.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court now DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Withdraw Admissions. All of the foregoing is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed in Chambers in Hammond, Indiana on September 4, 2019.
/s/ James R. Ahler
James R. Ahler
United States Bankruptcy Court Distribution: Defendant Harris-Teamer
All attorneys of record