State v. Otton

¶ 8 Smith was a case about the proper interpretation of ER 801(d)(1)(i), an evidentiary rule concerning the definition of “hearsay.” “Hearsay” is defined generally as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” ER 801(c). “Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these [evidentiary] rules, by other court rules, or by statute.” ER 802. However, ER 801(d)(1) provides that an out-of-court statement is not hearsay if

[t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (i) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition.

Because such a statement is not hearsay, it is admissible at trial as substantive evidence, that is, to prove the truth of matter asserted in the statement.

¶ 9 As noted, it is undisputed on appeal that the victim in this case testified at Otton's trial, that she was subject to cross-examination about her prior written statement, that the prior written statement was inconsistent with the victim's trial testimony, and that the prior written statement was given under oath and subject to the penalty of perjury. The only question is whether her police interview was an “other proceeding” within the meaning of ER 801(d)(1)(i).

¶ 10 When confronted with the same question in 1982, this court declined to issue a categorical ruling that a police interview is either always or never considered an “other proceeding.” Smith , 97 Wash.2d at 861, 651 P.2d 207. Rather, we held that “[t]he purposes of the rule and the facts of each case must be analyzed. In determining whether evidence should be admitted, reliability is the key.” Id. Applying this approach to the facts presented, Smith held that the police interview at issue in that case was an “other proceeding” because “the complaining witness-victim voluntarily wrote the statement herself, swore to it under oath with penalty of perjury before a notary, admitted at trial she had made the statement and gave an inconsistent statement at trial where she was subject to cross examination.” Id. at 863, 651 P.2d 207. The victim's sworn statement was therefore admissible as substantive evidence. Id. at 857, 651 P.2d 207.

¶ 11 We have not reexamined Smith since it was issued. However, based on Smith, the Court of Appeals has formulated a four-factor test for determining whether an out-of-court statement by a nonparty witness is admissible pursuant to ER 801(d)(1)(i):

(1) whether the witness voluntarily made the statement, (2) whether there were minimal guaranties of truthfulness, (3) whether the statement was taken as standard procedure in one of the four legally permissible methods for determining the existence of probable cause, and (4) whether the witness was subject to cross examination when giving the subsequent inconsistent statement.

Thach , 126 Wash.App. at 308, 106 P.3d 782. Otton does not challenge the trial court's discretionary determinations that the police interview at issue here qualified as an “other proceeding” and that the victim's written statement was properly admitted in accordance with this four-factor test. He also does not contend that the four-factor test is anything but a faithful application of Smith. Rather, he argues that we should reject Smith.

C. Otton has not shown that Smith is incorrect or harmful

¶ 12 Smith reasonably held that the phrase “other proceeding” must be interpreted Court of Appeals prevent the harmfulness that could theoretically flow from an unrestrained, subjective inquiry into “amorphous notions of ‘reliability,’ ” Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36, 61, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). We therefore hold that Otton has not shown that Smith 's interpretation of an “other proceeding” for purposes of ER 801(d)(1)(i) is clearly incorrect or harmful.

1. Otton has not shown that Smith is incorrect

¶ 13 Where a party asks this court to reject its previous decision, the party must show that the previous decision is “incorrect.” Stranger Creek , 77 Wash.2d at 653, 466 P.2d 508. Otton contends that Smith is incorrect because it conflicts with (1) the plain language of ER 801(d)(1)(i) and applicable principles of rule interpretation and (2) decisions of other jurisdictions that have considered similar evidentiary rules. We disagree with both contentions.

a. Interpretation of evidentiary rules

¶ 14 “This court interprets court rules the same way it interprets statutes, using the tools of statutory construction.” State v. Hawkins , 181 Wash.2d 170, 183, 332 P.3d 408 (2014). We therefore begin with the plain language of the rule. Id. ER 801(d)(1)(i)'s plain language allows prior inconsistent statements by nonparty witnesses to be admitted as substantive evidence if the statements were “given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition.” “Other proceeding” is not defined in the rule, and its meaning is not apparent from the rule's plain language. Smith therefore appropriately looked to the “history and purposes” of the federal counterpart to ER 801(d)(1)(i). Smith , 97 Wash.2d at 859, 651 P.2d 207 ; see Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC , 146 Wash.2d 1, 12, 43 P.3d 4 (2002) (statutory ambiguity may be resolved by considering relevant legislative history).

¶ 15 Smith noted that the first proposed version of the federal rule would have allowed “all prior inconsistent statements to be used as substantive evidence,” but a requirement “that the statement be made under oath, subject to penalty for perjury” was later added “to assure reliability.” Smith , 97 Wash.2d at 859–60, 651 P.2d 207. However, further proposals to restrict the rule by requiring greater procedural formalities (that the statements be given during grand jury proceedings and subject to cross-examination at the time they were given) were rejected. Id. at 860, 651 P.2d 207. This history shows that statements admitted under the rule must meet a certain level of reliability and must have been given with some level of procedural formality, but that the phrase “other proceeding” was intentionally left “open-ended.” Id. at 861, 651 P.2d 207.

¶ 16 Smith also considered “the original purpose of the sworn statement,” and noted that the statement given in that case “was taken as standard procedure in one of the four legally permissible methods for determining the existence of probable cause.” Id. at 862, 651 P.2d 207 (citing State v. Jefferson , 79 Wash.2d 345, 347, 485 P.2d 77 (1971) ). The court noted that “ ‘[o]ther proceeding’ under the rule would clearly cover” three of the four methods—grand jury proceedings, inquest proceedings, and filing a criminal complaint before a magistrate. Id. at 863, 651 P.2d 207. It would therefore be an anomaly to categorically exclude the fourth method—“police investigations into alleged criminal activity, and the taking of statements from witnesses and the presentment of them to the prosecuting attorney.” Id. at 862, 651 P.2d 207.

¶ 17 Otton, however, argues that based on applicable principles of statutory interpretation, this court must hold that an “other proceeding” “mean [s] something similar to the preceding specific terms ‘trial’ or ‘hearing.’ ” Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 6. This, according to Otton, would include “judicial proceedings, often adversarial, where the declarant is officially placed under oath and subject to questioning” but not proceedings like those at issue here, where voluntary, sworn witness statements are given outside “a courtroom or were to assume that this could be a reasonable interpretation in the first instance, it is not compelled by the plain language of ER 801(d)(1)(i).

¶ 18 By focusing on the terms “trial” and “hearing,” Otton takes into account only some of the context in which the term “other proceeding” is used. However, we must “give[ ] effect to the plain language of a court rule, as discerned by reading the rule in its entirety and harmonizing all of its provisions.” State v. George , 160 Wash.2d 727, 735, 158 P.3d 1169 (2007) (emphasis added). This means we must consider the fact that the plain language of ER 801(d)(1)(i) also includes statements made at depositions, which are not necessarily judicial proceedings and may take place outside of a courtroom or governmental office. Otton's proposed interpretation also reads into the phrase “other proceeding” terms that are not there. ER 801(d)(1)(i) does not refer to other judicial proceedings or other adversarial proceedings or other formal proceedings. It refers only to an “other proceeding,” a phrase that “does not, in itself, reveal its own dimension.” United States v. Castro–Ayon , 537 F.2d 1055, 1057 (9th Cir.1976).

¶ 19 Perhaps most problematically, even if we were to agree that the victim's statement here was not given at an “other proceeding,” Otton does not propose a workable analytical framework for future cases. See Key Design Inc. v. Moser , 138 Wash.2d 875, 883, 983 P.2d 653 (1999) (adhering to precedent in part because “Key Design proposes no alternative rule which would provide the clarity and certainty it says the [previous] rule lacks”). He certainly proposes a bright-line rule that witness statements given to investigating police officers are never admissible under ER 801(d)(1)(i), but the suggestions that an “other proceeding” must be adversarial and occur in a governmental building seem untenable. It is not clear how the physical location where a statement is given would necessarily advance the plain language or underlying purposes of the rule, and a grand jury proceeding is clearly an “other proceeding,” even though it is “investigatory,” rather than adversarial, in nature. Castro–Ayon , 537 F.2d at 1058.

¶ 20 We thus conclude that Smith 's interpretation of ER 801(d)(1)(i) was reasonable and that Otton's reading of ER 801(d)(1)(i) is not compelled by the rule's plain language.

b. Decisions from other jurisdictions

¶ 21 Where our prior interpretation is inconsistent with the decisions of “the vast majority of our sister states,” there may be good reason to reconsider our own approach. Davis v. Baugh Indus. Contractors, Inc. , 159 Wash.2d 413, 417, 150 P.3d 545 (2007). However, a decision is not necessarily incorrect merely because it lacks universal acceptance. See Key Design , 138 Wash.2d at 883, 983 P.2d 653 (argument “about the rule being extreme, unusually strict, and not generally accepted or favored” held insufficient). In this case, the decisions of other jurisdictions do not show that Smith 's interpretation of ER 801(d)(1)(i) is clearly incorrect.

¶ 22 We begin with the one jurisdiction that clearly and completely disagrees with Smith —Florida. Florida courts have specifically rejected Smith 's case-by-case approach and instead use a “ ‘bright line’ test” to interpret Florida's version of ER 801(d)(1)(i). Delgado–Santos v. State , 471 So.2d 74, 79 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1985). Under that test, an “ ‘other proceeding’ ” does not ever include a “police interrogation.” State v. Delgado–Santos , 497 So.2d 1199, 1199 (Fla.1986). However, while the Florida evidentiary rule is textually similar to ER 801(d)(1)(i), the Florida courts faced different considerations than the Smith court did. In light of these different considerations, we cannot say that the Florida courts' disagreement with Smith clearly shows that Smith is incorrect.

¶ 23 Notably, in the seminal case establishing Florida's bright-line test, the court was plainly troubled by the circumstances under which the statement at issue in that case was made: the witness who gave the statement was 16 years old at the time, he was accused of participating in the ‘pre-statement interrogation.’ ” Delgado–Santos , 471 So.2d at 75. The Florida court freely acknowledged that the “admixture of Ortiz's youth and the improprieties involved in confining him without arrest and without transporting him to a youth facility” would have been sufficient, in and of themselves, to exclude the proffered statement as substantively unreliable. Id. at 78.

¶ 24 Nevertheless, the Florida court rejected a case-by-case approach, and it did so explicitly as a matter of legislative deference:

While the legislature and Congress may have been ultimately concerned with the “reliability” of a particular statement, they sought to vindicate that concern only by establishing given and objective criteria as to the circumstances, including the kind of forum, under which it was given. And it is for the legislature, not the courts, to determine not only the policy to be promoted, but the means by which that end is to be achieved.

Id. at 79. In Washington, however, evidentiary rules are adopted by this court pursuant to its inherent powers under the state constitution. State v. Gresham , 173 Wash.2d 405, 428, 269 P.3d 207 (2012). “[W]hen interpreting court rules we are not concerned about usurping the role of the legislature because we alone are uniquely positioned to declare the correct interpretation of any court-adopted rule.” Jafar v. Webb , 177 Wash.2d 520, 527, 303 P.3d 1042 (2013).

¶ 25 Moreover, ER 801 is subject to amendment according to prescribed procedures, and ER 801(d)(1)(i) has never been amended to reject Smith. See GR 9 (procedures for rule making by this court). When considering challenges to previous statutory interpretations, “[t]his court presumes that the legislature is aware of judicial interpretations of its enactments and takes its failure to amend a statute following a judicial decision interpreting that statute to indicate legislative acquiescence in that decision.” City of Federal Way v. Koenig , 167 Wash.2d 341, 348, 217 P.3d 1172 (2009). We may comfortably presume that this court is aware of its own interpretations of evidentiary rules, and here, over 30 years have elapsed since Smith was decided and ER 801(d)(1)(i) has not been amended to reject it.

¶ 26 Otton also suggests that federal courts interpreting the federal equivalent of ER 801(d)(1)(i) have rejected Smith 's interpretation. In United States v. Dietrich , 854 F.2d 1056, 1061 (7th Cir.1988), the Seventh Circuit held that “[t]he term ‘other proceeding’ is not unlimited. A typical police station interrogation, for example, is not an ‘other proceeding’ within the meaning of the [federal] Rule[, FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) ].” Instead, Dietrich posited that ‘ “[t]he [federal] Rule seems to contemplate situations in which an official verbatim record is routinely kept, whether stenographically or by electronic means, under legal authority.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Livingston , 213 U.S.App.D.C. 18, 661 F.2d 239, 240 (1981) ). That might be a reasonable way to limit the phrase “other proceeding,” but it is not clear why it is more reasonable than Smith 's interpretation, let alone so clearly correct that we must adopt it and reject Smith. The text of ER 801(d)(1)(i) makes absolutely no reference to official verbatim records, and does not clearly intend to limit an “other proceeding” on the basis of specific procedural indicia of reliability beyond those required by the rule's plain language.

¶ 27 Moreover, like the Florida court in Delgado–Santos, the federal court in Dietrich was plainly concerned about the fact that the statements at issue were of questionable substantive reliability, in part because they were given by an individual who was under imminent threat of arrest for allegations related to the ultimate crime at issue. 854 F.2d at 1061–62; Delgado–Santos , 471 So.2d at 75. That concern (Glickstein, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“In my view, the ‘bright line’ test effects a lockstep or mind-set that could produce the injustice the test seeks to prevent.”).

¶ 28 Other federal cases also do not advance Otton's argument. Some cases, though holding statements made to investigating police were not given at an “other proceeding,” explicitly acknowledge that the purpose of the rule is “to ensure the reliability and truthfulness of any prior inconsistent statement,” and therefore look to “the totality of the circumstances” under which the statement was given. United States v. Day , 789 F.2d 1217, 1223 (6th Cir.1986) ; see also Livingston , 661 F.2d at 243. This clearly indicates an approval of a case-by-case approach turning on some indicia of reliability. And the Ninth Circuit has interpreted the federal rule in a manner entirely consistent with Smith, holding that an interrogation by immigration officials is an “other proceeding” under the rule and noting that “the choice of the open-ended term ‘other proceedings' was intentional.” Castro–Ayon , 537 F.2d at 1058.

¶ 29 If Washington were an extreme outlier in its interpretation of ER 801(d)(1)(i), we might reconsider Smith, even though it was a reasonable decision at the time it was made and has not been rejected by any intervening rule amendments. However, Washington is not such an outlier. Otton thus fails to show that Smith is clearly incorrect.

2. Otton has not shown that Smith is harmful

¶ 30 Even if Otton could show that Smith is clearly incorrect, we will not reject our precedent unless it is “both incorrect and harmful.” Barber , 170 Wash.2d at 864, 248 P.3d 494. However, the four-factor test formulated by the Court of Appeals creates a principled framework for determining whether a prior, inconsistent, out-of-court statement is sufficiently reliable, and ER 801(d)(1)(i) actually requires more objective procedural indicia of reliability than many other states' rules. Otton therefore has not shown that Smith is harmful.

¶ 31 Relying primarily on Crawford , 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177, Otton contends that any substantive, case-by-case reliability determination is simply too subjective to be allowed. See Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 12–14. This argument confuses the requirements of the confrontation clause at issue in Crawford, U.S. Const. amend. VI, with those of the evidentiary rule defining hearsay at issue here, ER 801(d)(1)(i). They are clearly not the same:

While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, it is quite a different thing to suggest that the overlap is complete and that the Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically at common law.

California v. Green , 399 U.S. 149, 155, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970).

¶ 32 The confrontation clause is a procedural guarantee that statements will be tested in “the crucible of cross-examination.” Crawford , 541 U.S. at 61, 124 S.Ct. 1354 ; see also Green , 399 U.S. at 158, 90 S.Ct. 1930 (discussing the purposes of the confrontation reviewed as a matter of law—either the confrontation clause was violated or it was not, and the individual perspective and observations of the trial court are not at issue. State v. Mason , 160 Wash.2d 910, 922, 162 P.3d 396 (2007). Meanwhile, evidentiary rules should be applied and interpreted in a manner that promotes their substantive purpose—“that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined” in each individual case. ER 102. Evidentiary rulings are therefore appropriately reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v. Sisouvanh , 175 Wash.2d 607, 621, 290 P.3d 942 (2012) (noting the considerations that support reviewing decisions for abuse of discretion).

¶ 33 Moreover, admissibility pursuant to ER 801(d)(1)(i) is not conditioned on each individual trial court's unrestrained assessment of reliability. Washington courts must work within a specific four-factor framework. Otton does not point to any published Washington cases that have applied this framework and reached conflicting conclusions, and we can find none. Washington courts have proved themselves well up to the task of evaluating evidence sought to be admitted pursuant to ER 801(d)(1)(i) in a consistent, evenhanded manner.

¶ 34 To the extent that Otton implies that it is inherently harmful to allow prior inconsistent statements to be admitted as substantive evidence without requiring specific procedural formalities beyond those found in the plain language of ER 801(d)(1)(i), we disagree. Indeed, many states allow the admission of prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence, even where the prior statements were given with few or no procedural formalities. See Douglas E. Beloof & Joel Shapiro, Let the Truth Be Told: Proposed Hearsay Exceptions to Admit Domestic Violence Victims' Out of Court Statements as Substantive Evidence , 11 Colum. J. Gender & L. 1, 11 n.29 (2002) (collecting statutes and court rules). Otton does not show those states have suffered any harm. And the beneficial effects of the procedural formalities that are required by ER 801(d)(1)(i)'s plain language are clearly preserved by Smith and its progeny. State v. Lavaris , 106 Wash.2d 340, 343, 721 P.2d 515 (1986) (noting that a statement to police that was not given under oath and subject to the penalty of perjury is not admissible as substantive evidence pursuant to ER 801(d)(1)(i)); State v. McComas , 186 Wash.App. 307, 319, 345 P.3d 36 (2015) (same); State v. Nieto , 119 Wash.App. 157, 161-62, 79 P.3d 473 (2003) (same); State v. Sua , 115 Wash.App. 29, 48, 60 P.3d 1234 (2003) (same).

¶ 35 Otton has not made a clear showing that Smith is incorrect or harmful. We thus adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis and reaffirm Smith 's interpretation of an “other proceeding” for purposes of ER 801(d)(1)(i).

CONCLUSION

¶ 36 A party asking this court to reject its precedent faces a challenging task. The party must show not merely that it would have been reasonable to reach a different conclusion in the first instance, but that the prior decision is so incorrect and harmful that it would be unreasonable to adhere to it. Otton has not made such a showing. We affirm the Court of Appeals.

WE CONCUR:

Barbara A. Madsen, C.J.

Charles W. Johnson, J.

Susan Owens, J.

Mary E. Fairhurst, J.

Debra L. Stephens, J.

Charles K. Wiggins, J.

Steven C. Gonzales, J.

GORDON McCLOUD, J. (concurring)

¶ 37 I agree with the majority that this is a case about stare decisis. The petitioner, Nakia Lee Otton, concedes that the Court of Appeals' decision is correct under this court's holding in State v. Smith , 97 Wash.2d 856, 863, 651 P.2d 207 (1982), and he asks true doctrine of stare decisis ... requires a clear showing that an established rule is incorrect and harmful before it is abandoned.”).

¶ 38 I also agree with the majority that the phrase at issue in this case—“other proceeding” in Evidence Rule (ER) 801(d)(1)(i)—is open ended. Had the drafters intended to strictly enumerate the “proceedings” covered by the rule, they would have done so. See Rivard v. State , 168 Wash.2d 775, 783, 231 P.3d 186 (2010) (“we interpret a statute to give effect to all language, so as to render no portion meaningless or superfluous”). But I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the phrase “other proceeding” in ER 801(d)(1)(i) is so open ended that it includes police interviews or permits the kind of fact-specific, case-by-case reliability test that this court crafted in Smith.

¶ 39 Indeed, among all the jurisdictions with identical rules whose courts have addressed the issue, Washington is the only one that interprets the phrase in this way. Other courts have consistently held that the “other proceeding[s]” covered by rules equivalent to ER 801(d)(1)(i) are limited to routinized proceedings, bearing hallmarks of formality such as oversight by a neutral officer and simultaneous transcription under authority of law, and thus exclude statements taken as part of a police officer's investigation. For the reasons given in Part I below, I conclude that Washington's contrary interpretation is inconsistent with ER 801(d)(1)(i)'s plain language and is therefore incorrect. I nevertheless concur in the majority's decision to affirm the Court of Appeals because I agree that Otton has not met his burden to show that Smith is clearly harmful.

I. SMITH WAS INCORRECTLY DECIDED

¶ 40 As the majority correctly notes, ER 801(d)(1)(i)'s federal equivalent—the rule on which ER 801(d)(1)(i) was based —reflected a compromise between drafters who wanted an “unrestricted version” admitting all prior inconsistent statements and drafters who wanted a rule limiting admission to statements made “at a ‘trial, hearing, deposition, or before a grand jury.’ ” Smith , 97 Wash.2d at 859–60, 651 P.2d 207 (quoting draft rule). In light of that legislative history, and consistent with the statute's plain language, the Smith court concluded that the compromise term “other proceeding” in the rule included, but was not limited to, grand jury proceedings. Id. at 860–61, 651 P.2d 207. This conclusion is sound; it is consistent with the legislative history and the case law interpreting the federal rule or other state equivalents. See discussion infra Section I.B. To the extent the majority endorses this aspect of Smith, I concur.

¶ 41 But the Smith court went on to address a more specific question: whether the open-ended phrase “other proceeding” in ER 801(d)(1)(i) included a situation in which detectives contacted a witness to request a statement, the witness talked with detectives and then wrote out a statement at the police station, and the witness subsequently signed the statement and swore to its accuracy before a notary. 97 Wash.2d at 858, 651 P.2d 207. It held that the answer was yes because the statement came with “[m]inimal guaranties of truthfulness.” Id. at 862, 651 P.2d 207.

¶ 42 To reach that conclusion, the Smith court relied on a single Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Castro–Ayon , 537 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir.1976), interpreting the federal equivalent rule, Fed. R. Evid. (FRE) 801(d)(1)(A). But the Smith was decided, many more courts have interpreted FRE 801(d)(1)(A) and equivalent state rules. Every court to do so has rejected Washington's interpretation; consequently, we are now an extreme outlier. The interpretation adopted by other jurisdictions is clear, consistent with the rule's plain language and legislative history, and much more amenable to fair application than Smith 's ad hoc approach is. I would therefore hold that Smith was incorrect.

A. To conclude that a police interview can be an “other proceeding” within the meaning of ER 801(d)(1)(i), the Smith court relied on a misreading of Castro–Ayon and distinguished, without explanation, more apposite cases reaching the opposite conclusion

¶ 43 In Castro–Ayon, the Ninth Circuit held that a tape-recorded interrogation by border agents was admissible under FRE 801(d)(1)(A). 537 F.2d at 1058. The Smith court acknowledged, in a footnote, that some federal courts had reached a very different conclusion, and would exclude sworn statements made to investigating officers from FRE 801(d)(1)(A)'s “other proceeding” hearsay exception. 97 Wash.2d at 861 n. 1, 651 P.2d 207 (citing United States v. Livingston , 213 U.S.App.D.C. 18, 661 F.2d 239 (1981) ; United States v. Ragghianti , 560 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1977) ). But it dismissed these decisions without analysis as “not deal[ing] with facts identical to the ones before us.” Id. The Smith court then went on to hold that admissibility under ER 801(d)(1)(i) is a fact-specific, case-by-case determination, which hinges on the prior statement's “reliability” rather than on the proceeding at which that statement was given: “each case depends on its facts with reliability the key.” Id. at 863, 651 P.2d 207. It explained that a statement was admissible under ER 801(d)(1)(i) so long as it bore “ ‘minimal guarantees of truthfulness.’ ” Id. at 861–62, 651 P.2d 207 (quoting David W. Louisell & Christopher B. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 419, at 169–71 (1980)).

¶ 44 In this respect, Smith is actually inconsistent with Castro–Ayon. The Castro–Ayon court did not endorse the idea that certain statements might be reliable enough to fall within FRE 801(d)(1)(A)'s “other proceeding” exception regardless of the proceeding at which they were given. Instead, that court held that the particular proceeding at issue in that case was sufficiently similar to a grand jury proceeding to fall within the ambit of FRE 801(d)(1)(A)'s “other proceeding” exception:

[W]e note that the immigration proceeding before Agent Pearce bears many similarities to a grand-jury proceeding: both are investigatory, ex parte, inquisitive, sworn, basically prosecutorial, held before an officer other than the arresting officer, recorded, and held in circumstances of some legal formality. Indeed, this immigration proceeding provides more legal rights for the witnesses than does a grand jury: the right to remain totally silent, the right to counsel, and the right to have the interrogator inform the witness of these rights.

We do not hold, as the question is not before us, that every sworn statement given during a police-station interrogation would be admissible. While this immigration proceeding bears many similarities to the station-house interrogation, we believe that it qualifies as an “other proceeding” within the meaning of the statute.

537 F.2d at 1058 (footnote omitted). Thus, Castro–Ayon was a holding about a particular semiformal proceeding , not a particular statement . Id. It does not support Smith 's, holding that trial courts should determine “other proceeding” admissibility under ER 801(d)(1)(i) through an open-ended, case-by-case evaluation of a particular statement for “[m]inimal guarantees of truthfulness.” Smith , 97 Wash.2d at 862, 651 P.2d 207. B. Contrary to the majority's assertion, Smith is an extreme outlier; in the 30 years since Smith was decided, every other court to address the question has held that the “other proceeding[s]” covered by rules equivalent to FRE 801(d)(1)(A) do not include interviews by investigating officers

¶ 45 As noted above, Smith adopted the minority position when it was decided 34 years ago. It held that witness statements taken during a police investigation could fall within ER/FRE 801's “other proceeding” exception, even though the majority of federal courts to examine that question had reached the opposite conclusion. Smith , 97 Wash.2d at 861 n. 1, 651 P.2d 207. Back then, however, the numbers were close: Castro–Ayon provided some support for Smith 's holding—albeit tenuous and indirect support—and two other federal cases rejected Smith 's interpretation of the rule. Thus, while Smith adopted a minority position, it could not be said to be contrary to an overwhelming majority of relevant precedent.

¶ 46 That is no longer true today, when many more cases have addressed the question. With the exception of Castro–Ayon, federal cases all hold that the “other proceeding[s]” contemplated in FRE 801(d)(1)(A) are proceedings in which “ ‘an official verbatim record is routinely kept ... under legal authority,’ ” and that investigations by law enforcement do not meet this standard. And relevant cases from other states reach the same conclusion. these are unhelpful to this analysis because they are Washington cases (Smith and its progeny). But all of the remaining 13 cases either reject Castro–Ayon 's holding entirely or limit that holding to its facts:

• State v. Collins , 186 W.Va. 1, 7–8 & n. 8, 409 S.E.2d 181 (1990) (noting that Castro–Ayon is an outlier that has been criticized in scholarship on FRE 801(d)(1)(A) ).

• State v. Smith , 573 So.2d 306, 314–16 (Fla.1990) (distinguishing proceeding in Castro–Ayon (admissible as an “other proceeding” under FRE 801(d)(1)(A) ) from prosecutor's transcribed investigative interrogation (inadmissible because it did not even remotely resemble a grand jury proceeding)).

• State v. Johnson , 220 Neb. 392, 394, 398–99, 370 N.W.2d 136 (1985), (victim's statement during interview with attorney was not an “other proceeding” under state equivalent of FRE 801(d)(1)(A) ; to the extent that Castro–Ayon supported that conclusion, it was “unique—and likely to remain so”), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Morris , 251 Neb. 23, 33-34, 554 N.W.2d 627 (1996).

• Delgado–Santos v. State , 471 So. 2d 74, 78 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1985) (“the overwhelming weight of authority on the issue is that no variation of police investigatory activity constitutes an [FRE] 801(d)(1)(A) ... proceeding” (collecting cases)).

• Tisdale v. State , 498 So.2d 1280, 1282 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1986) (embracing Delgado–Santos' interpretation of rule equivalent to FRE 801(d)(1)(A) and explicitly rejecting Smith 's contrary interpretation).

• United States v. Bonnett , 877 F.2d 1450, 1462 (10th Cir.1989) (rejecting argument that witness' statement to Federal Bureau of Investigation agents was admissible under FRE 801(d)(1)(A) because Castro–Ayon was “not persuasive and ... clearly distinguishable”).

• United States v. Dietrich , 854 F.2d 1056, 1061–62 (7th Cir.1988) (reading Castro–Ayon as limited to “proceeding[s] ... [that] contain[ ] many of the same procedural protections as a grand jury proceeding” and distinguishing the proceeding at issue in Castro–Ayon from a sworn statement made to investigating police officers in an interview that was neither transcribed nor conducted in front of a neutral third party).

• United States v. Day , 789 F.2d 1217, 1222-23 (6th Cir.1986) (declining to follow Castro–Ayon “to the extent the facts are not distinguishable”).

• Bell v. City of Milwaukee , 746 F.2d 1205, 1274 n.83 (7th Cir.1984), (noting in dicta that district court probably erred by admitting witness' sworn statement to investigator under FRE 801(d)(1)(A) ; noting that Castro–Ayon might be contrary), overruled on other grounds by Russ v. Watts , 414 F.3d 783 (7th Cir.2005).

• United States v. Powell , 17 M.J. 975, 976 (A.C.M.R.1984) (rejecting Castro–Ayon to the extent that it would allow admission of “a statement made in a policeman's office during a non-advocatory, inquisitorial police investigation merely because an oath was administered”).

• United States v. Whalen , 15 M.J. 872, 878 (A.C.M.R.1983) (stating that prior inconsistent statement made to investigating officer was not given in an “other

proceeding” for purposes of hearsay exception; noting that Castro–Ayon is contrary).

• United States v. Luke , 13 M.J. 958, 960 (A.F.C.M.R.1982) (rejecting Castro–Ayon to the extent that that case is not limited to its facts, i.e., to proceedings fundamentally similar to grand jury hearings).

• Livingston , 661 F.2d at 243 (holding that Castro–Ayon proceeding was distinguishable, for purposes of FRE 801(d)(1)(A) admissibility, from interview by postal inspector that was conducted at home of government witness who gave sworn statement but was afforded no rights, and that was neither transcribed nor conducted in front of an independent officer).

Given this overwhelming and consistent authority, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that “Washington is not such an outlier” in its interpretation of the phrase “other proceeding” in ER 801(d)(1)(i). Majority at 1122.

C. Contrary to the majority's assertion, Otton proposes a workable framework for analyzing ER 801(d)(1)(i) admissibility; it is the framework adopted by the other jurisdictions and compelled by the rule's plain language

¶ 48 I also disagree with the majority's assertion that “Otton does not propose a workable analytical framework for future cases.” Majority at 1113. Otton asks us to adopt the interpretation of “other proceeding” that is used by every single other court that has considered the issue presented in Smith. See Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 11 (quoting Dietrich , 854 F.2d at 1061 ). And, as the majority expressly acknowledges, that interpretation holds that FRE 801(d)(1)(A) and state equivalent rules “ ‘ “contemplate situations in which an official verbatim record is routinely kept, whether stenographically or by electronic means, under legal authority .” ’ ” Majority at 1114 (emphasis added) (quoting Dietrich , 854 F.2d at 1061 (quoting Livingston , 661 F.2d at 240 )). In short, the rules contemplate routinized proceedings bearing hallmarks of formality such as oversight by an independent (i.e., neutral) officer and simultaneous transcription. E.g., Dietrich , 854 F.2d at 1061 ; Livingston , 661 F.2d at 243.

¶ 49 The majority acknowledges that such an interpretation is “reasonable” but asserts that “it is not clear why it is more reasonable than Smith 's interpretation.” Majority at 1114. Again, I disagree. The interpretation of “other proceeding” adopted by the other jurisdictions is compelled by the rule of ejusdem generis, which holds that “ ‘specific terms modify or restrict the application of general terms where both are used in sequence’ ” in a statute. State v. Stockton , 97 Wash.2d 528, 532, 647 P.2d 21 (1982) (quoting Dean v. McFarland , 81 Wash.2d 215, 221, 500 P.2d 1244 (1972) ). In ER 801(d)(1)(i), as in its federal equivalent, the term “other proceeding” appears after a list of more specific terms: “... given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing , or other proceeding, or in a deposition.” Applying the interpretive canon of ejusdem generis, the phrase “other proceeding” must be read to encompass only those “proceeding[s]” that are fundamentally similar to a trial or hearing. Id. This is precisely why every other court addressing the question has held that police interviews are not “other proceeding[s]” within the meaning of the rule. See Livingston , 661 F.2d at 243 (statement given to investigating officers inadmissible under FRE 801(d)(1)(A) because “the circumstances fall far short of those in a grand jury proceeding, the paradigmatic ‘other proceeding’ under the Rule”).

¶ 50 In contrast to these other courts' interpretation, the four-factor reliability test that Washington courts have derived from Smith bears absolutely no relationship to ER 801(d)(1)(i)'s plain language whatsoever. Indeed, irrelevant under ER 801(d)(1)(i). And the fourth factor—whether the witness was subject to cross-examination when giving the subsequent inconsistent statement—is unhelpful because it is always satisfied. Moreover, Smith 's ad hoc approach, in which “each case depends on its facts with reliability the key,” 97 Wash.2d at 863, 651 P.2d 207, is inconsistent with the federal rule's legislative history, which reveals a compromise decision to restrict the rule's coverage to certain types of proceedings (as opposed to certain types of statements ). See Tisdale , 498 So.2d at 1282 (“the congressional dichotomy between House and Senate and the ultimate compromise giving rise to federal rule 801(d)(1)(A) [ ] seem to dictate a ‘bright line’ construction rather than a case-by-case analysis of the circumstances surrounding the taking of the statement to determine reliability and thus admissibility”).

¶ 51 Because Smith is inconsistent with ER 801(d)(1)(i)'s plain language and the overwhelming majority of precedent interpreting equivalent rules, I would hold that it was incorrectly decided.

II. OTTON, HOWEVER, HAS NOT MET HIS BURDEN TO SHOW THAT SMITH IS CLEARLY HARMFUL

¶ 52 Although I conclude that Smith was incorrectly decided, I concur in the majority's decision because I agree that Otton has not made the requisite showing of harm sufficient to overcome the rule of stare decisis.

¶ 53 Our cases have identified various kinds of harm that can satisfy this standard. We have found precedent “harmful” because it was incorrect and inequitable. State v. Berlin , 133 Wash.2d 541, 548, 947 P.2d 700 (1997) (prior precedent harmful because it overruled well-reasoned precedent without showing that precedent was incorrect and harmful, and because it precluded lesser included offense instructions in too many cases). We have found precedent “harmful” because it created serious policy problems. State v. Barber , 170 Wash.2d 854, 865, 248 P.3d 494 (2011) (collecting cases). And precedent is certainly harmful when it infringes a constitutional protection. E.g., State v. W.R. , 181 Wash.2d 757, 769, 336 P.3d 1134 (2014) (prior precedent violated due process protections); Barber , 170 Wash.2d at 871, 248 P.3d 494 (prior precedent offended separation of powers principles). But whatever underlying harm we have recognized, we have always required a clear showing of harm and we have placed this burden on the party seeking to overturn precedent. State v. Kier , 164 Wash.2d 798, 804–05, 194 P.3d 212 (2008) (citing State v. Devin , 158 Wash.2d 157, 168, 142 P.3d 599 (2006) (citing Stranger Creek , 77 Wash.2d at 653, 466 P.2d 508 )).

¶ 54 I agree with the majority that Otton has not met that burden here. To support his argument that Smith is harmful, Otton simply asserts that ad hoc “reliability” determinations are inherently subjective and therefore unfair. Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 12–14. But as the majority points out, these determinations pose no constitutional problems in the context of ER 801(d)(1)(i), majority at 17–18, and Otton offers no evidence that Smith has yielded uneven results in Washington courts.

CONCLUSION

¶ 55 Smith 's case-by-case reliability test conflicts with the plain language of ER 801(d)(1)(i) and the overwhelming majority of relevant precedent from other jurisdictions. I therefore conclude that Smith was incorrectly decided. I concur in the decision to adhere to Smith and affirm the Court of Appeals, however, because I agree that the petitioner has not met his burden to show that Smith is clearly harmful.