PER CURIAM.
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; J. Patrick Walters, Judge.
Carol Longenecker Schmidt, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before MALONE, C.J., ATCHESON, J., and LARSON, S.J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Nathaniel J. Enns appeals his sentence following his guilty plea to one count each of attempted rape and aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Enns claims the district court's no-contact order created an illegal sentence. He also claims the district court erred in denying his motion for a downward durational departure. We agree the district court improperly imposed a no-contact order, and we vacate that part of Enns' sentence. Because Enns received a presumptive sentence, we have no jurisdiction to review the district court's denial of his departure motion.
On April 2, 2012, Enns pled guilty to one count of attempted rape and one count of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. On May 2, 2012, the district court sentenced Enns to the aggravated presumptive term of 61 months' imprisonment for attempted rape and 43 months' imprisonment for aggravated indecent liberties with a child. The district court ordered the sentences to run consecutively, resulting in a controlling prison term of 104 months. The district court denied Enns' motion for a downward durational departure. Finally, the district court ordered Enns to have no contact with the victim in the case.
On appeal, Enns first claims the district court imposed an illegal sentence when it ordered him to have no contact with the victim. The State concedes the no-contact order is an illegal sentence but maintains the appellate court need not remand for resentencing because the remainder of Enns' sentence is lawful and should remain in effect.
The Kansas Supreme Court has made it clear that a district court has no statutory authority to sentence a defendant to prison and impose a no-contact order because the latter is a probation condition. State v. Post, 279 Kan. 664, 669, 112 P.3d 116 (2005). Such action therefore constitutes an illegal sentence. The Supreme Court recently affirmed this holding in State v. Plotner, 290 Kan. 774, 782, 235 P.3d 417 (2010). Consequently, the no-contact order is vacated. The remaining portions of Enns' sentence are valid and remain in force. See Plotner, 290 Kan. at 782.
Next, Enns claims the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a downward durational departure. But the district court sentenced Enns to presumptive terms of imprisonment for his convictions. Thus, we are without jurisdiction to consider this issue. See K.S.A.2012 Supp. 21–6820(c)(l) (appellate court shall not review any sentence within the presumptive sentence for the crime). Enns' reliance on State v. Whorton, 292 Kan. 472, 474, 254 P.3d 1268 (2011), is misplaced. Wharton involved sentencing for off-grid felonies. Here, Enns' crimes were nondrug grid offenses, and his appeal is limited by the provisions of K.S.A.2012 Supp. 21–6820(c)(1).
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and dismissed in part.