CHARLES W. WELCH, III JUDGE
Mr. Francis Gwanmesia
128 Fieldbrook Drive
Magnolia, DE 19962 Ms. Susan Maynard
826 Persimmon Tree Lane
Dover, DE 19901 Decision on Appellant's Motion for Reargument of Decision on Appeal from Justice of the Peace Court Dear Mr. Gwanmesia and Ms. Maynard:
The Court is in receipt of the correspondence of appellant, Francis Gwanmesia, dated March 13, 2013, which it considers a Motion for Reargument of the Court's decision of February 28, 2013. That decision affirmed the Justice of the Peace Court's denial of the appellant's Rule 60(b) motion to vacate the default judgment entered against him for this matter. In his motion, the appellant contests the Justice of the Peace's factual findings on the record.
Under Delaware law, a motion for reargument will only be granted if "the Court has overlooked a controlling precedent or legal principles or the Court has misapprehended the law or facts such as would have changed the outcome of the underlying decision." Simonton v. Orlov, 2008 WL 2962015, at *2 (Del. Com. Pl. July 31, 2008) (quoting Kennedy v. Invacare Corp., 2006 WL 488590, at *1 (Del. Super., Jan. 31, 2006)). A party should not use a motion for reargument to rehash arguments already decided by the Court. Id. (citing State v. Trump, 2004 WL 2827958, at *1 (Del. Super., Aug. 31, 2004)).
After carefully considering the appellant's motion, the Court finds that it is little more than an attempt to rehash the issues which were already decided by the Court in its decision of February 28, 2013. The arguments set forth in the appellant's motion are the same ones presented at appeal. He attempts to dispute facts as found by the Justice of the Peace on remand that he had received a complaint and a summons directing him to file an answer to the complaint, and that he never responded. In its decision of February 28, 2013, this Court found that the Justice of the Peace Court adequately showed, through documentation and testimony, that the defendant had received such a complaint and summons and never responded. The Court can find no reason to reverse that finding now.
The Court's review of the Justice of the Peace Court's denial of the appellant's motion to vacate the default judgment against him is limited to the issue of whether the trier-of-fact abused its discretion in denying the motion to vacate the default judgment. When reviewing a Justice of the Peace Court's ruling for abuse of discretion, this Court determines whether the decision "is a product of logic, based upon the facts and reasonable deductions to be drawn therefrom." Hurd v. Smith, 2009 WL 1610516, at *2 (Del. Com. Pl., June 10, 2009). As a reviewing court, this Court may not substitute its own discretion for that of the lower court. Id. Only judgments that are manifestly unreasonable, capricious or not based on recognized rules of law or practice are considered an abuse of discretion. Id. To put it simply, this Court finds that the Justice of the Peace Court's decision to deny the appellant's motion to vacate the default judgment that was entered against him for this matter was a product of logic, based upon the facts and reasonable deductions to be drawn therefrom. The appellant's arguments contained in his motion for reargument do not change that conclusion. Therefore, the motion must be denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Sincerely,
/s/
Charles W. Welch, III CWW:mek