SCOTT FAIRGRIEVE
Law Office of Michael C. Manniello, P.C., Westbury, for Petitioner. Peter J. Dunn, Esq., Deer Park, for Respondent.
SCOTT FAIRGRIEVE, J.
The respondents move for an order dismissing the petition upon the grounds that the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction; that the petition is jurisdictionally defective; that there exists no conventional landlord/tenant relationship between the parties; and that there exists no grounds for eviction under any subdivision of RPAPL § 713 upon which to evict.
The petitioner commenced this holdover proceeding seeking a final judgment of eviction and awarding the petitioner possession of 310 North Baldwin Drive, North Massapequa, New York.
The respondents, Drew S. Krautman and Theresa A. Krautman, were the prior owners of the subject property. Although the respondents assert that the petitioner comes to Court with unclean hands having participated in the theft of the respondents' equity, the Hon. Geoffrey J. O'Connell of the Nassau County Supreme Court held in an order entered November 7, 2007 that there was proof that the Krautman's executed and delivered a deed transferring the title to IPE Asset Management LLC and executed an accompanying affidavit. The Court further found that the Krautman's did not demonstrate that they were the victims of a fraudulent scheme, nor did they demonstrate that they did not execute the deed transferring the property. Therefore, the Court denied the Krautman's application to set aside the deed. IPE deeded the property to Tri State Solutions, Inc. who in turn deeded the property to the petitioner, Zenaida Mariano, on December 15, 2006.
Respondents contend that since no conventional landlord tenant relationship exists between the parties, this Court does not have jurisdiction over this matter. Counsel discusses each subsection of RPAPL 713 and asserts that not one of the subsections is applicable in this matter. Therefore, counsel posits a summary proceeding does not lie.
In opposition, the petitioner avers that the respondents cannot challenge the petitioner's right to possession and that this action is properly before the District Court. To support her contention, the petitioner relies upon RPAPL § 713(8) which states:
A special proceeding may be maintained under this article after a ten-day notice to quit has been served upon the respondent in the manner prescribed in section 735, upon the following grounds:
(8) The owner of real property, being in possession of all or a part thereof, and having voluntarily conveyed title to the same to a purchaser for value, remains in possession without permission of the purchaser.
Counsel for the respondents alleges that subsection eight was not enacted until January 14, 2010 and cannot be applied retroactively to this action. Contrary to the assertions made by respondents, this subsection has been in effect for decades.
As previously stated, the Supreme Court found that the respondents relinquished title to the subject premises to IPE Asset Management, LLC. The petitioner purchased the property from Tri State Solutions, Inc. who obtained the deed from IPE. All assignees in the chain of title can rely upon RPAPL § 713(8). Therefore, the Court finds that it has jurisdiction over this proceeding.
Accordingly, the respondents' motion is denied. This case is set down for trial for July 28, 2010.
So Ordered: