BIRD, V. C.
(Syllabus by the Court.)
Suit by William Rice against Lydia E. Rice for divorce. From rulings of the master as to the admission of evidence, both parties appeal. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
G. D. W. Vroom, for complainant.
William M. Lanning, for defendant.
BIRD, V. C. The complainant offered in evidence before the master a letter which was written by the alleged co-respondent, and by him directed to the defendant, which, in due course of mail, was delivered to the complainant, instead of the defendant. The complainant opened the letter, and discovered that the contents indicated very great familiarity between the writer and his wife. The defendant objected to the admissibility of this letter, insisting that it was not competent, because entirely irrelevant. The master admitted the letter, and hence this appeal. Iu support of the objection to the letter the case of Berckmans v. Berckmans, 16 N. J. Eq. 122, is relied upon. I think there is a wide distinction between the two cases. In that case the alleged co-respondent made declarations of familiarity with the defendant which were offered in evidence, and all will agree that they were properly rejected. The testimony in this shows many acts of familiarity between the defendant and Knapp, the author of the letter in question, prior to the date of the letter. In my judgment, it cannot be doubted that, after improper interviews have once been clearly established, every effort upon the part of an alleged paramour to have other interviews or communications may be shown. The former interviews exhibit the debased familiarity of the parties; the latter show the inclination on the one party to continue them; and, until it is clearly established that such familiarity has been broken off, the presumption is most violent that the efforts at further interviews continue to be encouraged. This would be especially so in a case like the present, where the passionate emotions of a co-respondent are boldly spread upon paper, and addressed to the defendant at the place of residence of herself and her husband; his office being almost directly opposite her place of abode, and on the same street. I think it is universally the practice in cases where such solicitations have once been established, whether they be by signs, such as waving the handkerchief, or by any token whatever, to allow proof of like solicitations, whether they be brought immediately home to the knowledge of the defendant, and rejected by her or not, to be offered in evidence. As intimated, they show the existence of undue familiarity, for, had they never existed, or, having existed, been broken off, and utterly rejected, the fair presumption is they would not continue. It will be seen, therefore, that according to my conception of the law this letter is admissible, because relevant. This seems to be in accordance with the authorities. The cases here cited show the nature and extent of the discussion upon the question now presented: Hamerton v. Hamerton, 2 Hagg. Ecc. 8; Caton v. Caton, 7 Notes Cas. Adm. & Ecc. 15, 17; Tucker v. Tucker, 11 Jur. 893; Grant v. Grant, 2 Curt. Ecc. 16; Noel v. Noel, 24 N.J. Eq. 137; 2 Tayl. Ev. § 769; Lord Ellenborough's Case. Macq. Pr. H. L. 650; Dundas' Case, Id. 610; Bogdell Case, Id. 651. Knapp, the author of the said letter, was proceeded against in the state of Ohio by his wife in a suit for divorce on a charge of adultery with the defendant in this cause, Mrs. Rice, and a decree was obtained against him. An exemplified copy of the decree is offered in evidence in this case. It was objected to by the defendant, but admitted by the master. I think the master was in error. This defendant was not a party to the proceedings in Ohio. It seems to me to be radically wrong to attempt to dispose of this case by a decree obtained in a foreign state in a cause in which she had no opportunity to be heard.