BIRD, V. C.
(Syllabus by the Court.)
Bill by the board of health of North Brunswick township against Samuel Lederer and others to abate a nuisance. Decree for complainant.
John S. Voorhees, for complainant. George C. Ludlow, for defendants.
BIRD, V. C. The business of the defendants, which the complainant seeks to restrain, is what is commonly called "fat rendering." It is carried on in the township of North Brunswick, in the county of Somerset, and within a short distance of the line dividing the said county from the county of Middlesex. There are only three or four houses within a few hundred feet of the establishment in the county of Somerset, and two or three several hundred feet further away, while there are a great many dwelling houses, occupied as such, in the county of Middlesex, and in the city of New Brunswick, within a few hundred feet of the place where this business is carried on. It is insisted that the board of health of the township of North Brunswick has no authority to proceed against the defendants for any nuisance hazardous to public health, in case it appears that the threatened mischief is only likely to affect the inhabitants residing in the said county of Middlesex. This is put upon the ground that jurisdiction is statutory, and is limited to the township which creates the board of health. It is true that its jurisdiction is so limited. The board of health of any township can only proceed to abate a nuisance existing or carried on within its own boundaries. But to my mind it is very clear that, whenever the public health is threatened by such a nuisance, whether those who comprise the public live upon one side of an imaginary line or another, the board of health in the township where such nuisance is located has committed to it the duty of removing the nuisance, or of asking the aid of the court to that end. But in this particular case the judgment of the court is not dependent upon any such question of jurisdiction; for the half dozen or more dwelling houses within the township of North Brunswick are sufficiently within the reach of the mischief, not only to claim, but to demand, the attention of the public authorities. Whether they be many or few, no higher obligation can rest upon the court than to protect them in their health, in case it be ascertained that it is in danger.
It is also strenuously urged that the defendants have had possession of the premises complained of for at least 28 years, and for all that period of time have been carrying on the tanning of hides and rendering of fat, and are consequently entitled to the protection of the court, notwithstanding the hazard to public health may be ever so great. Courts will be very slow to yield to such a proposition. An acknowledgment of the principle claimed would practically give to the defendants and others dominion over a very much larger extent of territory than it would be actually necessary for them to own, in order to conduct their business, provided they had occupied the premises beyond the prescribed statutory period, which prohibits actions to be brought by individuals. In the case of Com. v. Upton, 6 Gray, 473, the court said: "Carrying on an offensive trade for 20 years in a place remote from buildings and public roads does not entitle the owner to continue it in the same place after houses have been built and roads laid out in the neighborhood, to the occupants of and travelers upon which it is a nuisance." People v. Detroit White-Lead Works (Mich.) 46 N. W. 735; People v. Cunningham, 1 Denio, 524; Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 668; Mills v. Hall, 9 Wend. 315; Gas Co. v. Murphy, 39 Pa. St. 257; Savile v. Kilner, 26 Law T. (N. S.) 277; Renwick v. Morris, 7 Hill, 575; Wood, Nuis. § 18; Dygert v. Schenck, 23 Wend. 446; Sloggy v. Dilworth, 38 Minn. 179, 36 N. W. 451; see Railroad Co. v. Loeb (111. Sup.) 8 N. E. 460. But, since the public is interested, I think the principle of "nullum tempus occurrit regi," announced and maintained in Cross r. Mayor, etc., 18 N. J. Eq. 305, should control the case before me. In addition to this, very high authority has said: "In such cases, prescription, whatever the length of time, has no application. Every day's continuance is a new offense, and it is no justification that the party complaining came voluntarily within its reach. Pure air, and the comfortable enjoyment of property, are as much rights belonging to it as the right of possession and occupancy." Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, supra; Wells v. Northampton Co., 151 Mass. 46, 23 N. E. 724; Sloggy v. Dilworth, supra. In note to Railroad Co. v. Loeb, see principles in harmony with this view (111. Sup.) 8 N. E. 460, 59 Am. Rep. 353, 354; Hargreaves v. Kimberly, 53 Am. Rep. 130, notes.
It was likewise very earnestly insisted that the persons affected by the odors emitting from this establishment were in feeble condition of health by nature, or of abnormal physical characteristics; in other words, possessed of some idiosyncrasy which cast them beyond the protection of all laws of a general nature, or which are enacted for the public welfare. I think that the utmost use which can be made of this argument is in reference to persons that are peculiarly sensitive to odors or sounds, and which affect them seriously, and in a radically different manner from which they do the great mass of individuals; it being quite difficult, if notat least to be in conflict. But while the facts, from a general standpoint, coincide with those who say that the locality has been equally healthy with any other, and so sustain their theory, the particular facts, which have been above given somewhat in detail, emphatically and most conclusively sustain the theory of the medical experts called by the complainant. The latter do not say that any disease of a pestilential or violently destructive character has resulted from these odors. They simply say that they are of a character so to affect or influence the human system as to prepare the way for diseases, and that they will cause nausea, headache, diarrheal troubles, and are a menace to good health; and all of the, se afflictions have visited many of the witnesses, and have been produced by these odors. In my judgment, the case presented is fully within the provisions of the statute. The board of health did their duty in filing the bill, and in asking the aid of the court. They are the guardians of the public health, and the action of the legislature would be quite superfluous, in creating boards of health, if they were obliged to wait until it should be demonstrated by actual experiment to what extent such odors were capable of affecting health, or destroying life.
After what has been said in the case of Butterfoos v. State (which had the sanction of the court of errors and appeals) 40 N. J. Eq. 325, and in the case of Board v. Neidt (N. J. Ch.) 19 Atl. 318, it will be sufficient for me to say that, in all these cases where boards of health ask the aid of this court, they do so by virtue of the statute which extends its powers so far as to inquire whether nuisances, sources of foulness, or causes of sickness, hazardous to the public health, exist or not. The interpretation given to the statute by these cases shows that the inquiry is limited to the determination of questions relative to the public health, and that there must be proof of danger, peril, or risk, or something equivalent thereto, to justify the court in lending its aid, and that when this is made manifest the statute prescribes what the court shall do. In addition to the cases cited, see, also, People v. Detroit White-Lead Works, supra; Hurlbut v. McKone (N. J. Err. & App.) 10 Atl. 164.
Until very recently, the defendants did their rendering in uncovered cauldrons; and, since the fat could only be effectually separated by the highest possible degree of heat, the escape of the noxious odors and gases was, in the highest degree, excessive. They sought to entirely overcome this by the introduction of such devices or improvements as from time to time have been suggested. The separation of the fat therefrom is accomplished by putting the crushed bones and other matter in an inclosed vat or cauldron. This greatly, if not entirely, prevents the escape of the odors or gases during the steaming process. But all this matter, while it is still at a very high temperature, is exposed to the air, in passing from such vat or cauldron to other receptacles for the more thorough separation of the fat from the solid; and, after this exposure, other mechanical contrivances, of recent discovery, are used to perfect the work of rendering, and which do, to a large extent, accomplish the object in view, and prevent the escape of the objectionable odors and gases. But it is undoubtedly true that, while the mass is passing from the first receptacle to the second, it is so exposed as to throw off an incalculable amount of odor, most offensive because of the intense heat to which it has just been necessarily subjected. The defendant called two experts as witnesses, who testified that in their judgment the defendants might introduce additional improved machinery, which would greatly reduce the escape of gas and odors. Having come to the conclusion above expressed, it certainly follows that, as long as this condition of things continues, the establishment must be considered a nuisance, a source of foulness, a cause of sickness, and hazardous to public health, and should be enjoined until it can be carried on without disclosing these objectionable features. But the testimony discloses another condition, already alluded to, resulting from the operation of this fat rendering, which is equally, if not decidedly more, hazardous to public health, which will necessarily continue to threaten the health of the community, even though the foul odors just spoken of, and which are directly engendered by the process of rendering fat, should be entirely overcome. I refer to the condition of the brook spoken of, produced by the discharge of so much solid matter, together with the refuse liquid which is carried into the brook, and which lodges along its banks, and upon the stones and rough places in the bottom, and forms large sheets wherever the water eddies, or is at rest. If the presence of such an immense mass of corruption, of decaying animal matter, which process is always instened by the heat of the sun, be not hazardous to the public health, then all our sanitary legislation and all municipal regulations to that end are simple works of supererogation. While this mass may be, from time to time, carried away with high water, yet, when drought continues, it accumulates day by day, and necessarily, for long periods of time, the exhalations therefrom are extremely offensive. Therefore, it is manifest that the use made of this brook by the defendants is as certainly subject to the condemnation of the law as the rendering establishment itself, if not more so, and that it will not satisfy the demands of the public to effectually obviate the generation of the odors at the establishment itself, but that such demands extend to the prevention of the use of the brook in question, as a conduit for the refuse matter discharged in the process of rendering. Tint I may not be misunderstood, it is proper to observethat, in coming to these conclusions, I have had regard to the rights of the public only, under the statute referred to, and have not in any sense considered the rights of individuals who may have suffered by any annoyance or inconvenience in their persons or in their homes, or in damages by the depreciation of their property, because of proximity to this alleged nuisance. The complainant is entitled to costs.