LORENCE, J.
Robert R. Kaufman for petitioner. Roland A. Crowe for respondent. LORENCE, J. The respondent on March 22, 1951, was served with a summons issued out of the Family Court Division on the complaint of the petitioner herein alleging nonsupport. On the return day the respondent appeared by attorney, specially and solely for the purpose of vacating the summons and contesting the jurisdiction of this court over the respondent. need of serving of process. All of the parties were before the court." (P. 850, italics supplied.) My learned colleague, while citing the cases supporting the doctrine of immunity from service of process, took the further view that these cases did not apply because the respondent's motion to vacate the warrant was in the nature of a request for affirmative relief and that under the circumstances it would be contrary to public policy to give the respondent the benefit of the immunity privilege. Notwithstanding my great respect for my said colleague and appreciating his desire to accomplish a just result without circuitousness, I am constrained to differ with him. I cannot subscribe to the reasoning that the mere physical presence of the respondent Caldwell in court, at the time his motion to vacate the warrant of arrest under which he was brought into court was granted, "found" the respondent within the city of New York, within the meaning and purview of the Domestic Relations Court Act and the decisions of the Court of Appeals. Justice at the price of overruling well-founded and long-established judicial precedent tends to confusion. The law is not a "wilderness of single instances" but proceeds on established principles. These principles, I think, are violated by the decision in Caldwell v. Caldwell (supra) which, incidentally was not reviewed by the Appellate Division. The respondent's motion to vacate the service of the summons is granted and this proceeding marked "Reserved Generally". This petitioner is not without remedy. She may seek relief under the provision of the Uniform Support of Dependents Law (L. 1949, ch. 807). Respondent's attorney concedes that the respondent is a resident of California and since the act adopted by the State of California is similar to ours, a petition against this respondent will lie in our court. [*] The opinion as filed sets forth the true names of all parties but as here published substitutes fictitious names and disguises certain other details, in consonance with the spirit of section 52 of the Domestic Relations Court Act of the City of New York (L. 1933, ch. 482).